

Medieval Commentaries on
Aristotle's *Categories*

VISIT...

LANZAROTE
Caliente.COM

Brill's Companions to the Christian Tradition

A series of handbooks and reference works
on the intellectual and religious life of Europe,
500–1700

VOLUME 10

Medieval Commentaries on Aristotle's *Categories*

Edited by
Lloyd A. Newton



BRILL

LEIDEN • BOSTON

2008

Cover illustration: Avicenna, *Opera*, Venice, 1508, folio 2 verso. Printed edition. Photograph by Megan Bickford. With kind permission of Ed Macierowski.

This book is printed on acid-free paper.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Medieval commentaries on Aristotle's *Categories* / edited by Lloyd A. Newton.

p. cm. — (Brill's companions to the Christian tradition, 1871–6377 ; v. 10)

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN 978-90-04-16752-0 (hardback : alk. paper) 1. Aristotle. *Categoriae*.

2. *Categories* (Philosophy).

I. Newton, Lloyd A. II. Title. III. Series.

B438.M43 2008

160—dc22

2008014809

ISSN 1871-6377

ISBN 978 90 04 16752 0

Copyright 2008 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands.

Koninklijke Brill NV incorporates the imprints Brill, Hotei Publishers,

IDC Publishers, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers and VSP.

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission from the publisher.

Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal use is granted by Koninklijke Brill NV provided that the appropriate fees are paid directly to The Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Suite 910, Danvers, MA 01923, USA.
Fees are subject to change.

PRINTED IN THE NETHERLANDS

CONTENTS

Preface	vii
The Importance of Medieval Commentaries on Aristotle's <i>Categories</i>	1
<i>Lloyd A. Newton</i>	
The Medieval Posterity of Simplicius' Commentary on the <i>Categories</i> : Thomas Aquinas and al-Fārābī	9
<i>Michael Chase</i>	
Avicenna The Commentator	31
<i>Allan Bäck</i>	
Albertus Magnus On the Subject of Aristotle's <i>Categories</i>	73
<i>Bruno Tremblay</i>	
Interconnected Literal Commentaries on the <i>Categories</i> in the Middle Ages	99
<i>Robert Andrews</i>	
Thomas Aquinas on Establishing the Identity of Aristotle's <i>Categories</i>	119
<i>Paul Symington</i>	
Reading Aristotle's <i>Categories</i> as an Introduction to Logic: Later Medieval Discussions about Its Place in the Aristotelian <i>Corpus</i>	145
<i>Giorgio Pini</i>	
Simon of Faversham on Aristotle's <i>Categories</i> and The <i>Scientia</i> <i>Praedicamentorum</i>	183
<i>Martin Pickavé</i>	
Duns Scotus's Account of a <i>Propter Quid</i> Science of the <i>Categories</i>	221
<i>Lloyd A. Newton</i>	

Fine-tuning Pini's Reading of Scotus's <i>Categories</i>	
Commentary	259
<i>Todd Bates</i>	
How Is Scotus's Logic Related to His Metaphysics?	
A Reply to Todd Bates	277
<i>Giorgio Pini</i>	
John Buridan: On Aristotle's <i>Categories</i>	295
<i>Alexander W. Hall</i>	
A Realist Interpretation of the <i>Categories</i> in the Fourteenth	
Century: The <i>Litteralis sententia super Praedicamenta Aristotelis</i>	
of Robert Alyngton	317
<i>Alessandro D. Conti</i>	
Thomas Maulevelt's Denial of Substance	347
Thomas Maulevelt: <i>Quaestiones super Praedicamenta:</i>	
<i>Quaestio 16</i>	358
<i>Robert Andrews</i>	
Categories and Universals in the Later Middle Ages	369
<i>Alessandro D. Conti</i>	
Bibliography	411
List of Contributors	429
Index	433

PREFACE

St. Augustine's account of the ease with which he understood Aristotle's *Categories* is, as he himself admits, an anomaly. Unfortunately, the rest of us, like Augustine's contemporaries, struggle to understand what was for centuries, and still is, a fundamental text. On the surface, Aristotle's *Categories* is a markedly anti-platonic text: things are equivocal, not univocal; individual substances are primary, whereas universals are secondary; and Aristotle lists ten highest genera or categories of things, not five, as Plato does.¹ From its earliest reception, though, many commentators such as Porphyry and Boethius go to great lengths to reconcile it with Platonism, with the predictable result that many other commentators—Ockham comes immediately to mind—go to equally great lengths to purge it of any remaining traces of Platonism. Such attempts often hinge on what one takes to be the subject of the book: is the *Categories* about words, concepts, or things? Or is it somehow about all three: words, concepts and things? Regardless of how one answers this question, the philosophically more important question remains: to what extent do words, concepts and things parallel or mirror one another?

Of course, these are not the only questions pertaining to Aristotle's brief text. Given its wide range of topics, from the nature of equivocity to the different kinds of motion, coupled with its terse and introductory remarks on a number of issues, Aristotle's *Categories* generated a disproportionate number of commentaries since its first appearance in antiquity. These commentaries, though, are often far from being simple, literal expositions of the text. More often than not, they are occasions to

¹ As far as possible, I have endeavored to distinguish between '*Categories*', which refers to the name of the work by that title, and the ten 'categories', which, when not italicized, refer to the subject matter of that work, namely, to the ten principal genera of being discussed by Aristotle. Unfortunately, though, the distinction is not always clear, especially since Aristotle's *Categories* is essentially about the ten categories. This confusion is particularly evident in subsequent discussions about the subject of the *Categories*, which discussions I presume to be about the subject of the book, but which are also closely related to discussions about the way in which the ten categories are the subject of a science (which discussions are not about the subject of the book but about the ten genera).

explore philosophical problems, or opportunities to attack a particular philosopher's thesis, or the chance to defend one's own thesis. Bearing in mind, then, that commentary writing was traditionally a way of doing philosophy, it is not surprising that hundreds of extant commentaries on Aristotle's *Categories* exist, and that these commentaries often contradict one another, explore different topics of concern, and are philosophically rich, as the ensuing articles amply demonstrate.

While the vast majority of the extant commentaries on *Categories* are still not translated and largely inaccessible, things are beginning to change. The "*Ancient Commentaries on Aristotle*" series, published by Cornell Press, has recently made a number of early commentaries on the *Categories* available in English. Likewise, several medieval commentaries have recently been published and others are, I hope, soon to follow. Correspondingly, there has recently been an increasing interest in medieval logic in general, and in categories in particular, with a number of conferences, articles and books devoted to the subject.

When Julian Deahl first suggested the subject of this book in 2002 to Jorge J. E. Gracia at a medieval conference, Gracia remarked that, at the time, he did not think that more than half a dozen people in the field were qualified or interested in the subject. Fortunately, Gracia recommended that I be one of the contributors should the project ever get off the ground. While doing my own research on Scotus's commentary on Aristotle's *Categories*, I realized that more scholars were interested in the subject and approached Julian with the current project. To my surprise, Julian liked the project and asked if I would be interested in editing it. Consequently, I wish to thank Jorge J. E. Gracia for introducing and recommending me to Julian, to Julian Deahl for having the confidence in me to edit this work; and to Marcella Mulder and Gera van Bedaf of Brill, without whose assistance, this book would not be possible. Most of all, though, I am grateful to my wife, Lori, and to our three children for their support.

LLOYD A. NEWTON

INTRODUCTION
THE IMPORTANCE OF MEDIEVAL COMMENTARIES
ON ARISTOTLE'S *CATEGORIES*

Lloyd A. Newton

Aristotle's *Categories* is the subject of an extensive number of commentaries and of an unusual amount of debate, and for good reasons.¹ To begin with, in spite of its relatively short length, it can be a rather difficult text to understand, even for the trained philosopher, to say nothing of those who are just beginning their study of philosophy. Yet, because it laid the foundation for many subsequent philosophical discussions in general, and for logic in particular, it was, during much of the Middle Ages, often the very first philosophical text students encountered. Even contemporary philosophers who are steeped in philosophy and who have studied the *Categories* in depth often find it difficult, albeit for different reasons. One difficulty, as the ancient commentators on the *Categories* recognized, is that Aristotle himself is ambiguous about the subject of the work. What exactly is he categorizing? Is it 'things that are' or 'things that are said' or something in between, such as a concept? Furthermore, depending on how one understands its purpose, the *Categories* can be seen in harmony with, in contrast to, or even in contradiction to, Plato's own theory of the five highest genera. For all of these reasons the *Categories* has historically acted like a magnet, attracting commentaries from Aristotelians, Platonists, and Stoics alike. Quite naturally, some of these commentaries defend Aristotelianism, whereas others defend either Platonism or Stoicism by attacking Aristotle's *Categories*. Finally, still others, especially during the Late Middle Ages, use the *Categories* as a means to expound their own philosophical systems in the process of interpreting Aristotle.

¹ According to my count of the texts listed by Charles Lohr, roughly two hundred extant Latin commentaries on the *Categories* were written during the Middle Ages. Of course, this number does not take into account the commentaries that are not extant, nor the ones written in Greek, Arabic, or Hebrew. Cf. the lists of extant commentaries cited by Charles Lohr in *Traditio*, vols. 23–29.

Though many of the ancient and medieval commentators, such as Porphyry, Boethius and Albert the Great, did write original treatises on philosophical issues, their commentaries are in themselves valuable contributions to philosophy, particularly those from the later Middle Ages.² Consequently, studies of the various commentaries, and especially those dealing with the *Categories*, are valuable projects, as the following essays amply demonstrate. As Robert Andrews points out, medieval “*Categories* commentaries are the repository of centuries of analyses of the basic concepts of Western thought, all carefully organized and awaiting modern rediscovery.”³ And while most of those commentaries are still awaiting rediscovery, the following essays, I hope, will convince everyone that the effort is worthwhile.

Originally, I planned to include essays on all three main philosophical traditions alive throughout the Middle Ages, namely, those written by Jewish, Christian and Islamic philosophers. Essays pertaining to the Jewish tradition, however, are noticeably absent due to the lack of contemporary scholarship in this area. Consequently, the preponderance of the remaining articles focuses mainly on Christian philosophers. The scope of the project has, however, stayed away from theological issues, even though discussions of the categories often have tremendous theological implications, especially concerning the doctrines of Transubstantiation and the Trinity. Consequently, the issues raised in the following essays are properly philosophical issues, not theological.

What follows is a collection of fourteen original essays,⁴ all devoted to one or more medieval commentaries on Aristotle’s *Categories*, written by a wide variety of philosophers from Europe, Canada, and the United States. I will summarize each of them briefly.

Michael Chase begins the volume by demonstrating the importance of Simplicius’ commentary for two key medieval thinkers, Aquinas and al Fārābī. Due in part to Simplicius’ influence, and particularly

² Compare Fr. Wippel’s description of St. Thomas’ commentaries: of his theological commentaries, “two are commentaries in the strict sense, i.e., on the *De Hebdomadibus* of Boethius and on the *De divinis nominibus*; the other two offer brief expositions of the texts of Boethius and of Peter and use them as occasions for much fuller and highly personal disquisitions by Thomas himself.” John F. Wippel, *The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas: From Finite Being to Uncreated Being* (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University Press, 2000), p. xviii.

³ Robert Andrews, “Question Commentaries on the *Categories* in the Thirteenth Century,” *Medioevo* 26 (2001), 265–326, p. 266.

⁴ Not counting the introductory essay or the original work by Thomas Maulevelt.

his commentary on the *Categories*, both figures adopt the Neoplatonic project of reconciling Plato and Aristotle, in spite of the apparent differences between them. Interestingly, though, while both al-Fārābī and Aquinas ultimately agree on the harmony between Plato and Aristotle, they differ in that Aquinas follows Iamblichus, who makes philosophy subordinate to theology, while al-Fārābī follows Porphyry, who views philosophy as alone sufficient for beatitude.

In the second article, Allan Bäck argues that it is Avicenna, not Averroes, who rightly deserves the title “The Commentator.” In doing so, Bäck first turns to Aristotle himself to see what the true function of a commentator is. A good commentator, according to The Philosopher, is not simply one who explicates the views of others, but one who reports and critiques “certain *endoxa*,” namely, the opinions of the experts. Bearing in mind, then, the peculiar purpose, context, and style of Avicenna’s ‘commentaries’, it turns out that Avicenna is a better commentator than Averroes. At best, Averroes is only *the* commentator for the beginning student, who seeks to find out only what Aristotle actually said.

Whether Avicenna really deserves to be called The Commentator or not, his views on logic definitely influenced Albert the Great, as Bruno Tremblay shows in the next article. As is well known, Albert was one of the first medieval philosophers in the West to produce a set of commentaries on the entire *Organon*, and his assimilation of Avicennian doctrines (especially the distinction between universals *ante rem*, *in re*, and *post rem*) played an extremely important role in Albert’s understanding of logic. Consequently, in contrast to other contemporary philosophers, who interpret Albert in such a way that the subject of logic is either words or things, Tremblay contends that the subject of the categories for Albert is first and foremost concepts, and that Albert, therefore, is responsible for shifting the study of logic away from a more linguistic approach long favored by Neoplatonic philosophers such as Boethius.

If Avicenna’s commentaries are on one end of the spectrum of commentary writing, with Albert’s commentaries somewhere in the middle, then the other end of the spectrum is the literal commentary, a genre hardly appreciated by most contemporary philosophers. Nevertheless, in sharp contrast to Bäck’s spirited defense of Avicenna as The Commentator, Robert Andrews shows the importance of those often neglected studies at the other end of the spectrum, namely, the literal commentaries. In doing so, he focuses on three particular issues (‘the

nature of truth', 'denominative predication', and 'having') as those issues are treated by four rather obscure philosophers: Peter of Saint-Amour, Gerard of Nogent, Siger of Courtrai, and Thomas of Erfurt. He also lightens things up with what was probably the only joke in all the medieval commentaries on the *Categories*.

In the next article, Giorgio Pini begins by observing that the *Categories* owes its pride of place within the *Organon* and within the larger corpus of Aristotle's writings not to Aristotle himself, but to early Neoplatonists who wanted to structure Aristotle's writings into a system comparable to that of the Stoics. Considering the *Categories* as the beginning work of logic, however, posed a number of philosophical problems, not the least of which was how to reconcile what Aristotle says in this work with conflicting statements that he makes about categories in the *Physics* and *Metaphysics*. More importantly, Pini demonstrates that as the conception of logic evolved from a consideration of arguments to a consideration of second intentions, so too changed the conception of the *Categories*. Thus, depending on the philosopher—and Pini looks at eight different philosophers: Thomas Aquinas, Giles of Rome, Radulphus Brito, Duns Scotus, Peter Olivi, William Ockham, Walter Burley and Robert Alyngton—the *Categories* can be read in any number of ways: as an introduction to syllogistic reasoning; as a treatise dealing with second intentions; as a sort of therapy preliminary to philosophy to protect the student from any lingering traces of Platonism; or as an ontological treatise establishing the existence of universals.

Although Aquinas did not write a full length commentary on the *Categories*, he did comment on the categories in his commentaries on the *Physics* and *Metaphysics*. Furthermore, given the overall importance and influence of the Angelic Doctor as well as the scant treatment of his comments on the categories by most Thomistic studies, the editor thought it worthwhile to include an article exclusively on Aquinas. More important, though, in this article Paul Symington challenges the traditional interpretation of Aquinas's treatment presented by John Wippel and others. Symington notes a number of difficulties with the typical accounts and offers his own interpretation that connects Aquinas' derivation of the ten categories to the three main modes of *per se* predication.

While the derivation of the categories is one important issue, another important topic concerns the scientific status of categories, namely,

whether a single subject, analogous to being *qua* being for metaphysics, enables the categories to be treated as a science. If so, what kind of science is it and how does this science of the categories differ from metaphysics? Consequently, in the following two articles, two authors look at the scientific status of the categories. In the first one, Martin Pickavé focuses primarily on Simon of Faversham's commentary on the *Categories* and shows how Simon defends a certain type of knowledge or science of the categories. To understand and appreciate Simon better, Pickavé contrasts Simon's approach with an anonymous commentary (the Anonymous of Madrid) and with Henry of Ghent's position on the compound nature of the categories. As a result, we get a clearer, though also more complicated, picture of the relationship between logic and metaphysics as they are conceived by Simon of Faversham and Henry of Ghent.

In the second article, Lloyd Newton traces the development of the science of the categories from its inception through Martin of Dacia, Peter of Auvergne, and Simon of Faversham to its culmination in Duns Scotus. In order fully to appreciate what a science of the categories looks like, and what problems must be overcome in positing such a science, Newton includes a short overview of the medieval conception of science and its various kinds, and demonstrates the appropriation of Avicennian doctrines by Scotus in his unique claim that the categories are the subject of a *propter quid* science.

One of the main monographs on categories to appear recently, and one which is cited approvingly by many of the authors in this volume is *Categories and Logic in Duns Scotus*, written by Giorgio Pini and published by Brill Press. Pini's book traces the development of categories and logic throughout the thirteenth century, through both major philosophers, such as Aquinas and Henry of Ghent, and lesser known figures, such as Radulphus Brito, and culminates in his masterful study on Duns Scotus's treatment of the *Categories*. In this work, Pini advances the rather controversial claim that for Scotus, the categories are not always the same as they are studied in logic and as they are studied in metaphysics; that for Scotus there is not always an isomorphism between language, concepts, and things. Taking up the traditional interpretation of Scotus, however, is Todd Bates, who provides a brief criticism of Pini's monograph and argues that for Scotus, common natures are composite entities made up of a plurality of forms. To accomplish his goal, Bates first summarizes Pini's work, then presents texts from

Scotus that seem to contradict Pini's interpretation, and finally offers his own interpretation of Scotus's texts that Pini cites in favor of his own views.

Given the importance of Pini's work in general⁵ to the study of medieval commentaries on the *Categories*, and to the generally positive reception of his monograph in particular, I thought it only fair to allow Pini to respond to Bates's criticism. Thus, in the spirit of a medieval debate, there follows Pini's reply to Bates's criticism. In short, Pini argues that Bates fails to appreciate the subtle nuances of Scotus's logic, and in particular that the science of logic, for Duns Scotus, is radically distinct from metaphysics. According to Pini, the questions that Bates raises are not the concern of the logician, but of the metaphysician. For the sake of argument, Pini grants that Scotus's metaphysics may be such as Bates describes it, but argues that Scotus's logic is indifferent to and does not imply any specific metaphysical view.

By the fourteenth century, most commentaries on the *Categories* were no longer simple, literal expositions of the text, but highly evolved question commentaries, whose aims were often far different from the more moderate aims of explication that occupied almost all preceding commentaries. Consequently, commentaries written during or after the fourteenth century are often extremely complex, philosophically rich, and exhibit an almost unbelievable amount of freedom regarding the views that are questioned. Thus, of the four remaining essays, the first explicates an extremely nominalistic interpretation of the *Categories* while the second explicates a radically realist interpretation of the *Categories*. The third essay exhibits a freedom of thought scarcely imaginable in a medieval commentary, and the final essay focuses on the (in)famous problem of universals as it relates to the ten categories.

The first essay, by Alexander Hall, discusses Buridan's nominalistic explication of the categories along semantic lines, which enables him to read the *Categories* as concerned with properties of terms rather than things in the world, thereby effectively nipping any realist interpretation in the bud. However, to interpret the *Categories* nominalistically

⁵ See the bibliography for Pini's other writings in this area.

requires a complicated array of novel semantic terms pertaining to the categories; terms which are ostensibly lacking in Aristotle's short text. Consequently, Hall's essay focuses on Buridan's interpretation of being *said of* and *in* insofar as those are relations that hold among terms, explicable via the semantic properties of supposition, signification, appellation, and connotation, thus presenting a coherent nominalist reading of Aristotle's work.

In contrast to Hall's explication of a nominalistic interpretation of the *Categories*, Alessandro Conti's essay focuses on a realist interpretation. For in response to the various nominalistic interpretations of the *Categories*, many philosophers sought a more 'realistic' interpretation of the categories. Among them, Robert Alyngton, one of the most important authors of the generation after Wyclif, must be mentioned: his commentary on the *Categories*, which relies on Burley and Wyclif, is the most mature output of this realist interpretative tradition. Alyngton was able to work out a coherently realist ontology of the categories and a new semantic theory of second intentions, which developed into the general strategy adopted by the Oxford Realists after Wyclif, insofar as he methodically substituted reference to external objective realities for reference to linguistic and/or mental activities.

The previous two essays amply demonstrate, I think, the wide variety of what might be termed 'academic freedom' available to medieval philosophers. However, lest there be any doubt about the freedom philosophers had to put forth controversial subjects and to suggest novel views, Robert Andrews' essay should help settle the issue. Specifically, Andrews focuses on Thomas Maulevelt, a rather obscure English philosopher active in Paris in the early part of the fourteenth century. Like Ockham, Maulevelt was engaged in a radical reduction in the number of the categories. One by one all of the lesser categories fall, each shown to be merely a way of speaking. Maulevelt, however, is willing to go a step farther than Ockham. According to Andrews, Maulevelt entertains a unique, radical hypothesis: we have no need to posit that substance exists! The only category needed to describe the things of the world is that of quality—a view that is not entertained again until Hume. Following Andrews' essay is question 16 of Maulevelt's commentary on Aristotle's *Categories*, in which he entertains the possibility that substances do not exist.

Finally, this book ends where most medieval commentaries on the *Categories* begin: with a discussion of that thorny issue of universals first introduced by Porphyry in his famous introduction to the *Categories*, the *Isagoge*. Although it is not meant to be an introduction proper, this last essay, by Alessandro Conti, discusses the complicated relationship between universals and categories as they were treated in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. Specifically, he outlines the problem of universals in the late Middle Ages both from a systematic and from a historical point of view, indicating the connections with the doctrine(s) of categories. To that end, he first provides a short account of the standard theories of universals worked out between the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries; he then summarises Ockham's criticism of the traditional view; and he concludes with a discussion of the main positions about universals elaborated from 1330 ca. to 1430 ca. in some detail, thereby showing their increasing relevance for the categories. Hopefully, Conti's essay, as well as the other essays in this book, will spark a new interest in medieval theories of the categories analogous to the interest once sparked by Porphyry's *Isagoge*.

THE MEDIEVAL POSTERITY OF SIMPLICIUS'
COMMENTARY ON THE *CATEGORIES*:
THOMAS AQUINAS AND AL-FĀRĀBĪ

Michael Chase

1. *Simplicius' Commentary on the Categories
in the Medieval West*

Simplicius' commentary on the *Categories*, probably written about 538 A.D.,¹ seems to have had little impact on the Latin-speaking world until March of 1266, when it was translated into Latin by William of Moerbeke (c. 1215–c. 1286), probably at Viterbo. Whatever the relations may have been between William, a Dominican who ended his life as archbishop of Corinth, and Thomas Aquinas,² the fact remains that it was thanks to William's translation that Thomas appears to have

¹ Ilsetraut Hadot, ed. *Simplicius, sa vie, son œuvre, sa survie; actes du colloque international de Paris (28 sept.–1 oct. 1985)*, (Berlin, 1987), (Peripatoi; XV), pp. 20–21. Simplicius was the author of one of a number of Neoplatonic Greek commentaries on the *Categories* that have come down to us. We have others by Porphyry, Dexippus, Ammonius, Philoponus, Elias, and Olympiodorus. The Latin commentary by Boethius is largely based on Porphyry. On the interrelations between all these commentaries, cf. Ilsetraut Hadot, *Simplicius, Commentaire sur les Catégories: traduction commentée*, I: Introduction. Première partie: (pp. 1–9, 3 Kalbfleisch), sous la dir. de Ilsetraut Hadot; trad. par Philippe Hoffmann; avec la collab. de Ilsetraut Hadot & Pierre Hadot; commentaires et notes à la trad. par Ilsetraut Hadot; avec des appendices de Pierre Hadot & Jean-Pierre Mahé (Leiden, 1990), (*Philosophia antiqua*; 50); Ilsetraut Hadot, *Simplicius, Commentaire sur les Catégories: traduction commentée*, III: Préambule aux Catégories. Commentaire au premier chapitre des Catégories: (pp. 21–40 Kalbfleisch), sous la dir. de Ilsetraut Hadot; trad. de Philippe Hoffmann; avec la collab. de Ilsetraut Hadot, Pierre Hadot & Concetta Luna; commentaires & notes à la trad. par Concetta Luna. (Leiden, 1990), (*Philosophia antiqua*; 51); Concetta Luna, *Simplicius, Commentaire sur les «Catégories» d'Aristote*, Chapitres 2 à 4; trad. par Philippe Hoffmann; avec la collab. de Ilsetraut Hadot et Pierre Hadot; commentaires par Concetta Luna (Anagôgê; 1).

² The standard view, based largely on the testimony of Peter of Prussia's *Legenda Alberti Magni*, has it that William carried out his translations at the request of his "friend" Thomas. Yet several recent scholars have debunked this account as legendary: cf. Jean-Pierre Torrell, *Initiation à Saint Thomas d'Aquin: Sa personne et son œuvre* (Paris, 2002), pp. 255–58, followed for instance by Mark D. Jordan, *Rewritten Theology—Aquinas After His Readers* (Oxford, 2006).

been the first Latin author to refer to Simplicius' commentary.³ Prior to William's translation, the work appears to have escaped the omnivorous appetite for learning of Thomas' master Albert the Great, although this judgment may have to be revised as a result of the critical edition of Albert's logical works currently in course of publication at Cologne.

William's translation, in contrast, was to have a fairly wide circulation. It is transmitted in twelve manuscripts,⁴ several of which date from the 13th–14th centuries, as well as in five printed editions from the 16th century.⁵ Several of these editions also contain a second translation of Simplicius' commentary by Guilelmus Dorotheus. In the prefatory letter to his translation, Guilelmus fustigates Moerbeke's translation as the work of one who was "insufficiently skilled in both Greek and Latin;" this, however, did not stop Dorotheus from copying Moerbeke's new translations of the lemmas from Aristotle's *Categories*, which he passed off as his own.

Pace Dorotheus, Moerbeke's translation was a magnificent achievement. He made no pretence of producing a literary work, but translated word-for-word, so faithfully that even today, his version is of great assistance in the critical establishment and translation of the Greek text of Simplicius' commentary. Despite the fact that he appears to have worked from a corrupt manuscript,⁶ and that Latin still lacked much of the philosophical vocabulary necessary for rendering such a complex and technical work, William succeeded in producing a work that had

³ A. Pattin, "Pour l'histoire du 'Commentaire sur les *Catégories* d'Aristote' de Simplicius au moyen âge," in *Arts libéraux et philosophie au Moyen Âge: IV^e Congrès international de philosophie médiévale, Montréal 1967* (Paris, 1969), pp. 1073–1078, at p. 1073. Aquinas' citations of Simplicius' commentary on the *Categories* include *In duodecim libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis Expositio*, lib. 3, lect. 11 eds. Cathala and Spiazzi; cf. *In Octo Libros Physicorum Aristotelis Expositio*, lib. 1, lect. 15, section 138 ed. Marietti; *De malo*, q. 1, a. 1, ad 2, ad 7, ad 11; *De unitate intellectus*, cap. 3, p. 48 n. 76 ed. Keeler. Simplicius' *In Cat.* is also one of the primary sources of Thomas' treatise *De virtutibus*.

⁴ Laurentius Minio-Paluello, ed. *Aristoteles Latinus. I:1–5: Categoriae vel Praedicamenta* (Bruges, 1961), pp. lxxii–lxxiii; A. Pattin, "Pour l'histoire du 'Commentaire,'" I, xxiii–xxxix.

⁵ Minio-Paluello, *Aristoteles Latinus*, lxxiii noted four editions published by Hieronymus Scotus at Venice in 1540/41, 1543, 1550, and 1567/68. To these must be added the edition published by Paul of Genezano (Venice 1516), who appears to have revised Moerbeke's translation after the Greek version of Simplicius' commentary published at Venice in 1499. See A. Pattin, "Pour l'histoire du 'Commentaire,'" p. 1078.

⁶ According to Moerbeke's own testimony, as preserved in the ms. Toledo, Bibl. Capit. 47.11, fol. 179r, cited by A. Pattin, "Pour l'histoire du 'Commentaire,'" p. 1077: *Sciat enim, qui hoc opus inspexerit, exemplar graecum valde fuisse corruptum et in multis locis sensum nullum ex littera potui extrahere.*

a huge influence on subsequent Western philosophy, not least because of the large number of citations it transmitted from ancient authors, ranging from the Presocratics to Simplicius' immediate Peripatetic and Neoplatonic predecessors.⁷

In addition to Thomas Aquinas,⁸ Moerbeke's translation of Simplicius commentary on the *Categories* was used in the 13th century by Siger of Brabant, Henry of Ghent, Giles of Rome, and Godefroid de Fontaine (part of whose manuscript is now the ms. latin 16080 of the Paris Bibliothèque Nationale). Duns Scotus refers to it frequently as an authoritative work, and it is cited by Jean Quidort, Peter of Auvergne, Jacques de Thérines, Durand de St. Pourçain, Thomas of Strasbourg, Thomas Sutton, and James of Viterbo. The work continued to be cited throughout the 14th century, by such authors as Siger of Courtrai and the anonymous author of the ms. Erfurt, Amplon. F. 135.

2. *Simplicius' Commentary on the Categories* *in the Arabic tradition*

The name of Simplicius is mentioned rather infrequently in the Arabic tradition, although he may well have been used rather more often than he is actually cited.⁹ When he is mentioned, he is known as a commentator on the first book of Euclid—information completely lacking in Greek and Latin literature—and on Hippocrates, as well as on Aristotle's *De Anima*.¹⁰

⁷ On the importance of Simplicius *In Cat.* as a source for the history of ancient philosophy, see Wayne Hankey, "Thomas' Neoplatonic Histories: His following of Simplicius," *Dionysius* 20 (2002), 153–178; Michael Chase, *Simplicius, On Aristotle, Categories 1–4*; trans. with an introduction by Michael Chase (London, 2003), (The ancient commentators on Aristotle), pp. 1 ff.

⁸ For what follows, cf. A. Pattin, "Pour l'histoire du 'Commentaire,'" pp. 1073–1078; A. Pattin, ed. *Simplicius, Commentaire sur les Catégories d'Aristote, Traduction de Guillaume de Moerbeke*, 2 vols. (Louvain, 1971–1975), (Corpus Latinorum commentariorum in Aristotelem Graecorum 1–2). vol. I, pp. xviii–xxiii.

⁹ Helmut Gätje, "Simplikios in der arabischen Überlieferung," *Der Islam* 59 (1982), 6–31, p. 14, who points out that while Averroes never mentions the name of Simplicius, there are numerous parallels in the Cordoban's works with passages from Simplicius' commentaries on the *Physics* and the *De Caelo*. On the translations of Greek commentaries into Arabic, see Cristina D'Ancona, "Greek into Arabic: Neoplatonism in translation," in P. Adamson & R. C. Taylor, eds. *The Cambridge Companion to Arabic philosophy* (Cambridge, 2005), pp. 10–31.

¹⁰ He is also mentioned, as are a plethora of other Greek philosophers, as the author of alchemical and occult works; cf. H. Gätje, "Simplikios," 19.

That Simplicius' commentary on the *Categories* was known in the Arabic world is not open to doubt.¹¹ Not only is such a work mentioned in the bibliographical surveys of al-Nadīm¹² and al-Qiftī,¹³ but over and above these mentions, extracts from it are found in the Arabic manuscript Paris, BN ar. 2346 of the *Categories* and other works from the *Organon*, together with marginal glosses, prepared by al-Ḥasan ibn Suwār (ob. 1017),¹⁴ a student of Abū Zakarīyā' Yaḥyā ibn 'Adī (ob. 984), the learned Christian student of al-Fārābī. Further Simplician material may well be present in the still unpublished commentary on the *Categories* by ibn Suwār's student 'Abdallāh ibn al-Ṭayyib (ob. 1043), and in the fragmentary commentary by Abū-l-Ḥasan al-'Amirī (ob. 991).¹⁵

The great Arabo-Islamic philosopher Abū Naṣr Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad ibn Ṭarkhān ibn Awzalugh al-Fārābī (ob. 950) never mentions the name of Simplicius. However, as we have seen that Averroes uses the physical commentaries of Simplicius without feeling obliged to cite his source, so Philippe Vallat has recently argued persuasively that Simplicius' commentary on the *Categories* is an important, albeit unacknowledged, source for the man who, largely because of his vast output of works on the Stagirite's logic, was known in Islamic philosophy as the "second master" (*al-mu'allim al-thānī*), after Aristotle.¹⁶

3. *Simplicius' Commentary on the Categories in the Works of Thomas Aquinas*

The history of the influence of Simplicius' commentary on the *Categories* on Medieval thought as a whole remains to be written. Thanks to such

¹¹ F. E. Peters, *Aristoteles Arabus* (Leiden, 1968), p. 7.

¹² *Fihrist*, trans. B. Dodge, 1970, II, p. 598. Elsewhere (ibid., p. 640), however, al-Nadīm writes that Simplicius was the author of an "Exposition on the fourth book of Aristotle's *Categories*" (*Kitāb sharḥ Qāṭighūriyās li-Aristātīs al-maqāla al-rābi'a*). For speculation on what this may mean, cf. H. Gäte, "Simplikios," pp. 22 ff.

¹³ Ibn al-Qiftī, *Ta'rīkh al-ḥukamā'* (written c. 1240), ed. J. Lippert (Leipzig, 1903).

¹⁴ H. Gäte, "Simplikios," pp. 20–21. On this manuscript, which reveals the critical work carried out on the *Organon* by Arabic scholars from the beginning of the tenth century, cf. Henri Hugonnard-Roche, "Remarques sur la tradition arabe de l'*Organon* d'après le manuscrit Paris, Bibliothèque nationale, ar. 2346," in C. Burnett, ed. *Glosses and commentaries on Aristotle's logical texts* (London, 1993), pp. 19–28.

¹⁵ Gäte, "Simplikios."

¹⁶ For a useful orientation to Fārābī's logical works, see Deborah L. Black, "al-Fārābī," in S. H. Nasr & O. Leaman, eds. *History of Islamic philosophy* (London, 1996), pp. 178–97, pp. 179–84 with the literature cited at p. 193 n. 5.

scholars as Wayne Hankey,¹⁷ however, a fair amount of solid recent work has been done on the reception of this work by Thomas Aquinas, and I shall concentrate on this aspect of the matter in what follows.

According to Hankey, the main influence of Simplicius' commentary on the *Categories* on Thomas Aquinas concerned his conception of the history of philosophy in general, and more specifically the relations between Aristotle and Plato. Like all later Neoplatonists, Simplicius, following a doctrinal trend already sketched by Antiochus of Ascalon and fully expounded by Porphyry, believed that the doctrines of Plato and Aristotle were ultimately reconcilable. When in his introduction, Simplicius, following the standard Neoplatonic scheme of points to be discussed (*kephalaia*)¹⁸ at the beginning of a commentary on Aristotle, discusses the qualities necessary for the good exegete of Aristotle's text,¹⁹ he stresses that such a master exegete must be thoroughly familiar with the Stagirite's writings and stylistic habits, and be objective, not always striving to prove that Aristotle is right, "as if he had enrolled himself in the Philosopher's school." When it comes to apparent disagreements between Plato and Aristotle, however, the good exegete

must [...] not convict the philosophers of discordance by looking only at the letter (*lexis*) of what [Aristotle] says against Plato; but he must look towards the spirit (*nous*), and track down (*anikhneuein*) the harmony which reigns between them on the majority of points.²⁰

Thus, surface disagreements between the two great philosophers are just that: superficial, and the skilled commentator must not let himself be fooled by such apparent contradictions between the *letter* of their works, but track down the fundamental agreement hidden in the *spirit* of such texts.

¹⁷ Wayne Hankey, "Thomas' Neoplatonic Histories: His Following of Simplicius," *Dionysius* 20 (2002), 153–178; Wayne Hankey, "Aquinas and the Platonists," in *The Platonic Tradition in the Middle Ages: A Doxographic Approach*, eds. Stephen Gersh and Maarten J. F. M. Hoenen, with the assistance of Pieter Th. van Wingerden (Berlin, 2002), pp. 279–324.

¹⁸ For the importance of these *kephalaia* in Fārābī, cf. Philippe Vallat, *Fārābī et l'École d'Alexandrie. Des prémisses de la connaissance à la philosophie politique* (Paris, 2004), p. 61, citing in particular the *Book of words used in logic* (*Kitāb al-alfāz al-musta'mal fi'l manṭiq*), §51, ed. Maḥdi, where the order of enumeration corresponds to that in Simplicius, *In Cat.* In particular, Fārābī's fourth point corresponds to the fourth point in Simplicius, *In Cat.*, p. 8, 10–15 Kalb., who is the only Neoplatonic commentator to include it.

¹⁹ This is Simplicius's eighth *kephalaion*, cf. Michael Chase, *Simplicius*, p. 103 n. 96. All translations from Simplicius, *In Cat.* are taken from this work.

²⁰ Simplicius, *In Cat.*, p. 7, 29–32 Kalbfleisch.

The basis of Simplicius' attitude is the idea, again established by Porphyry, that the philosophies of Aristotle and Plato, far from being opposed, are in fact complementary. If they seem to disagree, this is because, generally speaking, they are not talking about the same thing. Aristotle writes from the viewpoint of the beginning student of philosophy, whose mentality is determined by the sensible world around him. His works therefore provide a virtually infallible guide for all subjects concerned with the sensible world: logic, physics, meteorology, natural history, and even, to a certain extent, psychology, which has at least partly to do with the sensible world.

When studied in the proper reading order (*taxis*), starting with the *Categories* and proceeding through the *De interpretatione*, *Prior* and *Posterior Analytics*, *Topics*, and *Sophistical Refutations*, the Aristotelian *Organon* eventually provides the student with the tools of demonstration (*apodeixis*), or reliable scientific reasoning. Armed with this indispensable prerequisite, he can then proceed to the study of ethics, physics, and even metaphysics.²¹

Yet this entire course of study, which a gifted student like Proclus took two years to complete, was considered a mere introduction to the study of the Platonic dialogues, which, when read in an order inaugurated by Iamblichus,²² provided an understanding of the whole of reality, including the intelligible world. Far from being mutually contradictory, then, the works of Aristotle and Plato are indispensable complements to one another. Apparent divergences are to be explained by the fact that Aristotle was tailoring his instruction to what we may anachronistically call an undergraduate audience, while Plato intended his work for graduate students.

This pedagogical approach was especially convenient for explaining the *Categories*, the work in which Aristotle is *prima facie* at his least Platonic. Indeed, what could be more opposed to Plato than to maintain, as the Stagirite does in *Categories* 5, that substance in the primary sense designates individual sensible things like human beings and horses, while such intelligible entities as genera and species are merely secondary? Surely this places Aristotle at the antipodes from his eminent teacher?

²¹ On the importance of the *taxis* of the Aristotelian works in Fārābī, who links it in an interesting and apparently original way to the parable of the cave in the *Republic*, cf. Ph. Vallat, *Fārābī*, pp. 134–35; 189–90.

²² Dominic O'Meara, *Pythagoras revived. Mathematics and philosophy in Late Antiquity* (Oxford, 1989), pp. 97–99.

By no means. As we have seen, Simplicius and the other Neoplatonists argued that Aristotle intended the *Categories* to be the first philosophical work tackled by students, and so he tailored it to an audience of beginners. When, therefore, he claims individual substances are primary, he really means primary for *philosophical beginners*, who, living on the level of sense perception, are ignorant of the existence of intelligible entities.

An alternative explanation of the *Categories*' restriction of substance to the sensible world was developed by Porphyry in his minor commentary on the *Categories* by questions and answers,²³ which was influential on Simplicius' own Commentary. The *skopos* or goal of the *Categories* is simple words.²⁴ When, at the dawn of mythical history, the Sage or council of Sages first got together to impose names on things,²⁵ they began by naming individual sensible objects: chair, man, dog, sun, etc. Thus, then, is another sense in which sensible substances are 'primary': not only are they primary from the viewpoint of beginning philosophy students, but they were the primary objects of the first imposition of names. But the *Categories* is precisely devoted to the study of the simple words that were the objects of this first imposition, as opposed to the *De interpretatione*, which studies the results of the second imposition, in which the Sages returned to the results of the first imposition and, in a metalinguistic approach, divided the words they had used into nouns and verbs.

Such ideas seem to have struck a chord in Thomas Aquinas. In his *Quaestio disputata de spiritualibus creaturis*, written in 1267–1268, he explains the differences between Plato and Aristotle as follows:

The diversity of these two opinions comes from the fact that when inquiring into the nature of things, some proceeded from intelligible reasons, and this was peculiar to the Platonists, and others from sensible things, and this was peculiar to the philosophy of Aristotle, as Simplicius says in his commentary on the *Categories*.²⁶

²³ Porphyry, *In Cat.*, p. 91, 19–27.

²⁴ Later, the standard Neoplatonic definition of the *skopos* of the categories is given as being "[...] about simple, primary words which signify the primary and most generic of beings by means of simple, primary notions" (Simpl., *In Cat.*, p. 13, 19–20 Kalbfleisch). On the *skopos* (Arabic *gharad*) of Aristotle's works according to Fārābī, for whom it constitutes "the privileged criterion for judging the correctness of interpretations of Plato and Aristotle" Cf. Ph. Vallat, Fārābī, pp. 172–75; 176–80; 242 ff. For Fārābī, the *skopos* of the *Categories* are the simple notions or primary principles that are innate within all human beings; cf. Vallat, p. 210.

²⁵ On the institution of language in Fārābī, cf. Ph. Vallat, Fārābī, pp. 255–66.

²⁶ Aquinas, *Quaestio disputata de spiritualibus creaturis*, ed. Cos (Rome, 2000) (Commissio Leonina: vol. 24/2), art. 3, p. 40, lines 275–82: Harum autem duarum opinionum

Although here he leaves out Simplicius' pedagogical explanation, Thomas agrees with the commentator that Plato's approach is basically deductive and rationalist, while Aristotle's is fundamentally inductive and empiricist. Thomas may also have been thinking of another passage from Simplicius' *Commentary in Cat*, where, once again following the typical Neoplatonic scheme of points to be discussed (*kephalaia*) in a commentary,²⁷ he discusses the difference in style between Plato and Aristotle:

[Aristotle] always refuses to deviate from nature; on the contrary, he considers even things that are above nature according to their relation to nature, just as, by contrast, the divine Plato, according to Pythagorean usage, examines even natural things insofar as they participate in the things above nature.²⁸

Likewise, according to Thomas, while Aristotle is a literalist, Plato "transmits divine things poetically and in fables."²⁹ He "says everything figuratively and teaches through symbols, intending something other through his words than what they themselves say."³⁰ This provides another explanation of the apparent disagreement between Aristotle and Plato: when the former criticizes the latter, he is arguing only against the literal meaning of Plato's words, not, of course, because the Stagirite himself failed to grasp the true meaning of Plato's words, but because—and here the pedagogical approach surfaces in Thomas as well—he was anxious lest students be led astray by the false surface meaning of these words.

In the context of the seventh *kephalaion* of his commentary on the *Categories*, Simplicius explains that while all ancient philosophers took care not to divulge their doctrines to the unworthy and the unprepared, they used different methods to achieve this goal. Plato preferred the use of myths and symbols, while Aristotle cultivated deliberate obscurity, "perhaps because he rejected the indeterminate hidden meaning

diuersitas ex hoc procedit quod quidam ad inquirendam ueritatem de natura rerum processerunt ex rationibus intelligibilibus: et hoc fuit proprium Platoniorum, quidam uero ex rebus sensibilibus: et hoc fuit proprium philosophiae Aristotilis, ut dicit Simplicius in Commento super Praedicamenta.

²⁷ The seventh *kephalaion*, cf. M. Chase, *Simplicius*, p. 103 n. 91.

²⁸ Simplicius, *In Cat.*, p. 6, 27–30 Kalbfleisch.

²⁹ *res diuinas poetice et fabulariter tradiderunt*, Aquinas, *In De Caelo*, lib. 1, lect. 22, sect. 227, p. 108.

³⁰ Aquinas, *Sententia libri De Anima* (Leonina 1984), vol. 45, pars 1, cap. 8, p. 38, lines 3–9.

(*huponoia*) of myths and symbols—such things can, after all, easily be understood differently by each interpreter.”³¹

Similarly, according to Thomas, Aristotle was not against Plato's understanding, “which was sound, but against his words.”³² This correct approach on the part of most commentators, Thomas notes, is in contrast to that of Alexander of Aphrodisias, who takes Aristotle to be arguing not against Plato's surface meaning; but against his intellectual intention. Again, Thomas' main source of information on the views of Alexander is Simplicius' commentary on the *Categories*.³³ Yet Alexander's view is inadequate. As we have seen, it is not enough to remain at a superficial level, where Aristotle attacks the surface meaning of Plato's words: instead, the interpreter must delve beneath the letter of Plato's text in search of its hidden spirit. When this is done successfully, it will be found that most or all of the apparent disagreements between Plato and Aristotle vanish into thin air.

4. *Simplicius in al-Fārābī*

This concordist attitude is shared by al-Fārābī,³⁴ who believed “that the aim of these two philosophers is one and the same and that they intended to offer one and the same philosophy.”³⁵ Like Simplicius, Fārābī also likes to explain apparent instances of discord between Plato and Aristotle by the fact that they are not talking about the same thing, and/or that their intentions in writing the passage in question were not comparable. This is particularly true in the case of substance: the judgment of the two philosophers does not pertain to the same viewpoint (*min jiya wāḥida*), or to the same goal (*maqṣūd wāḥid*).³⁶ As Philippe Vallat has shown,³⁷ Fārābī uses the same or similar principles to explain the

³¹ Simplicius, *In Cat.*, p. 7, 5–8 Kalbfleisch.

³² Aquinas, *In de caelo*, 1.22, sect. 228.

³³ Wayne Hankey, “Aquinas and the Platonists,” p. 293.

³⁴ Who probably derived it at least in part from Porphyry's lost work *On the unity of the philosophical schools of Plato and Aristotle*; cf. Richard Walzer, “Porphyry and the Arabic tradition,” in Porphyre (Vandoeuvres, 1966), (Entretiens sur l'Antiquité classique 12), pp. 275–99, 285 ff.

³⁵ Fārābī, *Kūāb taḥṣīl al-sa'āda*, cited by R. Walzer, “Porphyry and the Arabic tradition,” pp. 275–99, 287.

³⁶ al-Fārābī, *Book of the concordance in view of the two sages, the divine Plato and Aristotle*, eds. & French transl. F. W. Najjar & D. Mallet (Damascus, 1999), §20, p. 81, cited by Ph. Vallat, *Fārābī*, p. 173.

³⁷ Ph. Vallat, *Fārābī*, p. 173.

surface disparities between Plato and Aristotle on the subject of the validity of mixed syllogisms;³⁸ on vision;³⁹ moral dispositions;⁴⁰ reminiscence;⁴¹ and the eternity of the world.⁴²

Perhaps the most striking point of convergence between Simplicius and Fārābī concerns the mechanism of teaching itself. In his commentary on the *Categories*, Simplicius explains the metaphysical presuppositions of Neoplatonic pedagogy as follows.⁴³ When the soul is in the intelligible, it possesses knowledge of all things immediately, for there is not yet any distinction between subject and object: language is thus unnecessary. When the soul sinks into generation, however—that is, when it becomes incarnate in a human body—it loses this direct knowledge and can only project notions that approximate the noetic realities it used to intuit directly. Although the soul still possesses “sparks” or “embers” of its original, innate knowledge, these have been smothered and cooled down as the soul has become filled with forgetfulness. The only remedy for this situation is philosophical instruction:

When, however, the soul has fallen into the realm of becoming, it is filled with forgetfulness, and requires sight and hearing in order to be able to recollect. For the soul needs someone who has already beheld the truth, who, by means of language (*phônē*) uttered forth from the concept (*ennoia*), also moves the concept within [the soul of the student], which had until then grown cold [...] For intellections (*noēseis*) which proceed forth from other intellections [*sc.* those of the teacher] also set things in motion immediately, and they join the learner’s notions to those of the teacher, by becoming intermediaries (*mesotêtes*) between the two. When intellections are set in motion in an appropriate way, they adjust themselves to realities, and thus there comes about the knowledge of beings, and the soul’s spontaneous *eros* <*sc.* for knowledge> is fulfilled.⁴⁴

The person who has already beheld the truth is the philosophy teacher, who, by carefully chosen discourse, is able to rekindle the sparks that lie hidden in the student’s “common notions” or innate ideas, thereby

³⁸ al-Fārābī, *Concordance*, §31–33.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, §35–40.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, §42–44.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, §52.

⁴² *Ibid.*, §53–57.

⁴³ Simpl., *In Cat.*, p. 12, 13–13, 11 Kalbfleisch. On this passage, see the magnificent paper by Philippe Hoffmann, “Catégories et langage selon Simplicius. La question du *skopos* du traité aristotélicien des *Catégories*,” in Ilsetraut Hadot, ed. *Simplicius*, pp. 61–90.

⁴⁴ Simpl., *In Cat.*, p. 12, 26–13, 4 Kalbfleisch.

making him aware of the knowledge he possessed, unbeknownst to himself, all along. This is, of course, an adaptation of Socratic/Platonic maieutics, based on the doctrine of recollection or reminiscence (Greek *anamnēsis*).

In works such as the *Political regime* (*Kitāb al-siyāsa al-madaniyya, al-mulaqqab bi-mabādi'i al-mawjūdāt*, ed. Najjar); the *Political specilegium* (*Fuṣūl muntaza'a*, ed. Najjar); the *Book of the accession to happiness* (*Kitāb taḥṣīl al-sa'āda*, ed. al-Yasin) and the *Book of recollection of the way leading to happiness* (*Kitāb al-tanbīh 'alā sabīl-sa'āda*, ed. al-Yasin), Fārābī sets forth a doctrine that is strongly reminiscent of this theory, of which Simplicius is the only commentator on the *Categories* to provide a detailed account. For the Second Master, all human beings are provided by nature with certain innate (*jarīziyya*) intelligible principles (*awā'il*),⁴⁵ instilled in us by the Agent Intellect, but which we have forgotten, and it is the task of the philosophy teacher to remind us of them by means of lessons or philosophical dialogues in which the words are carefully chosen to fit or be suitable to (*ḥaṣara 'alā*) these innate intelligibles.⁴⁶ Once they are appropriately developed under the teacher's guidance—that is, classified and articulated—these principles can be used as logical premises, and thus serve as the starting-point for demonstration.⁴⁷ In the words of Philippe Vallat,

Nothing, then, seems to be lacking from Fārābī's exposition for us to be able to pronounce him faithful to the thought of Simplicius, especially in that there is no doubt that it is at the summit of this ascent that he too placed the instant in which man intelligizes the Agent Intellect, achieves felicity, and becomes divine.⁴⁸

If Vallat is correct, not only does Fārābī's adaptation of this Simplician doctrine confirm the influence of the latter's commentary on the *Categories* on the Islamic thinker, but it enables us to deduce details of the functioning of this doctrine that are lacking from Simplicius' preserved work.

⁴⁵ These are the equivalent of the Greek *koinai ennoiai*, which play a vital role in Neoplatonic thought, especially that of Porphyry; cf. Michael Chase, *Études sur le commentaire de Porphyre sur les «Catégories» d'Aristote adressé à Gédalios*. Diss. École pratique des Hautes Études, 5th section, Paris 2000.

⁴⁶ These words fit with the primary innate intelligibles, and are therefore able to reactivate them, because they are analogous to them (*mutanāsiba*) in a strictly defined technical sense; cf. Ph. Vallat 2004, 208, and especially his "Appendice: l'Analogie de l'être," pp. 347–65.

⁴⁷ Cf. Ph. Vallat, *Fārābī*, pp. 160–61.

⁴⁸ Vallat, *ibid.*, p. 214.

5. *Thomas, Simplicius and Iamblichus:*
The interpretation of Wayne Hankey

In view of what we have seen, we can agree with Wayne Hankey when he summarizes the influence on Thomas Aquinas of Simplicius' commentary on the *Categories*. Simplicius' work, he writes, is important:⁴⁹

1. for ideas and distinctions used in Thomas's philosophical constructions,
2. for knowledge of the content of the history of ancient philosophy, and
3. of the Peripatetic and Platonic hermeneutical traditions,
4. for theories about the history of philosophy used by Aquinas [...]
5. but also for that which conveys all these, namely, the commentaries on Aristotle's works.

Hankey is also correct, as we have seen, to point out the crucial importance for Thomas, as for Simplicius, of the notion of the ultimate reconcilability of the philosophies of Plato and Aristotle. Quite apart from specific points of doctrine, Thomas absorbed from Simplicius in general and from his commentary on the *Categories* in particular a conception of what philosophy is.

Here, however, I must express some reserves with regard to another aspect of Hankey's important work. In line with ideas he has expressed elsewhere, Hankey is anxious to emphasize the continuity between Iamblichus and Thomas Aquinas.⁵⁰ Iamblichus, who played a key role in the establishment of the Neoplatonic school curriculum, was also of fundamental importance for Simplicius' commentary on the *Categories*. This is not open to doubt; what seems more questionable, however, is the specific respects in which Hankey claims Iamblichus transformed the Platonism that Thomas eventually absorbed through Simplicius and his fellow-commentators. Iamblichus, claims Hankey, turned Neoplatonism⁵¹

⁴⁹ Wayne Hankey, "Thomas' Neoplatonic Histories," p. 156.

⁵⁰ Cf. especially Wayne Hankey, "Philosophy as a Way of Life for Christians? Iamblichus and Porphyrian Reflections on Religion, Virtue, and Philosophy in Thomas Aquinas," *Laval théologique et philosophique* (2003), 193–224, where the author attempts to refute Pierre Hadot's views on Christianity's role in the decline of philosophy as a way of life by showing that philosophy continues to be a way of life for Thomas, who continues the tradition of Iamblichus. I disagree with this view, but this is not the place to enter into the controversy in detail.

⁵¹ Wayne Hankey, "Thomas' Neoplatonic Histories," p. 158.

- (i) toward a positive relation to the sensible and the material,
- (ii) toward Aristotle, and
- (iii) toward theurgic (or sacramental) religion.

Points (i) and (iii) fall outside the framework of this study, although I will say with regard to the first point that it is not at all clear in what sense Iamblichus had a more positive attitude towards the sensible and the material than, say, his predecessors Plotinus—author of a lengthy treatise against the Gnostics, whom he reproaches for their systematic denigration of the sensible world—and Porphyry. Hankey's point (ii), in contrast, deserves some brief remarks. At least as far as the doctrine of the categories is concerned, Iamblichus may indeed have been more favorably disposed to Aristotle than, say, Plotinus, who subjects the Stagirite's doctrines to a devastating critique in *Enneads* VI 1–3.⁵² But Iamblichus was certainly no more pro-Aristotelian than his own teacher Porphyry, who had been responsible, prior to Iamblichus, for introducing the systematic study of Aristotle's works into the Neoplatonic school curriculum. We ought not to forget that while it is true that Simplicius based his commentary on the *Categories* to a large extent on Iamblichus' commentary on the *Categories*, Iamblichus in turn had based his own commentary on the lost commentary on the *Categories* by Porphyry in seven books, addressed to Gedalius. In this work, Porphyry's method had been to refute the objections raised by Plotinus against Aristotle's doctrines of the categories. To be sure, Iamblichus often, or rather usually, finds Porphyry's refutations inadequate, and spends many pages driving home and elaborating upon the criticisms Porphyry had merely sketched. An example may help to illustrate this point.

At *in Cat.*, p. 302, 5 ff. Kalbfleisch, Simplicius reports the objection by Plotinus (*Ennead* VI, 15) against the Aristotelian category of Doing (*to poiein*): Doing, said Plotinus, along with its opposite Being-affected (*to pathein*), should be ranged as a sub-genus of Activity (*to energein*) or rather *Motion* (*kinêsis*). Porphyry's response⁵³ to this criticism of Aristotle is as follows: in some things motion seems to be one and continuous in

⁵² Even this point is controversial, with several modern scholars (notably Franz de Haas and Steven Strange) arguing that Plotinus' attitude to the Aristotelian doctrine of the *Categories* is not one of rejection, but constructive criticism and adaptation. This view has, I believe, been convincingly refuted by the recent work of Riccardo Chiaradonna. I hope to return to this point elsewhere.

⁵³ Porphyry, *Ad Gedalius*, fr. 71 in A. Smith, ed. *Porphyrius, fragmenta* (Stuttgart-Leipzig, 1993).

the case of both doing and being-affected. When one throws or strikes an object, for instance, the motion of the thrower is the same as the motion of the object thrown or struck, but it becomes an affect (*pathos*) of the object, while it is an action (*poiêsis*) of the agent. Therefore, doing and being-affected cannot pertain to the same genus of motion, but there is a specific differentia between them.

Iamblichus finds this solution inadequate: Porphyry went too far afield in search of it, derived it from premises that are no more clear than their conclusion,⁵⁴ and which are not in accord with Aristotle's beliefs. It is not because one kind of action behaves this way that we can conclude they all do, nor should Porphyry have chosen the kind of action that is ontologically last⁵⁵—that which takes place through pushing and shoving. He was also wrong to agree with the Stoics that all action takes place by contact: contact is accidental in action, the real cause of which is the mutual suitability of agent and object of the action, as is shown by many obvious examples. To claim that the agent has the same substance as the thing being affected is to sow confusion everywhere, destroying the axioms of physics. If there is such a motion as Porphyry postulates, made up of the activity of the agent and the change of the object, then it does not belong in the pure genera (i.e., the intelligible world) of the categories, which are pure and unmixed, but is merely secondary, like all compound things. Instead, motion is common to doing and being-affected, but it is also separate from and intermediary between them, proceeding from the agent and accomplishing the affect (*pathos*) in the object being affected. Thus, just as the motive agent and the mobile object are two separate things, so the agent and the things-being-affected have also been divided into two.

Here, both Porphyry and Iamblichus agree that Plotinus is wrong in his suggestion of a critical modification to Aristotle's doctrine of the categories. Yet while Porphyry apparently restricted himself to adducing a counter-example to Plotinus' argument, Iamblichus sets out to demolish both Porphyry and Plotinus by a plethora of arguments, including the highly characteristic one that Porphyry's doctrine of a motion made up of doing and being-affected could not, as a compound entity, belong to the intelligible world.

⁵⁴ Thereby violating Aristotle's strictures in the *Posterior Analytics*, I, 2, 70b20–24.

⁵⁵ That is, presumably, because it is restricted to the merely sensible world, subject to the laws of physics.

We have here a clear example of Iamblichus' tendency to incorporate his intellectual theory⁵⁶ throughout his commentary on the *Categories*. Far from regarding this treatise, as Porphyry did, as a work for beginning philosophers that focuses on the sensible world, Iamblichus assumes Aristotle's treatise is applicable to the intelligible world.

For Iamblichus, as followed by Simplicius, the source of Plotinus' error is that he confuses activity and motion, which is far from being the truth.⁵⁷ This being the case, one may question the aptness of Hankey's account of this passage. According to this scholar, one of the means used in Simplicius' commentary on the *Categories* to reconcile Plato and Aristotle

[...] is the notion of 'motionless motion' which in this commentary is approached when considering 'making and suffering' (*de facere et pati*) and when treating 'motion' (*de motu*). In both places Simplicius reflects on Aristotle through Plotinus and his followers, especially Iamblichus. Simplicius shows Plotinus trying to dissolve the difference between activity and motion and between rest and motion. In learning, in intellectual life, for what is without parts and what is perfect, these exist together in such a way as to bring together apparently opposed teachings of Plato and Aristotle. Aquinas, sometimes by way of the Arabic commentators, is an heir of Plotinus, Simplicius, and others like Proclus, who teach this Neoplatonic commonplace. Thomas does not only use this construction to reconcile the two greatest philosophical authorities, 'motionless motion' is profoundly important for the structure and content of his own thought, including his treatment of the Trinity.⁵⁸

In fact, however, while it is true that Simplicius "shows Plotinus trying to dissolve the difference between activity and motion," he also shows Iamblichus *refuting this notion*, which he identifies as Stoic, *in no uncertain terms*. It is, moreover, not immediately clear what Hankey supposes the connection to be between the idea of motionless motion and that of abolishing the difference between activity and motion, or that between rest and motion. They are certainly not the same thing: that motion

⁵⁶ Cf. Simplicius, *In Cat.*, p. 2, 9–14: in his Commentary, Iamblichus "[f]or the most part, [...] followed Porphyry right down to the letter, but he picked out some things and articulated them in order to make them more clear. At the same time, he contracted the scholastic long-windedness Porphyry had used against the objections; and he applied his Intellectual Theory everywhere, to almost all of the chapter-headings." On Iamblichus' noetic theory, cf. John Dillon, "Iamblichus' *Noera theōria* of Aristotle's *Categories*," *Syllecta Classica* 8 (1997), 65–77.

⁵⁷ *Ho pollou dei alêthes einai*, Simplicius, *In Cat.*, p. 304, 32–33.

⁵⁸ Wayne Hankey, "Aquinas and the Platonists," pp. 300–1.

is equivalent to activity is a Stoic idea taken up by Plotinus but unanimously rejected by the subsequent Neoplatonic commentators, while motionless motion is an idea absent from Plotinus and fully developed by Proclus, but which already appears in the *Anonymous Commentary on the Parmenides*,⁵⁹ which Pierre Hadot has attributed, no doubt correctly,⁶⁰ to Porphyry. In sum, it is unlikely that Thomas derived his idea of motionless motion from Simplicius' commentary on the *Categories*. If he did, then he was not following Iamblichus but going against his express view. Hankey had previously suggested that Thomas derived this view, which is crucially important in his thought, from Arabic Neoplatonism.⁶¹ This may be, but it seems even more likely that the idea of motionless motion reached Thomas by way of the Pseudo-Dionysius.⁶²

⁵⁹ 14, 21–23, ed. Pierre Hadot, *Porphyre et Victorinus*, 2 vols. (Paris, 1968), vol. 2, p. 110: “And since they [sc. existence, life and thought] are all activities; according to existence the activity would be stationary” (*Kai pasón ousón energeiôn kai hós kata men tén huparxin hestôsa an eiê hê energeia*). Hadot notes this idea was taken over from Porphyry by Marius Victorinus, cf. *Adv. Ar.* III, 2, 36 *cessans motus*; IV, 8, 26. It has been suggested that both Porphyry and Victorinus may in fact have taken it over from the Gnostics, and more specifically the treatise *Allogenes* in the Nag Hammadi treatises; cf. M. Tardieu in Michel Tardieu-P. Hadot, *Recherches sur la formation de l'Apocalypse de Zostrien et les sources de Marius Victorinus*. Pierre Hadot, «Porphyre et Victorinus»: questions et hypothèses (Leuven, 1996). (Res orientales; 9), p. 84; but more recently Ruth Majercik has argued that it was the Gnostics who took over such conceptual schemes from Porphyry, cf. Ruth Majercik, “Porphyry and Gnosticism,” *Classical Quarterly* 55.1 (2005), 277–92.

⁶⁰ See, most recently, Ruth. Majercik, “Porphyry and Gnosticism.”

⁶¹ Wayne Hankey, “Review of: *Simplicius: On Aristotle's Physics 5*,” translated by J. O. Urmson, notes by Peter Lautner. *The Ancient Commentators on Aristotle* (New York, 1997), *Bryn Mawr Classical Review* 9.6 (1998), 585–8, p. 586: “This ‘different kind of motion’, the ‘act of the perfect’, Aquinas learns about from the Arab Neoplatonists.”

⁶² See, for instance, *De divinis nominibus* IX, 6, 9–10 (“What shall we say, when again the theologians say that the Immobile (*ton akinêton*) proceeds toward all things and is moved (*kai kinoumenon*)?” In his scholia on this passage, Maximus the Confessor (Migne, PG 4, 381A–D) sets out to identify the sense in which the Immobile God is moved. After eliminating the eight kinds of motion enumerated by the Ps.-Dionysus, Maximus concludes: “Thus, God is not moved according to any of these motions, but that which is called ‘motion of the Immobile’... is His will which leads to the generation of beings and the procession of His providence toward all things.” These texts, together with their Byzantine and Arabic posterity, have been brilliantly studied by Marwan Rashed, “La classification des lignes simples selon Proclus et sa transmission au monde islamique,” in C. D’Ancona & Giuseppe Serra (eds), *Aristotele e Alessandro di Afrodisia nella tradizione araba* (= *Subsidia Mediaevalia Patavina* 3) (Padova, 2002), pp. 257–79.

Conclusion

The particular parallels we have noted between Thomas and al-Fārābī may be indicative of a deeper similarity, which Simplicius' commentaries, including that on the *Categories*, may help to explain.

In a reversal of traditional viewpoints, recent commentators have argued that the philosophies of both Thomas Aquinas⁶³ and Fārābī,⁶⁴ usually considered as followers of the Peripatetic school, are in fact basically Platonist. Paradoxically, however, the same scholars have also argued that neither of these philosophers had actually read Plato.⁶⁵ This odd situation can be explained by the nature of the sources of both Thomas and Fārābī, which present definite similarities. Neither had access to complete translations of the works of Plato. Both were consequently forced to rely on the works of Aristotle, but this was an Aristotelian corpus quite unlike the one studied in the West today. It included works—the *Liber de Causis* was most influential in Thomas' case, while the *Theology of Aristotle* may have played an analogous role in the case of Fārābī—which we now know to be apocryphal compilations of Neoplatonic texts deriving from Proclus, Plotinus, and possibly Porphyry.⁶⁶ Equally importantly, however, it included Neoplatonic commentaries on the genuine works of Aristotle, including those by Simplicius.

As we have glimpsed, the philosophy of both Fārābī and Thomas Aquinas is profoundly influenced by the kind of Neoplatonizing interpretation of Aristotle that fills the commentaries of Simplicius, Ammonius, Themistius and other late antique professors of philosophy. These commentaries are the source of most of the common elements in their thought, the most crucial of which is no doubt the idea of

⁶³ Cf. Wayne Hankey, "Aquinas and the Platonists," p. 284: "Thomas' hermeneutical horizon was profoundly, extensively and subtly Platonist."

⁶⁴ Ph. Vallat, *passim*.

⁶⁵ In the case of Thomas, cf. R. J. Henle, *Saint Thomas and Platonism* (Hague, 1956), p. xxi.

⁶⁶ We might also count the works of the Pseudo-Dionysius Areopagita among these sources. As Hankey has shown, Thomas began his philosophical career by considering the Ps.-Dionysius as an Aristotelian; then, once he had read Proclus' *Elements of Theology* in Moerbeke's translation, he came to realize the Platonic nature of the Dionysian works. Ph. Vallat has pointed out a number of parallels between the works of the Ps.-Dionysius and those of Fārābī: cf. Vallat, *Fārābī*, pp. 33; 76; 88 n. 1; 291 n. 1; 307 n. 2; 334 n. 2; 346; 371.

the ultimate reconcilability of Plato and Aristotle. According to both Thomas and Fārābī, both Plato and Aristotle teach that there is a single divine cause that perpetually distributes being to all entities in a continuous, graded hierarchy.

There are, of course, also profound differences in the ways Thomas and Fārābī interpreted and utilized the doctrines they both received from the Alexandrian commentators. For Thomas, who (certainly indirectly) follows Iamblichus in this regard, philosophy occupies a subordinate position within theology, while for Fārābī, whatever his genuine religious beliefs may have been, philosophy remains the *nec plus ultra*, capable of providing ultimate happiness through conjunction with the Agent Intellect.

The contrasting attitudes of Thomas and Fārābī may, in turn, be traceable to a similar contrast with late antique Neoplatonism. Porphyry of Tyre was considered by his successors to have held that philosophy alone was sufficient for salvation, consisting in the soul's definitive return to the intelligible world whence it came, while Iamblichus was held to have placed the emphasis on the need for religion, in the form of theurgical operations and prayers, and the grace of the gods.⁶⁷ What seems to have been at stake in the arguments between the two was ultimately no less than the nature of philosophy: is it the ultimate discipline, sufficient for happiness, as Porphyry held, or is it merely an *ancilla theologiae*, as was the view of Iamblichus? Thomas and Fārābī, who had at least some knowledge of these debates through the intermediary of such sources as Simplicius' commentary on the *Categories*, seem to have prolonged this controversy, Thomas siding with Iamblichus and Fārābī with Porphyry.

Wayne Hankey has written,⁶⁸

Not only for both [sc. Iamblichus and Aquinas] is philosophy contained within theology, and theology contained within religion, but also, for both centuries its great teachers are priests and saints. In order to be doing philosophy as spiritual exercise belonging to a way of life, we need not engage directly in self-knowledge.

⁶⁷ In the judgment of Damascius, the teacher of Simplicius, "...some prefer philosophy, like Porphyry and Plotinus and many other philosophers; others hieratics [i.e., theurgy], like Iamblichus, Syrianus, Proclus and all the other hieratics", Damascius, *In Phaed.*, 1, vol. I, 172, 1–3 Westerink.

⁶⁸ Wayne Hankey, "Thomas' Neoplatonic Histories," p. 160.

Such ideas were anathema to Porphyry, the other great Neoplatonist whose ideas were transmitted to posterity by, among other sources, Simplicius' commentary on the *Categories*. For the Tyrian thinker, as for Fārābī writing some six centuries after him, philosophy is not subordinate to religion, nor are its teachers priests or saints, but it is autonomous and capable, all by itself, of ensuring human felicity both in this life and the next. Philosophy for Porphyry was indeed a way of life, an important part of which was reading and commenting on the philosophical texts of the ancient Masters. For Porphyry, however, who wrote a treatise *On the 'Know thyself'*,⁶⁹ as for the entire ancient tradition which, as Pierre Hadot has shown, considered philosophy to be a way of life,⁷⁰ self-knowledge was the indispensable starting-point for all philosophy.⁷¹ Indeed, one may question whether this was not the case for Iamblichus as well: it was he, after all, who established the *First Alcibiades* as the first Platonic dialogue to be read and studied in the Neoplatonic curriculum;⁷² but the *skopos* or goal of this dialogue, for Iamblichus, was none other than self-knowledge.⁷³

Whatever may have been Iamblichus' particular view, the Hellenic tradition on the whole was unanimous on the crucial importance of self-knowledge as the starting-point for philosophical education.⁷⁴ When

⁶⁹ Addressed to none other than Iamblichus. The fragments are printed by Smith, *Porphyrius*, fr. 273–275.

⁷⁰ Pierre Hadot, *Philosophy as a way of life: spiritual exercises from Socrates to Foucault*, ed. with an introduction by Arnold Davidson; trans. Michael Chase (Oxford, 1995); Pierre Hadot, *What is ancient philosophy?*, trans. Michael Chase (Cambridge, Mass, 2002).

⁷¹ Cf. Porphyry, *Sentence* 40, 4, p. 5, 5–6 Lamberz; *Letter to Marcella*, ch. 32; etc. On the central importance of self-knowledge for Porphyry, cf. Pierre Hadot, *Porphyre et Victorinus*, I, 91 n. 1; 327–328; J. Bouffartigue & M. Patillon, Porphyre, *De l'abstinence*, I (Paris 1977), pp. liii–lx; and the further literature cited by R. Majercik, "Porphyry and Gnosticism," p. 285 & n. 48.

⁷² Proclus, *In Alc.*, 11, 14–21, vol. I, p. 9 Segonds: "the divine Iamblichus assigns the *Alcibiades* the first rank among the ten dialogues which, he believes, contain the totality of Plato's philosophy."

⁷³ A.-Ph. Segonds, Introduction to his edition of Proclus' Commentary *In Alc.* (Paris 1985), vol. 1, p. xxv. Other texts by Iamblichus emphasizing the importance of self-knowledge (*Protreptic*, 21; *De myst.*, 10, p. 286, 11; *Life of Pythagoras*, 18, 83) are cited by Pierre Courcelle, "Le «Connais-toi toi-même» chez les néo-platoniciens grecs," in *Le néoplatonisme*. Actes du Colloque de Royaumont, 9–13 juin 1969 (Paris 1971), (Coll. internat. du CNRS), pp. 153–66, pp. 156–57.

⁷⁴ As Mme Ilsetraut Hadot points out in a personal communication, Simplicius, who may have been writing in Ḥarrān, also takes the *First Alcibiades* as the starting-point for his Commentary on the *Manual* of Epictetus (*In Ench. Epict.*, Praef. 82 ff.), "Tout le commentaire, avec ses explications fréquentes sur la nature des trois espèces

in 946 the traveler al-Mas'ūdī visited Ḥarrān in Mesopotamia, center of the pagan Šābiens, he saw, inscribed on the door-knocker of the central temple, an inscription in Syriac reading "He who knows his nature becomes god,"⁷⁵ which is, as Tardieu was the first to recognize, a reference to Plato's *Alcibiades* 133 C. When we recall that, according to some of his biographers, Fārābī went to Ḥarrān at about the time of Mas'ūdī's visit to complete his studies of the Aristotelian *Organon*, one is not surprised to find that self-knowledge is as essential for Fārābī as it was for Porphyry, with several of whose works the Second Master seems to have been familiar.⁷⁶

In Fārābī's noetics, the potential intellect (*al-aql bi'l-quwwah*) becomes an intellect in act (*al-aql bi'l-fi'l*) when, by abstracting the forms in matter from their material accompanying circumstances, it receives these disembodied forms within itself. Unlike the forms stamped in wax, however, which affect only the surface of the receptive matter, these forms penetrate the potential intellect so thoroughly that it becomes identical with the forms it has intelligized. Once it has intelligized all such intelligible forms, the intellect becomes, in act, the totality of intelligibles. The human intellect has thus become an intelligible, and when it intelligizes itself, it becomes an intelligible in act.⁷⁷

d'âmes qui se trouvent dans l'homme et leurs relations avec le corps, sur la position de l'âme humaine dans l'univers, sur les limites de ses possibilités d'action etc., montre que selon lui une amélioration de l'état éthique de l'homme ne peut se faire que sur la base de la connaissance de soi-même, c'est-à-dire de ses constituants et de sa possibilité d'action dans ce monde. Le connais-toi toi-même est la *conditio sine qua non* de tout progrès éthique."

⁷⁵ Al-Mas'ūdī, *Kitāb murūj al-dhahab wa-ma'ādin al-jawhar*, vol. IV, p. 64, 10 ff. Barbier-Meynard, cited by Michel Tardieu, "Šābiens coraniques et 'Šābiens' de Ḥarrān," *Journal asiatique* 274/1–2 (1986), 1–44, p. 13. Elsewhere (*Kitāb al-tanbīh wa-l-ishrāf*, p. 162, 3–5 De Goeje), Mas'ūdī cites the Ḥarrānian saying under the following form: "He who knows himself in truth becomes god."

⁷⁶ Cf. R. Walzer, "Porphyry and the Arabic Tradition," p. 281 f.; p. 294 ff.; F. W. Zimmermann, *al-Fārābī's commentary and short treatise on Aristotle's De interpretatione* (Oxford, 1991), p. xcii. I have discussed Fārābī's possible use of an otherwise unattested commentary by Porphyry on the *Posterior Analytics* in M. Chase "Did Porphyry write a commentary on Aristotle's *Posterior Analytics*? Albertus Magnus, Fārābī and Porphyry on *per se* predication," in P. Adamson, ed., *Classical Arabic Philosophy: Sources and Reception*, London/Turin: Warburg Institute/Nino Aragno (= Warburg Institute Colloquia 11), 2007, 21–38.

⁷⁷ Fit igitur haec essentia sibi intellecta in effectu; non fuit autem in nobis anima, antequam haec intellexeretur, nisi intellecta in potentia; modo autem est intellecta in effectu, eo quod intelligitur in effectu, et suum esse in seipsa est intellectu in effectu, Fārābī, *De intellectu et intellectu*, 169–173, p. 120, in Étienne Gilson, *Les sources gréco-arabes de l'Augustinisme avicennisant* (Paris, 1986), first published in the *Archives d'Histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Âge* IV (1929–30).

Thus, for the soul, or rather the soul's intellect, to know itself is to become, quite literally, identical with its essence,⁷⁸ and it can henceforth intelligize all other separate intelligibles—that is, those that have never been in conjunction with matter—in the same way as it knows its own essence. This occurs at the third of Fārābī's four levels or kinds of intellection, the *intellectus adeptus* (*al-ʿaql al-mustafād*).

Thus, for Fārābī, self-knowledge plays a crucial role both at the beginning and at a fairly advanced stage of philosophical progress. At the outset, the student must, with the help of an experienced professor, look within himself to find the first intelligibles innate within him which, once elaborated, clarified and classified, will serve as the premises of the syllogisms he will use as the starting-point of his logical deductions. At a later stage, when through abstraction he has accumulated a sufficient number of intelligibles, he will know his own intellect, and therefore himself, thoroughly. This in turn is the precondition for being able to know the intelligible Forms and separate intelligences which, unlike the material forms incorporated in the sensible world, have never been in conjunction with matter. The way is henceforth open for the permanent conjunction with the Agent Intellect which, according to Fārābī, constitutes felicity: that felicity which, for Fārābī as for Simplicius, is the only goal and justification for doing philosophy.

⁷⁸ Cf. E. Gilson, *ibid.*, p. 31: “c'est en quelque sorte elle-même, prise dans sa propre actualité, qu'elle devient en s'appréhendant.”

AVICENNA THE COMMENTATOR

Allan Bäck

A commentator should provide all the premises that are needed, and omit nothing but the obvious and the superfluous, for the most incompetent commentator is he who uses in his commentary premises more cryptic than, or as cryptic as, the premises of whatever he is commenting upon. These commentaries which [purport to] bring us the truth conceal in fact the theses better than the original texts, while what they conceal most is errors.¹

Avicenna has never had high standing as a commentator on Aristotle. In the scholarly world today, he, like any other Islamic medieval philosopher, has the automatic curse of not working from the original Greek in critical editions. He has the additional stigma of having received as Aristotle's work various spurious works, including Neoplatonist treatises by Proclus and Plotinus like the *Liber de causis*.²

Even in the medieval Islamic culture, his encyclopedic *Aṣ-Šifā* (the *Healing* or *Cure*), where he did write on many of Aristotle's works, was not viewed as faithful commentary. Consequently, so the story goes, Averroes was asked by Abū Ya'qūb to write a set of commentaries more textually based.³

Certainly, this assessment of Avicenna has some merit. He often departs from the text of Aristotle even when commenting upon it. He does so in various ways. (1) He states sometimes that Aristotle is just wrong, for instance, in his doctrine that in thinking the thinker becomes identical to the object thought.⁴ Again, when commenting upon

¹ "Memoirs of a Disciple [of Avicenna] from Rayy," §10, trans. Dmitri Gutas, *Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition* (Leiden, 1988), pp. 71–2.

² For this standard story cf. Frederick Copleston, *A History of Medieval Philosophy* (New York, 1972), pp. 106–7; F. Van Steenberghen 1970, *Aristote en occident* (Louvain, 1946), trans. as *Aristotle in the West*, trans. L. Johnston (Louvain, 1970), pp. 17–9; É. Gilson, *History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages* (New York, 1955), pp. 181–2.

³ Dominique Urvoý, "Ibn Rushd," in *History of Islamic Philosophy*, eds. S. Nasr & O. Leaman (London, 1996), pp. 330–345, p. 332. This story cannot be completely true, as we now know that prior to Avicenna there were many faithful commentaries written in Arabic on Aristotle's works, especially at the *bayt al-hikma*. See n. 51.

⁴ *On the Soul* 420a19–20; *Fi Nafs*, ed. G. Anawati (Cairo, 1962) 212,12–213,8.

the ontological square, the fourfold division of beings in *Categories* 2, Avicenna rejects it and replaces it with a fivefold division.⁵ In such cases Avicenna is offering his own views as substitutes. (2) Other times, he omits discussing what Aristotle says. Thus, in his *Al-Ilāhiyyāt* (*Metaphysics*) Avicenna ignores some books of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, like Book IV. Again, Avicenna's *Physics* hardly has the organization of Aristotle's. (3) Other times, he adds on a lot of material purportedly consistent with Aristotle's text, with the aim of defending or elaborating on it. Thus, in *Al-Ilāhiyyāt* Avicenna adds on discussions about the necessary being and prophecy. Likewise the organization of the *Qiyās* hardly follows that of the *Prior Analytics*, although Avicenna does end up covering most of the material there, while adding much more. (4) In some cases his attempts at a literal commentary fail ludicrously, as in his discussion of the *Poetics* where he attempts to describe Greek tragedies without having ever read or seen one.⁶ (I shall not be discussing this last type as it hardly gives Avicenna a claim for being a pre-eminent commentator. For it consists of standard, literal commentary, just done badly.)

The first three types of cases differ significantly. In the first type Avicenna goes where, he believes, the truth leads him at the expense of what Aristotle has said. As a result, we have an explanation inconsistent with Aristotle's doctrines. In the second and third types, we have material being introduced or omitted so as presumably to increase our understanding of the material being discussed by extending its doctrines. Such additions and omissions can remain consistent with Aristotle's doctrines. As for the omissions, Avicenna generally does discuss that material somewhere: he has just reorganized their presentation. Thus he does discuss the material of *Metaphysics* IV in various places: e.g., what is meant by genus, species, difference, etc. appears in his commentary on Porphyry (the *Logica* of the *Avicenna Latinus*); in his summaries as well he explains the meaning of many terms and reorganizes Aristotle's doctrines quite a lot.⁷ We can then find some justification for a commentary deviating from the text in the second or

⁵ *Al-Maḡūlāt*, eds. G. Anawati et al. (Cairo, 1959), pp. 18,4–20,3. See Allan Bäck, "Avicenna's Ontological Pentagon," *The Journal of Neoplatonic Studies* 7.2 (1999), 87–109.

⁶ Avicenna, *Aṣ-Ši'r*, ed. 'A. Badawī (Cairo, 1966). See my Review of *Averroes' Middle Commentary on Aristotle's Poetics*, trans. Charles Butterworth, *Canadian Philosophical Reviews* (1990), 92–101.

⁷ I am thinking of *An-Najāt* (*Salvation*), *Al-Ishārāt* (*Pointers*), and the Persian *Dānešnāme* (trans. Morewedge as *The Metaphysics of Avicenna*).

third way: the commentator is rearranging the material so as to make it more comprehensible. Yet the first way, rejecting what Aristotle says outright, hardly looks like a commentary at all, but instead an independent work. So too we might make this assessment for the so-called “*Glosses*” of Abelard on Porphyry.

Nevertheless I wish to explore the option that Avicenna remains a “faithful commentator” of Aristotle. For, if a commentary has the function of helping us to understand the material and the issues being discussed, and Avicenna presents materials that increase our understanding beyond what Aristotle has said, perhaps then he is writing commentaries of high value. To be sure, a commentary also has the function of helping us to understand the text being commented upon and its author’s intentions, context etc. in its own terms and on its own standards. Avicenna does not focus on such tasks, and when he does, he has no special claim to excellence (as in the example of the *Poetics* just mentioned. Such literal commentary amounts to parsing or paraphrasing and giving historical background. Yet, on the other hand, if we understand the issues being raised by a text in terms other than those given in the text, we might then be able to appreciate that text more so than if we had stuck to a literal *explicatione de texte*. We can understand what, say, Aristotle was struggling with and what he was trying, in a pioneering way, to get at. Pioneering efforts often have clumsy features, as the path of terminology, theory, articulation of detail etc. has not yet been laid down for those coming later to follow.

So I do not find it obvious just what constitutes a “good” commentary. I will start by discussing the attitudes of the person being commented upon about commentaries. For Aristotle himself commented upon the work of other philosophers, and wrote, if not “commentaries” in the customary sense, at the least critiques like the *Peri Ideōn*. Let us consider what The Philosopher does here.

Aristotle as Commentator

...our duty [is] for the sake of maintaining the truth even to destroy what touches us closely, especially as we are philosophers; for, while both are dear, piety requires us to honor truth above our friends.⁸

⁸ *Nicomachean Ethics* 1096a14–7.

In what sense would Aristotle himself understand ‘commentator’? Look at how Aristotle himself commented upon his predecessors—notably Plato. Certainly in his *Metaphysics* Aristotle thinks that he is giving the history of first philosophy. He comments upon the theories of his predecessors, mostly with the goal of showing how his own theory incorporates all their insights without their shortcomings.⁹

Earlier Aristotle scholars generally accepted Aristotle as a reliable chronicler and commentator. For instance, W. D. Ross generally takes Aristotle to give an accurate history of philosophy.¹⁰ Taylor, Burnet, and Guthrie may have had occasional doubts but generally concurred.¹¹

However it has now become a commonplace among scholars of Aristotle’s predecessors to assert that Aristotle misunderstands their views badly. For example, Kirk, Raven and Schofield claim that “his judgments are often distorted by his view of earlier philosophy as a stumbling progress to the truth that Aristotle revealed.”¹² Thus they suggest that Aristotle is mistaken about the significance of Zeno’s arrow paradox.¹³ If you look at random for other recent discussions of Aristotle in the treatment of the Presocratics, you will routinely find many such remarks.

Now if this current assessment of Aristotle’s scholarly abilities holds, Aristotle fails by his own standards. For he relies heavily on an endoxic method. We begin our scientific study, he says, from looking at phenomena and *endoxa*.¹⁴ As with astronomy, all the sciences must preserve the phenomena.¹⁵ For him the phenomena are the things as they appear to us, at times contrasted with how they are in themselves. The *endoxa* are the opinions that are generally or mostly accepted by anyone and, even more so, the opinions of the experts.¹⁶

⁹ *Metaphysics* 988a18–23.

¹⁰ *Metaphysics*, vol. I, pp. xxxv–li.

¹¹ A. E. Taylor, *Varia Socratica* (Oxford, 1911), pp. 84–7; J. Burnet, *Early Greek Philosophy*, 3rd ed. (London, 1920), vol. I, pp. 230–7; W. K. C. Guthrie, *A History of Greek Philosophy*, vol. 1 (Cambridge, 1962).

¹² *The Presocratic Philosophers*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, 1983) p. 3.

¹³ *The Presocratic Philosophers*, p. 273.

¹⁴ *De Caelo* 306a5–17; *Analytica Priora* 46a 17–22. Aristotle also seems at times to identify this mathematical method with a “dialectical” method. Cf. *Physica* 204b4, and Allan Bäck, “Aristotle’s Discovery of First Principles,” in *From Puzzles to Principles*, ed. May Sim (Lanham, Maryland, 1999), 163–182.

¹⁵ William Wians, “Saving Aristotle from Nussbaum’s *Phainomena*,” in *Essays in Ancient Greek Philosophy V*, eds. A. Preus & J. Anton (Albany, 1992), p. 135.

¹⁶ *Topics* 100b21–3. See J. D. G. Evans, *Aristotle’s Concept of Dialectic* (Cambridge, 1977), pp. 77–8 on difficulties of translating ‘*endoxon*’. I shall just use ‘*endoxon*’.

Even in the sciences Aristotle uses *endoxa*. As Owen made well known, Aristotle complicates his conception of phenomena considerably.¹⁷ In his ethics he begins his discussion of *acrasia* (incontinence) by rehearsing “the phenomena.” Yet he does not make observations of human behavior. Rather, he identifies these phenomena with the *endoxa*, the reputable opinions. [1145b2–6] On account of this, Owen claims that Aristotle uses ‘phenomena’ ambiguously: on the one hand to designate the empirical, given by sense perception, and on the other to designate the dialectical, given by widely accepted or reputable opinion. Indeed, in some texts Aristotle opposes phenomena and *endoxa*, and in others he assimilates them, even in his treatises on natural science.¹⁸ At times the contrast between phenomena and *endoxa* seems to disappear. Aristotle himself identifies the phenomena with the *endoxa* in his ethical investigation of *acrasia*. Again, in his study of the first principles common to all sciences in his science of being *qua* being, Aristotle examines *endoxa* dialectically by way of establishing them as first principles. Also, in justifying particular concepts in his *Physics*, Aristotle again appeals to *endoxa*, e.g., for his concept of place. [211a4–11] Aristotle blurs their difference even more when he distinguishes *endoxa* from “apparent *endoxa*” (φανομένων ἐνδόξων).¹⁹

Nussbaum offers a way of thinking of Aristotle’s conceptions of phenomena and *endoxa* consistently.²⁰ If we understand Aristotle to hold Quine’s view, that even sense perceptions are a theory-laden part of the fabric of our web of belief, then the empirical and the dialectical both concern opinion. We have no hard facts, just our beliefs about the world. Some beliefs may have a stronger tie to the stimulus meaning of sensation than others, and so are more empirical. Still scientific knowledge, like all other conversation, falls within the hermeneutical circle of our society and its ideology.

In any event, Aristotle does not equate *endoxa* in the dialectical inquiry of philosophy and science with majority opinion. He weights expert opinion more.²¹ Insofar as common people themselves defer to the opinions of experts, we might say that deferring to experts agrees

¹⁷ G. E. L. Owen, “*Ti henai ta Phainomena*,” in *Logic, Science, and Dialectic*, ed. Martha Nussbaum (Ithaca, 1986), p. 240.

¹⁸ E.g., *Generation of Animals* 725b5–6; 729b9–10; 760b27–33; *Parts of Animals* 648a20ff.

¹⁹ *Topics* 100b25.

²⁰ Martha Nussbaum, *The Fragility of Goodness* (Cambridge, 1986), pp. 244; 274–5.

²¹ C. D. C. Reeve, *Practices of Reason* (Oxford, 1992), pp. 35–6.

with common opinion, especially when the subject concerns something about which common people have no firm opinion (e.g., the sex life of nematodes), but when the expert and the common opinions diverge, Aristotle weights expert opinion more. Yet this weighting narrows the gulf between the phenomena which are true and the *endoxa*, which seem to be true. Too, phenomena themselves are literally appearances, how the world appears to us. As we judge, categorize, and reflect upon our sensations, the phenomena may well be thought to end up amounting to give what seems to us to be true, with special reliance on those who have observed carefully and repeatedly.

In our terms, Aristotle recommends doing a survey of the literature and critique of past theories if available before proceeding to do scientific research via direct observation and experiment and theory construction. Now, if Aristotle so radically misunderstands his predecessors, he is failing in this dialectical task and in his science.

We might use caution in accepting the opinions of current scholars on Aristotle as commentator, especially when their work focuses on Aristotle's predecessors. One always has the suspicion of people cheer-leading for the philosopher on whom they have devoted so much time. Moreover, it is curious, if Aristotle fails so badly in understanding his predecessors, why those who followed and critiqued him did not seize on the point more than they do? For many of the Greek commentators were Neoplatonists. They may modify Aristotle's doctrines, but generally accept his views of his predecessors.²² Even Plotinus proceeds in critiquing Aristotle not so much by showing how he misunderstands Plato but by defending Plato's views and picking holes in Aristotle's objections and own positions.

In any case, I am focusing here not on Aristotle's actual prowess as a commentator but rather on the standards he has for good commentary, regardless of whether he meets his own standards or not. So, putting *caveats* on his excellence as a commentator aside, let us concentrate on what Aristotle offers, or at any rate uses, as criteria for a commentary. For him a commentary is both a report and critique on certain *endoxa*, the opinions of the experts, preferably their opinions as recorded in written form. We can see Aristotle himself writing such commentaries. Aristotle went to great lengths to collect descriptions of phenomena, customs etc. We need only think of his collection of constitutions with

²² The commentaries of Simplicius and Alexander (pseudo and real) for instance.

accompanying analyses, his collections of observations of natural phenomena (including ones that he did not make himself, e.g., on elephants and the gymnosophists),²³ and his reviews of past theories whenever starting a scientific inquiry. These reports then should be accurate. Note, however, that Aristotle, like the historians of his time, tended not to insist on the historical accuracy of exact quotation, description of social and linguistic context, archival research etc. required by the historians of our times. Still, I suppose his accounts of his predecessors have about as much accuracy as the speeches that Thucydides puts into the mouths of Spartans and Persians.

Unlike modern historians and commentators, Aristotle insists also upon critiquing the views being commented upon. For he intends to use this material to seek the truth on the subject matter, and not ultimately the truth about who said what. We see a similar situation in his ethics. He wants to have a theory of what is the highest good but not merely for the sake of theory: “we are inquiring not in order to know what excellence is, but in order to become good, since otherwise our inquiry would have been of no use.”²⁴ To be sure, even modern historians organize their remarks and use the available primary historical data selectively, according to an ideology or according to a certain method, making many background foundational assumptions.²⁵ Yet they tend to avoid making assessment of value. In contrast, as Aristotle writes commentaries in order to use their results, his remarks have a certain focus largely absent in our modern commentaries. We separate theory and use, pure and applied science, scholarship and philosophizing, more sharply than he does.

Avicenna as Commentator

How then would Avicenna fare as a “commentator” in the Aristotelian tradition?

Let me first dispose of the standard complaints against Islamic commentators on Aristotle that I have mentioned at the beginning. To be sure they were Greek-less, although they had some contact with people

²³ E.g., the discussion of elephants in *History of Animals* I.10 and of the naked sophists in Fr. 35—if that is not genuine, just use another of Aristotle’s remarks on India.

²⁴ *Nicomachean Ethics* 1103b26–9.

²⁵ Cf. Marc Bloch, *The Historian’s Craft*, trans. P. Putnam (New York, 1953).

fluent in Greek. However, I find the Arabic translations of Ḥunayn Ishāq quite accurate for most technical points in Aristotle's texts. Moreover, the Islamic philosophers themselves were sensitive about problems of translation. Even before Avicenna, Islamic philosophers like al-Fārābī had long, sophisticated discussions about the various grammatical structures in Arabic, Greek, Persian, Syriac, Soghdian—as far as their linguistic resources permitted.²⁶

Moreover, Avicenna is no naïve reader, misled by having received Neoplatonist works by Proclus and Plotinus as written by Aristotle. He himself expresses doubts about the authenticity of the so-called *Theology of Aristotle*, known now to be spurious.²⁷ I give further examples below. So, I submit, let us not dismiss Avicenna's commentary on *a priori* grounds; instead, let us look at the contents of his works.

Avicenna claims to have written commentaries in his youth explicating Aristotle's thought.²⁸ These seem to have followed Aristotle's texts fairly closely, giving explications of his views. These early, fairly standard commentaries were apparently lost. Still we can perhaps get some sense of what they were like, or even what they actually were, by looking at some parts of his extant works. For, as Gutas has shown, Avicenna tended to recycle parts of earlier works into his later works. Thus some parts of the *De Anima* material of *Aṣ-Šifā* seem to have been written before.²⁹ Again, the *Poetics* portion of *Aṣ-Šifā* mentioned above may have been recycled, for it is a fairly literal commentary that seems to proceed by using a translation of the *Poetics* along with its attendant *marginalia* so as to produce an explication as best as can be without having any independent knowledge of Greek theater.

However, Avicenna wrote another sort of commentary later in his career. These followed the text much less closely and paraphrased far less. For in Hamaḍān around 1016, Avicenna's students had asked for him to replace these lost early commentaries.

The hope of ever obtaining his lost works having dimmed, we asked him to write them and he said, 'I have neither the time nor the inclination to occupy myself with close textual analysis and commentary. But if you

²⁶ See my "Islamic Logic," forthcoming.

²⁷ "Letter to Kiyā," section 3, in 'A. Badawī, *Aristū 'inda l-'Arab* (Cairo, 1947), pp. 120,9–122,8; trans. Gutas, *Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition*, p. 64.

²⁸ Namely, *Al-Ḥāsil wa-l-Maḥṣūl* (*The Available and the Valid*) probably in 1002 or 1003, following Gutas' dating.

²⁹ Gutas, *Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition*, pp. 104–5.

would be content with whatever I have readily in mind [which I have thought] on my own, then I could write for you a comprehensive work arranged in the order which will occur to me.' We readily offered our consent to this and urged that he start with physics.³⁰

Avicenna states clearly that in these commentaries—comments if you will—he will not be explicating Aristotle's thought and so will not be writing the usual sort of commentary. Rather, he shall be giving his own thoughts and theories on the topics and positions brought up by Aristotle:

...if you would like me to compose a book in which I will set forth what, in my opinion, is sound in these philosophical (sciences), without debating with those who disagree or occupying myself with their refutation, then I will do that.³¹

Accordingly, in his *Aṣ-Šhiḫā*, some parts of which constitute the *Avicenna Latinus*, Avicenna set out to "comment upon" a great portion of Aristotle's works, including the whole of the logic, much of the works on the natural sciences, and the *Metaphysics*. He completed this massive undertaking in but a few years, from 1016–27, if we are to believe the historical testimony—although it is likely that he used some earlier writings as some parts of *Aṣ-Šhiḫā*.

In *Aṣ-Šhiḫā* Avicenna has respect but not reverence for Aristotle. On some topics, Avicenna thinks that Aristotle has the whole truth. For instance, concerning Aristotle's classification of the fallacies, Avicenna says:

...after almost one thousand three hundred and thirty years, was this goal reached by anyone who blamed Aristotle for being deficient, and who was right in identifying a defect in him because Aristotle was in fact deficient in such and such a matter? And did there appear after him anybody who added anything at all to this art [*sophistics*] beyond what Aristotle said? Certainly not; for what Aristotle did is complete and perfect.³²

In such parts of *Aṣ-Šhiḫā* as the *Sophistics* then it is not surprising that Avicenna, perhaps using or borrowing from his earlier literal commentaries, if he had them available, offers something resembling a

³⁰ Introduction to *Aṣ-Šhiḫā*, Section 3, translated by Gutas, *Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition*, p. 101.

³¹ *The Life of Ibn Sina*, ed. and trans. W. Gohlman (Albany, 1974), 54.1–5.

³² *As-Safsāṭa*, ed. A. Ehwany (Cairo, 1958), 114 §7; trans. Gutas, *Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition*, p. 37.

usual commentary. Yet, even in such cases where Avicenna thinks that Aristotle has the right theory, he often proceeds to a critical discussion of it. Here we may agree with Gutas:

Avicenna presents himself in the prologue to the Cure not as an anti-Aristotelian despite himself, as al-Jūzjānī would have it, but as a conscious reformer of the Aristotelian tradition, an attitude which is also apparent in the Introduction to The Easterners and shared by other disciples of his...³³

However, in other parts of *Aṣ-Šifā* Avicenna has a much harsher attitude about what Aristotle says. First, in general, Avicenna holds Aristotle's logic to be defective, at least in the sense of needing to be supplemented.³⁴ Unlike Kant, Avicenna did not think that Aristotle had completed the whole of formal logic. For instance, following the Stoics, Avicenna devoted a lot of effort to working out the syllogistic for various sorts of hypothetical statements in his *Qiyās*. Second, and more particularly, on the *Categories*, Avicenna follows the lead of the Greek commentators who doubt the authenticity of some passages of the *Categories* and who stress its use as a work for the beginner.³⁵ He too doubts the authenticity of the *Categories* as a whole.³⁶ Yet, more than his predecessors, Avicenna stresses that the *Categories* is not so much for the philosopher as for the common people: not too technical nor of much use.³⁷

Even here, though, Avicenna is not rejecting Aristotle's views so much as reorganizing and extending them—perhaps, as I shall suggest below, following the lead of al-Fārābī. For instance, Avicenna imports much of the material on substance found in *Metaphysics* VII into his discussion of substance in *Categories* 5. Indeed, Avicenna discusses some of Aristotle's doctrines in the *Metaphysics*, like focal meaning and the relation of substance and form, more in this commentary on the *Categories* than in his “commentary” on the *Metaphysics*, *Al-Ilāhiyyāt*. Avicenna has the general habit of reorganizing the sequence of materials found in Aristotle, and *Al-Maḳūlāt* is no exception.

³³ Gutas, *Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition*, p. 111.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, 189.

³⁵ E.g., Porphyry, in *Cat.* 134, 28–9; Ammonius, in *Cat.* 13, 20–8.

³⁶ *Al-Maḳūlāt* 8, 11–5. So did earlier Islamic commentators, and to some extent Greek ones like Simplicius, in *Cat.* 18, 7–9. Cf. I. Madkour, *L'Organon d'Aristote dans le monde arabe* (Paris, 1934), pp. 78–9.

³⁷ *Al-Maḳūlāt*. 35, 10–11; 35, 20–36, 2; 189, 8–9; 264, 7; 265, 17.

Avicenna viewed his audience to consist solely in the elite philosophers. Rather like Confucius, who wanted only students who could bring back a square when given only a corner of it [*Analects* 7:8], Avicenna would expect his audience to be able to reconstruct his position from a few remarks. For him, the common people should not read philosophy. Like Plato, Avicenna wanted only the philosophers, and the worthy ones at that, to read his work. Avicenna believed Aristotle to hold the same view, due to a letter ascribed to Aristotle and written to Alexander. According to it, Aristotle was deliberately obscure in order to ward off the common people.³⁸ Likewise, al-Fārābī, whom Avicenna admired greatly, says:

Our style used an obscure way of expression for three reasons: First, to test the nature of the student in order to find out whether he is suitable to be educated or not; second, to avoid lavishing philosophy on all people but only on those who were worthy of it; and third, to train the mind through the exertion of research.³⁹

Religious traditions in Islam too had the custom of withholding knowledge from the *hoi polloi* and reserving it for the select few:

I have forbidden all my friends who would read [this treatise] to squander it on an evil or obdurate person, or show it to them, or to deposit it where it does not belong, and bound them [by an oath]...⁴⁰

Like Maimonides later, Avicenna writes only for those who deserve to read. We know that he withheld his writings from many of his contemporaries.

In short, Avicenna deliberately writes commentaries for the worthy few, the elite among the philosophers. Such an audience requires commentaries not of the usual sort. Such a commentary need not introduce and explicate the text to be commented upon. Rather, it needs to illuminate that text, to give a perspective whereby its reader will be helped in assessing the merits of that text. I have suggested that we view Aristotle as a “commentator” in the same way.

³⁸ Gellius, *Noctes Atticae* 20,5,11–2, in *Aristoteles, Privatorum Scriptorum Fragmenta*, ed. M. Plezia (Leipzig, 1977), 28. Cf. Simplicius, in *Cat.* 7, 6–9.

³⁹ Mabādi, *‘Al-Falasafah Al-Qadima* (Cairo, 1910), p. 14, trans. Gutas, *Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition*, p. 227.

⁴⁰ Avicenna, *Al-Mabda‘ wa-l-Ma‘ād* [*The Provenance and Destination*], ed. ‘A. Nūrārī (Tehran, 1984), Ch. 16.3; trans. in Gutas, *Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition*, p. 33.

Yet, even if we accept such criteria for a commentary, surely the text of Avicenna is so difficult and even convoluted so as to rule it out as a good commentary. Let me then comment upon Avicenna's style and on his writings.⁴¹

Avicenna deliberately takes on an oracular style. We can see this just from the titles of his works: *The Cure*, *The Salvation*, etc. He does so for various reasons: 1) on his own view, he has achieved an enlightenment stemming from the activation of his active intellect and its permanent, actual connection to the intelligibles;⁴² 2) what he is doing is better than the popular, vulgar prophecy of religion anyway;⁴³ 3) he is an elitist.

Avicenna has a style a bit like the Greek commentators: a rather cryptic, oracular, enigmatic utterance followed by some more mundane explanation. Alexander, Ammonius and Themistius have similar styles. Or, perhaps better, we may compare the writing style of Avicenna to that of Plotinus. In both cases too we might wonder how well the text was corrected and proofed. Likewise, in both cases it is hard to distinguish when the author is presenting a position given by somebody else and its implications from when he is giving his own position; to determine when a question ends and its answer begins.

Moreover, Avicenna's cavalier attitude towards his own writings does not help the quality of the text that we have. He generally would write extremely quickly. His own account has him writing fifty pages per day of the metaphysics and physics of *Aṣ-Šhiṣṣā*.⁴⁴ After writing something, he would give the copy to whom it was promised, or put it away for showing to the worthy few. Often, due to his frequent moves and the religious and political turmoil, his writings were lost or damaged.⁴⁵

⁴¹ Discussed and supported more in the Introduction to my translation of *Al-Maḥḥālāt*.

⁴² *Fī Nafs* 212,4–9. Cf. Gutas, *Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition*, pp. 161 n. 30; 175.

⁴³ Like al-Fārābī, Avicenna held that religious customs for the common people differ from those for the elite philosophers. For instance, for Avicenna prayer had as its goal the finding of middle terms; drinking wine is forbidden to the people but good for those of "powerful brains." Cf. *The Life of Ibn Sina*, 28,2–5; 54,7–9; *Al-Qānūn* I.169.26–9. For a spirited discussion of this issue, cf. Gutas, *Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition*, pp. 181–8.

⁴⁴ *The Life of Ibn Sina*, 58,2–8.

⁴⁵ Al-Jūzjānī, "Introduction" to *Aṣ-Šhiṣṣā*, §2, trans. Gutas, *Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition*, p. 40: "I have heard, however, that these were widely dispersed in that people who owned a copy of them withheld them [from others]; as for him, it was not his habit to save a copy for himself, just as it was not his habit to make a copy from his archetype or transcribe [an archetype] from his rough draft: he would only either dictate or himself write the manuscript and give it to the person who had commis-

Consequently, we have the situation that Avicenna probably proofread little, and what copies there were were made haphazardly under hasty circumstances. Aside from the contingencies of the political turmoil, we can see here perhaps echoes of Plato's attitude toward written philosophy as expressed in his "Seventh Letter." Written philosophy is dead philosophy, relics to be discarded as trinkets for those allowed to be souvenir hunters.

Again, Avicenna was a Persian, and not a native Arabic speaker or writer. At any rate, let me say that he is quite careless about the antecedents for his pronouns! I should also remark that at points we have some possible wordplay.⁴⁶

Apart from these reasons—the haste of composition, the state of the manuscript, these elitist tendencies, possible language problems—there are other reasons why reading Avicenna is difficult. To be sure, Avicenna can write clearly. Yet often he writes quite obscurely, regardless of the language in which the text is read. Perhaps this obscurity comes in part from Avicenna's trying to say something new, for which there would not naturally lie ready to hand extant phrasing. We can see similar obscurities in many original works: Abelard—or Aristotle himself—is a good example.

Above all, in reading works like *Aṣ-Šifā*, we have the problem of context. Avicenna is reacting not only to Aristotle's text but also to the other writings on it—commentaries, notes, *marginalia*, some of which surrounded the Arabic translation that he was using. Avicenna was probably using some revised version of Ḥunayn Ishāq's translation, the standard Arabic one of the time, with lots of *marginalia*.⁴⁷ Avicenna himself says about his studies in his youth that resulted in the more

sioned it from him. Moreover, he suffered from successive misfortunes, and disasters destroyed his books."

⁴⁶ E.g., at *Al-Maḳūlāt* 248, 17–8.

⁴⁷ F. E. Peters, *Aristotle and the Arabs* (New York, 1968), pp. 59–63; 160. It seems clear that, at least in some cases, Avicenna was not following Ishāq's translation (edited by Badawi, the eleventh century one with *marginalia* at the Bibliothèque Nationale of Paris) closely. Cf. Aristotle's *Categories* 1a24–5, discussed in *Al-Maḳūlāt* 28, 4ff with the current Oxford translation: "By 'in a subject' I mean what is in something, not as a part, and cannot exist separately from what it is in." If Avicenna is quoting and not paraphrasing loosely, he is not using Ishāq's translation. Again, cf. *Al-Maḳūlāt* 28, 4–5: the terminology for the category of having is not the same as Ishāq's either. Likewise, at 57, 19, the translation for the Greek "boxer": Ishāq's translation has 'boxer'; Avicenna has 'wrestler'. However, Porphyry, in *Cat.* 135, 9–11, has the example of the wrestler as well as that of the boxer, and it is true that wrestling was and is far more prominent in Islamic cultures than boxing.

textual commentaries, now lost: "Then I began to read the books [of the *Organon*] by myself and consult the commentaries until I had mastered logic."⁴⁸ So he had read some commentaries, more than marginal notes. At this point, we can make only educated guesses about what commentaries Avicenna used. For Avicenna hardly ever cites any others by name. Moreover, he need not have read those whom he does mention. Likewise, when al-Fārābī names Archytas [of Tarentum], he probably picked this name up from Simplicius.⁴⁹ As for *Al-Maḳūlāt*, the Greek commentaries on the *Categories* by Porphyry, Simplicius, Ammonius, Philoponus, and likewise Plotinus (especially *Enneads VI*), insofar as they were translated into Arabic, are plausible candidates for Avicenna's sources, at least indirectly.⁵⁰ By the time of Avicenna, there were also very many Islamic commentators and glossers, most of which have not been studied carefully yet.⁵¹ By his own testimony, Avicenna considered the commentaries of al-Fārābī the most important of these.⁵²

⁴⁸ Avicenna, *Autobiography* §5.

⁴⁹ al-Fārābī, *Greater Commentary on De interpretatione*, eds. W. Kutsch and S. Morrow (Beirut, 1960), 157, 19–20; trans. F. W. Zimmermann (London, 1981), p. 152. Cf. Simplicius, in *Cat.* 86,28–30; 206,20; 408,11–2; 409,1–5. Archytas was a Pythagorean contemporary of Plato; the commentary on the *Categories* is presently thought to be a first-century (A.D.) forgery. Cf. T. A. Szlezák, *Pseudo-Archytas über die Kategorien* (Berlin, 1972).

⁵⁰ Gerhard Endress, "Die wissenschaftliche Litteratur," in *Grundrisse der Arabischen Philologie*, ed. H. Gätje, vol. 2 (Wiesbaden, 1987), pp. 416–31; Julius Weinberg, *Abstraction, Relation and Induction* (Madison, 1965), p. 91. On Greek texts available to Avicenna and not preserved today, see A. Badawī, *La transmission de la philosophie grecque au monde arabe* (Paris, 1968); "New Philosophical Texts Lost in Greek and Preserved in Islamic Translations," in *Islamic Philosophical Theology*, ed. P. Morewedge (Albany, 1979), pp. 3–13; H.-J. Ruland, *Die arabischen Fassungen zweier Schriften des Alexander von Aphrodisias: Über die Vorsehung und Über das liberum arbitrium*, diss. Saarbrücken 1976; "Zwei arabischen Fassungen der Abhandlung des Alexander von Aphrodisias über die universalien," *Nachr. der Akademie der Wiss.* In Göttingen, 1979 no. 10. Again, Porphyry's lost commentary *Ad Gadalium*, was probably available at the time of Avicenna. Cf. Michael Chase, ed. & trans., *Simplicius: On Aristotle's Categories 1–4* (Ithaca, 2003), p. 96.

⁵¹ The number of these works is staggering. On those on the *Categories*, cf. F. E. Peters, *Aristoteles Arabus* (Leiden, 1968), pp. 7–11; H. Daiber, "Review of Peters," *Aristoteles Arabus*, *Gnomon* 42 (1970), p. 542; Gerhard Endress, "Die wissenschaftliche Litteratur," in *Grundrisse der Arabischen Philologie*, vol. 2 (Wiesbaden, 1987), pp. 402–34; Gutas, *Greek Thought, Arabic Culture*, p. 151. For secondary literature and more updates see *Grundrisse der Arabischen Philologie*, ed. H. Gätje, vol. 2, pp. 481–502.

⁵² "Letter to Kiḳā," in *Aristū 'inda l-'Arab*, ed. Badawī (Cairo, 1947), 120,9–122,8, §3, trans. Gutas, *Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition*, p. 64: "At the present moment it is impossible for me [to rewrite it]: I do not have the free time for it, but am occupied with men like Alexander [of Aphrodisias], Themistius, John Philoponus, and their likes. As for al-Fārābī, he ought to be very highly thought of, and not to be weighed in the same skill with the rest: he is all but the most excellent of our predecessors." *Re al-Fārābī on the Categories*, we have chiefly (extant today) al-Fārābī's epitome on

In sum, on current estimates, the commentaries that Avicenna used most are those by Simplicius and al-Fārābī.⁵³ Given Avicenna's choice of issues, I suggest adding Porphyry to the list; Avicenna would have known of Porphyry's views on homonymy at least indirectly via their presentation in Simplicius.⁵⁴

Consequently, the text of *Aṣ-Šhiṭā* is not self-contained. Avicenna is often replying to arguments and doctrines that he does not state fully. Many of these arguments can be found in the Greek commentaries or in later Islamic ones. However, we do not yet have many accessible editions or translations of the commentaries written in Arabic, even by such as those by al-Fārābī.

Moreover, Avicenna uses a technical vocabulary, inherited from the Greek traditions and his Islamic predecessors. This appears most clearly at first glance in his use of various prepositions which seems to flout or at least stretch ordinary Arabic usage. Aristotle himself in the *Categories* and Simplicius even more in his commentary on it did the same with Greek.⁵⁵ Avicenna continues this tradition by making up terms or transforming the meaning of existing terms in order to express his own theory.⁵⁶ For Avicenna also is engaged in constructing his own

the *Categories* (*Al-Mantiq 'inda l-Fārābī*, ed. R. Al-Ġam, vol. 3 (Beirut, 1986); trans. as "al-Fārābī's Paraphrase of The Categories of Aristotle," *Islamic Quarterly* (1957), 158–97, and more original discussions in the *Kitāb al-Hurūf*, ed. M. Mahdī (Beirut, 1970) and *Kitāb al-ʿAlfāz al-Musta'mala fī l-mantiq*, ed. M. Mahdī (Beirut, 1968). See Gerhard Endress, "Die wissenschaftliche Literatur," in *Grundrisse der Arabischen Philologie*, vol. 3 (Wiesbaden, 1992), p. 53, nn. 185–7.

⁵³ Ilsetraut Hadot, "La vie et oeuvre de Simplicius d'après des sources grecques et arabes," in *Simplicius: sa vie, son oeuvre, sa survie*, ed. I. Hadot (Paris, 1987), p. 36; Gutas, *Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition*, p. 150; Michael Chase, ed. & trans., *Simplicius: On Aristotle's Categories 1–4* (Ithaca, 2003), pp. 2–3. In regard to the *Al-Maqūlāt* proper, it is suggestive that, like Ammonius but unlike Simplicius, Avicenna does not discuss chapter 15 on "having", although Avicenna might have omitted this on his own initiative. Also, like Philoponus, in *Cat.*, 126,9, Avicenna discusses the Resurrection example, and so maybe Avicenna is following him at 153,15ff.

⁵⁴ Concetta Luna, "Commentaire," pp. 65; 82. In addition to the extant commentary in *Cat.* in the *Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca* and translated by S. Strange (Ithaca, 1992), there is a lost commentary *Ad Gedalum*, probably available at the time of Avicenna. Cf. M. Chase, *Simplicius*, p. 96.

⁵⁵ Cf. Richard Gaskin, trans. & comm., *Simplicius, On Aristotle's Categories 9–15* (Ithaca, 2000), n. 628.

⁵⁶ Cf. Gutas, *Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition*, p. 10. Afnan, *Philosophical Terminology in Arabic and Persian*, p. 33, says, wrongly, "A significant feature which was not of the language but which cramped philosophical vocabulary in general and fossilized it almost permanently, was the lack of initiative on the part of the Falāsifah to coin special terms of their own." But then he is following Atkinson's *The Greek Language*, which says the same about Aristotle and Greek!

technical vocabulary for Greek technical expressions in Arabic. He uses some already made up, say by al-Fārābī. Still, he seems to be making up more himself, especially as his theory differs from earlier ones.⁵⁷

In sum, Avicenna is not writing a commentary of the usual sort. Like his later works, we can say of those in the *Šifā* that they contain many “Doubts about Aristotle”—although, to be sure, Avicenna also accepts much of what Aristotle and earlier Aristotelians said.⁵⁸ He is writing a commentary in the sense of following the order of Aristotle’s texts and commenting on what is being discussed. He often does not bother to explicate Aristotle’s text. Rather, he presents what he thinks on these topics. Although he does often agree with Aristotle, often he does not: for instance, in *Al-Maḳūlāt* he disagrees with Aristotle in the *Categories* on homonymy, synonymy, and paronymy, on the ontological square, and on the number of categories. Still, many of the doctrines used by Avicenna to correct the doctrine of the categories can indeed be found in Aristotle’s works elsewhere. I have given some examples above.

We can find analogous “commentaries” in Abelard. His *Glosses on Porphyry* are hardly glosses; his commentaries on Boethius stray so far from the texts that we look in vain in Boethius for most of the doctrines Abelard puts forward. Like Abelard, Avicenna uses the text as a source of questions, topics, and problems that he then investigates and for which he provides the answers. Avicenna does indeed seem to have a style much like Abelard’s: always looking for alternatives, contemptuously dismissing views that he finds silly (here more with the verve of Roger Bacon). Avicenna differs from Abelard perhaps in having his own, final definite position on most issues.

The Case of Categories I

What Avicenna does in his discussion of homonymy gives a good instance of his approach. In effect, he takes the materials from the Greek period and offers a new theory, perhaps with a wider compass than what

⁵⁷ Cf. Shukri Abed, “Language,” in *History of Islamic Philosophy*, eds. S. Nasr & O. Leaman (London, 1996), pp. 904–13.

⁵⁸ Gutas, *Greek Thought, Arabic Culture*, p. 153. Cf. Dag Hasse, *Avicenna’s De Anima in the Latin West* (London, 2000), p. vii: “different stages in a continuous process of reworking his position with the Peripatetic tradition and eventually emancipating himself from it.”

we find in the (extant) Greek commentaries. For the Greek commentators tend to relegate parts of their discussion to different passages: the materials about rhetorical, dialectical, and fallacious homonymies do not appear much in the *Categories* commentary. In contrast, Avicenna incorporates their doctrines into a general theory of homonymy. He has a continuum, ranging from the merely ambiguous to the completely synonymous.

Just what did Avicenna get from al-Fārābī's discussions of the *Categories*? If we look at his extant works, we do not find much original doctrine. Moreover, Avicenna does not follow al-Fārābī, e.g., in discussing the category of having.⁵⁹ Perhaps what he found important in al-Fārābī's work was his method. For al-Fārābī does not follow the order of the text of Aristotle, even in his so-called *Paraphrase*. Instead, he gathers Aristotle's doctrines and writes a treatise with a clear, original organization.⁶⁰ So perhaps Avicenna got from al-Fārābī a new approach. This would fit with his remark that he did not understand Aristotle's *Metaphysics* until he had read al-Fārābī's work on it: that is, he did not understand the overall plan and structure of the *Metaphysics*.⁶¹

Along these lines, Avicenna begins his commentary on the text of the *Categories* not with homonymy as Aristotle and all the Greek commentators did, but with synonymy—presumably because synonymy is for science while homonymy is for sophistry. It is worth noting that in his later works like *Al-Najāt* and the *Ishārāt* Avicenna does not discuss homonymy at all, although he does discuss some other topics discussed in the *Categories*.

Moreover, al-Fārābī, like the Arabic translation of Ishāq [e.g., at *Cat.* 1 line 5], speaks of expressions in terms of having the same or different senses.⁶² He also will speak of the essences themselves in terms of their being the same or different in their senses.⁶³ Such statements may well have suggested to Avicenna a general structure for homonymy based on senses. At any rate, as we shall now see, he does have such a scheme.

⁵⁹ al-Fārābī, in his *Paraphrase of the Categories of Aristotle* ed. & trans. D. M. Dunlop, *Islamic Quarterly* 5.1 (1959), 24,7–15 [trans. p. 40 §36], comments on the category of having and even distinguishes two types: a natural having, as a tree has its bark, and a voluntary having, as a man has his clothes.

⁶⁰ Likewise in *Kūtāb al-Ḥurūf*, where he presents some of the doctrine of the *Categories*, al-Fārābī uses his own organization of the materials.

⁶¹ *Autobiography* §9. So too Gutas, *Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition*, p. 239.

⁶² *Kūtāb al-Ḥurūf* §81 110,20–1.

⁶³ In *Kūtāb al-Ḥurūf* §89 117, 8–10.

In order to understand Avicenna's text and to see just how he differs from the earlier commentators, I shall first discuss their doctrines.

The Greek commentators on *Categories* 1 all presented the same basic interpretation of homonymy with some variations. From the viewpoint of Aristotle's text, they provide too much commentary. For they develop, or augment, the few lines devoted to homonyms into a full-blown theory of homonymy incorporating many of Aristotle's doctrines found elsewhere. By comparison, their commentaries on synonymy and paronymy are much shorter.

The Greek commentators worry a lot over the subject to be discussed in the *Categories*. They have various answers, ranging from beings *qua* beings, to thought, to predicables, to predications, to significative expressions, to expressions *qua* expressions. [Simplicius, in *Cat.* 9,4ff.; Porphyry, in *Cat.* 59,10–33] Simplicius reports that Alexander of Aphrodisias proposed that it deals with thoughts. [10,11–9; 9,31–10,2] In contrast Porphyry, in both his extant commentary and in his lost commentary to Gedalius, says that it is about predicates, sc., about expressions signifying things. [57,6; 58,6–10 & 18–20; Simplicius, in *Cat.* 10,20–3] Simplicius ends up concluding that the *Categories* deals with significative expressions, but claims that this amounts to dealing with thoughts insofar as they signify. [10,4–5; 11,12; 12,1–4; 13,11–5; 21,7–9] At one point he likens these thoughts to the Stoic concepts, presumably the *lekta*. [10,2–4] As Aristotle holds at the beginning of *On Interpretation* that thoughts constitute a mental language that the spoken language directly, and the written language indirectly, signify, we can see why he would think these two positions equivalent. Aristotle seems to speak of words and propositions signifying definitions and “meanings” on this basis. [E.g., *An. Po.* 93b29–35]⁶⁴

They all then proceed to divide up these items, the significative thoughts, let's call them, into those that signify homonyms and those that signify synonyms.⁶⁵

They find this division exhaustive for the mental language. They add polynoms and heteronyms to the homonyms, synonyms, and paronyms

⁶⁴ David Charles, “Aristotle on Names and their Signification,” in *Language*, ed. S. Everson (Cambridge, 1994), p. 43.

⁶⁵ In addition to those discussed below, there are also classifications by Boethius, in *Cat.* 166B–C, who follows Simplicius, and variant ones by Olympiodorus, in *Cat.* 34,3–35; David Elias, in *Cat.* 139,29–140,25; Sophonias, in *Cat.* 1,24–2,17. All these seem to have had no influence on Avicenna.

discussed explicitly by Aristotle to account for features peculiar to the spoken or written language. Polynymy has the same account but different names, like two mantles with respect to 'cloak' and 'cape'. Heteronymy has neither the name nor the account in common, as a crow is named 'crow' while a dog is named 'dog'. Simplicius distinguishes such cases, which he calls "merely other names", from heteronymy proper, which have a common substratum. [22,30–1] In this sense, there is a single thing, say, a stair or a mountain, with two names, 'ascent' and 'descent'. [23,31–3]⁶⁶ Simplicius gives two reasons why Aristotle does not discuss polynymy and heteronymy explicitly in *Categories* 1: either he found them obvious or he relegated their discussion to his rhetorical and poetical works. [23,6–19; cf. 36,25–31]

Porphyrus presents a classification of homonymy given also by many other commentators. [*in Cat.* 65,18–66,21] Homonymy is: I) by chance, as 'Alexander' names both the son of Priam and the son of Philip; II) by intent, either 1) by similarity, as a man and a picture of a man are both named by 'animal', or 2) by analogy, as the term 'ἀρχή' ('principle' or 'beginning') can be applied to numbers and lines and rivers, or 3) from something (ἀφ' ἐνός), as different items can be called medical as their names are all said from 'medicine' according to different accounts, or 4) relative to something (πρὸς ἓν), as things that are called healthy as said relative to health. He notes that some put what is from or relative to something as intermediate between homonymy and synonymy. [66,15–21] This would include, for instance, Alexander, where he locates focal meaning between homonymy taken in a narrow sense and synonymy. [*in Metaph.* 241,3–24]⁶⁷ Also Porphyry discusses the example of the foot of a bed or a mountain. He says that some, like Atticus, take this to come about by metaphor from the foot of an animal.⁶⁸ However he classifies it as homonymy by analogy. [66,34–67,32]

Simplicius gives the same classification and examples as Porphyry. [31,22–32,11] He adds only the remark that some combine II.3 & II.4 into a single type. [32,12–3] Still, given Aristotle's discussion of the two examples in *Metaphysics* IV and the connection between paronymy and

⁶⁶ Also cf. Clement of Alexandria, *Stromateis* VIII.8.24.2–9, ed. Stählin, p. 95,5–26; Ammonius, *in Cat.* 16,24–17,3; Alexander, *in Top.* V,4 398,1–4; Luna "Commentaire," p. 52.

⁶⁷ Also Porphyry, *in Cat.* 66,18; Syrianus, *in Met.* 57,18–20.

⁶⁸ Hans Wagner, "Über das Aristotelische 'pollachos legetai to on'," *Kantstudien* 53 (1962), 75–91, p. 75, observes that analogy became the main focus of discussions of homonymy in Latin medieval philosophy.

focal meaning discussed above, it is hard to see why the two types should be distinguished in the first place. To be sure, the ‘medical’ example concerns things used in the service of medicine, and so concerns the efficient or productive cause, while the health example concerns things for the sake of health and so concerns the final cause. Yet these differences look material and not formal. Perhaps we can find examples of focal meaning that do not involve paronymy. Of course, we could find terms having focal meaning that are not derived from a common base, like Aristotle’s own example of ‘excellence’ [*Cat.* 10b5–9], but then we would not have homonymy but some sort of heteronymy.

Following Alexander, Simplicius says that homonymy can hold between things under the same genus, like ‘equal’ for continuous and for discrete quanta, or between things under different genera, like ‘equal’ for *quanta* and for *relata*. [*in Phys.* 403,13–19] He is insisting on its being possible for homonyms to be in the same genus, as Aristotle says, for instance, that, when *differentiae* are in different species, there is homonymy. [*Part. An.* 643a1–7] This distinction might be correlated with a narrow and a broad conception of homonymy. Simplicius says also that a triangle and triangularity are homonyms with respect to ‘triangle’. [Simplicius, *in Cat.* 264,7–10]⁶⁹ However this position seems to come from his Platonist insistence that material triangles, not being perfect triangles, can be triangles in name only.⁷⁰

Ammonius however gives a more elaborate classification. [*in Cat.* 21,16–22,10] Once again, homonyms are either I) by chance or II) by intention 1) “Some are homonyms of one another and paronyms of what they are called after”⁷¹ a) from the efficient cause, as what is said ‘from something’, as with ‘medical’ b) from the final cause, as what is said relative to something, as with ‘healthy’ 2) “Others are homonyms of one another and also homonyms of what they are called after”, where the two things a) differ in the times where they have the name i) when one thing is named in memory of the other, earlier one, like calling a child by the name of his father or teacher ii) when two have the same name by chance iii) when the later one is named in the hope that it will have attributes of the earlier thing, like naming someone today ‘Plato’

⁶⁹ Cf. Plotinus, *Enneads* VI.3.2.2–4; also VI.II.1.

⁷⁰ Michel Narcy, “L’homonymie entre Aristote et ses commentateurs néoplatoniciens,” *Les Études Philosophiques* 1 (1981), 35–52, p. 47. S. Marc Cohen and G. Matthews, trans. & comm., *Ammonius: On Aristotle’s Categories* (Ithaca, 1991), n. 42, claim that this is Platonist.

⁷¹ Trans. S. Marc Cohen and G. Matthews, p. 30.

b) do not differ in the times where they have the name, and are named i) by the similarity of the objects, as when the wise (*phronimos*) man is called wisdom (*phronesis*) ii) by participation, like ‘musical’ in musical woman and musical knowledge iii) by analogy, like ‘good’ applied to the bed and to the mountain *aa*) in virtue of similarity, as Gorgias and the river both have the name ‘Gorgias’, from moving rapidly *bb*) from the similarity of the shape *cc*) by metaphor, like the feet and crown of a mountain. Ammonius does not give many details, and may have run together different classifications into one.

Philoponus follows Ammonius somewhat, perhaps because his “commentary” was, it seems, his notes on Ammonius. Be that as it may, he offers two divisions.

The first one is: homonymy either I) by chance II) by intention 1) by memory 2) in hope 3) by analogy, as ‘foot’ for an animal and a hill 4) from something, like medical i) from a cause as a paradigm (—i.e., the formal cause?) as a picture of a man is called a man from the name ‘man’ being applied to the man ii) from the efficient cause, as a scalpel is called healthy 5) relative to one, like ‘healthy’ [and perhaps 6) not by proportion, namely, perhaps. a proportion suitable for making an analogy]. [*in Cat.* 16,22–17,10]

The second one is: homonymy is either I) by chance II) by intention 1) where one of the homonyms is named paronymously from the other a) from the efficient cause, as with ‘medical’ b) from the final cause, as with ‘healthy’ 2) where one of the homonyms is not named paronymously from the other when one thing is named in memory of the other earlier one. [21,14–22,11] This second classification resembles Ammonius’ one, but seems less organized, as Philoponus goes on to observe that the ‘from something’ and the ‘relative to something’ can be simultaneous or not, and that the ‘from something’ can be based on similarity or on the second having the shape of the first, as the picture has the shape of the man in the pictured and so both are called ‘man’. He also lists the difference of being said in hope or in memory. What we have here is basically Ammonius’ scheme, a bit more disorganized with a few other distinctions already made appended perhaps in haste.

Whatever its nuances, the interpretation of Simplicius *et al.* makes homonymy more a matter of the relationship between concepts about things, than about the things themselves.⁷² Perhaps in this he has

⁷² Concetta Luna, “Commentaire,” p. 41: “...une interprétation “conceptualiste” de l’homonymie: pour Simplicius, l’homonymie consiste dans le rapport entre un seul

become more Platonist, as Plato saw homonymy as more a matter of different beliefs people have about things than a doctrine about things and their names.⁷³

I shall now make some remarks useful for understanding these classifications and Avicenna's use of them.

In surveying the corpus of Aristotle, the Greek commentators found a broad and a narrow conception of homonymy. Sometimes Aristotle calls any things said in many ways homonyms. Other times he distinguishes homonyms from things said to be relative to something. Some beings do not have the merely accidental unity of a name, but a real unity, sufficient to ground a science of being *qua* being as Alexander notes. In contrast to this scientific use of a sort of homonymy, Aristotle also names a fallacy one of "homonymy".

Still, on account of Aristotle's general use of 'homonymy', the commentators had reason to see how all these more particular ways in which things are said in many ways could fit into a general scheme of homonymy.

However, they tended to leave out, or at least deemphasize, some cases of homonymy from their general classification: analogy, metaphor, and the homonymy of the fallacy [which we might call, following Avicenna *et al.* 'ambiguity']. Accordingly, they explain that Aristotle did not discuss metaphor and analogy, and likewise heteronymy and polynymy, in the *Categories* as he relegated these topics to rhetorical and poetical works.

In some of these classifications of homonymy we see the appearance of paronymy. Simplicius even goes so far as to make paronymy intermediate between synonymy and homonymy. [*in Cat.* 37,3–4] No one gives a full explanation why, but we can construct one.⁷⁴ Accept

mot et une multiplicité de représentations mentales produites par ce mot, plutôt que dans le rapport entre un seul mot et une multiplicité de choses."

⁷³ Concetta Luna, "Commentaire," pp. 56–7: "Comme l'a souligné J. P. Anton, la différence d'approche du problème de l'homonymie, entre Aristote et Platon, consiste en ce que pour Platon l'homonymie est une question d'opinions différentes (ce qui est cohérent avec la conception platonicienne de la philosophie comme dialogue), tandis que pour Aristote les ambiguïtés qu'il faut lever ne sont pas celles des opinions: le problème naît uniquement parce que certaines réalités ont le même nom que d'autres." Cf. J. P. Anton, "The Aristotelian Doctrine of Homonymy in the *Categories* and its Platonic Antecedents," *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 6 (1968), 315–326, p. 317.

⁷⁴ This is the charitable interpretation. The other leading candidate is that they confused in what ways the 'relative to something' and the 'from something' are related.

Aristotle's doctrine of focal meaning. Then there will be things having different definitions yet having the same name derived from the focal one. E.g., walking and having a temperature of 98°F are both called "healthy", a name derived from the name 'health'.⁷⁵ (Note that their having the same name is a feature accidental to particular natural languages, like English and Greek. Indeed Arabic with its more complex verbal system would tend to use different forms for names for 'being productive of health' and 'being a sign of health'.)⁷⁶ Here then we have a case of two things sharing the same name yet differing in account. So they are homonyms. Yet each of them is also a paronym relative to health. On this interpretation, health, the state itself, would not be a homonym relative to one of the things called "healthy".

Ammonius' classification, despite being expressed unclearly, falls along these lines. Some homonyms have a paronymous name in common; others do not. Thus Philoponus says, "for it (medical) is named paronymously from it (medicine), while [holding] homonymously to each other." [*in Cat.* 21,201; cf. Simplicius, *in Cat.* 264,7–10]⁷⁷ However, his use of 'from something' and 'relative to something' would be rather careless. For all homonyms having a paronymous name are said "from something". But then Ammonius goes on to subdivide these two into those having things named from the efficient cause, as being productive of, say, health, and into those having things named from the final cause, as for the sake of health. The problem is that he describes the former as "from something" and the latter as "relative to something". Yet these expressions also describe the structure common to all such paronyms. Ammonius himself admits that some combine these two types [*in Cat.* 21,21–2].

⁷⁵ Cf. Philoponus, *in Cat.* 15,7–10, although he is discussing names for things and for their essence.

⁷⁶ As Avicenna himself notes at *Al-Maḡulāt*, eds. G. Anawati, A. El-Ehwani, M. El-Khodeiri, & S. Zayed (Cairo, 1959) (Part One, Volume Two of *Aṣ-Šifā*) 16,12–17,14; *Al-Ṭbāʾa*, ed. M. Al-Khudayri (Cairo, 1970), (Part One, Volume Three of *Aṣ-Šifā*) 19,16–21,6. He is following al-Fārābī, *Kitāb al-Hurūf*, ed. M. Mahdi (Beirut, 1969), e.g., §§19–20, 71,2–15. On the structure of paronymy in Arabic see W. Wright, *A Grammar of the Arabic Language* (Cambridge, 1967), Vol. I §195; Wolfdietrich Fischer, *A Grammar of Classical Arabic*, 3rd ed. trans. J. Rodgers (New Haven, 2002) p. 35.

⁷⁷ Concetta Luna, "Commentaire," p. 149: "La langue grecque n'a pas deux termes pour désigner la triangularité et le triangle, comme elle en a deux pour désigner la courbure... et ce qui est courbe... On dit donc "τρίγωνον" à la fois pour désigner la propriété d'être triangle... et pour désigner le triangle écrit sur le tableau ou fait en bois (le poion). Cette double signification de "trigwnon" en fait un terme homonyme."

The doctrines of the Greek commentators passed into Islamic philosophy, just as the late Greek commentators themselves were exiled from a Byzantine Christian court but then invited to establish a school by a Muslim caliph.⁷⁸ Let us now see what Avicenna does with it.

Avicenna begins by discussing synonymy, whereas Aristotle starts *Categories* 1 with homonymy. The Greek commentators made a great defense of Aristotle's order of presentation (Cf. Simplicius, in *Cat.* 21,1–22,13). In contrast, Avicenna is rejecting it.

Avicenna holds that names have a relation to things via senses or concepts. We have seen some basis for such a conception of senses in Aristotle and the Greek commentators, as well as in the Arabic translation of the *Categories* and in al-Fārābī. There is also the Stoic concept of the *lekton*, which seems quite a close relative of Avicenna's conception of a sense (*ma'nan*). Aside from Stoic doctrines presented in the Greek commentators, it is hard to know what Stoic sources Avicenna had. Still, given his extensive treatment of hypotheticals in his formal logic (in *al-Qiyās*), he seems to have had some. In any case, for him the conception of a sense is fundamental. Also suggestive is the fact that Stoics tended not to distinguish synonymy and pluronymy, nor even heteronymy and homonymy.⁷⁹ This tendency would encourage Avicenna to see homonymy, synonymy etc. lying on a continuum.

Constructed on a conception of the sense, Avicenna's theory of homonymy is far simpler than those of the Greek commentators. Seeing its simplicity depends on having a certain interpretation of his conception of similarity. What makes things similar but not the same? We may say: because they share some but not all features. This holds even in a metaphorical comparison. A woman may be likened to a rose with respect to beauty but not with respect to having thorns or needing pruning in the winter. So too senses may have some similarity or overlap but not be the same. Thus, when Avicenna distinguishes homonyms, he says that homonyms of the second sort do not have the same sense but have a similarity. Now not having the same sense is compatible with having and with not having totally different senses. So we get cases like

⁷⁸ Gerhard Endress, "Die Wissenschaftliche Literatur," in *Grundrisse der Arabischen Philologie*, ed. H. Gätje (Wiesbaden, 1987), vol. 2, pp. 402–5.

⁷⁹ Cf. Simplicius, in *Cat.* 36,8–12. Concetta Luna, "Commentaire," p. 115: "Dans l'usage stoïcien, 'synonyme' a donc la même signification que 'polyonyme' et, pourrait-on dire, il correspond tout à fait l'usage moderne de ce mot. Simplicius affirme que l'usage aristotélicien est plus approprié..." Cf. C. Douglas McGee, "Who Means What by 'Synonymy'?", *Inquiry* 2 (1959), 199–212.

similarity, such as Socrates and his picture both being named ‘man’. Avicenna will consider metaphors of the same type, like the leg of an animal and a bed, and analogies, like the ‘archē’ of number and line—apparently with analogy being a type of metaphor.⁸⁰

Furthermore, it helps to view Avicenna’s classification of homonymy not as discrete but as continuous. In effect, he gives a continuum with one endpoint limiting the homonymous being the strictly synonymous and the other being the completely heteronomous (which he mentions at 11,4, and at 15,16–16,3 along with polynymy), having neither a common name, account, or sense. Inside this continuum, within each type of homonymy, he will discuss cases that satisfy its description more or less so. Moreover, because having disjoint, discrete types does not concern him, he does not fuss much over the classification but over the details of the structure of particular cases. So he has a continuum within his division, and perhaps implies this at *Al-Maqūlāt* 11,5–7; 14,6–15,15. But, for the sake of reference, I shall divide up and number the sorts that he does discuss.

His classification is threefold:

It may be said that everything that is not by way of agreement [synonymy] is by coincidence of the name [homonymy], and has three divisions: that is because either [I] the sense is one in itself, even though it differs in another respect, or that [II] it is not one, but between the two of them there is a similarity, or that [III] it is not one and there is also not a similarity between them.⁸¹

The first division [I] contains things that are not strictly synonymous but share a single sense. In light of the descriptions and examples, the first division includes those things said by Aristotle and the commentators to be named either “from something” or “relative to something”.⁸² [II] The second division concerns cases where the things being named have a real basis of similarity for sharing the name, but not the same sense. From the examples, this type seems to include all cases based on a real resemblance, including metaphor, analogy, and similarity of appearance, like the example of Socrates and his picture. [III] The third division concerns cases where the things share only the name.⁸³

⁸⁰ Cf. Aristotle, *Poetics* 1457b6–16.

⁸¹ *Al-Maqūlāt* 10,4–7; all translations from this are mine.

⁸² Cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 1030a32–b7; *Nicomachean Ethics* 1147b34–1148a2.

⁸³ A likely important source for this classification is al-Fārābī’s *Short Treatise On Aristotle’s* De interpretatione, trans. Zimmermann (Oxford, 1981), pp. 49–52, pp. 227–30.

Avicenna considers senses, the concepts in the mental language [cf. *Int.* 16a3–8], to exist in the mind via sense perception and abstraction. Such senses are given conventional names by imposition or stipulation in the written or spoken language. These senses differ from definitions or “accounts” (λόγοι) proper, as they contain all that is common to the individuals from which they are abstracted. Avicenna gives the example of people living in the Sudan: from them we would have the sense or concept of a human being as having black skin, even though the definition of human being, grounded upon *quiddities* in themselves accessed via intuition (νοῦς) does not include that characteristic.⁸⁴

I now discuss each type of homonymy distinguished:

[I] Given what he says at 11,5, Avicenna divides homonyms sharing a name and a single sense into A) the absolute and B) the relative. Both the absolute and the relative sorts concern things with focal meaning. Avicenna says about all these cases that the two things could have instead been named by different names or expressions—presumably synonymous ones. Even in the absolute cases, we could have said, more precisely, e.g., ‘being that is prior’ and ‘being that is posterior’. Hence, even though only the relative cases use paronymous names as commonly understood, even the absolute cases use names having a whiff of the paronymous.⁸⁵

[A] In the absolute sort, the name applies to the two things in the same sense. The name does not need a different sense when predicated of each. Yet it will need a different “account”, or perhaps definition, if the things are to avoid being synonyms.

1. [10,8–11] ‘Existent’ (being; ὄν) can be applied to substances, quantities etc. in the same sense and so is used absolutely.⁸⁶ Quantities and substances exist *in re* in the same sense. Yet they do differ in terms of priority and posteriority and this, as Aristotle had said, eliminates strict synonymy.⁸⁷ (Indeed Simplicius had brought up this issue later on in his *Categories* commentary. [418,19–419,6]) Also they differ in the sense that they have different modes of existence or being: as a substance, as a quantity etc. This fits with Avicenna’s metaphysics where the

⁸⁴ *Al-Burhān*, ed. Badawi (Cairo, 1954), 46,11–6 *et passim*. Cf. Avicenna, *Fī Al-Nafs*, ed. G. Anawati (Cairo, 1962), II.2. I thank Claude Panaccio for instigating this paragraph.

⁸⁵ As in Porphyry’s distinction II.2 perhaps.

⁸⁶ Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 1030a32–b7.

⁸⁷ *Eudemian Ethics* 1218a1–8.

necessary being causes various *quiddities* to come to exist *in re* and to associate with other ones via acquiring *differentiae* and via some becoming accidental to others.⁸⁸

2. [10,12–16] Avicenna also says that homonyms may have a name with the same sense and be simultaneous (being neither prior nor posterior), while differing in being primary and secondary. He gives no examples. I offer as possible candidates a triangle and an isosceles triangle both being named ‘triangle’ or being named ‘something having its interior angles equal to two right angles’. As Aristotle had said, such names hold of both triangle and the isosceles triangle, but of the former primarily and of the latter not so. [*An. Po.* I.5]

3. [10,17–11,4] Other names keep the same sense and even the same account but differ in what they signify about the things they describe. Ivory and snow are not equally white. They are white understood on the same definition. Still ‘white’ when applied to ivory means ‘off-white’, let’s say, while, when applied to snow, it means ‘arctic white’. The Greek commentators do not mention this case.⁸⁹

Why does Avicenna say that such homonyms have the same sense? Apparently, he is thinking of white as the genus, covering a range of whitish colors. These colors would be differentiated by specific *differentiae* like ‘off-’ and ‘arctic’ in the example above. They still share the same general, Aristotelian definition of whiteness: standing out in sight.⁹⁰ Nevertheless, they are not precisely synonyms with respect to ‘white’ it seems. For they are more or less white, and so have the name hold of them in different degrees. They also fall under the priority condition given by Aristotle,⁹¹ like the first two cases (IA.1 & 2).

Avicenna also remarks, about this sort but presumably with general import, that in ordinary language names will be used imprecisely and their senses must be ascertained from the intention of the speaker. Indeed Avicenna regularly distinguishes an ideal, technical language from the ordinary vernacular. Perhaps he is thinking here of such cases as when ‘white’ is taken to describe varying colors of human skin.⁹²

⁸⁸ See Allan Bäck, “The *Triplex Status* and its Justification,” *Studies in the History of Logic*, eds. I. Angelelli & M. Cerrezo (Berlin, 1996).

⁸⁹ Possibly: *Nicomachean Ethics* 1147b34–1148a2.

⁹⁰ Cf. Ammonius, in *Cat.* 45,2; 40, 13–4.

⁹¹ *Eudemian Ethics* 1218a1–8.

⁹² See Allan Bäck, “The Ordinary Language Approach in Traditional Logic,” in *Argumentationstheorie*, ed. K. Jacobi (Leiden, 1993), pp. 507–30, pp. 511–2.

[B] [11,5–7] The relative sort concerns things having the same name said “relative to something” in Aristotle’s account of focal meaning. In this case the shared sense does not come from the name common to the two homonyms but from the thing relative to which they have a relationship. Thus the knife and exercise may have a common, paronymous name, ‘medical’. ‘Medical’ however is defined differently when predicated of the knife and exercise. The shared sense comes from the presence of ‘medicine’ in the different definitions.

Avicenna differs fundamentally from the Greek commentators and perhaps from Aristotle himself about what things he allows to share a single name in the same sense. He has a set of examples of names ranging from ‘existent’ to ‘white’ and ‘philosophy’ to ‘medical’ and ‘healthy’ and ‘divine’. He says that some of these names hold absolutely with different degrees of priority, primacy, or participation, while others hold only relatively. The fundamental point lies in his claiming that cases like ‘being’ and ‘medical’ have formal differences. Even Aristotle grouped these cases together in arguing for the unity of a science of being *qua* being. To put the point historically backwards, Avicenna has a position on transcendental terms more like Scotus’ than Aristotle’s.

II. [11,8–12,7] The type where the sense of the name is not one but the homonyms have a similarity is homonymy proper, in the narrow sense distinguished by Alexander. Avicenna runs together two examples commonly kept apart by the Greek commentators. (A) The first is the basic one from *Categories* 1, where an animal and its picture are homonyms with respect to being named ‘animal’. (B) The second is the standard example of a metaphor, of a leg of an animal and a leg of a bed.⁹³ Avicenna recognizes that the latter is a metaphor while the former is not. Still he observes that the metaphor was made on the basis of a perceived similarity—and so he does not use the usual Arabic word for ‘metaphor’ but instead calls this “a transferred name”: we might call it a *simile*.⁹⁴ In both cases the name is applied to one homonym primarily and to the other secondarily.

He also remarks that some of these homonyms are (C) fixed by itself (or *per se*) while (D) others are based on a “relationship” (*nisba*).

(C) The first sort seems straightforward. The very attributes of the two things involved fix the similarity. Thus the form of the animal and

⁹³ *Poetics* 1457b16–9; *Rhetoric* 1401a12–5.

⁹⁴ Cf. Zimmermann, *al-Fārābī’s Commentary*, p. 227, nn. 2–3.

the form of its picture are similar, and so are the shapes of the legs of animals and tables because of attributes of the two things involved.

(D) The second sort is more cryptic. ‘*Nisba*’ can also mean ‘attribution’ or ‘proportion’. Avicenna seems to use it in a quasi-technical sense to signify a relationship between two things that does not fall into the category of relation.⁹⁵ From the Greek commentators we can see that the relationship here is analogy, which can be understood as a “proportion”. The example of ‘beginning’ (ἀρχή) is the standard one of analogy in Porphyry and Simplicius.

Some of the subdivisions of the classifications given by the Greek commentators might apply to this second sort, as I will discuss below. For example, Avicenna mentions Ammonius’ distinction [I.2.i–iii] of giving things a common name by chance, in memory, or in hope. [14,1–5]

III. [11,8–13.14] In the third main type, the two things have only the name in common, with no shared sense or similarity. Avicenna does not include metaphor here when it has a real basis—the transferred name or simile. However, when ‘dog’ is applied to a star and an animal, in the example from the *Rhetoric*, Avicenna thinks that there is no real similarity between stars and dogs, but only a merely mental one.⁹⁶ So Aristotle puts this example here. Paralogisms of the fallacy of homonymy would belong to this sort too.⁹⁷

Avicenna does offer the option that, if such cases like the dog and the Dog star could be shown to have a real similarity, then they would belong to the second sort and be similes. [13,15–14,6] He uses the example of the name ‘*ayn*’ applied to an eye and to cash. He gives an etymological way to connect them up so that they have a real similarity, but seems to be ambivalent about whether or not there is indeed a real similarity. He distinguishes here the three causes for applying the name of an eye (‘*ayn*’) to cash that Ammonius had given: coincidence, memory, and hope. [II.2ai–iii] For Avicenna these would suggest that the naming had no real similarity. Still, he can also apply his remark about ordinary language use and the intention of the speaker here, so as to allow for a loose conception of the second type (II).

Avicenna settles on calling this third sort ‘ambiguity’ (*taṣkīk*). Thus, when discussing whether being is a genus for the ten categories or whether it is “said in many ways”, he says:

⁹⁵ *Nicomachean Ethics* 1148b7–10. See too 67,2–3; 79,5; 85,10; 145,17. Cf. al-Fārābī, *Kūṭāb al-Ḥurūf* §§37–40.

⁹⁶ Aristotle, *Physics* 249a19–25; *Nicomachean Ethics* 1147b34–1148a2.

⁹⁷ Cf. *Al-Safsāṭa*, ed. A. Ehwany (Cairo, 1958), 45,5; 50,14.

And the multiplication of what is being talked about is in three modes: Either there is multiplication via agreement in its subjects, or a multiplication via a coincidence in inflection comprehending its similarity and participation [homonymy], or a multiplication via ambiguity. [59,10–1]

Apparently Avicenna means by “agreement in its subjects” here not synonymy (as ‘agreement’ normally means for him) but having the same sense. If so, we have the focal-meaning type of homonymy (I), homonymy in the narrow sense, the second type (II) of homonymy, and ambiguity as its third type (III). Avicenna, being interested in science and not sophistry, would have little use in his own philosophy for this third sort, and so would separate it out.

He distinguishes the second and third types of homonymy in the same way at 14,6–15,15. He goes on to observe that they agree in not having the same account but using a single name. He then gives a somewhat confusing discussion of the example where the name ‘leg’ is applied to both a bed and an animal. Above he said that this was a case of the second type. Here he suggests a way that it might, alternatively, be taken of the third type and be a case of mere ambiguity. The main idea is that the things could have the similarity of being three-dimensional bodies, but differ in being legs. For after all, Aristotle would say that a leg that is not alive is a leg only homonymously. [*Part. An.* 640b35–641a5; cf. *Metaph.* 1035b23–5; 1036b30–2] If this were the only similarity between bed and animal legs—and not also being a support for the main bulk of an object etc.—then ‘leg’ would indeed be used ambiguously. However the things being compared do seem to have such additional similarities. Thus the example looks contrived. It has the further problem that animal legs and bed legs are legs synonymously with respect to the name ‘body’—unless Avicenna is thinking of making it an instance of one of the sorts of the first type of homonymy (I). This entire discussion would then resemble the standard one in the Greek commentators about whether homonyms are synonyms: with respect to the name ‘homonym’ the things that are homonyms via another name are synonyms; with respect to that other name, they are homonyms.⁹⁸

(Avicenna also considers but rejects an argument appearing in the *Sophistical Refutations* [165a10–3] that homonymy is inevitable as there

⁹⁸ E.g., Simplicius, in *Cat.* 30,16–31,21.

are an infinite number of things but only a finite number of words. This entire issue does not appear in the Greek commentators.)

In sum, Avicenna has a field of homonymy running the full spectrum of the phenomena: the linguistic data and the *endoxa*, the texts of Aristotle and the others, and the reputable common ways of talking. Strict synonymy, where the name has no change in inflection and the definition, gives one endpoint or limit to the spectrum. The things having the same name in the same sense but in different respects (I) lie on the boundary of homonymy closest to that endpoint. Mere ambiguity, where it has just chanced in a particular language that the same sign, spoken and/or written, happens to be used for two different objects without any common ground, provides the other boundary. Heteronymy, where two different things have two different names, senses, and definitions, provides the other endpoint or limit. Various changes of meaning, along with the respective texts in the Aristotelian tradition, can be fitted along the continuum of this spectrum within those limits.

Avicenna's division of homonymy does not match up with the standard one of the Greek commentators. Take their main one: homonyms by chance or by intention. Some of each of these types will fall into his third type, where there is no overlap in sense or in similarity. The same word may chance to name two different sorts of objects, like κλέις in Greek, *ʿayn* in Arabic, and 'bank' in English, with no overlap. Yet likewise we can have such names intentionally: if I call my child 'angel' in hope that she will act like one, or my wastebasket 'Dubya' in memory of a U.S. President. One might object that in the latter cases there is an imagined similarity. But for Avicenna such fancies are for sophists; an imagined similarity need not be a real one.

Avicenna's scheme for homonymy has the advantage over the earlier ones of greater compass. He can include in it the fallacious, metaphorical, and ambiguous sort of homonymy that were omitted or left to one side earlier. He also has a greater range of texts from Aristotle, e.g., *Sophistical Refutations* 165a10–3, on the argument that homonymy is inevitable because things are infinite while words are finite.

Avicenna has a very complex terminology for 'homonymy'. The homonymous he indicates by two expressions, not necessarily similar in his own theory: "participating" or "sharing" (*iṣṭirāk*), on the one hand, and "coinciding" (*ittiḥḩāq*), on the other. The latter appears in Iṣḩāq's translation of *Categories* 1. The former comes from Arabic philology and was used by al-Fārābī, who uses "participation in the name" when

speaking of two senses of ‘non-existent’.⁹⁹ These two expressions have the common notion that the things share the name, or coincide or agree in it, but not in the definition. In addition Avicenna adds ‘ambiguous’ (*mutašābih*) and ‘equivocal’ (*mušakuk*) to the mix, each of which might be used to signify homonymy. Many translators have ignored these differences and just translated most of these expressions by ‘ambiguous’ or ‘homonymous’.¹⁰⁰ Yet Avicenna does take some pains to keep all these terms distinct.

However, Avicenna perhaps has a technical usage for these different expressions, obscured by such translations. (I have noted that the Revised Oxford translation of Aristotle is not too precise either!) Now we have seen that the Greek commentators kept distinct various types of homonymy often signified by different expressions. Following their tradition, Avicenna distinguishes different types of homonymy too. Does he have a systematic vocabulary?

In light of Avicenna’s classification of homonymy, I suggest that Avicenna generally, albeit with exceptions, has the following usage: ‘coincident’, following Ishāq’s translation, signifies homonymy in general, and sometimes, in particular the narrow sort of homonymy discussed in *Categories* 1, i.e., type II. Likewise ‘equivocal’ when modifying ‘name’ would represent some sort of homonymy, such that the two homonyms have two different definitions or accounts relative to that name.¹⁰¹ ‘Participating’ signifies the first type (I) of homonymy, based on focal meaning, and ‘ambiguity’ the third type (III) dealing with poetry, rhetoric, and sophistry. Thus, for instance he contrasts synonymy, homonymy by participation, and ambiguity.¹⁰² So perhaps Avicenna has a systematic vocabulary as well as a systematic theory for homonymy.

How does Avicenna’s classification fare as an interpretation of Aristotle? Above all, his theory seems to differ, as he uses senses as well as

⁹⁹ *Kitāb al-Hurūf* 122,4; so too in Avicenna, *Safsafa* 45,5; 47,1 when discussing the fallacy of homonymy. Cf. Zimmermann, *al-Fārābī’s Commentary and Short Treatise*, p. 228 n.3. This use of ‘participation’ may not be confusing Aristotle with Plato. Cf. Ammonius, in *Cat.* 22,2–10, on division of homonymy, incl. participation. S. Marc Cohen and G. Matthews, trans. & comm. Ammonius: *On Aristotle’s Categories* (Ithaca, 1991), n. 42, claim that this is Platonist.

¹⁰⁰ Goichon in her *Lexique* and the editors of *Al-Maqūlāt* in their Index of terms do give different translations for most but don’t explain the differences.

¹⁰¹ Cf. *Al-Maqūlāt* 11,5; 94,13.

¹⁰² *Al-Maqūlāt* 28,5–8.

names and “accounts” (or definitions) in his analysis of homonymy. Aristotle himself does not mention “senses” in his account—unless we accept the new Owenite orthodoxy that homonymy deals with meanings. So it depends how strongly we take Aristotle’s claim that homonyms have *only* a name in common. [*Cat.* 1a3]

Avicenna’s scheme fares better as giving a theory covering Aristotle’s uses and remarks on homonymy. The continuum gives a clear sense to Aristotle’s distinction between close and remote homonymy¹⁰³ in terms of being closer to or further away from having a relation of synonymy. That is, we can think of objects as having senses and then consider to what extent the senses overlap. For modern interpreters also have claimed that “the distinction between homonymy (complete difference in definitions) and synonymy (identity of definitions) is not a dichotomy because definitions may be partially identical, partially different.”¹⁰⁴

Again, Hintikka also complains that Aristotle is not consistent in different passages in classifying analogical and metaphorical uses of a word.¹⁰⁵ Avicenna’s discussion about how metaphors can be taken as type II or III has some use here as he offers a way to put analogy and metaphor on a continuum.

We might compare Avicenna’s classification of homonymy with a modern one, given as an interpretation of Aristotle. Christopher Shields, who also attributes senses and meanings to Aristotle, takes homonymy in general to be “comprehensive homonymy”, where the homonyms are “not completely overlapping in definition”.¹⁰⁶ He divides comprehensive homonymy into the discrete and the associated.¹⁰⁷ The discrete has no overlap in definition, while the associated does.¹⁰⁸ Homonymy

¹⁰³ Aristotle, *Physics* 249a19–25; *Nicomachean Ethics* 1147b34–1148a2.

¹⁰⁴ Hintikka. “Aristotle and the Ambiguity of Ambiguity,” p. 141.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 143.

¹⁰⁶ Christopher Shields, *Unity in Multiplicity* (Oxford, 1999), p. 11. Cf. T. H. Irwin, “Homonymy in Aristotle,” *Review of Metaphysics* 34 (1981), p. 255 on connected and unconnected homonymy. Likewise, Hintikka. “Aristotle and the Ambiguity of Ambiguity,” p. 144: “We have to realize that the distinction between homonyms and terms with merely different applications often amounts to something rather different from distinction between complete and partial discrepancy of definitions.”

¹⁰⁷ Christopher Shields, *Unity in Multiplicity*, p. 29.

¹⁰⁸ So too T. H. Irwin, “Homonymy in Aristotle,” p. 524, with “connected” and “disconnected” homonymy—i.e., Avicenna’s I & II versus III. He goes on, p. 528, to contrast homonymy where the term is predicated of both things strictly, from the “spurious cases, where only one is, while the second has the predication based on similarity—i.e., Avicenna’s I versus II.

of focal meaning is one sort of the associated, which Shields calls the core-dependent.¹⁰⁹ He also divides the associated into the accidental and the non-accidental, which seems to include the core-dependent.¹¹⁰ (He also distinguishes seductive and non-seductive homonymy, as well as homonymy based on shallow and deep differences in signification, although he does not want these in his classification proper.¹¹¹ The former distinction contrasts homonymies easy to spot from those that are not; the latter does something similar by appealing to nominal versus real definitions.)

In the terms of the Greek commentators (whom he does not cite much) and Avicenna, Shield's comprehensive is homonymy in the broad sense (I–III), the discrete is homonymy in the narrow sense (I & II), the associated is that of the focal meaning sort (I), the accidental is homonymy by chance, and the non-accidental is homonymy by intention. So Avicenna does not have too different a classification from Shield's, except that his doctrine of shared senses gives more precision to "overlap", and his scheme gives Aristotelian philosophy more theoretical coherence. Indeed, if we are to follow the "new" orthodoxy of attributing senses to Aristotle, we might as well become followers of Avicenna. Anthropological trope theory today uses a vertical dimension of analogy similar to Avicenna's continuum.¹¹² Moreover, as for the contemporary treatment of fallacy, if Powers is right that all fallacies can be reduced to the fallacy of equivocation, Avicenna's classification may offer a start to a comprehensive theory.¹¹³

There are some semblances of scholarly and philological scholasticism, with regard to Aristotelian studies...but the hurricane of Avicenna's philosophy quickly swept such tendencies away.¹¹⁴

Averroes as The Commentator?

The Aristotelian tradition may have slighted Avicenna as a commentator on account of Averroes being given canonical status as 'the

¹⁰⁹ Christopher Shields, *Unity in Multiplicity*, pp. 37; 27.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 29.

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 39–40; 101–2. Cf. Aristotle, *Sophistical Refutations* 182b25–7.

¹¹² Paul Friedrich, "Polytropy," in *Beyond Metaphor*, ed. J. Fernandez (Stanford, 1991), pp. 19–55, p. 40.

¹¹³ Lawrence Powers, "Equivocation," in *Fallacies*, eds. H. Hansen & R. Pinto (University Park, 1995), pp. 293–301, p. 287.

¹¹⁴ Dmitri Gutas, *Greek Thought, Arabic Culture*, p. 55.

Commentator". In addition, Averroes depicts Avicenna as a deviant Aristotelian and a lousy commentator. Before assessing Avicenna's worth as a commentator, let me review this historiography.

Averroes is known in the West in two guises: first, as the Commentator on Aristotle's works (with the exception of a few like the *Politics*).¹¹⁵ This appellation came about because he gave the most literal and extensive commentary then available, and because in large part the West received the works of Aristotle in Latin translation incorporated into Averroes' commentary. Second, as the leader of Averroism in the Renaissance, where, among other things, he was followed for his views on the active intellect. In his latter guise, his *Incoherence of the Incoherence* assumed prominence, where he debates with Al-Ghazālī over the orthodoxy of the views of the philosophers. Yet even here Averroes mostly follows the Greek commentators and occasionally earlier Islamic commentators like al-Fārābī or Avicenna.

Thus the medievals reckoned Averroes as "The Commentator" of Aristotle without equal. At any rate, so they appellated him. Why did he deserve to have this name so imposed?

The usual story is this: Averroes, that is, Abu'l Walid Muhammad ibn Ahmad ibn Muhammad ibn Rushd, was born at Cordoba in Andalusia in the twelfth century into a family of jurists and theologians of the literalist tradition. He himself became a judge, as well as a court physician and a philosopher. He was commissioned by the caliph, Abū Ya'qūb, to write a series of commentaries on Aristotle, so that the doctrine could be understood more clearly and used by the Islamic community.¹¹⁶

At the least this standard view of Averroes as The Commentator needs modification. For we know that there were many literal commentaries on Aristotle's works available before Averroes and indeed before Avicenna, notably in Baghdad. Perhaps the point remains that those in Spain did not have these works accessible, and so needed a set of Aristotle commentaries locally. However, Muslim Spain was not that isolated: recall that Maimonides managed to move from Spain to Africa to Egypt.

At any rate, upon his commission from the caliph, Averroes then wrote a series of threefold commentaries on most of the works of Aristotle.

¹¹⁵ Oliver Leaman, *Averroes and his Philosophy* (Oxford, 1988), p. 179.

¹¹⁶ George Hourani, *Averroes on the Harmony of Philosophy and Religion* (Leiden, 1959), pp. 12–3.

For most of the works, he wrote an epitome, a medium-length or middle commentary, and a long commentary. For him, these commentaries had different functions: 1) the epitomes were designed for general use, and accordingly contained many remarks not to be found in the works of Aristotle, so as to relate the doctrines of Aristotle to the current conditions in Muslim Andalusia; 2) the middle commentaries were designed for the religious authorities, those who had a profound knowledge of Islam but were not philosophers; 3) the long commentaries were designed for specialists, sc., for the few, elite philosophers. This division of labor among the commentaries agrees with Averroes' theory of the threefold levels of truth: the rhetorical, the dialectical, and the demonstrative.¹¹⁷

Averroes' commentaries follow in the tradition of his native culture and jurisprudence: they are literalist. Despite the insistence of some on the brilliance of Averroes,¹¹⁸ I can find nothing original in detail in Averroes that cannot be found in earlier philosophers and commentators, notably Alexander and Themistius. The exceptions concern general and not particular features, as I discuss next. We might call him not "the Commentator" as the medievals did, but 'the Paraphraser'. However, I am not certain that this is a criticism. For Averroes was a literalist. Further, at his time, given that many commentators on Aristotle, like Porphyry, Simplicius, and al-Fārābī, had injected Neoplatonic and Stoic influences, and others, like Avicenna, had departed greatly from the text, a literalist interpretation, intent on reclaiming the original Aristotle, had some value.

Moreover, Averroes did not paraphrase blindly all of Aristotle's works nor the earlier commentaries, especially of Alexander of Aphrodisias. For instance, take his commentary on the *Poetics*. Note that Islam had no tradition of theater. Accordingly, Averroes had no experience of plays, whether tragic or comic. Now, in writing his commentary on the *Poetics*, Averroes did not follow Avicenna's lead, of trying, pathetically, to explain what tragedies and comedies were on the basis, it seems, of *marginalia* in the Arabic translations of the *Poetics*. Instead, he looked for counterparts for tragedies and comedies in his own culture. He found them in the poetical traditions of eulogy and satire. His examples are not as silly as you might think. Indeed, they give some plausibility to the

¹¹⁷ Hourani, *On the Harmony of Religion and Philosophy*, pp. 64–6.

¹¹⁸ E.g., Leaman, *Averroes* pp. 10; 110.

claim that Aristotle's philosophy, or, if you like, philosophy in general, has some claim to being transcultural.

Another instance of Averroes' independent thought concerns political theory. Averroes commented on most works of Aristotle. One big exception is the *Politics*. In its place, he commented on Plato's *Republic*. We can suspect various reasons for this. One is that Averroes is following the Islamic tradition of al-Fārābī *et al.*, who commented upon and extended the doctrines of Plato's *Republic* to Islam. Another is that he would have found Plato's political theory more relevant to the caliphate structure of government common in Andalusia. A third is that, given his own theory of the threefold levels of truth, he would have found Plato's view of the relation of philosophy and religion, with its supporting doctrines, more congenial or, at any rate, more explicit than Aristotle's. Still, on the whole, Averroes does little in his commentaries besides present Aristotle's texts in a close reading, with explications drawn from earlier commentators.

Averroes may though have had originality in his depiction of Avicenna. In his debate with Al-Ghazālī, largely unknown to the medieval West, he defended philosophy by offering Avicenna as a scapegoat. In general he asserts that Aristotle and the like do not have views antithetical to Islam. Rather only Aristotle as interpreted by Avicenna does. Averroes concedes the incoherence of *a* philosopher, *sc.*, of Avicenna's views, both with the text of Aristotle and with the truth, while defending the coherence of the other philosophers.

In this, Averroes may have been partly responsible for the Latin medievals' having an "Avicenne *factif*," as well as an "Aristote *factif*." For instance, he represents Avicenna as defining the possible as what has a cause and the necessary existent as what does not have a cause.¹¹⁹ True, Avicenna does hold that the "possible existent" needs a cause to exist while the necessary existent does not.¹²⁰ Still, he holds too that the logically possible itself like the necessary needs no cause for being possible: it is possible in itself. Averroes makes other mistakes about Avicenna's doctrines, e.g., that he denied that there can be an infinite number of souls.¹²¹ Again, Averroes accuses Avicenna of being wrong on the nature of the empirical agent, and sides with Aristotle. However,

¹¹⁹ Van den Bergh, *Tahāfut*, pp. 164–6 [277–80].

¹²⁰ Al-Ilāhiyyāt I.6.

¹²¹ Van den Bergh, *Tahāfut*, p. 163 [274], but see p. 14 n. 6; n. 1 and *Al-Ilāhiyyāt* IX.3–4.

he does not seem to have Aristotle's view correctly.¹²² Again, Averroes may be making the same mistake in accusing Avicenna for introducing matter for incorporeal substances and not following Aristotle.¹²³

Again, in his *Questions on Logic*, Averroes sees Avicenna as the odd-ball among commentators who has committed many errors both of interpretation and of philosophy. He insists, against Avicenna, that the copula serves merely to connect subject and predicate and not to make an assertion of existence.¹²⁴ He particularly dislikes Avicenna's analysis (derived from Sosigenes and Alexander) of necessary and categorical propositions into different types according to the duration of the existence of the subject and the time of predication.¹²⁵ However, Averroes' own views look peculiar. He says that the existence of individual men has no relevance to the truth of 'every man is animal' because "the universals are not generable."¹²⁶ That is, a universal proposition concerns universals and not individuals. This surely moves away from Aristotle's insistence on the primacy of individual substances. (Averroes may have been inclined to this view by his view of the copula.)

One circumstance that might explain Averroes' inaccurate portrait of Avicenna—and Aristotle?—concerns the philosophical community in Spain at his time. There were then some rather fervent followers of al-Fārābī and Avicenna.¹²⁷ Averroes might be attacking their interpretations rather than the tortuous texts of Avicenna.

We might further explain a lot of Averroes' claims in light of his political motives.¹²⁸ He wanted to make philosophy respectable to

¹²² Van den Bergh, *Tahāfut*, pp. 108–9 [180–2]; 108 n. 1. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 1073a 28

¹²³ Van den Bergh, *Tahāfut*, p. 160 [270–1], but cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 1069b 25

¹²⁴ *Quaestiones in libros logicae*, in *Aristotelis Opera cum Averrois Commentariis* (Venice 1562–74; repr. Frankfurt-am-Main, 1962), vol. Ib 78B. (I have consulted the Arabic text in D. M. Dunlop, "Averroes on the Modality of Propositions," *Islamic Studies* 1 (1962), when available: §§11–2, pp. 32–4).

¹²⁵ *Quaestiones* 79L; 80B. He says, 80B–C, that Avicenna has a different view in *An-Najāt* (so too Nicholas Rescher, *Studies in the History of Arabic Logic* (Liverpool) 1963, p. 104. But cf. the notes above: Avicenna seems there only to be summarizing and simplifying his doctrines. George Hourani, "Ibn Sina on Necessary and Possible Existence," *The Philosophical Forum* 14.1 (1974), p. 74, agrees.

¹²⁶ *Quaestiones*, 80C.

¹²⁷ Nicholas Rescher, *Studies in the History of Arabic Logic*, p. 90.

¹²⁸ Cf. Barry Kogan, *Averroes and the Metaphysics of Causation* (Albany, 1985), pp. 7; 12–5; 722–3. He says, pp. 52–3, that Averroes is concealing his real views in the *Tahāfut*. But where then are they? In his "commentaries" on Aristotle? Cf. too, Thérèse-Ann Druart, "Averroes on God's Knowledge of Being *qua* Being," in *Studies in Thomistic Theology*, ed. P. Lockey (Houston, 1996), p. 185.

Muslim fundamentalists perhaps at the cost of truth. Too, Averroes may be attacking some of his Avicennian contemporaries more than Avicenna himself. For many of Avicenna's current followers ascribe some of Alexander's doctrines to him: the world as a necessary eternal animal; the divinity of the heavenly animal.¹²⁹ Given also his political motives, Averroes may well be attacking them more than Avicenna proper.

At any rate, clearly Averroes has the goal of making philosophy respectable to Muslims. E.g., on miracles he says:

The ancient philosophers did not discuss the problem of miracles, since according to them such things must not be examined and questioned, for they are the principles of the religions, and the man who inquires into them and doubts them deserves punishment, like the man who examines the other general religious principles, such as whether God exists...¹³⁰

Given Aristotle's (and Plato's!) contempt for popular religion, these claims have little truth.¹³¹ But they would serve to clear Aristotle of heresy, as Averroes wanted. For, at the conclusion of his *Tahāfut*, Averroes says that Al-Ghazālī had accused the philosophers of heresy, and now he has cleared them of the charges.¹³²

Averroes then may clear philosophy of heresy at the cost of making an Aristotle and an Avicenna *fictif*. Indeed he may have created one or more Averroes *fictifs* too! For his views in his various works do not agree.¹³³

So what to make of Averroes? He did write reliable, literal commentaries paraphrasing Aristotle's texts and previous commentaries on them. He also misrepresents Aristotle's views, especially in his debate

¹²⁹ Van den Bergh, *Tahāfut*, p. 254 [421]. Averroes: *Tahāfut al-Tahāfut*, Simon van den Bergh, trans. & comm. (London 1954). The numbers in brackets are page numbers from the Arabic, Averroes, *Tahafot at-tahafot*, ed. Maurice Bouyges (Beirut 1930). Also I consulted Beatrice Zedler, trans. & comm., *Destructio Destructionum Philosophiae Algazels* (Milwaukee, 1961).

¹³⁰ Van den Bergh, *Tahāfut*, p. 315 [514]. Averroes approves of religion pragmatically, because religion causes virtue in men. Cf. too p. 359 [580–2].

¹³¹ Alfred Ivry, "Towards a Unified View of Averroes' Philosophy," *The Philosophical Forum* 14.1 (1974), p. 108, says, "It seems well nigh impossible for Averroes to modify his position to accommodate the dogmas of religion or any particularist religion...in Averroes' view certain locutions [in the political sphere] are ones that are absurd outside that sphere." Ivry, pp. 109–10, has the implausible view that Averroes is struggling towards a view that the philosophical viewpoint is just as metaphorical and inadequate as the religious one.

¹³² Van den Bergh, *Tahāfut*, p. 362 [587].

¹³³ Cf. George Hourani, *Averroes on the Harmony of Religion and Philosophy* (London 1961), pp. 41–54; 77, who attributes two different views to Averroes.

with Al-Ghazālī, for the sake of making philosophy respectable in Islam. In doing so he caricatures Avicenna so as to offer him as a scapegoat for the devout to sacrifice instead of philosophy entire. This caricature may have distorted later views on Avicenna's worth as a commentator on Aristotle.

Conclusions

I have some sympathy for Hintikka's complaint:

...those who have not themselves wrestled with serious conceptual issues tend to underestimate by orders of magnitude the extent to which a great philosopher has to struggle against confusion, contradictions, and other difficulties.¹³⁴

One advantage medieval commentators have here over contemporary ones, despite their linguistic and historical poverty, lies in their having this same pragmatic interest: they seek to do Aristotelian science, not merely talk about it.

What sort of commentator would Aristotle himself have like to have had? Judging by how he treats his predecessors, including his friend and teacher Plato, he would have wanted someone who would comment on his writings in the way that he did upon Plato's writings.

His own student and successor Theophrastus did so upon his writings. Thus he disagreed with Aristotle on the validity of the mixed modal Barbara syllogism. He challenged Aristotle's account of the intellect and his astronomy. Hardly a tractable student.

Now certainly, like Theophrastus, Avicenna fits Aristotle's criteria for a commentator far more than Averroes does. At times Avicenna defends Aristotle's entire doctrine. At other times, he will reject Aristotle's teachings almost completely.

Would Aristotle like this? Certainly he treated his own teacher and his other predecessors thus. Yet we may distinguish choosing a successor of a school and a tradition from selecting someone to comment upon and preserve the original content of a member of that school. In this way, commentators are more like curators and historians, and less like those who wish to continue the tradition of the school.

¹³⁴ Jaakko Hintikka, "The Development of Aristotle's Ideas of Scientific Method," in *Aristotle's Philosophical Development*, ed. W. Wians (Lanham, Md., 1996), p. 84.

Should Aristotle like this? Suppose Aristotle had been put in the position of designing his own ideal commentator. Should he choose one dedicated to preserving his legacy and prevent it from being corrupted by later interpolations, corrections and emendations? Or one who would take his results as starting points for future research—as is indeed done in the sciences, which themselves have an Aristotelian base in doctrine as well as in their organization? Let us have Aristotle playing the Creator of The Commentator. In *De libero arbitrio* III.16, Augustine argues that it is better for God to create beings with free will who may well disobey His precepts and the path that He has set for them than to create beings who will do the right, divinely prescribed thing without having to make choices on their own. Now, just on those grounds alone, Aristotle may well prefer commentators of independent mind. But in his case, as his own views do not have the divine guarantee of being the truth, he has the additional ground for preferring commentators following the truth where it leads them, that his successors might make better choices and get better results than he did.

So I submit that Aristotle would choose Avicenna, not Averroes, to comment upon his works. Now we pedants may prefer the style of paraphrase and footnote. And of course such a style has its uses for those seeking to become familiar with a text—for students, be they beginning or advanced. Yet this approach does not make the philosophy being commented upon a living enterprise capable of growth and progress, but rather an antique curiosity suitable for custodians and gawkers. Averroes may rightly have been The Commentator for the Latin medievals just beginning to study Aristotle. Yet, judging by the citations of Avicenna at key points in discussions by Aquinas, Scotus, Ockham *et al.*, Avicenna was The Commentator for these working, creative philosophers. Perhaps we *moderni*—or *post-moderni*—also should take stock and reconsider what we want in a commentator.

ALBERTUS MAGNUS ON THE SUBJECT OF ARISTOTLE'S *CATEGORIES*

Bruno Tremblay¹

If the natural and metaphysical works written by Albertus Magnus (c. 1200–1280) have received attention from a relatively important number of researchers, it is nevertheless the case that his logical writings have been largely ignored by twentieth-century scholars.² One can only hope that the publication of the critical edition of his logical commentaries, by the Albertus-Magnus-Institut, will help change this situation. It seems to me that many reasons militate in favour of a closer and deeper study of his commentaries-paraphrases on Aristotle's *Organon* and on the treatises that tradition has added to it.³ It is too early to say much about the precise degree of originality of his logical writings,⁴ but we know that Albert the Great was among the very first medievals to produce a complete or nearly complete logical corpus, similar to

¹ Thank you to David Zettel, Cynthia Tremblay, and Lloyd Newton, for their kind and numerous suggestions concerning my use of the English language throughout this paper. It goes without saying that all remaining awkward wordings are my responsibility.

² The reasons for this fact are numerous and cannot be explained here. William A. Wallace enumerates some of them on pp. 11 and 15 of his "Albert the Great's Inventive Logic: His Exposition on the *Topics* of Aristotle," *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* 70 (1996), 11–39.

³ Besides his commentaries on Aristotle's *Categories*, *Peri Hermeneias*, *Prior Analytics*, *Posterior Analytics*, *Topics*, and *Sophistical Refutations*, we have his commentaries on Porphyry's *Isagoge*, on Boethius' *De divisione*, and on the anonymous *Liber sex principiorum*. Some passages from his works might lead us to believe that he also commented on one of Boethius' *opuscula* on categorical syllogisms and that he wrote a book on poetics, but these works, if they ever existed, are now lost. See *Analytica posteriora* 1.1.1, ed. Auguste Borgnet (Paris, 1890), p. 4A, and *Metaphysica* 3.2.10, ed. Bernhard Geyer (Münster, 1960), p. 127, l.34–35, and 5.5.5, p. 280, l.52.

⁴ The kind of general judgment passed by Sten Ebbesen on Albert's *Logica* seems to me to be quite hasty, to say the least, considering how little the details have been studied. See Sten Ebbesen, "Albert (the Great?)'s Companion to the *Organon*," in *Albert der Grosse. Seine Zeit, seine Werk, seine Wirkung*, ed. Albert Zimmermann (Berlin, 1981), pp. 89–103. A very different view on Albert's logical commentaries can be found in Ruth Meyer, "Eine neue Perspektive im Geistesleben des 13. Jahrhunderts: Plädoyer für eine Würdigung der *Organon*-Kommentierung Alberts des Großen," in *Geistesleben im 13. Jahrhundert*, ed. Jan A. Aertsen and Andreas Speer, *Miscellanea Mediaevalia* 27 (Berlin, 2000), pp. 189–201.

those which already existed among Arabic philosophers, and that he actually played an extremely important role in the assimilation to the West of Arabic thought, particularly in the field of logic.⁵ The time in which Albert made his contribution to logic is also crucial: the writing of his logical corpus (or at least most of it) probably took place in the 1250s,⁶ when Albert was in Cologne after having left the University of Paris, which situates this corpus just after those of Parisian masters of arts like Johannes Pagus, Nicholas of Paris, and Robert Kilwardby, but before the large number of commentaries from the last third of the thirteenth century and the beginning of the fourteenth. There is a definite possibility that Albert's teachings in logic influenced later commentators,⁷ and, combined with his general strength as a philosopher, it warrants a closer look at his writings in this discipline.

Further, Albert's teachings on the *Categories* deserves even more attention, if only because of the importance that has been traditionally given to this particular treatise within Aristotle's thought, and because of the very serious difficulties that its interpretation poses, notwithstanding Augustine's famous claim that, as a young man, he easily read and understood it.⁸ At the core of these difficulties lies the precise identification of the subject of the book, and whether it is about things, concepts, or words, or all three. This problem is significant, both in itself, and also because of the bearing it has on questions like the method of the treatise, its division, or the part of philosophy it belongs to. The difficulty and significance of this problem were seen by medieval thinkers, and in particular by those of the thirteenth century, which of course does not mean that they were any more unanimous about its solution than we modern readers of Aristotle are. This presentation is obviously not the right place for an overall comparison of the different views on the subject of the *Categories* that dominated the thirteenth century,

⁵ Assimilation and influence that are especially evident in Albert's general introduction to logic. See Bruno Tremblay, "Albert le Grand: *De ce qui vient avant la logique*," *History and Philosophy of Logic* 25 (2004), 165–203.

⁶ Hugo Stehkämper, ed. *Albertus Magnus: Ausstellung zum 700. Todestag* (Cologne, 1980–81), pp. 135–136. See also the editor's introduction to Albert's *Super Porphyrium De V universalibus*, ed. Manuel Santos Noya (Münster, 2004), pp. vi–vii.

⁷ I am thinking here about commentators from the second half of the thirteenth century, but the same can be said about fourteenth- and fifteenth-century thinkers. See for instance E. P. Bos, "John Versor's Albertism in his Commentaries on Porphyry and the *Categories*," in *Chemins de la pensée médiévale. Études offertes à Zénon Kaluza*, ed. Paul J. J. M. Bakker, Textes et études du Moyen Âge 20 (Turnhout, 2002), 47–78.

⁸ Augustine, *Confessions*, 4.16.28, ed. Pierre de Labriolle (Paris, 1950), p. 86.

but clearly the position thereon of a giant like Albertus Magnus must be better known before we can understand the real nature and value of that century's contribution to the comprehension of this intriguing Aristotelian treatise.

*The Short Definition of the Subject Found in the
Commentary on the Categories*

Like most medieval works of this kind, Albertus Magnus' commentary on the *Categories* is preceded by a proem in which some very important questions are briefly addressed. They are important because they concern the very foundations of the science to be taught, and the treatment thereof is necessarily brief because it belongs to an introduction and because a more in-depth consideration would presuppose a level of knowledge that the beginner, for whom the commentary is written, does not yet have. Here is how Albert the Great briefly describes, in the proem of his commentary, the subject of the *Categories*: "the subject is what can be ordered into a relation of predicability or subjectibility, inasmuch as it stands under the vocal sound that signifies this order," *est enim subiectum ordinabile in rationem praedicabilis vel subicibilis, secundum quod stat sub voce talem ordinem significante*.⁹

This definition of the subject, at first sight and considered by itself, is not extremely helpful. First, it seems to be very close to a widely used and almost standard formulation of the time, traces and variations of which can be found in other commentaries and even in student manuals.¹⁰ It remains to be seen how much such a commonly used expression

⁹ *De praedicamentis* 1.1, eds. Carlos Steel, Silvia Donati and Manuel Santos Noya (Münster, 2008), p. 2, 1.7–9. I am using the (almost complete) first draft of the forthcoming critical edition, which C. Steel was kind enough to let me consult. When I refer to passages beyond 7.3, however, I use the Auguste Borgnet edition (Paris, 1890).

¹⁰ This is true of texts written both before and after Albert's commentary. See for example Ezio Franceschini, "Giovanni Pigo: Le sue *Rationes super Praedicamenta Aristotelis* e la loro posizione nel movimento aristotelico del secolo XIII," *Sophia* 2 (1934), 172–182, p. 176: *dicibile incomplexum ordinabile in genere vel ordinatum*; E. J. Ashworth, "L'analogie de l'être et les homonymes: *Catégories*, 1 dans le 'Guide de l'étudiant'," pp. 287–288, in *L'enseignement de la philosophie au XIII^e siècle. Autour du "Guide de l'Étudiant" du ms. Ripoll 109*, eds. Claude Lafleur and Joanne Carrier (Turnhout, 1997), pp. 281–295: *dicibile incomplexum ordinabile in genere*; Robert Andrews, "Petrus de Alvernia, *Quaestiones super Praedicamentis*: An Edition," *Cahiers de l'Institut du Moyen-Âge grec et latin* 55 (1987), 3–84,

can tell the reader about Albert's own views on the question. Also, were this definition specific to Albertus Magnus, there would still remain the problem of its ambiguity. What, exactly, can be "ordered"? Is it things, concepts, or words? The fact that modern scholars do not agree on this is probably the best sign of the ambiguity of the definition: E. J. Ashworth,¹¹ pointing to the second half of Albert's definition and also to his explicit mention of Boethius' well-known description of the subject of the *Categories* ("the ten vocal sounds that signify the first genera of things"),¹² thinks Albert has first and foremost words in mind; Alessandro Conti,¹³ on the basis of the great similarity between Albert's definition and those of other contemporary thinkers who often explicitly mention *ens*, believes it is things; Giorgio Pini¹⁴ formally rejects a more "conceptual" interpretation because Albert describes the subject of the *Categories* in terms of predication rather than of second intention, and because this expression is nowhere to be found in this philosopher's general introduction to logic, even though Pini identifies some passages and distinctions which might actually militate in favour of such an interpretation. In relation to this problem, what does the last part of the definition—"inasmuch as it stands under the vocal sound that signifies this order"—mean? Does it refer to some kind of grammatical or linguistic consideration of the *Categories*? Moreover, how does this definition of the subject relate to the ten supreme genera themselves?

p. 10: *ens incomplexum secundum quod ordinabile in genere*; Carmelo Ottaviano, "Le 'Quaestiones super libro Praedicamentorum' di Simone di Faversham," *Atti della R. Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei. Memorie della Classe di Scienze morali, storiche e filologiche* 3 (1930), 258–351, p. 266: *ens dicibile incomplexum ordinabile in genere secundum sub et supra*. For other authors, see P. O. Lewry, *Robert Kilwardby's Writings on the Logica Vetus, Studied With Regard to Their Teaching* (doctoral thesis, Oxford, 1978), pp. 91 and 265–266. These descriptions of the subject of the *Categories* are not necessarily and always the only ones used by the authors who include them in their writings. Robert Kilwardby, *Notulae super librum Praedicamentorum, proemium*, for instance, refers to that subject as *ordinabile* and *dicibile* after formally treating the question of the subject in very Boethian terms. (Thank you to Alessandro Conti for letting me see the first draft of the new edition he is preparing.)

¹¹ "L'analogie de l'être et les homonymes," p. 289. This view is somewhat supported in William E. McMahon, "Albert the Great on the Semantics of the *Categories* of Substance, Quantity, and Quality," *Historiographia Linguistica* 7 (1980), 145–157, although in a strongly semantical perspective.

¹² *De praedicamentis* 1.1, p. 2, 1.1–2. See Boethius, *In Cat.* 1, ed. J. P. Migne (Paris, 1891), pp. 159D–160B. A better edition of this passage is provided in Monika Asztalos, "Boethius as a Transmitter of Greek Logic to the Latin West," *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology* 95 (1993), 367–407.

¹³ Alessandro Conti, "Thomas Sutton's Commentary on the *Categories* according to MS Oxford, Merton College 289," p. 175, in *The Rise of British Logic*, ed. P. O. Lewry (Toronto, 1983), pp. 173–213.

¹⁴ Giorgio Pini, *Categories and Logic in Duns Scotus* (Leiden, 2002), pp. 26–27.

Are they the subject of the treatise? If not, what are they? Finally, as a last example of a question that this definition raises: how does this definition allow us to distinguish the subject of the *Categories* from the subject of the *Isagoge*? Isn't Porphyry's short treatise also concerned, at least partially, with something that can be ordered within a genus or a species?

I shall address the first problem, i.e., the nature of that *ordinabile* that constitutes the subject of the *Categories*, and in so doing I shall have the opportunity to touch upon the other problems briefly. As a more complete picture of Albert's views on what the *Categories* is concerned with is drawn, it will become clear that Ashworth and Conti were both right in saying, respectively, that words (*voces*) and things (*entia*) have to be part of the solution, but unlike them I shall argue that the emphasis needs to be put above all on concepts (*intentiones*). In order to show this, I shall first state a few things about Albert's conception of logic, and then establish a series of fundamental (and mostly meta-physical) distinctions that are absolutely necessary to reach a deeper and better understanding of what Albert has in mind when he writes his short definition of the subject of the *Categories*, a definition which I shall revisit toward the end of this paper. In so doing, I shall rely upon Albert's *De praedicamentis* and also upon some of his other works, whether they belong to logic or not. Among these, Albert's commentary on the *Isagoge*, which was likely written right before the commentary on the *Categories* and which begins with a general introduction to logic, deserves special attention.

Albert's Conception of Logic

A few scholarly publications over the last 40 years have tackled the question of Albert the Great's general views on logic, but usually in a very brief and partial way, which probably explains why they often reach contradictory conclusions.¹⁵ The question of how Albert conceives

¹⁵ See for example Mauricio Beuchot, "La naturaleza de la lógica y su conexión con la ontología en Alberto Magno," *Diánoia* 33 (1987), 235–246; Eladio Chávarri, "El orden de los escritos lógicos de Aristóteles según San Alberto Magno," *Estudios filosóficos* 9 (1960), 97–134; Ralph McInerny, "Albert on Universals," *Southwestern Journal of Philosophy* 10 (1979), 3–18; Giorgio Pini, *Categories and Logic in Duns Scotus*, pp. 24–25; Richard F. Washell, "Logic, Language, and Albert the Great," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 34 (1973), 445–450.

of logic and its subject is complex and would certainly deserve a separate study, but for now I would like to emphasize two important points, each of which shows a strong Avicennian influence on Albert's logical views.

First, logic's practical goal is to help the human mind go from the known to the unknown.¹⁶ Throughout his works Albert constantly reminds his reader of this, and although it might sound like empty and incomprehensible jargon, it actually states something quite simple and easy to understand. It refers to the fact that the usual mode of our intelligence is not intuition, but rational process: we usually come to know things based on other things we already know, be it when we draw a conclusion based on some premises we already accept or when we try to understand the nature of a thing based on ideas already possessed and arranged in a definition.¹⁷ Logic studies this rational mode or process and the instruments that allow us to complete it, and thus provides guidance to reason in all philosophical fields.¹⁸

Second, Albert has a very "intentionalist" view on what the science of logic studies.¹⁹ He accepts the Avicennian position²⁰ that the science of logic considers properties that belong to things as we know them, and as we use them to know other things. These properties have a purely intentional being, and are necessarily produced by reason as it goes from the known to the unknown.²¹ Although Albert, much like Avicenna himself, rarely uses the expression "second intention," he does use it at the beginning and at the end of his career—in his commentaries on Peter Lombard's *Sentences*²² and on Aristotle's *Metaphysics*²³—, and certainly the doctrine that underlies this expression, taken directly from Avicenna's *Logyca*, is clearly and explicitly presented by Albert in his

¹⁶ *De praedicamentis*, 1.1, p. 1, l.6–21.

¹⁷ *Super Porphyrium De V universalibus* 1.1.5, p. 8, l.28–53.

¹⁸ *Super Porphyrium De V universalibus* 1.1.1, 5 and 7. See Avicenna, *Logyca* (Venise, 1508), fol. 2v, and Bruno Tremblay, "Nécessité, rôle et nature de l'art logique, selon Albert le Grand," *Bochumer philosophisches Jahrbuch für Antike und Mittelalter* 12 (2007).

¹⁹ This is a claim that has rightly been made by Norman Kretzmann, although he has provided no detailed justification for it. See his *William of Sherwood's Introduction to Logic* (St. Paul, 1966), p. 21, n.1.

²⁰ Avicenna, *Logyca*, fol. 2rb. See also Michael E. Marmura, "Avicenna on the Division of the Sciences in the *Isagoge* of His *Shifa*," *Journal of the History of Arabic Science* 4 (1980), 239–251.

²¹ *Super Porphyrium De V universalibus* 1.1.2.

²² *Super libros sententiarum* 1.13.A.1, ad 1, ed. Auguste Borgnet (Paris, 1893), p. 370B.

²³ *Metaphysica* 1.1.1, ed. Bernhard Geyer (Münster, 1960), p. 3, l.8–12. See Avicenna, *Liber de philosophia prima sive scientia divina* 1.2, ed. S. van Riet (Louvain, 1977), p. 10, l.73–75.

general introduction to logic.²⁴ More sophisticated definitions of second intentions, such as those which can be found in Thomas Aquinas or Duns Scotus would, of course, come only later.²⁵

The Categories Is Concerned with Universals Post Rem

Since according to Albert universals are what the mind orders within a genus or a species,²⁶ one must conclude that for him the *Categories*, whose subject is an *ordinabile*, is concerned with universals. Yet, saying this does not take us very far; in fact, it could even be like opening a Pandora's box, since Albert's doctrine of universals rests on complex metaphysical distinctions, and in fact has the reputation of being marked with confusion and contradictions.²⁷ Although I cannot here engage in a serious analysis of this difficult doctrine, I will endeavor to state a few of its basic elements.

The first thing that one should keep in mind when trying to decipher Albert's teachings on universals is that for him the word "universal" is a very equivocal word that can refer to a considerable number of meanings, which, although linked to each other by analogy, can be distinguished.²⁸ In everything that Albert labels a "universal," one can always find, one way or another, something one in relation to some multiplicity,²⁹ but the manner in which "one," "relation" or "multiplicity" is to be understood is not always the same, and if it is, the manner in which the things named "universals" relate to them

²⁴ The close link between the doctrine laid out in the beginning of Avicenna's *Logica* and the use of the expression "second intentions" in his *Metaphysica* (see supra, note 23) must have been seen by Albert just as it is easily understood by modern readers of Avicenna. See for example A. I. Sabra, "Avicenna on the Subject Matter of Logic," *The Journal of Philosophy* 77 (1980), 746–764.

²⁵ See Giorgio Pini, *Categories and Logic in Duns Scotus*, chapters 2, 3, and 4.

²⁶ *De sex principijs* 1.1, ed. Ruth Meyer (Münster, 2006), p. 4, l.38–41.

²⁷ Ralph McInerny, "Albert on Universals," pp. 17–18.

²⁸ The way Albert begins his most systematic review of the different kinds of universals clearly indicates that he does so in the context of analogy of words: *Dicimus igitur universale quattuor modis dici proprie et hoc, quocumque modo dicatur, tribus modis vel quattuor considerari.* (*Metaphysica* 5.6.5, p. 285, l.16–18)

²⁹ *Metaphysica* 5.6.5, p. 285, l.84–86. Albert's choice of words in this passage also shows that logical analogy, and not univocation, is at stake here.

changes.³⁰ Some of the meanings attached by Albertus Magnus to the word “universal” are laid out in the famous Neoplatonist division of the kinds of universals that he found in Eustratus³¹ and Avicenna,³² the one into universals *ante rem*, *in re*, and *post rem*. This division is ubiquitous in Albert’s works, and it makes sense that the scholars who have treated the question put emphasis on it.³³ To put it very simply, universals *ante rem* are the eternal divine ideas. They are imagined by us as being many but in fact are one and can somehow be identified with God.³⁴ They are exemplary ideas, acting as an origin and a cause in relation to concrete things that surround us,³⁵ through an elaborate causal process which cannot be described here. They can be said to be universals in the sense that as exemplars they “precontain” (*prae-habentes*) and somehow cause a multiplicity of things.³⁶ Universals *ante rem* are, thus, the exemplary origin of the actualized natures or forms of natural things. These latter forms, or universals *in re*, exist in the things that surround us and make natural, material, concrete created things what they are. A particularized form or nature is universal in the sense that from it other particularized things can be generated³⁷—a human being generates other human beings³⁸—and in the sense that despite

³⁰ In other words, I think that behind the multiple uses of the word “universal” Albert would see cases of both analogies *secundum communam proportionem* and *ad unum*. For a brief consideration of Albert’s doctrine of logical analogy, see Bruno Tremblay, “A First Glance at Albert the Great’s Teachings on Analogy of Words,” *Medieval Philosophy and Theology* 5 (1996), 265–292.

³¹ *In primum Aristotelis moralium ad Nicomachum*, 1096a10–14, ed. H. Paul F. Mercken (Leiden, 1973), p. 69, 1.85–p. 70, 1.29.

³² *Logica*, fol. 2rb and 12ra–va.

³³ See among others Georg Wieland, *Untersuchungen zum Seinbegriff im Metaphysikkommentar Alberts des Großen* (Münster: 1972), pp. 41–46; Sophie Wlodek, “Albert le Grand et les Albertistes du XV^e siècle: le problème des universaux,” in *Albert der Grosse. Seine Zeit, seine Werk, seine Wirkung*, Band 2, ed. Albert Zimmermann, *Miscellanea Mediaevalia* 14 (Berlin, 1981), pp. 193–207; Alain de Libera, “Théorie des universaux et réalisme logique chez Albert le Grand,” *Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques* 65 (1981), 55–73; id., *Albert le Grand et la philosophie* (Paris, 1990), pp. 180–213; id., *La querelle des universaux. De Platon à la fin du Moyen Âge* (Paris, 1996), pp. 245–262; Thérèse Bonin, *Creation as Emanation. The Origin of Diversity in Albert the Great’s On the Causes and the Procession of the Universe* (Notre Dame, 2001), pp. 41–50.

³⁴ *De causis et processu universitatis* 2.1.20, ed. Winfried Fauser (Münster, 1993), p. 85, 1.39–44; *Super Dionysium De divinis nominibus* 4.84, ed. Paul Simon (Münster, 1972), p. 190, 1.65–p. 191, 1.20; 5.16, p. 312, 1.5–15; *De praedicamentis* 7.9, p. 290A.

³⁵ *Super Dionysium De divinis nominibus* 2.8.3, p. 97, 1.20–29.

³⁶ *Super Porphyrium De V universalibus* 2.3, p. 23, 1.26–38, and *Metaphysica* 5.6.5, p. 285, 1.59–77.

³⁷ *Metaphysica* 5.6.5, p. 285, 1.87–92.

³⁸ *De sex principiis* 1.5, p. 58, p. 11, 1.29–p. 12, 1.11.

its particularization it keeps its real capacity of being intellectually abstracted from matter and of being grasped in its unity in relation to the actual or at least potential multiplicity of things in which it finds itself individualized.³⁹ Finally, one can also call universal something that is posterior to natural things: the one common notion thanks to which a non-causative mind grasps a multiplicity of similar individual things.⁴⁰ It is a universal *post rem*, which exists as a likeness of things in the human or rational mind, and not in the extra-mental natural world or in a divine or purely intellectual mind.

Before moving ahead in the description of the logical universal and of the subject of the *Categories*, one should take note of the special effort often made by Albertus Magnus to link universality *post rem* to prior universalities, whether they be *in re* or *ante rem*, and to insist on the underlying “unity” that exists among them all and that has its source in divine causality.⁴¹ He says very explicitly that universality exists outside of the human mind, *in natura rerum*, a way of speaking that might surprise someone who is used to the more Averroistic approach and vocabulary that can be found in Aquinas.⁴² It is possible that this insistence is to be explained by the fact that Albert still remembers and fears the nominalist ghosts of the twelfth century,⁴³ and that he sees the danger that would be implied by affirming without any nuance and too abruptly that universals or universality are pure creations of the human mind, a preoccupation that Aquinas might not have had to the same degree.⁴⁴ It must also be repeated that for Albert the logical universal and the other universals are not universals in exactly the same sense, and that when he mentions⁴⁵ that universality exists *in natura rerum*, he

³⁹ *Super Porphyrium De V universalibus* 2.3, p. 24, l.37–72.

⁴⁰ *Metaphysica* 5.6.5, p. 285, l.93–96.

⁴¹ *Super Porphyrium De V universalibus* 2.6, p. 34, l.57–p. 35, l.20.

⁴² See for example *De ente et essentia* 3, ed. Hyacinthe F. Dondaine (Rome, 1976), l.99–101.

⁴³ *Super Porphyrium De V universalibus* 9.3, p. 146, l.1–20, and 2.3. See also Manuel Santos Noya, “Die Universalienlehre der ‘Nominales’ in der Darstellung Alberts des Großen,” in *Albertus Magnus. Zum Gedenken nach 800 Jahren: Neue Zugänge, Aspekte und Perspektiven*, ed. Walter Senner, Quellen und Forschungen zur Geschichte des Dominikanerordens 10 (Berlin, 2001), pp. 171–194.

⁴⁴ Which is not to say that Aquinas himself never refers to the *ante rem* / *in re* / *post rem* division or that he never speaks of the extra-mental nature as something that has in itself the property of being communicable to many. See for example *Scriptum super libros sententiarum* 2.3.3.2, ad 1, ed. R. P. Mandonnet (Paris, 1929), and *Expositio libri peryrmenias* 1.10, ed. René-Antoine Gauthier (Paris, 1989), l.87–89.

⁴⁵ Including in logic. See *Super Porphyrium De V universalibus* 2.3, p. 24, l.49–p. 25, l.6.

means that realities analogous to logical universals exist outside of our mind and can also rightly be called universals—other universals on which emphasis is placed since they are presupposed by logical universals and are their foundation.⁴⁶ I think that the best proof that Albert is thinking about universals analogously and not univocally is that for him predicability is a necessary property of the logical universal,⁴⁷ whereas other universals are not, strictly speaking, predicable.⁴⁸ Which, of course, means that the *Categories* deals directly with universals *post rem*, and not *in re* or *ante rem*.

*The Categories Is Concerned with Notions and
Accidents of Things*

The opportunity to affirm that this predicability is proper, strictly speaking, to the universal *post rem* presents itself when Albertus Magnus determines what meaning must be given to the word “substance” when it is said that logic, and more specifically the *Categories*, studies substance. (The distinctions he then makes are quite important because many of them apply to all the other remaining categories.) After identifying three main senses of the word, he goes on to say that the substance that logic is interested in is something to which all things that are substances can be reduced through predication: whatever a dog, a flower, an animal, a plant, or a man are, each of them can be said to be a substance, which plays the role of a common, unifying predicate or predicable. Now this substance can be such a predicable only because it is the form of the whole subject of which it is said—which ultimately means the individual substance.⁴⁹ This characterization of the logical universal as

⁴⁶ *Metaphysica* 5.6.6. It seems that some of Albert’s followers from the fifteenth century, for instance Heymeric de Campo, also ascribed some sort of analogical character to the underlying unity that links the different types of universals. See Sophie Wlodek, “Albert le Grand et les Albertistes,” pp. 19–20.

⁴⁷ *Super Porphyrium De V universalibus* 2.1, p. 17, l.6–20.

⁴⁸ See, among others, *De praedicamentis* 2.1 and 3, p. 24, l.13–21, and *Super Dionysium De divinis nominibus*, 2.83, p. 97, l.20–29. According to *De causis et processu universitatis* 2.1.5, p. 65, l.47–49, the classic definition of the logical universal, *unum in multis et de multis*, may be applied to other universals, but only *secundum quid*, again an expression that clearly shows that Albert’s treatment of the problem of the universals rests on analogical uses of words.

⁴⁹ *De praedicamentis* 2.1, p. 20, l.41–51.

forma totius is often repeated throughout Albert's works,⁵⁰ among others in a commentary that must not be neglected in the interpretation of the one on the *Categories*: the commentary on the *Liber sex principiorum*, an anonymous treatise that we know to have been written in the twelfth century, supposedly to compensate for Aristotle's extreme concision in the treatment of the last six categories.⁵¹

The unknown author of this work holds the rather enigmatic view that the six categories that constitute the subject of the book are "forms" and that each of them is "contingent to composition," *compositioni contingens*.⁵² This difficult statement is not really explained by its author, but Albert's interpretation of it does provide some more insight into his conception of what a treatise like the *Categories* or the *Liber sex principiorum* is about. From a logical point of view, Albert writes,⁵³ forms like the categories are intentions or notions, representations that exist in the human mind and that would not exist without it. Our mind grasps real things through determinations or "forms" that exist in them—whether these determinations be substantial or accidental, necessary or contingent, etc.—and through this multiplicity of determinations or forms it fashions within itself a multiplicity of concepts or intentions, all of which allow it, although in diverse ways, to apprehend a part of reality. When the mind relates one of its notions or concepts to the external world in order to know the latter, it does so through predication and the use of the copula "is," which affirms a kind of unity or identity between a subject and a form that is predicated of it.⁵⁴ If I am right in thinking and saying that Plato is an animal, then it means that through my notion of animal I truly conceive the whole of Plato and not just part of him—otherwise I could not identify both Plato and my concept of animal in a sentence. This identity cannot, obviously, be without qualification, since different conceptualized forms are truly

⁵⁰ See for example *Super Dionysium De divinis nominibus* 2.85, p. 99, l.13–18, in which the universals *ante rem*, *in re* and *post rem* are named and distinguished after three kinds of forms: *forma exemplaris*, *forma partis* and *forma totius*.

⁵¹ Albert himself (*De sex principijs* 1.1, p. 1, l.14–20) attributes this work to Gilbert of Poitiers, and this seems to have influenced other authors to think the same. See P. O. Lewry, "The *Liber sex principiorum*, A Supposedly Porretanean Work. A Study in Ascription," in *Gilbert de Poitiers et ses contemporains. Aux origines de la Logica modernorum*, eds. Jean Jolivet and Alain de Libera (Naples, 1987), pp. 251–252.

⁵² *Anonymi fragmentum vulgo vocatum "Liber sex principiorum"* 1.3, ed. Laurent Minio-Paluello (Bruges, 1966), p. 35, l.3–4.

⁵³ *De sex principijs* 1.2, p. 4, l.9–29.

⁵⁴ *Super Porphyrium De V universalibus* 2.1, p. 18, l.20–24.

identified with a same subject—Plato is at the same time truly said to be a man, an animal, a philosopher, and a Greek—, even though the words that signify those conceptualized forms are not synonyms.⁵⁵ It is possible for such “forms” to be predicable or identified with a subject through predication only because they are the form of the whole subject, although not necessarily in actuality. When I say that Plato is an animal, not only do I explicitly and actually attribute animality to Plato, but I also conceive and leave open the possibility that he is something else: rational or non-rational, a man or a horse, white or black, etc. This is the difference between, say, animal or white, which can be predicated of Plato, and animality and whiteness, which affirm the forms they signify in some kind of absolute sense that excludes any other form or determination: using the concept or word of “animality,” I mean the form of animality alone and I imply no possibility of anything else, whatever that may be. “Animality” and “whiteness” therefore cannot be said of Plato in a true sentence, since it would be false to identify Plato with animality or whiteness, which are just parts of what he is.⁵⁶ The *Categories* (as well as the *Liber sex principiorum*), in short, is concerned with the universal concepts or representations thanks to which we grasp the whole of things or subjects and which thus can be said of them.

Albertus Magnus also comments on the second part of the *Liber sex principiorum*’s definition, which says that the kind of form this work is concerned with is *compositioni contingens*. At first sight, this could lead one to believe that these forms are notions that represent mentally only contingent forms of material beings, but Albert interprets it differently. His explanation is especially interesting because it links this question to the distinction of the three kinds of universals:

I say therefore that it [i.e., the kind of “form” studied in the *Liber sex principiorum*] is contingent because the way of receiving it—as the notion of the whole—is accidental and always contingent. For there is a universal that comes before the thing, and this one is the *per se* or the accidental cause of the thing; there is also a universal that is in the thing, and this one is the substance of the thing or an accident disposed toward its

⁵⁵ *De praedicamentis* 2.8, p. 37, l.57–p. 38, l.36.

⁵⁶ *Super Porphyrium De V universalibus* 3.3, p. 47, l.60–p. 48, l.6. See also E. P. Bos and A. C. van der Helm, “The Division of Being over the *Categories* According to Albert the Great, Thomas Aquinas and John Duns Scotus,” in *John Duns Scotus: Renewal of Philosophy. Acts of the Third Symposium Organized by the Dutch Society Medium Aevum (May 23 and 24, 1996)*, ed. E. P. Bos (Amsterdam, 1998), 183–196, p. 187. These are all distinctions that Thomas Aquinas would make famous in his *De ente et essentia* 3, l.245–308, a work likely written at the same time as Albert was working on his logical commentaries.

substance; and there is a universal that comes after the thing, and this one is the universal separated from the thing itself by the intellect, and this happens to the thing and is accidental to the thing. This, indeed, is nothing but the apprehension of the universal or the form without this or that [particular], and without the now, which is the apprehension, simple and separated from the particular and what makes [things] particular, of the thing. It is in this [third] sense that the form that the intellect orders within a genus and a species and whose coordination is reduced to a predicament or a principle was said to be a universal.⁵⁷

The forms that the *Categories* and the *Liber sex principiorum* are interested in are universals *post rem* and as such are accidents of things that surround us. The notions or concepts that our intellect fashions are not accidental to things in the sense that they all mentally represent real accidents of things, but in the sense that the formation and the very existence of these notions or concepts is not part of the essential nature of things and is in fact contingent: it happens or does not happen to things that a human mind knows them, and whether or not this happens changes nothing to what they are fundamentally.⁵⁸ This explains why for Albertus Magnus both treatises belong to logic, since their subjects are included in what logic in general is concerned with, as Avicenna and Albert himself in his introduction to logic had defined it: both deal with accidents of things that happen to them as we acquire notions of them and as these become part of a rational process of knowing.

Albert explicitly mentions logical universality and its five main modes as described in the *Isagoge* as examples of such accidents. Being a genus, for example, is a relation that happens to exist in the intellectually abstracted notion of animal as we compare it to man and horse.⁵⁹ Our intellect then grasps animal as something one having a similar relation to many things, and conceived as *forma totius*, animal, unlike animality, can be said of man and horse in order to know and express what these essentially are.

The Categories Is Concerned with The Principles of Things

Now if the genus is the first kind of logical universal, as Albert states in his commentary on the *Isagoge*,⁶⁰ and if the *Categories* is said to have

⁵⁷ *De sex principijs* 1.2, p. 4, 1.27–41.

⁵⁸ *De natura et origine animae* 1.2, ed. Bernhard Geyer (Münster, 1955), p. 4, 1.89–92.

⁵⁹ *Super Porphyrium De V universalibus* 3.3, p. 46, 1.2–45.

⁶⁰ *Super Porphyrium De V universalibus* 2.9, p. 39, 1.6–48.

something to do with genera and especially the ten supreme genera, then a question arises. Porphyry says in his *Isagoge*⁶¹ that genera are principles of things: does this mean that the *Categories* studies principles of things? The passage from Albert's *De sex principiis* which I quoted above and in which "predicament" and "principle" seem to be considered as synonymous words goes in the same direction.

However, Albert explicitly rejects this possibility in his commentary on the *Categories*. Universals, substance for example, can indeed be seen as principles of being or formal causes in relation to concrete things that surround us—these are what they are because of their forms or natures—but that is not how universals are considered in a logical treatise like the *Categories*. Other parts of philosophy study the natures of things in their extra-mental activity as principles of being; in other words, they study universals as founded in natures or forms that are independent of the human mind.⁶² But logic, says Albert, considers them as predicable, that is to say in as much as natures, when grasped by our intellect and used to grasp other natures to which it relates in the same way,⁶³ take on the property of logical universality, which can be recognized by the fact that these natures are predicable. These are not principles of being; they only exist in the human mind.⁶⁴

Now even if strictly speaking logic does not consider universals *post rem* as principles of being (since, as principles of being outside of the human mind, natures or forms are not even species or genera yet),⁶⁵ Albert still thinks that the formal causality that a nature possesses in the extra-mental world is somehow mirrored in the notion that the human intellect has of this nature. A genus or a species, for example, can be said in logic to be a principle of being of an individual thing in the limited sense that it is the intention or mental representation of its principle of being. Commenting on a famous passage from chapter 5 of the *Categories*, Albert writes that it is only in this sense that secondary substances (e.g., the universal concept of animal or man) could be said to be ontologically prior to primary substances (e.g., Socrates).⁶⁶

⁶¹ *Porphyrii Isagoge* 2, ed. Adolf Busse (Berlin, 1887), p. 2, 1.12–13.

⁶² *De praedicamentis* 1.1, p. 2, 1.60–71.

⁶³ *Analytica posteriora* 1.2.3, p. 28A.

⁶⁴ *De sex principiis* 1.2, p. 4, 1.9–48, and p. 5, 1.43–53.

⁶⁵ *De praedicamentis* 2.1, p. 21, 1.40–42.

⁶⁶ *De praedicamentis* 2.3, p. 25, 1.6–12.

But there is another way in which the *Categories* can be said to study principles of things, and this way is more important because it lies at the core of Albert's conception of logic. Rational discourse is opposed to intuition and consists in knowing things step by step, in knowing some aspect of reality and then using it to know another one. As mentioned earlier, Albert likes to describe logic as a study of this passage from the known to the unknown and of the means to complete this movement, because it is through this study that reason can obtain a better knowledge of its own process and thus perform it better. This "practical" goal of logic is closely related to the reason the *Categories* considers universals *post rem* and not the prior universals that exist outside of the human mind and that are the foundations of the former. Here is the key distinction, made by Albert at the outset of his logical corpus: "the known, thanks to which the knowledge of the unknown is acquired, can be considered in two ways: inasmuch as it is a thing outside of the soul of the knower or inasmuch as it is a certain notion in the soul of the knower. Now, [the known] does not make one know the unknown inasmuch as it is a thing outside of the soul of the knower, but rather inasmuch as the notion of the thing exists in the soul of the knower. Indeed, it is thus that it makes known and sheds light on the unknown."⁶⁷

It is only once it is grasped or conceptualized by the human mind that a thing can immediately play the role of an instrument—a beginning, a point of departure, a principle—in relation to the unknown thing that one is trying to know rationally. Things, once they are known through abstraction, can acquire properties that, although accidental to the real natures of things, make rational discourse possible and are therefore at the center of interest for logic. First among these logical properties is universality, a notion which within logic itself is analogical:⁶⁸ a form or nature, once intellectually abstracted from the particular conditions in which it exists, can be compared to its subjects and then perhaps relates to them as a genus, thus allowing us to know partially what these subjects essentially are; or as a species, thus allowing us to know the complete essence of these subjects; and so on for the three other modes of universality, i.e., specific difference, property, and accident. On a more general level, once a nature or form has been intellectually

⁶⁷ *Super Porphyrium De V universalibus* 1.4, p. 7, 1.68–p. 8, 1.7.

⁶⁸ *Super Porphyrium De V universalibus* 2.9, p. 39, 1.6–10.

and immaterially grasped by the human mind, it is ready to take on the properties that are at the core of logic's consideration: depending on how reason uses it and what it compares it to, it can become a genus, part of a definition, a middle term, etc. It can, in other words, become a principle of knowing in relation to some unknown. This fits well with Albert's general description of logic or rational science, as opposed to sciences that study *entia naturae*: "rational sciences are different from natural sciences, because rational sciences consider things through their principles of knowing whereas natural sciences consider them through their principles of being."⁶⁹

The *Categories* can be said to be about principles of knowing in more than one way. First, and quite simply, because the book is about universals, and universals are principles of knowing that of which they are said, by making it known through its essence or its accidents.⁷⁰ But since our intellect cannot have a distinct knowledge of the whole of reality through one single concept⁷¹ and must in fact multiply them, the question of the order of these multiple universals poses itself right at the outset of logic.⁷² This means that the attribution of a universal form or nature to some subject through predication necessarily involves other logical relations that are either already known, or that this predication will somehow help us know: when placing dog in the genus animal, one knows or one is becoming ready to know that a dog is a living being, since living being, as a more universal genus, comprehends the universal animal.⁷³ At the end of the day, such observations lead Albert to hold the view that the *Categories* is especially concerned with the ten fundamental, univocal⁷⁴ universals, i.e., the ten supreme genera. They are, indeed, principles of knowledge like any other universals, but they are also principles of knowledge specifically as supreme genera, because of their role in the ordering of the multiplicity of universals and therefore predicables that exist in the human mind, which ordering

⁶⁹ *De homine* 60, sol., ed. Auguste Borgnet (Paris, 1896), p. 517A.

⁷⁰ *Metaphysica* 5.2.11, p. 248, l.67–69. Like any other intentions or mental representations, universal intentions make known the things of which they are the intentions. See *De Anima* 2.3.4, ed. Clemens Stroick (Münster, 1968), p. 102, l.28–36.

⁷¹ *De bono* 5.1.3, sol., eds. Heinrich Kühle et al. (Münster, 1951), p. 274, l.30–31.

⁷² *Super Porphyrium De V universalibus* 2.1, p. 17, l.50–p. 18, l.17.

⁷³ *De praedicamentis* 1.6, p. 14, l.12–40.

⁷⁴ This precision, i.e., univocation, is of a certain importance, inasmuch as the analogical notions of being and one, for instance, can also be seen as kinds of beginnings or principles of knowledge. See *De praedicamentis* 1.7, p. 17, l.39–48.

Albert usually calls *ordinatio praedicabilium*. The ten supreme genera are in fact principles in relation to all *ordinabiles*, and through the study of the ten genera the logician in some way reaches and treats the whole coordination of *ordinabiles*.⁷⁵

Does this distinction between principles of being and knowing cut off logic, and more specifically the *Categories*, from reality? Does it turn this treatise into a study that is completely isolated from the external, extra-mental world, into a consideration of concepts that would not and could not also refer to things? Obviously not. In order to be at the root of predications that are true, the known natures or forms that are ordered within the categories must correspond to something somehow real, and while the logical relations and order that exist among predicable are a product of the human intellect⁷⁶—a product that depends on the mode of knowing of the latter, i.e., the necessity for the intellect to go through abstraction, to multiply concepts, to order them so as to be able to know and speak the truth, etc.—, the remote foundation remains extra-mental reality. In other words, even though logical generality and “specieity” exist only because of the rational activity of our intellect, the truth of the subordination of dog to the genus animal, expressed through a predication like “a dog is an animal,” is directly measured by the external world: extra-mental reality, and not the intellect, is the reason why this statement is true.⁷⁷

There exists at least one other reason why for Albertus Magnus forms or things, and not only the accidents or logical properties that their mental representations or *intentiones* take on as they are compared to one another in order to go from the known to the unknown, must in some way be present in the *Categories*. I mentioned earlier that Albertus Magnus accepts the Avicennian doctrine of second intentions and that he sometimes also uses this vocabulary. In his commentary on the *Metaphysics*, he repeats Avicenna’s dictum that logic considers “second intentions established in things (...), thanks to which one obtains ways to go from the known to the unknown.”⁷⁸ This might well mean that logical entities (i.e., the accidents or more precisely the relations that

⁷⁵ *De praedicamentis* 1.3, p. 10, 1.10–16, and *De sex principiis* 1.1, p. 1, 1.24–44, and 2.6, p. 28, 1.18–25.

⁷⁶ *De praedicamentis* 1.1, p. 1, 1.39–p. 2, 1.5.

⁷⁷ *De praedicamentis* 1.5, p. 13, 1.46–51, and 7.12, p. 296B, and *De Anima* 3.3.2, p. 210, 1.18–20.

⁷⁸ *Metaphysica* 1.1.1, p. 3, 1.9–11. See Avicenna, *Liber de philosophia prima sive scientia divina* 1.2, p. 10, 1.73–75.

exist between the already known and conceptualized things that are used as principles of knowledge and the things that become known thanks to the former) are always defined concretely in logic. Let us take the example of a logical being at the core of the treatise of the *Categories*: genus. The first part of Porphyry's definition of genus is not relation or order, but "that which," *quod*, that is to say the known thing or nature that is the subject to the accident that is generality.⁷⁹ The passage from the commentary on the *Metaphysics* gives us the reason why in logic the accidents of things that constitute the subject of the discipline are defined concretely, as inherent to things, and not in an abstract way: second intentions can become instrumental in the passage from the known to the unknown only if they are incarnated in the things we conceive. Logical generality, as an abstract accident conceived without a subject, is of no use to allow us to know partially the essence of the different kinds of animals: only the genus animal, that is to say the notion of animal put in relation to its species, can.

Thus, one understands better Albert's concern to remind his reader that the principles of the being of a thing are also its principles of knowing:⁸⁰ too radical a dissociation would endanger the objectivity and even the possibility of human rational knowledge. But the truth of this saying requires for him an important distinction: it is only as it becomes a mental representation or *intentio* and takes on the accidents that are brought about by the rational process that a thing might become for us an instrument or a principle of knowing and that it can be studied by logic.

The Categories Is Concerned with Words

For Albert the *Categories* is concerned both with things and the notions we have of them. But what about words, the third option that is often put forth by Greek commentators as the subject of this work?

It is clear that for Albert words are not foreign to the subject of the *Categories*, or at least to its consideration. If statements and arguments are defined as signifying vocal sounds (*voces*), as they are in Aristotle and in Albert's commentaries,⁸¹ and if the *Categories* examines potential

⁷⁹ *Super Porphyrium De V universalibus* 3.3, p. 45, l.56–69.

⁸⁰ *Super Porphyrium De V universalibus* 2.3, p. 23, l.5–13. See Aristotle, *Physics* 1.1, ed. Henri Carteron (Paris, 1961), 184a12–13.

⁸¹ See Aristotle, *On Interpretation* 4, ed. Laurent Minio-Paluello (Oxford, 1949),

elements of statements and arguments, as Albert tells us they do,⁸² then it seems quite logical to assume that the *Categories* is about some sort of words. Moreover, if one describes this subject in terms of predicability, and if one holds that logical predication takes place within a statement,⁸³ then it seems necessary that the said subject is somehow related to words. Finally, although strictly speaking Albert does not adopt Boethius' definition to answer directly the question of the *skopos* of the *Categories*, he does refer to it and he does so with obvious sympathy.⁸⁴

Despite all this, we should not conclude too hastily and without any nuance that Albert identifies the subject of the treatise with words. As a good disciple of Avicenna, he denies explicitly and strongly in his general introduction to logic that the subject of logic can be defined, strictly speaking, in terms of words or vocal sounds.⁸⁵ Among his many justifications, one is especially worth mentioning here: the purely logical properties that we ascribe to words and statements do not belong to them as words or statements—just as, strictly speaking, they do not belong to the things that exist in the external world and that the words indirectly refer to—, but only inasmuch as they are signs of what these logical properties first and foremost belong to, that is to say things as conceived or known by us.⁸⁶ For example, we divide signifying vocal sounds into complex and non-complex, but vocal sounds have these properties only because they signify complex and non complex conceptions of the mind.⁸⁷ Interestingly, Albert repeats the same thing about the logical property that is at the core of the *Categories*: logical universality is essentially a property of *intentiones* or things as known, and not things as named or things as they exist outside of our intellect.⁸⁸

Albert does not reject Boethius' definition for one reason: it gives him a chance to refer to a distinction he has already made in his general introduction to logic. There Albert reminds his readers of the experiential fact that we are not able to go from the known to the

16b26–17a3, and *Prior Analytics* 1.1, ed. W. D. Ross (Oxford, 1964), 24a16–b20, and Albertus Magnus, *Peri hermeneias* 1.4.1, ed. Auguste Borgnet (Paris, 1890), p. 406A, and *Analytica priora* 1.1.3, ed. Auguste Borgnet (Paris, 1890), p. 461.

⁸² *De praedicamentis* 1.1, p. 2, 1.25–36, and *Peri hermeneias* 1.1.1, p. 374B.

⁸³ *Super Porphyrium De V universalibus* 3.3, p. 46, 1.46–59.

⁸⁴ *De praedicamentis* 1.1, p. 1, 1.52–p. 2, 1.2. He also makes explicit use of Boethius' definition in *Peri hermeneias* 1.1.2, pp. 377B–378A.

⁸⁵ *Super Porphyrium De V universalibus* 1.4 and 5.

⁸⁶ *Super Porphyrium De V universalibus* 1.4, p. 7, 1.68–p. 8, 1.10.

⁸⁷ *Super Porphyrium De V universalibus* 1.5, p. 9, 1.40–67, and *De praedicamentis* 1.5, p. 12, 1.6–35.

⁸⁸ *Super Porphyrium De V universalibus* 1.5, p. 9, 1.68–p. 10, 1.3.

unknown unless we use, externally or in our imagination, vocal signs of our concepts.⁸⁹ Now since the *Categories* considers universals, and more precisely universals as principles of knowing, and since universals cannot concretely act as principles of knowing unless they are signified by words, then the *Categories* will study and consider universals in relation to words, as the property of predicability shows. But it must be kept in mind that for Albertus Magnus words are not, properly speaking, the *ordinabilia* that constitute the subject of the *Categories*.

As long as it is clearly understood that in logic things are considered not in themselves but as foundations of our notions, and likewise words and sentences are considered not in themselves but as signs of our notions, Albert seems to think that it matters little whether one speaks of the different subjects studied in logical treatises in terms of words, concepts, or things. This learned indifference, so to speak, is particularly obvious in his commentary on the *Categories*, in which the ten supreme genera are successively alluded to in terms of things, notions, and words.⁹⁰ This is an attitude which is in sharp contrast with the rigidity found in some Neoplatonist commentators, such as Boethius.⁹¹ It is easy to understand that so much diversity in the way the subject of a book is defined could make a commentator ill at ease, especially if he wants to see the treatise as being more than a mere junk yard filled with grammatical, logical, and metaphysical considerations which are unable to produce a unified science. But one must be reminded of the important role played by logical analogy in the thought of many medieval thinkers, and we saw an example of this when briefly discussing Albert's teachings on universality. If it is thanks to analogy that one can understand the underlying unity of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*,⁹² may we not also think that if in the course of his commenting on the *Categories* Albert ascribes the logical properties that he studies to things, notions, and words, it is because they belong to them all, but not in the same sense? The analogy that is at stake reminds us of the analogy between three main uses of the word "healthy": strictly speaking only living beings that accomplish their biological functions well are healthy, but by analogy one can also call healthy what causes health (e.g., a healthy food) and what manifests health (e.g., a healthy color).

⁸⁹ *Super Porphyrium De V universalibus* 1.4, p. 7, l.1–21.

⁹⁰ See, among a great diversity of examples, 2.3, p. 24, l.18–21, and 6.1, p. 130, l.32–35.

⁹¹ See Boethius, *In Categorias Aristotelis* 1, p. 162AC.

⁹² *Metaphysica* 1.1.3.

In the same way, the notions of things are the essential subject of the logical properties that are studied in the *Categories*, but by analogy one can also attribute such properties to the extra-mental foundations or to the vocal signs of these notions.⁹³

The Definition Of The Subject Of The Categories, Revisited

We are now in a better position to understand the meaning of the brief and introductory definition of the subject of the *Categories* that is given by Albert in the *proemium* of his commentary: "what can be ordered into a relation of predicability or subjectibility, inasmuch as it stands under the vocal sound that signifies this order." Although much more could be said, the following distinctions can be established.

First, it should now be clear that, in Albert's mind, that which, strictly speaking, can be related to something else as a subject or a predicate is primarily a notion or a form as it exists in our mind, and as logical universality is added to it by reason when it tries to go from the known to the unknown. One may also say that it is a thing or being (or a principle of being), or a word, but such ascriptions are less strict and presuppose analogy.

Second, the order or relationship that is at stake is necessarily produced by reason when, using a notion that it already possesses in order to know something else, it grasps the already known thing as inherent to the unknown thing and as able to be identified, as *forma totius*, with the unknown thing and said of it through predication. The known, which here is used as a principle of knowing in comparison to the unknown, becomes then related to the unknown as a predicate, and that to which the known nature is attributed becomes related to it as a subject. The use of the notion of order (*ordo*), which adds to the notion of relationship (*ratio*) the idea of before and after, is justified by the fact that logically speaking a predicate is a principle of knowing with regard to the subject, and as such it comes before.⁹⁴ These relationships of predicability and subjectibility are obviously actualized only in the second act of reason—composition or division, through

⁹³ *De praedicamentis* 7.6. See also *Ethica* 6.2.1, ed. Auguste Borgnet (Paris, 1891), pp. 407A–408B.

⁹⁴ *De praedicamentis* 1.1, p. 1, 1.22–38, and p. 2, 1.31–36; 7.1, p. 133, 1.53–p. 134, 1.9, and 12, p. 295A. See also *Analytica priora* 1.2.6, p. 495.

statements, of grasped natures—, and the logical study that depends on the first act of reason examines these relationships inasmuch as they exist in potency.⁹⁵

Third, even if in this definition subjectibility and predicability are both explicitly present,⁹⁶ they do not seem to be on the same footing or equally relevant for Albert, who in fact usually mentions only predicability.⁹⁷ This is understandable given that: 1) in the strictest sense only individual substances, and not natures as known, are subjects,⁹⁸ and only natures as conceptualized or known, and not individual substances,⁹⁹ are predicates; 2) the notion of predicate includes all universal things studied in the *Categories* whereas the notion of subject, even taken in a looser sense, does not include the ten supreme genera; 3) the *Categories* studies universals as principles of knowledge and order, and therefore the ten supreme genera or univocal predicates, which are such principles not only in regard to individual things but also to all other universals within their category, get the lion's share of the logician's attention;¹⁰⁰ 4) universals are, as such, defined as predicates and not as subjects.¹⁰¹

Fourth, the last part of the definition found in Albert's *proemium* ("inasmuch as it stands under the vocal sound that signifies that order") does not mean that the *Categories* studies first and foremost words, or that universals are examined through the grammatical and conventional properties of the words that signify them. It merely states that since we need the sensible signs that words are, whether they be spoken or simply imagined, in order to think rationally (to go from the known to the unknown), universals and the logical order that exists among them can only be discovered and studied through their sensible, vocal manifestation.

⁹⁵ *De praedicamentis* 7.2, p. 136, l.8–14.

⁹⁶ Probably to emphasize the fact that the *Categories* will provide material to build statements, which are always made of a subject and a predicate. See *De praedicamentis* 1.1, p. 2, l.25–36, and *Peri hermeneias* 1.1.1, p. 374B.

⁹⁷ See for example *Super Porphyrium De V universalibus* 2.1, p. 17, l.6–32, and *De praedicamentis* 1.1, p. 2, l.31–36.

⁹⁸ *De praedicamentis* 2.1, p. 20, l.41–51, and p. 21, l.29–39.

⁹⁹ *Super Porphyrium De V universalibus* 3.4, p. 48, l.42–p. 49, l.21, and *De praedicamentis* 1.5, p. 13, l.29–45.

¹⁰⁰ *De praedicamentis* 1.7, p. 17, l.3–9.

¹⁰¹ *Super Porphyrium De V universalibus* 4.2, p. 59, l.57–64. Given everything that I have tried to establish in this paragraph and in general throughout the paper, I really cannot understand what E. P. Bos means when he writes that "it is important to note that by a *praedicabile* Albert means a thing of which something is or can be said" ("The Division of Being over the *Categories* According to Albert the Great, Thomas Aquinas and John Duns Scotus," p. 185) and that "by 'category', Albert here means a thing of which something is or can be said" ("John Versor's Albertism in his Commentaries on Porphyry and the *Categories*," p. 56).

Even if our knowledge of thirteenth-century logic remains very partial, Albert's general understanding of the subject of the *Categories* shows that it is probably quite safe to say that this philosopher is a very clear example of the shift in emphasis from words to concepts or intentions that took place during that century,¹⁰² even if words, as well as things, remain important parts of the solution he proposes.

The Categories, The Isagoge and Metaphysics

I mentioned at the beginning of this paper at least one more question which Albert's short definition of the subject of the *Categories*, considered by itself, does not solve, and which requires further explanations. It is a problem that, at first, looks like a rather technical and not very significant one, but which opens the door to some very serious questioning. This problem is the following: how does Albert distinguish the logical consideration of universals found in the *Categories* from the one made by Porphyry in his *Isagoge*?

Albert's usual answer is that the *Isagoge* studies the different relations by means of which universals can be ordered, whereas the *Categories* studies the ordered things themselves. And this makes sense given the practical purpose he assigns to logic: to order the things that exist in our thoughts, we must first know the five main relations of universality or predicability—the task of the *Isagoge*¹⁰³—, but we must also know the things that can be ordered according to these relations—the task assigned to the *Categories*.¹⁰⁴ Albert goes as far as to say that the *Isagoge*

¹⁰² Norman Kretzmann, "History of Semantics," in *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, ed. Paul Edwards (New York, 1967), vol. 7, p. 371. Thus I disagree with Giorgio Pini (*Categories and Logic in Duns Scotus*, p. 27), who, in his very interesting survey of pre-Scotus thirteenth-century views on logic and the *Categories*, says that Albert did not really apply the Avicennian doctrine of second intentions to his understanding of the subject of that work, and that such attempts would only come "slightly after Albert." It is true that Albert never uses the expression *secunda intentio* in his commentary on the *Categories*, and that in *Super Porphyrium De V universalibus* 1.4 he states that the subject of logic is *argumentum* and does not refer to that expression there either; and that an explanation must indeed be found for that fact. As I have tried to show in this paper, however, Albert's understanding of *ordinabile* and *praedicabile*, in his definition of the subject of the *Categories*, is very clearly along the lines of Avicenna's description of the kind of being that logic studies. It comes as no surprise to me to see that Albert would explicitly write, at a point in his career when he had not yet begun to write commentaries in logic, that the word "genus" names a second intention (*Super libros sententiarum* 1.13.A.1, ad 1).

¹⁰³ *Super Porphyrium De V universalibus* 2.1, p. 18, 1.40–56.

¹⁰⁴ *De praedicamentis* 1.1, p. 1, 1.22–38.

considers accidents of things according to which things are classified in genera, species, etc., and that the *Categories* studies the classified things themselves.¹⁰⁵ This last description, in particular, is quite troubling, and according to the way Albert himself understands logic, it might be like saying that the *Isagoge* is a logical treatise but the *Categories* is not! Yet, in every part of his logical corpus, Albert affirms that the Aristotelian work is a logical treatise.¹⁰⁶

Although Albert is not extremely explicit on this, I think that for him the difference between the logical consideration of universals conducted in the *Isagoge* and that conducted in the *Categories* must be understood as a distinction between what is more general and abstract, on the one hand, and what is more particular and concrete, on the other hand.¹⁰⁷ In his commentary on Porphyry,¹⁰⁸ Albert writes that, unlike the *Categories*, the *Isagoge* considers universals as predicable, which in this particular passage does not simply mean that the *Isagoge* is not interested in universals *in re* or *ante rem*, but that it is interested in defining the five main modes of logical universality or predicability in general, whatever the things that are universal and predicable may be. This would be why, in Albert's view,¹⁰⁹ Porphyry begins his definitions with a vague "that which," *quod*: a genus is "that under which a species is placed," is "that which is predicated of specifically different things, in saying what they are," etc. The five different modes of universality or predicability can belong to most things the mind conceives, and this is why one cannot define what a genus is using the notion of animal or living being, for instance. The *Categories*, on the other hand, is interested in logical properties that belong to precise notions or conceptualized things or natures. The logical inquiry into substance, for example, studies the logical properties that belong to substance as this specific universal *post rem*, and not necessarily to every genus.¹¹⁰ So in that sense the *Categories*

¹⁰⁵ *Super Porphyrium De V universalibus* 2.1, p. 18, l.24–29.

¹⁰⁶ *Super Porphyrium De V universalibus* 1.7, p. 15, l.23–34; 2.1, p. 18, l.23–50; *De praedicamentis* 1.1; *De sex principiis* 1.1, p. 1, l.6–40; *Peri hermeneias* 1.1.1, p. 374B; etc.

¹⁰⁷ Robert Kilwardby might have the same distinction in mind when he writes at the beginning of his commentary on the *Categories* that after the consideration of the universals that took place in Porphyry's *Isagoge*, the logician must now "go down" to the predicaments themselves, which is what is done in the *Categories*. See Robert Kilwardby, *Notulae super librum Praedicamentorum, proemium*.

¹⁰⁸ *Super Porphyrium De V universalibus* 2.1, p. 17, l.6–32. See also *De praedicamentis* 1.1, p. 1, l.24–30.

¹⁰⁹ *Super Porphyrium De V universalibus* 3.3, p. 46, l.68–p. 47, l.18.

¹¹⁰ *De praedicamentis* 2.6, p. 31, l.1–6. See also the general statement made in 1.1, p. 2,

studies the different known things themselves that are predicable, but it remains a logical consideration.

But important problems remain, the most important of which is, I think, that Albert sees in the Aristotelian treatise long passages in which extra-mental properties of categories are discussed. The very fundamental chapter on substance, for example, contains, according to Albert, first an enumeration of the logical properties of substance, and then an enumeration of objective or extra-mental properties.¹¹¹ He mentions that the former comes first in the text because it belongs more properly to a logical work like the *Categories*, but he accepts the presence of the latter without protesting. Why? Answering this question will require a very careful examination of the commentary, which cannot be done here.¹¹² It is interesting to see, however, how strong an advocate of Avicenna's views on logic Albert was, and how he tried to apply them to the *Categories*, which the tradition classifies as a logical work. But at the same time we are told by Avicennian scholars that in the yet untranslated *Categories* of his *Shifa*, Avicenna himself strongly questions this classification.¹¹³ In such circumstances, one wishes one could rewrite history and make a Latin translation of Avicenna's commentary available to Albert the Great, just to see what fruits this confrontation of ideas might have borne.

l.62–67, which I think must be interpreted in the same light: “(...) inasmuch as they [= the natures or forms that are studied in the *Categories*] are something which can be predicated or ordered within a genus according to *this* or *that* way of being a predicate or a subject, (...) they have many properties and characteristics (*passiones*) that can be demonstrated of them. And this is how we will treat of them here.” (My emphasis.)

¹¹¹ *De praedicamentis*, 2.6, p. 31, l.1–6.

¹¹² Among all the different justifications given by Albert for a logical consideration of apparently metaphysical or natural matters—see for example *De praedicamentis* 2.12, p. 45, l.14–39; 6.1, p. 130, l.28–41; 7.1, p. 133, l.17–42; 7.4, p. 278; and 7.13, 297A—, some seem at first sight a little unsatisfying, and obviously call for a more serious and in-depth consideration. Just like the short definition of the subject of the *Categories* that one finds in Albert's *proemium*, some of these short explanations seem to be quite standard for the time (see for example the *proemium* of Kilwardby's *Notulae super librum Praedicamentorum*) and would require a separate study of their own in order for us to fully comprehend what precise meaning Albert gives them.

¹¹³ Dimitri Gutras, *Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition* (Leiden, 1988), pp. 265–267; Ibrahim Madkour, “Le traité des *Catégories* du *Shifa*,” *Mélanges de l'Institut dominicain d'études orientales du Caire* 5 (1958), 253–278; A. I. Sabra, “Avicenna on the Subject Matter of Logic,” p. 764.

INTERCONNECTED LITERAL COMMENTARIES ON THE *CATEGORIES* IN THE MIDDLE AGES

Robert Andrews

Literal commentaries on Aristotle's *Categories* from the Middle Ages have certain conditions which make them less attractive to the modern researcher than comparable question commentaries.¹ Literal commentaries analyze an authoritative text line by line, so that less interesting passages often get just as much attention as important ones, and important passages may be handled perfunctorily. For the modern investigator, philosophical debates need to be teased out of the text rather than presenting themselves organized into questions. For an editor, different literal commentaries can be confusingly alike, leading to conflation and misattribution. For a translator, literal commentaries are almost impossible to translate smoothly or pleasingly to the modern ear. (Attempts can be seen in the translations of Aquinas's various Aristotelian commentaries). Finally, the sheer mass of detailed comment, of varying import, can overwhelm an unaccustomed researcher.

However, these perceived disadvantages carry with them concomitant advantages. Literal commentaries are exhaustive in their analyses, including even minor points of exegesis which might be of interest to a scholar. Their format is systematic, so that a researcher knows where to find the locus for a philosophical discussion extending over several centuries. (Discussions of the nature of number, for example, are to be found in the *Categories* at 4b26.) Trails of traditions, translations, biases, and influences are all laid clear. And literal commentaries still provide some focus on important issues by means of inserted *dubia* regarding disputed topics. Ultimately, the greatest advantage of the medieval working and re-working of this sort of detailed commentary is that it

¹ For the relative advantages of question commentaries, see Robert Andrews, "Question Commentaries on the *Categories* in the Thirteenth Century," in *Medioevo: Rivista di storia della filosofia medievale* 26 (2000), 141–183. Silvia Donati proposes a nuanced classification of questions, in "Per lo studio dei commenti alla Fisica del XIII secolo. I: Commenti di probabile origine inglese degli anni 1250–1270 ca.," *Documenti e Studi sulla Tradizione Filosofica Medievale* II, 2 (1991), 384–5.

results in a thorough understanding of the text, one that is illuminating of both the original work as well as of the medieval psyche.

For these reasons, to begin to provide entrance to the treasury of material to be found in medieval literal commentaries, I shall show some of the features of an interconnected tradition among literal *Categorias* commentaries of the late 13th and early 14th centuries. I shall do so by centering on a work by a relatively obscure commentator active at the University of Paris, Peter of Saint-Amour, showing his style, method, derivations, originality, traditions, and influences, and his connection to other authors within the same historical progression, including Gerard of Nogent, Siger of Courtrai, and Thomas of Erfurt.

1. *Peter of Saint-Amour, Life and Works*

Not much is known about the life of Peter of Saint-Amour. The most established information about his life seems to be that he was a Master of Arts at the University of Paris, and that in 1281 he was rector there.² In a pamphlet from 1902, M. Perrod³ tried to argue that Peter can be identified with the Peter of Saint-Amour who was nephew of William of Saint-Amour, but this identification has been refuted by Fr. Gauthier.⁴

The works of Peter of Saint-Amour, besides the *Sententia supra librum Praedicamentorum* in Paris Bibl. Nat., nouv. acq. lat. 1374 ff. 13rb–34rb, include the flanking commentaries on Porphyry's *Isagoge* (ff. 1ra–9rb) and Aristotle's *De interpretatione* (ff. 34rb–48vb). Other *Perihermenias* commentary versions are dismissed by Tabarroni.⁵ Catalog records also report commentaries on the *Posterior Analytics* and *De generatione et corruptione* by Peter.⁶ Barbara Faes de Mottoni claims to have found

² *Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis* I, Heinrich Denifle and Emile Chatelain, eds. (Paris, 1889–1897), pp. 588–9 n. 503.

³ M. Perrod, *Pierre de Saint-Amour, recteur de l'Université de Paris, chanoine de Mâcon, archidiacre de Vauxrenard* (Besançon, 1902). Perrod is likely the source of Glorieux's note: "Pierre de Saint-Amour. Pierre Bellison. Neveu de Guillaume de Saint-Amour. Dès 1250 chanoine de Saint-Vincent de Mâcon. Recteur de l'Université en 1281. Mort le 1er juin 1295;" P. Glorieux, *La Faculté des arts et ses maîtres au XIII^e siècle* (Paris, 1971).

⁴ Thomas de Aquino, *Expositio libri Perihermenias. Opera omnia* I,1, Editio altera retracta (Rome: Commissio Leonina, 1989) 74*.

⁵ Andrea Tabarroni, "Lo pseudo Egidio (Guglielmo Arnaldi) e un'inedita continuazione del commento di Tommaso al *Perihermenias*," *Medioevo* 14 (1988), 391–403.

⁶ Charles H. Lohr, "Medieval Latin Aristotle Commentaries. Authors: Narcissus – Richardus," *Traditio* 28 (1972), 371.

excerpts from the *Posterior Analytics* commentary in Vatican Bibl. Apost. Pal. lat. 1009;⁷ another manuscript, Vienna Nationalbibl. Pal. 5366,⁸ contains a *Posterior Analytics* commentary explicitly attributed to Peter, which Tabarroni⁹ reports is close to but not identical with the text printed in Faes de Mottoni.

One sophism, "*Nihil est contingens*," is explicitly attributed to Saint-Amour in Vatican lat. 14812 ff. 5r–6r; he may as well be the author of the two preceding sophisma on folios 1r–5r.¹⁰

2. *Peter of Saint-Amour's* Sententia supra librum Praedicamentorum

A surprising number of manuscript copies of commentaries on the *Categories* have been attributed to Peter. In his introduction to Thomas Aquinas on the *Perihermenias*, Fr. Gauthier¹¹ suggests several new texts by Peter: Munich Clm 8002 ff. 88va–98va; Vatican Bibl. Apost. Pal. lat. 1007 ff. 11ra–21ra; Paris Arsenal 530 ff. 16ra–21va; Oxford Merton College 296 ff. 7r–23v; and a fragment contained on f. 142r of Munich Clm 14763. Among these the strongest case lies with the fragmentary Munich Clm 14763, which is explicitly attributed to Peter: "Explicit liber Praedicamentorum editus a Petro de Sancto Amore." This same fragment is credited to Peter by Lohr.¹² However, Tabarroni¹³ refutes these attributions; the incipits and explicits that he reproduces do not correspond with the Peter of Saint-Amour text of Paris Bibl. Nat., nouv. acq. lat. 1374.

⁷ Barbara Faes de Mottoni, "Il commento di Pietro di S. Amore agli *Analitici Posteriori* ritrovato?," *Studi Medievali* 27 (1986), 383–405.

⁸ Cf. M. Markowski, *Repertorium commentariorum mediæ ævi in Aristotelem latinorum quæ in bibliothecis Wiennæ asservantur. Opera philosophorum mediæ ævi, Textus et studia* (Wrocław, 1985), p. 264.

⁹ Andrea Tabarroni, "Lo pseudo Egidio (Guglielmo Arnaldi) e un'inedita continuazione del commento di Tommaso al *Perihermenias*," *Medioevo* 14 (1988), 400 n. 42.

¹⁰ Cf. Siger de Brabant, *Écrits de logique, de morale et de physique*, Bernardo Bazán, ed. *Philosophes Médiévaux* xiv (Louvain-la-neuve, 1974), pp. 7–8.

¹¹ Thomas de Aquino, *Expositio libri Peryermenias. Opera omnia* I,1, Editio altera retracta (Rome, 1989), pp. 73*–74*.

¹² Charles H. Lohr, "Medieval Latin Aristotle Commentaries. Authors: Narcissus – Richardus," *Traditio* 28 (1972), 370–1.

¹³ Andrea Tabarroni, "Lo pseudo Egidio (Guglielmo Arnaldi) e un'inedita continuazione del commento di Tommaso al *Perihermenias*," *Medioevo* 14 (1988), 393–4.

Tabarroni¹⁴ also provides the service of showing that the text of Paris BN 1374 is indeed authentically by Peter of Saint-Amour. He finds in a *Notabilia super Porphyrium* in the same manuscript an allusion to Peter's doctrine:

Anonymus (H. de Brox?) *Notabilia super Porphyrium*, Paris Bibl. Nat., nouv. acq. lat. 1374 f. 55vb: Tertio modo potest exponi, ut exponit magister Petrus de Sancto Amore, et hoc sic: *sub figura appellationis*, id est sub simili significatione appellantis ad appellatum, quia res significata est una, quamvis differenter consideratur, quae importatur et designatur nomine generis, speciei, et differentiae, et individui.

Petrus de Sancto Amore *Sententia supra librum Praedicamentorum*, Paris Bibl. Nat., nouv. acq. lat. 1374 f. 17vb: Et ideo exponatur sic littera (3b15): *autem*, pro 'sed', *videtur in secundis substantiis hoc aliquid significare sub figura appellationis*, id est sub similitudine termini appellantis ad terminum appellatum, quia utraque imponuntur in singulari numero.¹⁵

Peter of Saint-Amour's *Sententia supra librum Praedicamentorum* is thus extant in a single manuscript, Paris Bibl. Nat., nouv. acq. lat. 1374 ff. 13rb–34rb. The manuscript has been previously described by Delisle¹⁶ and Senko.¹⁷ A marginal note on f. 109v dates an early ownership to 1330.

In structure, the *Sententia supra librum Praedicamentorum* is a literal commentary with inserted *dubia* and *notabilia*.¹⁸ The format is rather invariant: first, a division of the text (the first paragraph after the *Prooemium* is a division of the entire book), providing explicit *lemmata* for the subdivisions; then each subdivision of the text is analyzed—usually both summarized and reported word for word, with interposed clarifying paraphrases. For example, in explaining 10a4, the author writes:

¹⁴ Ibid., 398–9.

¹⁵ References to the text of the *Categories* within my edition are indicated by the Bekker number in parentheses, thusly: (7a17). My procedure has been to *italicize* the interposed text of Aristotle, as done in the edition of the *Metaphysics* commentary of Albert the Great (Albertus Magnus *Metaphysica, libros quinque priores*, ed. B. Geyer, Alberti Magni *Opera omnia* XVI,1, Aschendorff, 1960). The spelling presented in the editions is normalized. The rudimentary punctuation of the manuscripts has served as a guide without obligation.

¹⁶ L. Delisle, "Manuscripts divers acquis par la Bibliothèque Nationale en 1876, 1877 et 1878," *Mélanges de Paléographie et de Bibliographie* (Paris, 1880), pp. 469–71. In edition it is 61000 words long.

¹⁷ W. Senko, *Repertorium commentariorum mediæ ævi in Aristotelem latinorum quæ in Bibliothecis publicis Parisiis asservantur. Opera philosophorum mediæ ævi, Textus et studia tom. 5 fasc. 1–2* (Warsaw, 1982), pp. 103–6.

¹⁸ The colophon entitles the work *Sententia et etiam notabilia supra librum Praedicamentorum*.

And then the Philosopher continues, saying that not only those qualities which arise from passions are called transient qualities, but *Similarly any aberrations*, that is externalities or affections, *not naturally*,—supply ‘are in the soul’—, *but are made from some other circumstances* which are difficult to change; *also such things* are called *qualities*. And he proves this, because *according to those we are called qualities*.

The author dissects Aristotle’s text in great detail, and often parses the arguments into syllogisms, supplying missing premises or conclusions.

Following each section are *dubia* and *notabilia*. The *notabilia* are the commentator’s didactic remarks on the text. The *dubia* raise problems, which are immediately answered. These may occur singly or in a series, and at the most complex there may be a series of counter-objections and successive responses. Although at the time this commentary was written the genre of question commentaries on the *Categories* was well established, this work maintains the older literal commentary format, and never rises to the complexity and freedom of the question commentary genre.

Nothing is known about the composition or presentation of the work, but it may have been presented as a lecture:

Amplius si convenienter (7a31). In parte ista, quia **tota die locutus est** de convenienti et inconvenienti assignatione, et ista non multum sunt manifesta, ideo hic ostendit quid per ipsa intelligat.

Authors of three other commentaries seem to belong to the same tradition of literal *Categories* commentaries as Peter of Saint-Amour: Gerard of Nogent, Siger of Courtrai, and Thomas of Erfurt.

3. Gerard of Nogent’s

Glossulae supra librum Praedicamentorum Aristotelis

The attribution to Gerard of Nogent of the *Logica vetus* commentary considered here is uncertain; it is in competition with an unspecified Durandus (and the *Perihermenias* commentary contained in it was sometimes credited to Thomas Aquinas).¹⁹ Gerard of Nogent, like Peter of Saint-Amour, was Rector at the University of Paris, in 1292. However, his *Categories* commentary shows signs of being earlier than Peter’s,

¹⁹ Cf. Thomas de Aquino, *Expositio libri Perihermenias*, *Opera omnia* I,1, Editio altera retracta (Rome, 1989), p. 75*.

which is comprehensible since it is known that Gerard was resident earlier in Paris, between 1253 and 1274.²⁰ The only work which with certainty can be attributed to Gerard is a commentary *Super librum Posteriorum*. The manuscript of the *Categories* commentary from which I transcribe is Padova Bantoniana XX.480 ff. 7vb–25vb; it is extant also in Escorial BReal f.III.24, ff. 1–44v, Milano BTrivulziana 753 (H 67), ff. 1–74, Oxford Merton College 261, ff. 72–112, Paris Bib. Nat. Mazarine 3523, ff. 1r–56v, Paris BN lat. 15005, ff. 206–249,²¹ and Paris BN lat. 16618 f.125seqq.²² A conflation in the Milan manuscript with some material associated with John of Seccheville is discussed by P. O. Lewry.²³ Despite the uncertainty of attribution I shall continue to refer to the work as by Gerard of Nogent.²⁴

4. *Siger of Courtrai's* Commentarium in Categorias

Siger of Courtrai is well known from the early collection of his works in *Les Philosophes Belges*²⁵ and the complete edition of his *Perihermeneias* commentary by C. Verhaak.²⁶ As well a number of his modistic texts are available.²⁷ His *Categories* commentary discussed here is found

²⁰ Charles H. Lohr, "Medieval Latin Aristotle Commentaries. Authors A–F," *Traditio* 23 (1967), 162–3.

²¹ This manuscript is incomplete; it is described in W. Senko, *Repertorium commentariorum mediæ ævi in Aristotelem latinorum quæ in Bibliothecis publicis Parisiis asservantur*, in *Opera philosophorum mediæ ævi, Textus et studia tom. 5 fasc. 1–2* (Warsaw, 1982), p. 185.

²² Described in W. Senko, *Repertorium commentariorum mediæ ævi in Aristotelem latinorum quæ in Bibliothecis publicis Parisiis asservantur*, in *Opera philosophorum mediæ ævi, Textus et studia tom. 5 fasc. 1–2* (Warsaw, 1982), p. 78.

²³ P. O. Lewry, "Robertus Anglicus and the Italian Kilwardby," in *English Logic in Italy in the 14th and 15th Centuries*, Acts of the 5th European Symposium on Medieval Logic and Semantics, Rome, 10–14 November 1980, ed. A. Maierù (Naples, 1982), pp. 34–5.

²⁴ Bits of this work have been printed in Robert Andrews, *Peter of Auvergne's Commentary on Aristotle's "Categories": Edition, Translation, and Analysis*, Dissertation: Cornell University 1988 and in Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Quæstiones in Isagogen Porphyrii et Quæstiones super Prædicamenta Aristotelis*, eds. R. Andrews, G. Etzkorn, G. Gál, R. Green, T. Noone, and R. Wood (*Opera philosophica* vol. I) (New York, 1999).

²⁵ G. Wallerand, *Les oeuvres de Siger de Courtrai* (*Les Philosophes Belges*, VIII) (Louvain, 1913).

²⁶ Siger de Courtraco, *Expositio in librum Aristotelis Perihermeneias*, in *Zeger van Kortrijk, Commentator van Perihermeneias*, edited with an introduction by C. Verhaak (Brussels, 1964).

²⁷ Siger de Courtraco, *Summa modorum significandi, Sophismata*. New edition by Jan Pinborg, *Sophisma* IV: "Album potest esse nigrum" (*Amsterdam Studies in the Theory and History of Linguistic Science*. Series III, *Studies in the History of Linguistics* 14) (Amsterdam, 1977).

in two manuscripts, Erfurt SB Amplon. F.135, ff. 91ra–139v,²⁸ and Venice BMarc. lat. VI 21, ff. 92r–158v. Brief passages from this work have been published.²⁹ Siger was a Master of Arts in Paris in 1309, and died in 1341.³⁰ Pinborg dates his commentary on the *Categories* to 1300–1320.³¹

5. *Thomas of Erfurt's Expositio super librum Praedicamentorum*

Thomas of Erfurt was active in the first quarter of the fourteenth century. His *De modis significandi* gained lasting impact because of its misattribution to Duns Scotus.³² Little is known of his life; influences on his work suggest that he was educated at the University of Paris, and later documents place him in Erfurt, Germany.³³ His *Expositio super librum Praedicamentorum* exists in four manuscripts: Erfurt SB Amplon. Q.266, ff. 8ra–20rb; Leipzig UB 1356, ff. 9ra–18rb; München SB Clm. 4378, ff. 29r–66v; München SB Clm. 14458, ff. 119ra–133ra.³⁴

²⁸ Described in Mieczysław Markowski, *Repertorium commentatorum mediæ ævi in Aristotelem Latinorum quæ in Bibliotheca Amploniana Erfordiae asservantur* (Polska Akademia nauk, Instytut filozofii i socjologii) (Wrocław, 1987), pp. 173–4.

²⁹ Robert Andrews, *Peter of Auvergne's Commentary on Aristotle's "Categories": Edition, Translation, and Analysis*, Dissertation: Cornell University 1988 and in Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Quæstiones in Isagogen Porphyrii et Quæstiones super Praedicamenta Aristotelis*, eds. R. Andrews, G. Etzkorn, G. Gál, R. Green, T. Noone, and R. Wood. (*Opera philosophica* vol. I) (New York, 1999).

³⁰ C. Lohr, "Medieval Latin Aristotle Commentaries. Authors: Robertus – Wilgelmus," *Traditio* 29 (1973), 138; C. Verhaak, *Zeger van Kortrijk, Commentator van Perihermeneias* (Brussels, 1964), pp. xxii–xxix.

³¹ Jan Pinborg, *Die Logik der Modistae*, *Studia Mediæwistyczne* 16 (1975), 39–97, p. 42.

³² Thomas of Erfurt, *Grammatica Speculativa. An Edition with Translation and Commentary*, ed. G. L. Bursill-Hall (London, 1972).

³³ Information about his life may be found in Sönke Lorenz, *Studium Generale Erfordense. Zum Erfurter Schulleben im 13. und 14. Jahrhundert* (Monographien zur Geschichte des Mittelalters, 34) (Stuttgart, 1989), pp. 312–25. See also Jack Zupko's article online in the *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*: <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/erfurt/>.

³⁴ This work is discussed in Robert Andrews, "Thomas of Erfurt on the *Categories* in Philosophy," in *Was ist Philosophie im Mittelalter?* Akten des X. Internationalen Kongresses für mittelalterliche Philosophie der Société Internationale pour l'Etude de la Philosophie Médiévale, 25. bis 30. August 1997 in Erfurt, edited by Jan A. Aertsen and Andreas Speer (Miscellanea Mediaevalia 26) (Berlin, 1998), pp. 801–8. Its edited version is 54000 words.

6. *Interconnections among the Commentaries*

Peter of Saint-Amour's work was not written in isolation. It is demonstrable that his commentary imitated other writers, and it in turn was imitated by successors. This is not at all unusual. Medieval literal commentaries (transgressing against modern taste) are often highly derivative. In composing a literal commentary, many authors took some predecessor's text as a template upon which to elaborate, embellish, and expand. The modern disdain for plagiarism is an inverse of medieval values, for in the medieval world tradition was respected rather than innovation; what was new was unproven and suspect, while the old was established, authoritative, and time-honored. This is reflected in the medieval practice of only referring to antiquated authorities like Aristotle or Boethius by name, referring to contemporaries instead as "some people" (*aliqui*) or "certain ones" (*quidam*).

It is clear that there is an interconnection among the commentaries by the authors Gerard of Nogent (writing c. 1270–80), Peter of Saint-Amour (c. 1270–80), Siger of Courtrai (c. 1300–20), and Thomas of Erfurt (c. 1300–25). Other commentaries, attributed or anonymous, may be added to the list. The similarities are such that the works sometimes have been confused with each other. Several scholars have noticed the similarities between the *Categories* commentaries of Siger of Courtrai and Thomas of Erfurt.³⁵ Verhaak observes that the Thomas manuscripts are "in many cases identical" with Siger's commentary, and says that these manuscripts "represent a different recension" of the texts ascribed to Siger.³⁶ Verhaak's conclusion is that the two commentaries "show traces of having derived from a common older *expositio*." Also, despite all the manuscripts Fr. Gauthier attributes to Peter of Saint-Amour, only one is authentic, but the other manuscripts exhibit considerable similarities.

In what follows I shall show that these commentaries belong to a long tradition of imitation and accretion in which each writer builds upon what has gone before, refining the analysis and adding original material.

³⁵ For example, Stephan Grotz in his introduction to his translation of *De Modis Significandis*: Stephan Grotz, translator, *Thomas von Erfurt, Abhandlung über die bedeutsamen Verhaltensweisen der Sprache* (Tractatus De modis significandi) (Amsterdam, 1998), p. vii, n. 1.

³⁶ Siger de Courtraco, *Expositio in librum Aristotelis Perihermeneias*, in *Zeger van Kortrijk, Commentator van Perihermeneias*, edited with an introduction by C. Verhaak (Brussels, 1964), pp. cxxix–cxxx.

7. *Truth (2a8)*

I shall begin with the history of a typical passage, an inserted note prompted by Aristotle's passage at 2a8 where he remarks that only complete sentences are true or false—individual components of sentences (such as the terms which fall under the categories) are neither true nor false. I set in juxtaposition the treatment of this passage in four authors, beginning with Gerard of Nogent.

Gerardus de Nogento

Glossulae supra librum Praedicamentorum Aristotelis

Ms. Padova Bantoniana XX.480 f. 9vb

Secundo notandum quod supra passum istum dicit Boethius³⁷ quod duplex est veritas. Quaedam est quae est adaequatio rei et intellectus cognitione.³⁸ Et loquendo de tali, nullum illorum est verum vel falsum.

Alia est veritas quae est rei entitas. Et de tali dicitur quod verum et ens convertuntur.³⁹ Et hoc modo quodlibet illorum potest dici verum.⁴⁰

Gerard has the simplest approach. He wishes to note that there is a sense of 'truth' which derives from the so-called transcendental terms (drawn from Aristotle's *Metaphysics* II,1 993b30–31), a sense in which there is a convertibility among being, truth, and goodness: whatever has being is good; whatever is good is true; whatever is true has being. Of course in this sense even the single terms which fall under the categories may be said to be true. Another sense is the traditional one of "*adaequatio rei et*

³⁷ Immo Albertus Magnus, *Liber de Praedicamentis* I,7 (1890) 165b: Et hoc est verum de hoc vero quod est adaequatio rerum complexarum cum intellectu componente vel dividente. . . . Possunt tamen alio modo esse vera vel falsa, secundum quod verum dicimus purum, alienae naturae non permixtum, vel existens et non apparens tantum.

³⁸ Cf. Avicenna, *Metaph.* I, 8 (1977) 55; Bonav., *Sent.* I d. 40 a. 2 q. 1 in corp. (I 707b nota 5); Thomas Aquinas, *De veritate* q. 1 a. 1 (XXII–1) 6; Robertus Grosseteste, *De veritate propositionis* (1912) 144: Veritas enim sermonis vel opinionis est adaequatio sermonis vel opinionis et rei; cf. J. T. Muckle, "Isaac Israeli's Definition of Truth," *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Age* 8 (1933), 5–8.

³⁹ Cf. Aristoteles, *Metaph.* II,1 993b30–31; Jacqueline Hamesse, *Auctoritates Aristotelis, Senecae, Boethii, Platonis, Apulei et quorundam aliorum* (Louvain) 1974, p. 118 (42): Unumquodque sicut se habet ad entitatem, sic se habet ad veritatem.

⁴⁰ "In the second place it should be noted about this passage (2a8) that Boethius says that there are two kinds of truth. One kind is a correspondence of thing and the intellect in comprehending; and in this sense none of these is either true or false. The other kind of truth is the same as the being of a thing, as when it is said that "truth and being are convertible" (993b30); and in this way each of them can be said to be true."

intellectus,” the correspondence between intellect and thing, and in this sense single terms are not true. This definition has a long history,⁴¹ but it does not occur in Boethius, to whom Gerard misattributes it.

Petrus de Sancto Amore

Sententia supra librum Praedicamentorum

Ms. Paris BN 1374 f. 15va

Secundo notandum quod supra istum passum dicit Boethius quod duplex est veritas. Quaedam est quae est adaequatio rei et intellectus cognitione. Et dico ‘cum cognitione’, quia si intellectus non cognoscaret rem, non posset apprehendere neque adaequari rei. Et per oppositum, falsitas est inadaequatione rei et intellectus. Et sic loquendo, nullum istorum est verum vel falsum.

Alia est veritas quae est rei entitas. Et de tali dicit Philosophus⁴² secundo Metaphysicae quod “ens et verum convertuntur.” Et hoc modo quodlibet istorum potest dici verum.⁴³

Peter clearly bases his analysis on Gerard, but he inserts several clarifying additions. Like Gerard, he falsely credits the distinction to Boethius. He has the same term ‘*cognitione*’ in the traditional definition “*adaequatio rei et intellectus*,” but appends the clarification that this is because a true correspondence depends on cognition, not intellect alone. Then Peter inverts the definition to apply it to falsity, which is the lack of correspondence between intellect and thing. Finally, Peter provides the specific reference of Aristotle’s *Metaphysics* Book II for the appeal to transcendentals. Peter’s account is basically Gerard’s, with inserted clarifications.

⁴¹ Cf. J. T. Muckle, “Isaac Israeli’s Definition of Truth,” *Archives d’histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Age* 8 (1933), 5–8.

⁴² Aristoteles, *Metaph.* II,1 993b30–31; Hamesse, *Auctoritates Aristotelis*, p. 118 (42): Unumquodque sicut se habet ad entitatem, sic se habet ad veritatem.

⁴³ “In the second place it should be noted about this passage (2a8) that Boethius says that there are two kinds of truth. One kind is a correspondence of thing and the intellect in comprehending. I say ‘in comprehending’, because if the intellect does not comprehend a thing, it can neither understand nor correspond to the thing. Conversely, falsity is a lack of correspondence between thing and intellect. In this sense none of them is either true or false. The other kind of truth is the same as the being of a thing. In this sense Aristotle in the second book of the *Metaphysics* says that ‘being and truth are convertible’ (993b30); and in this way either of them can be said to be true.”

Siger of Courtrai

Commentarium in Categorias

Ms. Venice M L. VI. 21 f. 111vb

Ad evidentiam huius partis est intelligendum quod duplex est veritas, una scilicet quae est natura rei entitatis, quae est adaequatio rei ad sua principia. Et isto modo quodlibet ens est verum, quia quodlibet illorum habet naturam rei entitatem.

Alia est veritas quae causatur ex compositione vel divisione aliquorum adinvicem. Et illa quae sic sunt vera non sunt in praedicamento, quia omnia quae sunt in praedicamento sunt incomplexa, ut probatum est.⁴⁴

In his first distinction, Siger conflates the transcendental and the correspondence senses of truth: transcendental truth is the “*adaequatio rei ad sua principia*.” For the second limb of his distinction he appeals (without reference) to the definition of truth found in Aristotle’s *De interpretatione* 16a12–13: “*circa compositionem enim et divisionem est falsitas veritasque*.” A similar but tripartite distinction is also to be found in Siger’s *De interpretatione* commentary: transcendental truth, correspondence truth, and the truth arising from composition and division.⁴⁵ Compared with Gerard and Peter, Siger employs much the same terminology, but incorporates it into a new result.

Thomas de Erfordia

Expositio super librum Praedicamentorum

Mss. Erfurt SB Amplon. Q.266 [= E] f. 9vb; Leipzig UB 1356 [= L] f. 10rb; München SB Clm. 4378 [= M] f. 34v; München SB Clm. 14458 [= N] f. 121rb

Notandum quod aliquis posset instare: verum et ens convertuntur; sed unumquodque praedicamentorum significat ens; ergo significat verum, ut videtur.

⁴⁴ “In explaining this part (2a8) it should be understood that that there are two kinds of truth. One kind is the same as the nature of the being of a thing, which is the correspondence of a thing to its principles. In this sense each thing is true, because each thing has the nature of the being of a thing. The other kind of truth is that which is caused by the composition or division [of expressions], and what is true in this sense is not within a category, because anything within a category is simple, as has been shown.”

⁴⁵ Siger de Courtraco, *Expositio in librum Aristotelis Perihermeneias*, in *Zeger van Kortrijk, Commentator van Perihermeneias*, edited with an introduction by C. Verhaak (Brussels, 1964) in 16a12–13: Et est sciendum quod veritas potest accipi tripliciter. Uno modo secundum quod est passio entis; et isto modo verum convertitur cum ente, nec isto modo accipitur hic. Alio modo potest accipi ut est passio intellectus; in isto modo non pertinet ad librum istum sed magis ad librum *De Anima*. Alio modo potest accipi ut significatur et repraesentatur per vocem; et isto modo accipitur hic cum dicitur “circa compositionem et divisionem” etcetera.

Dicendum quod duplex est veritas: quaedam est veritas quae est idem quod pura et impermixta rei entitas, sicut dicimus illud est unum verum quod est purum et natura aliqua impermixtum. De ista veritate loquitur Philosophus secundo Metaphysicae⁴⁶ quando dicit quod omnino sicut res se habent ad entitatem, sic se habent ad veritatem; quia sicut ens et verum convertuntur, sic entitas et veritas. Et in isto modo concludit argumentum.

Alia est veritas quae causatur ex compositione et divisione praedicati cum subiecto vel a subiecto, de qua veritate dicit Philosophus primo Perihermenias⁴⁷ quod “circa compositionem et divisionem consistit veritas vel falsitas.” Quam veritatem etiam Boethius et Commentator⁴⁸ secundo Metaphysicae sic definiunt: quod “veritas est adaequatio rei et intellectus,” id est conformitas intellectus cum re extra. Et de illa veritate intendit Philosophus cum dicit “Singula praedicamentorum secundum se non sunt vera neque falsa” (2a5) etc.⁴⁹

Thomas’ passage is the most complex of all. He formulates the issue as an objection (“*aliquis posset instare*”) to Aristotle’s claim that categorical items are neither true nor false: true and being convert (transcendentally); anything within a category is a being, and so therefore true. Thomas’ distinction is basically Siger’s: the two types of truth are transcendental or caused by composition and division. However, in his description of transcendental truth he (like Peter of Saint-Amour) gives the reference to Aristotle’s *Metaphysics*, as well as the full *aucto-*

⁴⁶ Aristoteles, *Metaph.* II,1 993b30–31; Hamesse, *Auctoritates Aristotelis*, p. 118 (42): Unumquodque sicut se habet ad entitatem, sic se habet ad veritatem.

⁴⁷ Aristoteles, *De interp.* I 16a12–13: Circa compositionem enim et divisionem est falsitas veritasque.

⁴⁸ Cf. Averroes, *In Aristotelis Librum II Metaphysicorum Commentarius* com. 1, ed. Darms (Freiburg, 1966) 53.16–56.67, *sed non ad rem*.

⁴⁹ “It should be noted that someone might object, thusly: ‘Truth and being are convertible; but each category signifies being; therefore each category signifies truth’.

In response to this it should be said that that there are two kinds of truth. One kind is truth which is the same as the pure and unmixed being of a thing, just as we say that which is one [and] true is pure and unmixed with another nature. The Philosopher speaks of this sense of truth in the second book of the *Metaphysics* when he says that each thing is ordered to being in just the way that it is ordered to truth, because just as being and the true are convertible, so are [the abstracts] being and truth. In this way the objection is resolved.

The other kind of truth is that which is caused by the composition of the predicate with the subject, or the division of the predicate from the subject. Aristotle speaks of this kind of truth in the first book of *De interpretatione* (16a12) when he says that ‘truth and falsity belong to composition and division’. Also Boethius, and Averroes on the second book of the *Metaphysics*, define this sort of truth as ‘correspondence of thing and intellect’, that is, a conformity of the intellect with an external object. Aristotle means this sort of truth when he says (2a5) that ‘Individuals within a category are in themselves neither true nor false’.

ritates quotation. Furthermore, he uses language which refers back to the earliest known proponent of a distinction regarding truth in this context, Albert the Great, whose language (“*purum, alienae naturae non permixtum*”) was only adumbrated in Siger.

When Thomas explains the type of truth caused by composition and division, he adds to Siger a reference to and quotation from *De interpretatione*. As well he identifies this sort of truth with the correspondence theory of truth. Like Gerard and Peter he falsely attributes this definition to Boethius—and adds another false attribution for good measure, to Averroes! Indeed, in his comments on *Metaphysics* II Averroes discusses truth, but without the phrase “*adaequatio rei et intellectus*.” Thomas’ account is more than three times as long as Gerard’s, and seems to incorporate elements from all of the other writers. Various writers and commentators may be involved in the chain of influence, but it is clear that Thomas’ final result is original only in the sense that it uniquely combines earlier elements.

The preceding passages reflect the several different techniques for adaptation of a predecessor. Clarification may be provided by inserted annotations and elaborations. Associations might lead to digressions. A simple allusion to an authority may be filled out with an explicit attribution—correctly or incorrectly!—and a more complete quotation. Textual elements may be rearranged or combined. None of these techniques produce entirely original results, but they are the methods by which literal commentaries grow—by synthesis and accretion.

8. Denomination (1a13)

In another series of texts one can see the correlations and incrementation of the literal commentary process. The issue at hand concerns the requirements for denomination.⁵⁰ The starting point for the discussion is Boethius: “*Tria sunt autem necessaria ut denominative vocabula constituentur: prius ut re participet, post ut nomine, postremo ut sit quaedam nominis transfiguratio.*”⁵¹

⁵⁰ Regarding denomination, see the bibliography in Robert Andrews, “Peter of Auvergne on Denomination,” in *Meaning and Inference in Medieval Philosophy: Studies in Memory of Jan Pinborg*, ed. Norman Kretzmann (Dordrecht, 1988).

⁵¹ Boethius, *In Cat.* (1860), col. 168: “Three conditions are required in order that words be considered denominative: first, that they agree in object; next that [they agree] in name; and finally that there is a certain transformation of the name.”

A more proximate source is Albert the Great: “*In denominatione ergo haec tria necessaria sunt, scilicet natura aliena subiecto extrinsecus aptata et circumposita, in principali et denominativo eadem res significata, et diversi modi significandi.*”⁵²

I present our four authors in the same order as above.

Gerardus de Nogento

Glossulae supra librum Praedicamentorum Aristotelis

Ms. Padova Bantoniana XX.480 f. 8vb

Circa istam partem notandum primo quod ad hoc quod aliqua dicuntur denominativa quattuor requiruntur—Boethium.⁵³ Primum est quod communicant in principio et differunt in fine. Et per hoc patet quod studiosus denominative non dicitur a virtute. Secundum est quod significet eandem rem formaliter. Tertium est quod differant in modo significandi, ita quod unum significet per modum per se stantis, reliquum per modum adiacentis. Quartum est quod abstractum differat essentialiter ab eo cui concretum inheret. Et per hoc habetur quod concretum proprie non est substantiis, quia humanitas non differt essentialiter ab eo cui homo sit concretum.⁵⁴

Petrus de Sancto Amore

Sententia supra librum Praedicamentorum

Ms. Paris BN 1374 f. 14rb

Item nota quod ad naturam denominativorum quattuor requiruntur. Primum est quod convenient in voce a parte principali et differunt a parte finis. Et per hoc removetur quod studiosus non dicitur a virtute denominative. Secundum est quod significet eandem rem formaliter. Tertium est quod differant in modo significandi, ita quod unum significet per modum per se stantis, reliquum per modum adiacentis. Quartum est quod abstractum differat (determinat ms.) per essentiam ab eo cui concretum inheret. Et per hoc habetur quod non convenit proprie in substantias, quia humanitas non differt per essentiam ab eo cui homo

⁵² Albertus Magnus, *Liber de Praedicabilibus* (B. Alberti Magni *Opera omnia* I), ed. A. Borgnet (Paris, 1890) 158b; “Thus these three conditions are required for denomination, namely, a nature separate from a subject extrinsically attached and situated, the same thing signified by both a principal [term] and a denominative [term], and different modes of signifying.”

⁵³ *Immo* Albertus Magnus, *Liber de Praedicamentis* I,4 158b.

⁵⁴ “Regarding this part it should be noted firstly that four conditions are required for denomination (according to Boethius). The first is that [the terms] agree at the beginning and differ at the end; because of this ‘studious’ is not said to be derived denominatively from ‘virtue’. The second condition is that [the terms] signify the same thing formally. The third condition is that they differ in mode of signifying, so that one signifies in the mode of a noun, the other in the mode of an adjective. The fourth condition is that the abstract differs essentially from that in which the concrete inheres; and because of this there is properly no concrete among substances, because *humanity* does not differ essentially from that for which *man* is a concrete.”

est concretum; vel oportet quod differant essentialiter. Et quod utrique sit nomen impositum, propter hoc non possunt denominative dici sicut homo ab humanitate, quia non differunt essentialiter.⁵⁵

Siger of Courtrai

Commentarium in Categorias

Ms. Venice M L. VI. 21 f. 109va

Notandum est secundum Albertum⁵⁶ quod ad hoc quod aliquid sit denominativum tria requiruntur, scilicet identitas vocis a parte principii, et diversitas a parte finis. Quia si esset totalis identitas, tunc esset aequivocum et non denominativum, sicut apparet de ‘musica’ prout dicitur de scientia et muliere habente scientiam. Similiter si esset totalis diversitas in voce, tunc tale nomen esset synonymum et non denominativum, ut studiosus. Quod autem differant in fine potius quam in principio, ratio est quia omnis diversitas est a forma, quia forma dat esse,⁵⁷ et distinguit et separat. Etiam forma et finis coincidunt, intelligendo de fine intrinseco, propter quod diversitas debuit esse ex parte finis.

Secundo requiritur identitas significati.

Tertio diversitas modi significandi, quia principale significat rem suam per modum entis absoluti, sed denominativum significat idem per modum inhaerentis et dependentis ad subiectum.⁵⁸

⁵⁵ “Next note that four conditions are required for the nature of denominatives. The first is that [the terms] are alike at the beginning of the word, and differ at the end; because of this ‘studious’ is not said to be derived denominatively from ‘virtue’. The second condition is that [the terms] signify the same thing formally. The third condition is that they differ in mode of signifying, so that one signifies in the mode of a noun, the other in the mode of an adjective. The fourth condition is that the abstract differs in essence from that in which the concrete inheres; and because of this there is properly no [denomination] among substances, because *humanity* does not differ in essence from that in which *man* is a concrete (or, it is required that they differ essentially). And it is not enough for denomination that the [same] name be assigned to them, like *man* and *humanity*, because these two do not differ essentially.”

⁵⁶ Albertus Magnus, *Liber de Praedicamentis* I,4 158b.

⁵⁷ Cf. Aristoteles, *Metaph.* VIII,5 1043a2; Hamesse, *Auctoritates Aristotelis*, p. 130 (189): Unde forma dat esse rei.

⁵⁸ “It should be noted according to Albert that three conditions are required for denomination. One is identity of word at the beginning, and difference at the end. If there would be complete identity, then this would be a case of equivocation and not denomination, just as ‘music’ means both the science of music as well as a [musical] woman knowing that science. Likewise, if there were complete diversity in the words, then it would be a case of synonyms and not denominatives, like ‘studious’ [and ‘virtuous’]. The reason why [the terms] must differ at the end rather than at the beginning is that all diversity arises from form (since “form gives being”), and form distinguishes and separates; and “form and [end] agree” (meaning intrinsic end); so diversity must arise because of the end.

The second condition is identity of what is signified.

The third [condition is] diversity in mode of signifying, so that the principle [term] signifies a thing in an absolute mode of being, but the denominative [term] signifies the same thing in a mode of inherence and dependence upon a subject.”

Thomas de Erfordia

Expositio super librum Praedicamentorum

Mss. Erfurt SB Amplon. Q.266 [= E] f. 8va–b; Leipzig UB 1356 [= L] f. 9va; München SB Clm. 4378 [= M] f. 31r; München SB Clm. 14458 [= N] f. 119vb–120ra

Item secundo notandum secundum Albertum⁵⁹ ad hoc quod aliquid sit denominativum, tria requiruntur. Prima identitas vocis ex parte principii, et diversitas ex parte finis. Quia si esset totalis identitas, tunc magis essent aequivocum et non denominativum, sicut apparet de ‘musica’ prout dicitur de scientia et muliere habente scientiam musicae. Similiter si esset totalis diversitas in voce, tunc tale nomen magis esset synonymum et multivocum et non denominativum, sicut studiosus non dicitur denominative a virtute. Quod autem magis debeat in fine differre quam in principio, ratio est quia omnis diversitas est a forma, eo quod forma separat et distinguit; sed forma et finis coincidunt, ut dicitur secundo Physicorum;⁶⁰ propter quod diversitas debet esse a parte finis.

Secundo requiritur identitas significati. Et propter hoc ‘lucus’ non dicitur a luce denominative, quia lucus non convenit cum luce in significato, quia dicitur ‘lucus’ quasi minime lucens, quia repugnat rationi lucis.⁶¹

Tertio requiritur diversitas in modos significandi, ita quod denominativum sive concretum significet per modum inhaerentis subiecto; principale autem sive abstractum per modum distincti contra subiectum. Et propter hoc obliqui casus non dicuntur denominative a recto; quia sicut rectus significat per modum adiacentis subiecto, vel distincti contra subiectum, sic et obliqui ipsius.⁶²

⁵⁹ Albertus Magnus, *Liber de Praedicamentis* I,4 158b.

⁶⁰ Cf. Aristoteles, *Physica* II,7 198a24–7.

⁶¹ Cf. *The Concise Oxford Dictionary*, 5th ed. (1964), p. 726: *lucus a non lucendo*—Paradoxical derivation;...explanation by contraries. Cf. Maurus Servius Honoratus, *In Vergiliū carmina commentariū*, eds. G. Thilo et H. Hagen (Leipzig, 1881) I, 441: ‘lucus’ autem dicitur quod non luceat.

⁶² “Secondly, it should be noted according to Albert that three conditions are required for denomination. The first is identity of word at the beginning, and difference at the end. If there would be complete identity, then this would rather be a case of equivocation and not denomination, just as it is clear that ‘music’ means both the science of music as well as a [musical] woman knowing that science. Likewise, if there were complete diversity in the words, then it would be a case of synonyms or reformulations rather than denominatives, just as ‘studious’ is not derived denominatively from ‘virtuous’. The reason why [the terms] must differ at the end rather than at the beginning is that all diversity arises from form, since form separates and distinguishes; but ‘form and end agree’, as is stated in the second book of the *Physics* (198a24–7); so diversity must arise because of the end.

The second condition is identity of what is signified. Because of this condition ‘grove’ (*lucus*) is not derived denominatively from ‘light’ (*lucis*), because ‘grove’ and ‘light’ do not have the same signification—rather ‘grove’ is called so because there is a lack of light there, and is opposed to the nature of light.

These four passages show a great deal of similarities, but the differences among them reveal their relative connections. The preponderance of correlations occurs between Gerard and Peter, and between Siger and Thomas. All agree that denominative words vary in spelling: for Gerard and Peter they “*communicant (convenient in voce, Peter) in principio et differunt in fine;*” according to Siger and Thomas they exhibit “*identitas vocis a parte principii, et diversitas a parte finis.*” As a second requirement all agree that denominative words signify the same thing: for Gerard and Peter they “*significet eandem rem formaliter;*” according to Siger and Thomas they exhibit “*identitas significati.*” In describing the third requirement they all adopt a version of Albert’s phrase: for Gerard and Peter they “*differant in modo significandi;*” according to Siger and Thomas they exhibit “*diversitas modi significandi*” or “*diversitas in modos significandi.*” Only Gerard and Peter add a fourth requirement, that “*abstractum differat essentialiter (per essentiam, Peter) ab eo cui concretum inheret.*” In each of the two pairs, the later author adds a few clarifying phrases to his predecessor. Even when little of importance is changed, there seems to be a conscious effort to re-word or to rearrange the phrasing. Small flourishes of originality are valued even amid the extensive duplication.

Information does not always survive the transmission. Only Gerard correctly identifies the originator of the discussion, Boethius. Once Peter drops the reference, it is left to Siger and Thomas to add credit to the more proximate source, Albert.

9. *Having a Wife (15b28)*

Finally, I turn to two anonymous manuscripts which have been attributed to Peter of Saint-Amour. One is a fragment, München CLM 14763 f. 142, which Charles Lohr thought to be a version of Peter of Saint-Amour’s *Categories* commentary.⁶³ The other one, Vatican Bibl. Apost. Pal. lat. 1007 ff. 11ra–21ra, was among those credited to Peter

The third requirement is diversity in mode of signifying, so that the denominative or concrete [term] signifies in a mode of inhering in a subject, while the principle or abstract [term] signifies in a mode distinct from the subject. Because of this oblique cases are not said to be derived denominatively from the nominative case, because just as the nominative case might signify its subject in the mode of an adjective—distinct from the subject—so might the oblique case signify it.”

⁶³ Charles H. Lohr, “Medieval Latin Aristotle Commentaries. Authors: Narcissus – Richardus,” *Traditio* 28 (1972), 370–1.

by Fr. Gauthier while cataloging the manuscripts of Thomas Aquinas on the *Perihermenias*.⁶⁴ That these are misattributions can be shown by reference to that rarest feature in medieval philosophy—a joke.

The humor arises in connection with the very end of the *Categories* (in fact, the final few lines of Aristotle's text)—perhaps when the commentators were in a celebratory mood. Aristotle there offers eight different senses of the word 'having' (*habere*), such as to have a quality, have a quantity, have a possession, and so forth. The final type of having is the way in which a husband is said to have a wife (15b28). Most commentators in the genre give a standard explanation of why Aristotle lists this type of 'having' last: because it is the least important. This explanation is given in all four of the commentaries considered above—Gerard of Nogent, Peter of Saint-Amour, Siger of Courtrai, and Thomas of Erfurt. However, only Peter of Saint-Amour adds that, according to a certain *truffator* (that is, joker or fool), this is placed last because when a man believes that he has a wife, he doesn't—rather, some other man does.

Petrus de Sancto Amore

Sententia supra librum Praedicamentorum

Ms. Paris BN 1374 f. 34ra

Aut etiam vir (15b28). Hic ponit octavum modum habere. Et dicit quod octavus modus ipsius habere est *habere uxorem*. Et secundum istum modum illud quod habet etiam habetur, ut vir habet uxorem, et habetur ab uxore. Et ideo dicit Philosophus de isto modo in comparatione ad alios, quod iste est *alienissimus in eo quod est habere*. Et subdit rationem, *quia nihil aliud est habere uxorem quam cohabitare cum ea*. Sed sicut vir cohabitatur cum muliere, ita mulier cum viro. Et ita utrumque dicitur habere secundum istum modum; secundum autem alios, non; et ideo dicitur alienissimus.

Sed quidam truffator (tryfator *var.*) dicit quod iste est alienissimus propter hoc quod quando vir credit habere uxorem, non habet; immo quidam alius.⁶⁵

⁶⁴ Thomas de Aquino, *Expositio libri Perihermenias. Opera omnia* I,1, Editio altera retracta (Rome: Commissio Leonina, 1989). The misattribution is discussed in Andrea Tabarroni, "Lo pseudo Egidio (Guglielmo Arnaldi) e un'inedita continuazione del commento di Tommaso al *Perihermenias*," *Medioevo* 14 (1988), 371–427.

⁶⁵ "A man also [*is said to have a wife*]. Here [Aristotle] presents the eighth sense of 'to have'. And he says that the eighth sense of 'to have' is *to have a wife*. In this sense he who has is also had, as a man has a wife, and is had by a wife. Therefore Aristotle says that this sense in comparison to the others is *the most remote meaning of 'to have'*. He appends the reason for this, because to have *a wife is nothing other* than to live with her.

In the two anonymous manuscripts we see a procedure typical for literal commentaries, in which an original comment is elaborated and revised. Not only do they repeat but also invert the joke—perhaps in keeping with equality between the sexes. Here, a certain *truffator* says that when a man believes that he has a wife, he doesn't have her, because some other man does; and similarly, when a wife believes that she has a husband, she does not have him because, sometimes, some other woman does.

Anonymus

Expositio super librum Praedicamentorum (fragm.)

Ms. München CLM 14763 f. 142r

Dicit quidam triumphator dicaxque (dycitque? *ms.*) quod iste modus alienissimus est; dixit quidam triumphator propter hoc <quod> quando vir credit habere uxorem, non habet eam, sed alius (*aliis ms.*). Similiter et uxor; cum credit habere virum, non habet ipsum, sed quaedam alia mulier quandoque habet. In aliis autem modis non sic est; et ideo est alienissimus.⁶⁶

Anonymus

Rationes super librum Praedicamentorum

Ms. Vatican Bibl. Apost. Pal. lat. 1007 f. 21ra

Et quidam triumphator dixit quod ille modus alienissimus est propter id quod quando vir credit habere uxorem, non habet eam, sed aliquis alius. Similiter et uxor; cum credit habere virum, non habet (*is add. et del.*) ipsum, sed aliqua alia mulier quandoque habet. In aliis autem modis non sic est; ideo alienissimus est.⁶⁷

Just as a man lives with a wife, so does a wife live with a man. Each is said to have the other reciprocally in this sense, but not in the other senses; therefore this sense is said to be the most remote.

However, a certain joker says that this is the most remote sense because when a man believes that he has a wife, he doesn't, because some other man does!"

⁶⁶ "A certain joker and wit says that this is the most remote sense; and the joker said this because when a man believes that he has a wife, he doesn't have her, but some other man does. Likewise when a wife believes that she has a husband, she does not have him, but sometimes some other woman does. This is true in no other sense, so this is the most remote."

⁶⁷ "A certain joker said that this is the most remote sense because of the fact that when a man believes that he has a wife, he doesn't have her, but some other man does. Likewise when a wife believes that she has a husband, she does not have him, but sometimes some other woman does. This is true in no other sense, so this is the most remote."

This is surely one of the only jokes to be found in medieval philosophy. That it is a joke is signaled by the appearance of the vernacular term ‘*truffātor*’, which also proves that all of the versions belongs to the same tradition. ‘*Truffātor*’ (spelled here as ‘*tryfator*’, ‘*trumphator*’, and ‘*truphator*’) was current in ancient French as *trufeor*,⁶⁸ and survives in English as both ‘truffle’ and ‘trifle’. The expansions of the two anonymous manuscripts are sufficient evidence that the works are not the same as the simpler version of Peter of Saint-Amour. Indeed, their elaborations suggest that they are subsequent to Peter, although all could have arisen independently from an even earlier source. But certainly there is enough evidence to treat all of these works as part of the same tradition.

Upon contemplating this commentary passage, I realized that perhaps the *truffātor* has it right, and that Aristotle himself intended his concluding remark to be a joke. It seems only natural that, after a long lecture, one would end with a light-hearted remark, perhaps even a somewhat risqué one. So the reason that Aristotle listed ‘having a spouse’ as the very last type of ‘having’ may well have been his wry insight that this is indeed a tenuous sort of possession.

The recognition of the interconnectedness of related literal commentaries can help in dating, assigning provenance, and identifying philosophical traditions. Understanding standard treatments can aid in several respects, such as filling out illegible or missing script. Some passages can even be collated across different authors. Most importantly, literal philosophical commentaries cannot be appreciated in isolation. Their value lies not in pure originality, but in accretion and the subtle reworking of the materials of tradition.

⁶⁸ A. J. Greimas, *Dictionnaire de l'ancien français jusqu'au milieu du XIV^e siècle* (Paris, 1987), p. 647.

THOMAS AQUINAS ON ESTABLISHING THE IDENTITY OF ARISTOTLE'S CATEGORIES

Paul Symington

Providing a philosophical justification for the specific number and identity of Aristotle's categories is a task that dates back at least to Simplicius's commentary on Aristotle's *Categories* (ca. 6th century A.D.).¹ Scholastics from the thirteenth century onward addressed this issue, which they called *sufficiencia praedicamentorum*, mostly in commentaries on Aristotle's *Categories*.² Two related questions were pertinent. The first asked whether Aristotle provided an adequate list of categories and the second asked whether a philosophical justification could be given for the specific items on the list.³ Although the latter task predates Albertus Magnus (ca. 1208–80), he is credited as being the first scholastic to attempt it.⁴ Albertus established a method of arriving at a list of the

¹ For a recent translation of Simplicius's commentary on Aristotle's *Categories*, see *Simplicius: On Aristotle's Categories 1–4*, trans. Michael Chase (Ithaca, 2003). See esp. pp. 74–91.

² Robert Andrews identifies other texts that offered opportunity for medieval commentators to address the topic of the *sufficiencia*, such as Aristotle's *Metaphysics* V, *Physics* III, and *Topics* I, in "Question Commentaries on the *Categories* in the Thirteenth Century," *Medioevo* 26 (2001), 292. Although Aquinas may be the first scholastic to refer to Simplicius, he does not seem to be familiar with Simplicius's justification of the number and identity of the categories. However, Radulphus Brito shows familiarity with Simplicius's treatment. See William E. McMahon, "Radulphus Brito on the Sufficiency of the *Categories*," *Cahiers de l'institut du moyen-Âge grec et latin* 39 (1981), 86. For a topical discussion of the various philosophical questions generated around Aristotle's *Categories*, see Jorge J. E. Gracia and Lloyd Newton, "Medieval Theories of *Categories*," *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, 14 April 2006, <<http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/medieval-Categories>> (8 August 2006).

³ See Giorgio Pini, "Scotus on Deducing Aristotle's Categories," *La tradition médiévale des Catégories (XII^e–X^e siècles): XIII^e Symposium européen de logique et de sémantique médiévales*, eds. Joël Biard and Irène Rosier-Catach (Louvain, 2003), p. 24.

⁴ Albertus Magnus, *Liber de Praedicamentis* 7.1, *Alberti Magni Opera omnia*, 1, ed. A. Borgnet (Paris, 1890), pp. 270–72. For a discussion of Albertus Magnus on the categories, see William E. McMahon, "Albert the Great on the Semantics of the Categories of Substance, Quantity, and Quality," *Historiographia Linguistica* 7, 1/2 (1980), 145–57 and E. P. Bos and A. C. van der Helm, "The Division of Being over the Categories According to Albert the Great, Thomas Aquinas and Duns Scotus," in *John Duns Scotus: Renewal of Philosophy: Acts of the Third Symposium Organized by the Dutch Society for Medieval Philosophy Medium Aevum (May 23 and 24, 1996)*, ed. E. P. Bos, (ELEMENTA: Schriften zur Philosophie und ihrer Problemgeschichte) 72 (Amsterdam, 1998), pp. 183–96.

categories from the modes of predication. Thomas Aquinas followed Albertus's lead and tried to establish an exhaustive categorial division of being by showing that there are only so many ways in which predicates are said of subjects.⁵ Although Aquinas never wrote a commentary on Aristotle's *Categories*, he provided two closely related justifications for the list of categories (*praedicamenta*) in his commentaries on the *Metaphysics* (Book V, lect. 9) and the *Physics* (Book III, lect. 3).⁶ Moreover, Aquinas's account was historically more influential than Albert's, even though Aquinas's discussions of the topic are relatively brief.

Although the division of the categories is metaphysically fundamental and interesting, as well as hotly debated among scholastics, the secondary literature on Aquinas's contribution to the problem of *sufficientia praedicamentorum* is scant. In fact, not only is the literature devoted specifically to it meager, but the discussion is often altogether ignored in broad discussions of Aquinas's metaphysics.⁷ This is not surprising given Aquinas's brief and elliptical treatment of it. The issue, however, has not escaped the attention of a few scholars, including John Wippel, who has provided the most detailed treatment of Aquinas's view to date.

The purpose of this article is to offer an alternative interpretation of Aquinas's view. The key passage is his statement that "those things that are said to be *secundum se* which signify in every manner the figures of predication [i.e., the modes of predication]."⁸ I argue that this passage is crucial to a proper understanding of Aquinas's derivation

⁵ In "Categories in Aristotle," Michael Frede interprets the Aristotelian categories as kinds of predications rather than kinds of predicates. In *Studies in Aristotle*, ed. Dominic J. O'Meara (Washington, D.C., 1981), pp. 1–24. He also claims that in Aristotle's works there is not "any sign of a systematical derivation of the categories, e.g., in terms of a set of formal features" (p. 22). In contrast, Aquinas holds 1) that the categories (*praedicamenta*) are substance and nine accidents, and 2) the list of categories can be established according to formal features of propositions (namely, the modes of predication or *figuras praedicationis*).

⁶ Thomas Aquinas, *In duodecim libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis expositio*, eds. M. R. Cathala and R. M. Spiazzi (Turin, 1950); hereafter cited as '*In Met.*' Through the chapter, I either provide my own translations of the text or modifications of John P. Rowan's translation, *Commentary on Aristotle's Metaphysics: St. Thomas Aquinas* (Notre Dame, 1995). Thomas Aquinas, *In octo libros Physicorum Aristotelis expositio*, ed. P. M. Maggiolo (Turin, 1954); hereafter cited as '*In Phys.*'

⁷ See, for example, Eleonore Stump, *Aquinas (The Arguments of the Philosophers)*, (New York, 2005) and Robert Pasnau and Christopher Shields, *The Philosophy of Aquinas* (Boulder, 2004). Etienne Gilson also does not mention it in *Being and Some Philosophers* (Toronto, 1952), p. 55.

⁸ *In Met.* 5.9, n. 889: "quod illa dicuntur esse *secundum se*, quaecumque significant figuras praedicationis." For the passage of Aristotle to which Aquinas refers, see *Metaphysics* 5.7.

of the categories and that Wippel's account does not adequately take it into consideration. This passage indicates a key feature of Aquinas's approach: that the categories are identified and distinguished from each other based on essential propositions, i.e., *secundum se* or *per se* propositions, which have predicates that are essentially related to their subjects. Consequently, in the first section of this chapter, I present Wippel's interpretation of what Aquinas means by *secundum se* as it relates to the modes of predication and I point out some difficulties with it.⁹ To be more precise, problems arise with Wippel's interpretation because he does not take into account Aquinas's focus on *per se* modes of predication. In the second section of this chapter, I offer an interpretation of what Aquinas means by *secundum se* when he describes the modes of predication from which the categories are established. Specifically, I interpret *secundum se* to refer to three of the four *per se* modes of predication as they are discussed in the *Posterior Analytics*: *primo modo*, *secundo modo*, and *quarto modo per se* predication.¹⁰ My claim is that Aquinas determines the number of categories by reflecting on the ways in which the predicates of *per se* propositions are related to the subjects of other such *per se* propositions. Finally, in the third section I show how Aquinas establishes the categories from the modes of *per se* predication. For the sake of brevity, I focus mainly on substance, quantity, and quality and provide only a sketch of how Aquinas deals with the remaining categories.

⁹ John F. Wippel, "Thomas Aquinas's Derivation of the Aristotelian Categories (Predicaments)," *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 25 (1987), 13–34 and *The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas* (Washington, D.C., 2000), pp. 208–28. Other scholars with similar interpretations of Aquinas's view are Giorgio Pini, "Scotus on Deducing Aristotle's Categories," and E. P. Bos and A. C. van der Helm, "The Division of Being over the Categories According to Albert the Great, Thomas Aquinas and Duns Scotus."

¹⁰ Thomas Aquinas, *Expositio Libri Posteriorum, Sancti Thomae de Aquino Opera omnia*, Leonine edition (Rome, 1989), 1.2; hereafter cited as '*Post. An.*' The fact that the commentary on the *Posterior Analytics* is believed to have been written roughly at the same time as the commentary on the *Metaphysics* (between 1269–72) makes it pertinent for our discussion. See *The Cambridge Companion to Aquinas*, eds. Norman Kretzmann and Eleonore Stump (New York, 1993), p. 283. In addition, both texts discuss modes of predication. Also, although these three modes of predication are awkwardly named (I refer to three modes of predication but there is no *tertio modo*), I follow the convention in the secondary literature of naming each specific mode according to the Latin ordinal used in the text. See William M. Walton, "The Second Mode of Necessary or *Per Se* Propositions According to St. Thomas Aquinas," *The Modern Schoolman* 29 (1951–52), 293–306. Aquinas identifies *tertio modo* in *Post. An.* 1.10 as not a mode of predication but rather one way to understand the term '*per.*' For a similar interpretation of *secundum se*, see Ralph McInerny, "Being and Predication," in his *Being and Predication: Thomistic Interpretations* (Washington, D.C., 1986), pp. 173–228.

I. *John Wippel's Interpretation*

In this section I focus exclusively on Wippel's interpretation of Aquinas's derivation as it is presented in his commentary on the *Metaphysics* V, 9, focusing specifically on Wippel's understanding of Aquinas's statement that "those things are said to be *secundum se* that signify in every manner the modes of predication."¹¹ I also criticize Wippel's interpretation insofar as it is neither sufficient for establishing the number and identity of the categories from modes of predication, as Aquinas claims, nor compatible with the general context of Aquinas's discussion. To be fair to Wippel, however, it should be noted that he offers an accurate overview of the text in which Aquinas establishes the list of categories. He notes that Aquinas identifies three ways in which a predicate can be related to its subject in a proposition. In the first way, (1) "the predicate is really identical with that which serves as the subject,"¹² and these propositions signify substance. The example that Wippel provides to illustrate this is "Socrates is an animal." In a second way, (2) "a predicate may be taken from something which is in the subject."¹³ If the predicate is absolutely in the subject and follows from the matter (2a), then the category of quantity results, but if it follows from the form (2b) of the subject, then the category of quality results. Wippel does not give examples of, nor discusses how, a predicate is understood to be in a subject either according to the matter of the subject or according to its form. It is possible that he would say that "Socrates is five-feet tall" and "Socrates is bald" are examples in which the predicate is said to be in the subject because the former signifies how much the subject is and the latter how the subject is. If, however, the predicate is taken not absolutely but in relation to something other than the subject (2c), then relation is expressed. Although Wippel does not provide an example, he might say that "Socrates is the teacher of Plato" is an example of this.

In a third way, (3) "a predicate may be derived from something which is realized outside the subject."¹⁴ Again, Wippel provides no examples to illustrate this, nor does he discuss how a predicate is understood to be realized outside the subject. Rather, he simply claims that the various

¹¹ *In Met.* 5.9, n. 889.

¹² Wippel, *Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas*, p. 213.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 214.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

ways in which the predicate is denominated by that which is realized outside the subject yield the remaining categories. For example, if the predicate in any way measures the subject (3a–c), in combination with other conditions, then the categories of place (e.g., “Socrates is in the marketplace”), time (e.g., “The play is at dusk”) and position (e.g., “Socrates is sitting”) result. If the predicate does not measure the subject (3d), then habit (e.g., “Socrates is shod”) results. The last two categories, action (e.g., “Socrates is cutting”) and passion (e.g., “The paper is being cut”) are signified by those predicates that are only “partly present in the subject (3e–f).”¹⁵

Wippel cites an earlier passage in which Aquinas states that “those things are said to be *secundum se* that signify in every manner the modes of predication.”¹⁶ He notes that “Thomas begins [the derivation] with the observation that according to Aristotle those things are said to be in the proper sense (*secundum se* rather than only *per accidens*) which signify different figures of predication [i.e., modes of predication].”¹⁷ However, Wippel does not expand any further on this passage, leaving us with three questions. First, what does he take ‘figures of predication’ to mean? Second, what is the antecedent to ‘those things,’ i.e., to what do ‘those things’ refer? Do they refer to “predicates,” “subjects,” “the various significations of the copula,” “propositions,” or something else? Third, what does it mean for something to be said to be *secundum se* (‘in a proper sense’) and how is this different from that which is said to be *per accidens*? I will address each question in turn.

Figures of Predication

In discussing the meaning of ‘figures of predication,’ Wippel refers to both ‘modes of predicating’ (*modus praedicandi*) and ‘modes of predication’ (*modus praedicationis*). Wippel does not distinguish between these two terms and seems to use them interchangeably.¹⁸ He simply says that the categories are distinguished according to different modes or ways of predicating.

¹⁵ Ibid., p. 215.

¹⁶ *In Met.* 5.9, n. 889.

¹⁷ Wippel, *Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas*, p. 212.

¹⁸ In keeping with Aristotle’s and Aquinas’s general theory of psychology, I take it that a ‘proposition’ is the object of the second act of the intellect, and that ‘predicating’ is the activity itself. Thus, ‘predication’ would be the abstract form of ‘predicating’.

Of those names which are predicated, continues Thomas, some signify what something is, that is to say, substance. Some signify how it is (quality), and others how much there is (quantity), and so on. Therefore, in accord with each of these supreme modes of predication, *esse* must signify the same thing, i.e., what something is, or what kind it is, or how much there is, etc. For instance when we say that man is an animal, the term 'is' signifies substance. When we say a man is white, the verb 'is' signifies quality.¹⁹

In this passage, Wippel identifies "modes of predication" as the basic ways in which a predicate says something of its subject and points out that each category is distinguished according to a different mode of predication. A predicate that expresses what the subject is signifies substance, one that expresses how the subject is expresses quality, etc. For example, since both "Socrates is an animal" and "Bucephalus is a horse" have predicates that say what the subject is, the *esse* of each proposition must signify substance. Likewise, "Socrates is white" and "Socrates is bald" signify quality because they have predicates that show how the subject is. To put it another way, "white" and "bald" are answers to the question "How is Socrates?" Thus, two propositions that have predicates that relate to their subjects in the same way (e.g., both propositions have predicates that signify what the subject is) signify the same category. When Wippel refers to the signification of *esse*, he means the copula 'is' in a proposition. In a simple subject-predicate proposition the copula functions to unify the subject and predicate in a single signification, so that a proposition as a whole can signify a substance or accident according to the sense of the predicate. For example, the proposition "Socrates is an animal" signifies substance, and "Socrates is white" signifies an accident (viz., quality).

The Antecedent of 'those things'

This understanding of what Wippel means by 'modes of predication' or 'modes of predication' helps us to understand the second question posed above concerning how Wippel understands 'those things' in Aquinas's statement that "those things are said to be *secundum se* that signify in every manner the modes of predication."²⁰ Although Wippel does not identify the antecedent of 'those things', his brief treatment

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ *In Met.* 5.9, n. 889.

of the issue seems to suggest that the modes of predication are the various ways in which predicates are related to subjects. Therefore, it would seem that Wippel understands 'those things' (*illa*) to mean the modes of predication that he identifies, such as "what the subject is," "how the subject is," "how much the subject is," etc. However, if this were the case, Aquinas's passage would have the following interpretation: the specific modes of predication are said to be *secundum se* that signify in every manner the modes of predication (and the categories are established from them). That is, the modes of predication that Wippel identifies 1) are the modes of predication that are said to be in a proper sense and 2) are the modes of predication from which the categories are derived.

"Secundum se"

This interpretation in turn provides us with an answer to the question concerning what it means for modes of predication to be said '*secundum se*.' Wippel points out that *secundum se* is opposed to *per accidens* and translates the former as "in a proper sense." Thus, it would be reasonable to infer from this that *per accidens* in this context may be translated as "in an improper sense." Consequently, in the passage in question, "in a proper sense" qualifies "modes of predication" in that only propositions that have predicates that are related to their subjects according to one of the ten supreme modes of predication are '*secundum se*.' For example, a proposition that is *secundum se* is one in which the predicate says what the subject is or is one in which the predicate says how the subject is, etc. Also, those propositions that have predicates that are not related to their subjects according to one of these ways are *secundum accidens*. This indicates how, for Wippel, categories are distinguished according to modes of predication. "Socrates is a man," "Bucephalus is a horse," and "A man is rational," signify substance because they have predicates that show what their subjects are and "Socrates is white" signifies quality because the predicate says how the subject is.

Now let me turn to some problems with Wippel's understanding of Aquinas's view. First, Wippel seems to present two independent ways of "distinguishing" or "deriving" the categories.²¹ This could be called 'the

²¹ It may be controversial to interpret Wippel as equating the terms 'deriving' and 'distinguishing.' However, there are several reasons why I believe he does so. 1) He

problem of two derivations.’ On one hand, he says that the categories “are distinguished according to the different modes or ways of predicating,”²² and then identifies the mode of predication specific to each category. For example, propositions with predicates that express what the subject is signify substance (e.g., “man is an animal”) and propositions that express how the subject is signify quality (e.g., “Socrates is bald”). On the other hand, he presents the “derivation” of the categories from propositions that express a relationship between the subject and predicate according to three ways: “In one way, the predicate is really identical with that which serves as the subject”;²³ “in a second way, a predicate may be taken from something which is in the subject”;²⁴ and “in a third major way, a predicate may be derived from something which is realized outside the subject.”²⁵ Thus, it appears that he has a problem of two derivations. That is, he seems to have two accounts for how the list of categories is established. This problem arises because there is no discernable relation between the so-called ten supreme modes of predication and the three ways in which a predicate is related to its subject. This is problematic because Aquinas only presents one way of establishing the categories in the text. Wippel does not discuss how the modes of predicating that show how the subject is or how much the subject is are related to that in which the predicate is taken from something in the subject. That is, if “Socrates is white” distinguishes the category of quality because it shows how the subject is, what is the significance of Aquinas saying that “white” as understood in the

never defines ‘derivation’ but he does use both terms in very similar contexts: “Thomas would have us appeal . . . to diversity in modes of predication in order to render explicit the distinction between substance and accident in general, and also to derive the nine supreme classes of accidents” (p. 211). It would make sense to say that just as substance is distinguished from accident, so too the nine categories are distinguished from each other as well. 2) Aquinas never uses a term that corresponds to Wippel’s term ‘derivation.’ Rather, Aquinas uses terms such as *distinguuntur* and *dividitur* to discuss the so-called derivation of the categories. Thus, when Wippel uses the term ‘distinguish’ in the context of the categories it is reasonable to hold that he uses it interchangeably with the term ‘derive.’ 3) He states that the categories “are *distinguished* according to different modes or ways of predicating” (p. 212) and immediately after identifying these modes of predicating through which the categories are distinguished he proceeds directly to discuss the derivation of the categories. It is difficult to understand how the categories are distinguished and derived from the modes of predication if ‘distinguished’ and ‘derived’ do not have the same meaning.

²² Ibid., p. 212.

²³ Ibid., 213.

²⁴ Ibid., 214.

²⁵ Ibid.

subject "Socrates" according to the form of the subject is a way of distinguishing the category of quality from other categories? Indeed, it appears that the first account presented by Wippel obviates the need for the second one.

A second problem with Wippel's interpretation specifically pertains to the way that Aquinas establishes the category of substance. Wippel suggests that substance is "derived" when a predicate is "really identified" with the subject.²⁶ But it seems that this is the same as the mode of predication in which the predicate says what the subject is. For example, in "Socrates is an animal," "Socrates" is really identified with "animal" and "animal" says what the subject "Socrates" is. Given these factors, according to Wippel, the proposition signifies substance. This is in contrast to "Socrates is white," which does not signify substance because the predicate is neither identified with the subject nor does it show what the subject is.

However, not only is the condition in which the predicate is really identified with the subject not mentioned by Aquinas, but it is also insufficient for establishing the category of substance. For it cannot be used to distinguish propositions signifying substance from propositions that do not. This is because there are propositions that have predicates that are identified with their subject and yet do not signify substance. Consider the following examples: "White is a color," "A surface is a continuous quantity," or "This patch of color is red." In these propositions the predicate is identified with the subject and shows what the subject is. "White" is really identified with "color" in the sense that white really is a color. Also, a particular patch of color that is red is such that "red" is identified with that patch of color. But none of these propositions directly signifies substance. Thus Wippel's suggestion is not sufficient for establishing the category of substance. This is a problem because Aquinas's procedure aims to distinguish propositions from each other that signify different categories from a consideration of the way in which predicates are related to subjects.²⁷ The fact that Wippel's interpretation does not take this into account leads one to infer that he has misinterpreted Aquinas's position.

²⁶ Ibid., p. 213. All Aquinas says is that in one way a "predicate states what the subject is, as when I say Socrates is an animal." *In Met* 5.9, n. 891.

²⁷ *In Met.* 5.9, n. 890: "Et propter hoc ea in quae dividitur ens primo, dicuntur esse praedicamenta, quia distinguuntur secundum diversum modum praedicandi."

Third, Wippel does not offer an interpretation of how Aquinas establishes the categories that is consistent with the overall meaning of the text. As a consequence, Wippel's interpretation fails to show how all ten categories are said to be *entia secundum se*, which is a fundamental claim of Aquinas in the text. In lect. 9, Aquinas is commenting on Aristotle's text in which he discusses the various ways that being is said.²⁸ The text is divided into the following distinct sections. 1) In n. 885, Aquinas provides an overarching division in which being is said (*ens dicitur*) either *secundum se* or *secundum accidens*.²⁹ Furthermore, it is important to note that in this section Aquinas says that these two ways that being is said are not the same as the division of being into substance and accident.³⁰ Rather, he says that the division of being *secundum se* and *secundum accidens* "is understood according to whether something is predicated of something else either essentially [*per se*] or accidentally [*per accidens*]."³¹ 2) Next, in nn. 886–88, Aquinas subdivides the latter division and discusses the nature of being that is said accidentally (*secundum accidens*); namely, that which is predicated accidentally. "A man is musical" and "Socrates is white" are beings that are said *secundum accidens* because they predicate accidents of substances and their predicates are not essentially predicated of their subjects.³² 3) Finally, in nn. 889–94, Thomas turns to the former division and discusses that which is said to be *secundum se*. It is in this context that he states that "those things that are said to be *secundum se* in every manner signify the modes of predication"³³ and it is in this context that he establishes the list of categories (n. 892).

An understanding of how the text is divided and how the so-called derivation text fits into it reveals some significant problems with Wippel's interpretation. On the one hand, Wippel states that the mode of predication that reveals the category of quality is that in which the predicate shows how the subject is. Therefore, since "Socrates is white" and "Socrates is musical" are propositions that have predicates that show how the subject is, they must signify the category of quality. On

²⁸ *In Met.* 5.9, n. 885: "Hic Philosophus distinguit quot modis dicitur ens."

²⁹ *Ibid.*: "ens dicitur quoddam secundum se, et quoddam secundum accidens."

³⁰ *Ibid.*: "Sciendum tamen est quod illa divisio entis non est eadem cum illa divisione qua dividitur ens in substantiam et accidens."

³¹ *Ibid.*: "Unde patet quod divisio entis secundum se et secundum accidens, attenditur secundum quod aliquid praedicatur de aliquo per se vel per accidens."

³² *Ibid.*, n. 886: "Ostendit quot modis dicitur ens per accidens... cum accidens praedicatur de subiecto, ut cum dicitur, homo est musicus."

³³ *Ibid.*, n. 889.

the other hand, Aquinas states that being "*secundum se* is divided into the ten categories, of which nine are accidental kinds"³⁴ and being *secundum se* refers to essential predication. However, both "Socrates is white" and "Socrates is musical" are said *secundum accidens*. Therefore, since propositions that have predicates that say how the subject is have predicates that are predicated accidentally (*secundum accidens*), this cannot be the mode of predication from which quality is established. Rather, the mode of predication from which all the categories are derived must be related to essential predication.³⁵

Finally, I question Wippel's overall understanding of Aquinas's approach to establishing the categories. I disagree with Wippel's suggestion that Aquinas's text provides a way to discover the categories, if by 'discover' Wippel means that the technique for distinguishing the categories is in itself a way of determining the meaning of each of the categories. That is, since the term 'discover' has the connotation of "being made known," the suggestion that through the technique presented by Aquinas one discovers definitions or characteristics of specific categories is misguided. Rather than discovering the categories, Aquinas's technique merely distinguishes or divides propositions that signify different categories according to the logical properties of propositions. Wippel seems to hold that for Aquinas "Socrates is human" is a way of understanding the meaning of substance signified by the proposition because the predicate says what the subject is. In contrast, I

³⁴ Ibid., n. 885: "Quod ex hoc patet, quia ipse postmodum, ens secundum se dividit in decem praedicamenta, quorum novem sunt de genere accidentis."

³⁵ Pini follows Wippel in his interpretation in "Scotus on Deducing Aristotle's Categories," p. 26: in "the predication 'man is white', 'is' signifies a quality, and so on. Since there are ten kinds of predicate—something Aquinas demonstrated too... there are ten different meanings of the verb 'to be'.... Hence, since predicates are classified into ten genera according to what they signify, he could conclude that there are ten genera of being." Earlier in the text Pini states that "Since a predicate can be attributed to its subject in ten different ways, he could conclude that there were ten different modes of being" (pp. 25, 26). The same criticism applies to Pini's interpretation: although Aquinas holds that the 'is' in the proposition "Socrates is white" expresses a metaphysical accident, such a proposition cannot be used to deduce the category of quality. This is similar to the interpretation given by Bos and van der Helm in "The Division of Being over the Categories," pp. 187–89. Two other treatments of Aquinas's on the *sufficiencia praedicamentorum* are of note. They follow a similar line of interpretation as Wippel: M. Marina Scheu in *The Categories of Being in Aristotle and St. Thomas* (Washington D.C., 1944), pp. 60–6; and Stanislas Breton, "La déduction thomiste des catégories," *Revue philosophique de Louvain* 60 (1962), 5–32. Scheu stresses Aquinas's logical approach in deriving the modes of being (p. 63). However, Scheu treatment is brief and does not expand on the various modes of predication.

hold that Aquinas identifies “Socrates is human” as signifying substance in the following way: 1) every proposition that has a given logical form signifies substance (what this logical form specifically is will be discussed in the third section); 2) “Socrates is human” has that given logical form; 3) therefore, “Socrates is human” signifies substance. Aquinas does not provide a way of discovering what propositions signifying categories mean (e.g., that “Socrates is human” signifies substance, which means “what the subject is”) but rather a way of distinguishing propositions from each other in a way that parallels the categorial division of being. In support of this, Aquinas states that “that into which being is first divided (*dividitur*) are called categories because they are distinguished (*distinguuntur*) according to different modes of predicating.”³⁶ In addition to this, I contend that Aquinas emphatically does not establish the division of being into the categories by identifying the ten supreme modes of predicating (“what the subject is,” “how the subject is,” etc.) but rather establishes the categories through the three ways that predicates may be related to their subjects.

II. *Per se Predication and the Identity of the Categories*

The starting point for my interpretation of the way that Aquinas establishes the categories is based on the passage in which he says that being said *secundum se* and *secundum accidens* “is understood according to whether something is predicated of something else either essentially [*per se*] or accidentally [*per accidens*].”³⁷ I claim that the categories are established through the modes of *per se* (i.e., essential) predication.³⁸ In this section I develop some points crucial to understanding Aquinas’s procedure for establishing the categories from *per se* modes of predication; namely, that a successful way to establish the categories is by identifying differences in the predication structure of *per se* propositions.³⁹ Next, I

³⁶ *In Met.* 5.9, n. 890. My emphasis.

³⁷ *In Met.* 5.9, n. 885. Later in his commentary (n. 1054), Aquinas specifically identifies the various meanings of ‘*secundum se*’ with the various meanings of ‘*per se*’ predication as it is found in the *Posterior Analytics*.

³⁸ For a discussion of the various senses of *modus* in Aquinas, especially as it plays a role in his metaphysics, see John Tomarchio, “Aquinas’s Division of Being According to Modes of Existing,” *Review of Metaphysics* 54, 3 (2001), 585–613.

³⁹ For the difference between *per se* propositions and *per se* predication, see fn. 18 above.

introduce the various *per se* modes of predication—namely, *primo modo*, *secundo modo* and *quarto modo per se*—and distinguish them from the *per accidens* modes. Each mode of predication indicates how a predicate is related to its subject. Furthermore, I show that each *per se* mode of predication satisfies the two criteria of *per se* predication; viz.: 1) the predicate is predicated universally of the subject and 2) the subject, or something possessed by the subject, is the cause of the predicate. This provides a foundation for the third section of this chapter (III) in which I discuss how Aquinas establishes the various categories from *per se* modes of predication.⁴⁰

As previously mentioned, Aquinas's derivation of the categories that I am focusing on is found in the fifth chapter of his commentary on the *Metaphysics*. In order to understand Aquinas properly, however, one must consider the larger context of the passage. The general issue that Aquinas addresses in this section of his commentary concerns the various significations of 'being'; that is, the basic senses of the term.⁴¹ He begins by noting that for Aristotle the term *ens* signifies either *ens per se* or *ens per accidens*.⁴² This is the division of being into substance (*per se*) and accidents (*per accidens*). However, Aquinas makes another distinction of *ens* into being that is said *secundum se* and that which is said *secundum accidens*. This latter division of being refers to the various senses of the copula ('is') in a proposition. Because the copula of a proposition is a kind of being ('is' is a cognate of 'being'), being that is said *secundum se* refers to propositions in which the predicate is essentially or *per se* predicated of its subject.

There are two important features of the copula. First, it signifies what the predicate and subject taken together signify.⁴³ For example, the copula of "Socrates is an animal" signifies Socrates-the-animal (the specific unified extramental being). Second, the copula is classified or characterized according to the way in which the predicate of a proposition

⁴⁰ The textual basis for my interpretation is mainly the *Commentary on the Metaphysics* V, 9. Due to its similarity with the passage in *Physics* III, 5, I use the latter parallel text only for purposes of amplification.

⁴¹ *In Met.* 5.9, n. 885.

⁴² Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 5.7 (1017a8).

⁴³ See: Gyula Klima, "Aquinas' Theory of the Copula," *Logical Analysis and History of Philosophy* 5 (2002) and "The Semantic Principles Underlying Saint Thomas Aquinas's of Being," *Medieval Philosophy and Theology* 5 (1996), 87–141; Pini, "Scotus on Assertion and the Copula: A Comparison with Aquinas," in *Medieval Theories on Assertive and Non-Assertive Language. Acts of the 14th European Symposium on Medieval Logic and Semantics, Rome, June 11–15, 2002*, eds. A. Maierù and L. Valente (Firenze, 2004), 307–31.

is related to its subject. For example, the copula in “Socrates is an animal” is an *ens secundum se* because the proposition has a predicate that is essentially related to its subject. The reason why the copula can be characterized in this way is because it has the specific function of relating the predicate to the subject in a proposition. The ways in which the copula relates the predicate to the subject can be characterized in different ways. An understanding of the two features of the copula helps us to interpret Aquinas’s statement that Aristotle “divides being *secundum se* into the ten categories, of which nine are accidents.”⁴⁴ By this, Aquinas means that even though the nine accidents of being are *per accidens*, they are *entia secundum se* in the sense that they can be signified by propositions that have *secundum se* copulas. That is, all ten categories can be signified by being that is said *secundum se* because any proposition in which an essential predication occurs has a copula that signifies any one of the ten categories, including any of the nine accidental categories. For example, “White is a color” has a copula that is both *secundum se* and signifies the category of quality (which is an *ens per accidens*), whereas “Socrates is white” is a proposition that has a copula that signifies a *per accidens* being and is itself *secundum accidens*. Similarly, “Socrates is an animal” has a copula that is *secundum se* and signifies a *per se* being (substance). Although a substance is an *ens per se* and accidents are *ens per accidens*, both substance and accidents can be signified by propositions with copulas that are *entia secundum se*. To simplify matters, instead of referring to a proposition’s copula, I will use the phrase ‘a *per se* predication’ or ‘a *per se* proposition’ to refer to a proposition in which the predicate is essentially related to its subject.⁴⁵

When Aquinas states that those things that are said *secundum se* signify the figures of predication [i.e., modes of predication], he means that *per se* propositions or predications provide an understanding from which the categories are established. When this interpretation of *secundum se* (meaning “*per se* predication”) is coupled with Aquinas’s statement that “being must be narrowed down (*contrahitur*) to diverse kinds (viz., categories) according to a different mode of predication [from that of genus and species] because being is said in as many ways as the ways

⁴⁴ *In Met.* 5.9, n. 885.

⁴⁵ Following Wippel, I will use these two terms interchangeably.

in which something is predicated,"⁴⁶ the result is that the categories are distinguished from each other in the following way: propositions that signify different categories are divided from each other by identifying differences among the modes of *per se* predication. This procedure shows how being is divided into categories by dividing propositions that signify different categories by distinguishing *per se* propositions from each other according to different ways that a predicate can be *per se* predicated of subjects.

Although it may be counter-intuitive to interpret *secundum se* as referring exclusively to propositions in which the predicate is essentially or *per se* related to its subject, there are several reasons to do so. The first is that it heeds Aquinas's explicit admonition that "being is said in a certain way according to itself and in a certain way according to accidents, nevertheless, it must be noted that that part of being is not the same with that division in which being is divided into substance and accidents."⁴⁷ That is, it avoids conflating the meaning of *ens per se* with *ens secundum se*; *per se* being refers to substance and being *secundum se* refers to a proposition in which there is an essential relation between subject and predicate.

Second, it resolves the issue of the sense in which the nine accidents can be understood as being *secundum se*. This interpretation allows us to understand how the nine accidents are on the one hand not *entia per se*, because this applies to substance alone (and accidental being is dependent on the being of substance), and on the other hand, because the nine categories are still fundamental extramental entities, not reducible to anything else (e.g., not reducible to *entia per se*); they are fundamental entities that can be identified through, and correspond to, fundamental differences among *per se* propositions.

Third, it allows Aquinas's argument for the categories to avoid the charge of a *non sequitur* fallacy. Aquinas would indeed be guilty of such a charge if he held that "The categories are established from the modes of predication," follows from "The categories are established by seeing which propositions happen to signify which categories"; for example, that "Socrates is an animal," establishes the category of substance because it signifies substance. Merely stating that a given proposition

⁴⁶ *In Met.* 5.9, n. 890: "Unde oportet, quod ens contrahatur ad diversa genera secundum diversum modum praedicandi, qui consequitur diversum modum essendi; quia 'quoties ens dicitur', idest quot modis aliquid praedicatur."

⁴⁷ *In Met.* 5.9, n. 885.

signifies substance is not the same as establishing the category of substance from a mode of predication. For in this case, no appeal is made to the way in which the predicate is related to its subject; rather, appeal is made only to the metaphysical category a particular proposition happens to signify. Rather, in order for the categories to be established, it must be shown how propositions having copulas which signify a specific mode of *per se* predication can be used to distinguish different categories.

In contrast to Wippel's interpretation, Aquinas establishes the ten categories by reflecting on the three *per se* modes of predication as they are established in the *Posterior Analytics* I.⁴⁸ There he gives two criteria of *per se* predication. According to one, a predicate must be universally predicated of its subject—meaning that the predicate is found in each of the things that are included in its subject.⁴⁹ According to the second criteria, “the subject or something possessed by the subject [must be] the cause of the predicate.”⁵⁰ This second criterion is based on the fact that since the term ‘per’ (‘by’) signifies a causal relation it is necessary that there be a causal feature for all *per se* predications.⁵¹ In contrast, accidental predication obtains when at least one of these two criteria are not met.

Aquinas goes on to say that there are three general modes of predication that meet these two criteria: *primo modo*, *secundo modo* and *quarto modo*.⁵² *Primo modo per se* predication obtains “when the definition or something posited in the definition is predicated of something.”⁵³ Examples of this mode occur in “Socrates is a man,” “White is a color” and “Humans are animals.” This mode meets the two criteria because every

⁴⁸ As previously mentioned, Aquinas will subsequently identify *secundum se* predication with *per se* predication in his *Commentary on the Metaphysics*, nn. 1054–1567.

⁴⁹ *Post. An.* 1.9, lines 47, 48.

⁵⁰ *Post. An.* 1.10, lines 19–24: “Sicut autem hec prepositio ‘per’ designat habitudinem cause quando aliquid extraneum est causa eius quod attribuitur subiecto, ita quando subiectum uel aliquid eius est causa eius quod attribuitur ei, et hoc significat ‘per se’.

⁵¹ *Post. An.* 1.10, lines 8, 9: “Circa primum sciendum est quod hec prepositio ‘per’ designat habitudinem cause.”

⁵² Aquinas does mention another sense in which something is *per se* (viz., *tertio modo*). However, this “mode is not a mode of predicating, but rather a mode of existing.” For in this sense, the *per se* signifies something that is alone, as something singular in the genus of substance. *Post. An.* 1.10, lines 117–21.

⁵³ *Post. An.* 1.10, lines 25–30: “Primus ergo modus dicendi per se est quando id quod attribuitur alicui pertinet ad formam eius, et quia diffinitio significat formam et essentiam rei, primus modus eius quod est ‘per se’ est quando predicatur de aliquo diffinitio uel aliquid in diffinitione positum.”

proposition of this form has a predicate that is predicated universally of its subject insofar as the predicate is contained in the definition of the subject. Also, the predicate is linked to its subject causally insofar as the predicate signifies the essence of the subject.

Secundo modo per se predication obtains "when the subject is posited in the definition of a predicate, which is a proper accident of the subject."⁵⁴ This mode occurs in "A surface is colored" and "Humans have the capacity to laugh." A characteristic of this *per se* mode of predication is that it involves predicates that are property terms (*propria*). This mode of predication meets the two criteria as well. First, the predicate is universally predicated of its subject; for example, every surface has the predicate "colored" truly predicated of it. Second, the predicate is causally linked to the subject in that even though the predicate is not in the definition of the subject, the subject is signified in the definition of the predicate; in "A surface is colored," the definition of 'colored' includes the notion of "surface." Because of this, this mode of predication is determined by a relationship between the predicate and the subject in which the predicate is understood to be in the subject.

Quarto modo per se, the most obscure of the modes, obtains when "the preposition *per* designates a condition of efficient cause or other... [but] the predicate is in fact in the subject on account of itself."⁵⁵ Aquinas says that this mode of predication occurs in "Having been slaughtered, it died." This mode of predication can also be understood to meet the two criteria of having a predicate that is universally predicated of its subject and having a predicate that is understood to be causally linked to its subject. First, in the example given, the predicate "it died" is universally predicated of that which has been slaughtered. Second, the predicate is linked to the subject according to an efficient cause: the slaughtering is understood as the efficient cause of the death of the animal. This *per se* mode of predication is said to signify an extrinsic

⁵⁴ *Post. An.* 1.10, lines 64–67: "Unde secundus modus dicendi 'per se' est quando subiectum ponitur in diffinitione predicati quod est proprium accidens eius."

⁵⁵ *Post. An.* 1.10, lines 122–35: "Deinde cum dicit: item alio modo etc., ponit quantum modum, secundum quod hec prepositio 'per' designat habitudinem cause efficientis uel cuiuscunque alterius <extrinsece>. Et ideo dicit quod quicquid inest unicuique propter se ipsum, per se dicitur de eo, quod uero non propter ipsum inest alicui, per accidens dicitur, sicut cum dico: 'Hoc ambulante coruscat': non enim propter id quod ambulat, coruscauit, set hoc dicitur secundum accidens. Si uero quod praedicatur inest subiecto propter ipsum, per se inest, ut si dicamus quod interfectum interiit: manifestum est quod propter id quod interfectum est, interiit, et non est accidens quod interfectum intereat."

cause between subject and predicate even though it is stated in such a way that it is *per se*.

Although Aquinas is clear that the categories are established through *per se* predication (this is evident when one considers the statements “being *secundum se* is divided into ten categories, of which nine are accidental kinds” and “the division of being *secundum se* and *secundum accidens* follows according to which something is predicated of another either *per se* or *per accidens*”),⁵⁶ he does not explicitly mention the three specific modes of *per se* predication in either of his commentaries on *Metaphysics* V, 9 or *Physics* III, 5. However each mode can be identified in the text. For example, *secundo modo* predication is understood as having predicates that are in the subject because the predicates signify the subject itself, and Aquinas describes such a relationship between subject and predicate as that mode of predication from which quality and quantity are derived.⁵⁷ Likewise, he refers to a way in which a predicate is related externally to its subject, and this is how he characterizes *quarto modo per se* predication.

Furthermore, the modes of *per se* predication are contrasted by Aquinas with the modes of *per accidens* predication.⁵⁸ He identifies three modes of *per accidens* predication. The first obtains when a term signifying an accident is predicated of another term that also signifies an accident; for example, “The just is musical.” The second type of *per accidens* predication obtains when a term signifying substance has a term signifying an accident predicated of it; for example, “The man is musical.” The third type of *per accidens* predication obtains when a term signifying substance is predicated of a term that signifies an accident; for example, “The musical is a man.” These modes of predication do not meet the criteria of *per se* predication.

These differences between *per se* and *per accidens* predication clarify the procedure Aquinas follows to establish the number and identity of the categories. How he does this is the subject of the next section (III). However, here I offer an overview of Aquinas’s procedure. First, he focuses on *per se* modes of predication; that is, he focuses on propositions that are characterized by one of the three *per se* modes of predication.

⁵⁶ *In Met.* 5.9, n. 885.

⁵⁷ *In Met.* 5.9, n. 892: “Secundo modo ut praedicatum sumatur secundum quod inest subiecto: quod quidem praedicatum, vel inest ei per se et absolute, ut consequens materiam, et sic est quantitas: vel ut consequens formam, et sic est qualitas.”

⁵⁸ *In Met.* 5.9, nn. 886–88.

For example, he would group "Socrates is a man," "Bucephelus is a horse" and "A human is a rational animal" together because they have the *primo modo per se* predication form. He would group "A surface is colored" and "A human has the capacity to laugh," together because they each have the *secundo modo per se* predication form. Finally, he would identify "Having been slaughtered, it died," as having the *quarto modo per se* predication. Separating propositions such as these from each other according to the kind of *per se* modes of predication that they have is Aquinas's procedure for distinguishing the categories from each other. Any two given *per se* propositions that have different predication structures signify different categories. No two *per se* propositions that have different *per se* modes of predication signify the same category. In short, Aquinas establishes substance through *primo modo* predication; quantity, quality and relation through *secundo modo* predication; and the remaining six categories through *quarto modo* predication.

Second, after he groups propositions according to the different *per se* modes of predication that they have, he further subdivides propositions in the same group according to differences in the way that predicates are related to their subjects in the group. For example, a given proposition that has *secundo modo* predication can signify quantity, quality or relation. Thus, Aquinas identifies the distinctive way in which predicates are related to subjects in propositions that signify quantity from the way in which predicates are related to subjects in propositions that signify quality. It is by way of division and subdivision of propositions according to their predication features that Aquinas establishes the identity of the categories.

III. *The Derivation of the Categories from per se predication*

In nn. 889–894 of the text, Aquinas presents a justification of the list of categories and refers enigmatically to the modes of predication. Since Aquinas presupposes so much about how the modes of predication are used to establish the list of categories, in this section I present in detail how Aquinas establishes specific categories from *per se* modes of predication. Specifically, I show how substance, quantity and quality are derived and then indicate how the remaining categories could be established.

Although Joseph Owens suggests that because of its ontological priority substance "is too striking to need defense in a metaphysical

context,” Aquinas seeks to establish it based on the *per se* modes of predication.⁵⁹ A predicate can be *per se* related to its subject in a first way “when the predicate expresses what the subject is, just as when I say, ‘Socrates is an animal,’ for Socrates is that which is an animal. And this predicate is said to signify first substance since it is a particular substance, about which all things are predicated.”⁶⁰ Aquinas is referring to those propositions that are *primo modo per se*, in which “the definition [of the subject] or something posited in the definition [of the subject] is predicated of the subject.”⁶¹ By reflecting on propositions that have this mode of predication one can see a further relationship between the terms of the subjects and predicates of such propositions. One can identify those propositions that have subjects that “are not predicated of another subject but other things are predicated of them.”⁶² This yields *per se* propositions that signify primary substance. For example, “Socrates is an animal” signifies substance because it is a *primo modo* proposition in which the subject cannot be *primo modo* predicated of anything else.

However, it could be asked whether this mode of *primo modo* predication distinguishes those propositions that signify primary substance from those that signify primary accidents.⁶³ For example, are “Socrates is an animal,” and “This patch of color is white” (if this patch of color really is white) both *primo modo per se* propositions in which the subject cannot be *primo modo per se* predicated of anything else? The answer is that although both propositions are *primo modo per se* propositions, there is a further difference between them that distinguishes substances from other categories. Indeed, both propositions have subjects that cannot be *per se* predicated of another; for neither ‘Socrates’ nor ‘this patch of color’ can be predicated of anything else. However, whereas “Socrates is an animal” is such that the predicate ‘animal’ cannot be *secundo modo* predicated of any other subject, “This patch of color is white” does have a predicate (‘white’) that can be *secundo modo per se* predicated of another subject; namely, ‘a surface’. That is, in *secundo modo* predication

⁵⁹ Joseph Owens, *An Elementary Christian Metaphysics* (Milwaukee, 1963), p. 145.

⁶⁰ *In Met.* 5.9, n. 891: “Uno modo cum est id quod est subiectum, ut cum dico, Socrates est animal. Nam Socrates est id quod est animal. Et hoc praedicatum dicitur significare substantiam primam, quae est substantia particularis, de qua omnia praedicantur.”

⁶¹ *Post. An.* 1.10, lines 25–30.

⁶² *In Met.* 5.10, n. 898.

⁶³ This is discussed by Aristotle in *Categories* 3 (1a16–1b9) where he makes the four-fold distinction between being ‘predicated of’ and being ‘in’ another.

the predicate is related to a subject in two ways. In one way, it is related to the subject of the proposition as a determination of the subject. This is in virtue of the fact that it is a predicate in a proposition; Aquinas held that "the predicate is compared to the subject as form is to matter."⁶⁴ In the second way, the subject is itself signified by the predicate independently of the subject. For example, in "This patch of color is white" (if this patch of color really is white) "surface" is signified by the predicate "white." Consequently, this proposition is distinguished from *per se* propositions that signify substance because no proposition with a predicate that can be *secundo modo* predicated of another signifies substance. Therefore, primary substance is sufficiently identified through *primo modo* predication insofar as *per se* propositions that signify substance have predicates that are exclusive to *primo modo* predication.

From the derivation of primary substance, Aquinas moves to the derivation of quantity, quality and relation. He indicates that a predicate is related to its subject in a second way, "when a predicate is understood according to what is in [inest] a subject. For instance, a predicate is in the subject *per se* and absolutely as following from its matter, and in this way it is quantity. Or, a predicate is in the subject *per se* and absolutely as something following from its form; in this way it is quality, or it is not in it absolutely but in respect to another, and then it is relation."⁶⁵ Quantity, quality and relation are established through propositions that signify *secundo modo per se* predication. Aquinas states in the Commentary on the *Posterior Analytics* I, that the 'per' of *per se* predication, because it is a causal notion, "designates a condition of material cause, just as when it is said that a body is colored by way of its surface because a surface is the proper subject of color."⁶⁶ Thus, the subject signified

⁶⁴ Aquinas, *Expositio Libri Periermenias*, 1.8, n. 11.

⁶⁵ *In Met.* 5.9, n. 892: "Secundo modo ut praedicatum sumatur secundum quod inest subiecto: quod quidem praedicatum, vel inest ei per se et absolute, ut consequens materiam, et sic est quantitas: vel ut consequens formam, et sic est qualitas: vel inest ei non absolute, sed in respectu ad aliud, et sic est ad aliquid." To borrow a phrase from Walton (*supra*, fn. 10, pg. 306) quantity and quality are related to substance as matter and form respectively in an *ontological* sense, whereas both quantity and quality are formal determinations of a substance, where substance is the matter, in a *logical* sense. Although it seems that Aquinas believes that relation is established through *secundo modo* predication, he does not show how it is established through this mode in either *In Met.* 5.9 or 5.17 where he discusses the sense of relation.

⁶⁶ *Post. An.* 1.10, lines 14–17: "quandoque autem habitudinem causae materialis, sicut cum dicitur quod corpus est coloratum per superficiem, quia scilicet proprium subiectum coloris superficies est." See also lines 51–67: "Secundus modus dicendi per se est quando hec prepositio 'per' designat habitudinem causae materialis, prout scilicet

by the subject of a *secundo modo per se* proposition is the material cause (logically speaking) of the predicate.

Quantity and quality are derived from an examination of the relationships between subjects and predications of *secundo modo per se* propositions insofar as they exist absolutely in their subject. However, since both of these categories are established from *secundo modo per se* propositions, what further predication understanding can be used to determine how propositions that signify quantity can be distinguished from those that signify quality? Aquinas offers a clue for dividing quantity from quality in V, lect. 15 (where he specifically discusses the senses of ‘quantity’). He says that “only in the genus quantity are some things signified as subjects [of properties] and others as properties [themselves].”⁶⁷ The category quantity is signified by *secundo modo per se* propositions that have predicates that not only are *secundo modo* predicated of its subject but also the term of the predicate can itself be the subject of a different property. For example, in “A body is surfaced” (i.e., “A body has a surface”) the term ‘surface’ of the predicate itself can be the subject of the *secundo modo per se* predicate ‘colored’ (i.e., “The surface is colored.”). Thus, “The body has a surface” signifies quantity. Another example of this could be “The body has mass.” The term ‘mass’ of the predicate is *secundo modo* predicated of ‘body’ and it also can be the subject in the *secundo modo* proposition “The mass is heavy.” Therefore, according to this mode of *secundo modo* predication “The body has mass” signifies quantity. In this way quantity is established through *secundo modo per se* predication.

On the contrary, this criterion does not apply to terms that signify quality. For example, in “The surface is white,” ‘white’ signifies a property because it signifies its proper subject ‘surface’ in its definition. However, ‘white’ itself cannot be the subject of a property. For

id cui aliquid attribuitur est propria materia et proprium subiectum ipsius. Oportet autem quod proprium subiectum ponatur in diffinitione accidentis, quandoque quidem in obliquo, sicut cum accidens in abstracto diffinitur, ut cum dicimus quod simitas est curuitas nasi; quandoque uero in recto, ut cum accidens diffinitur in concreto, ut cum dicimus quod simus est nasus curuus. Cuius quidem ratio est quia cum esse accidentis dependeat a subiecto, oportet etiam quod diffinitio eius significans esse ipsius contineat in se subiectum. Vnde secundus modus dicendi per se est quando subiectum ponitur in diffinitione predicati quod est proprium accidens eius.”

⁶⁷ *In Met.* 5.15, n. 983: “Nam sola quantitas habet divisionem in partes proprias post substantiam. Albedo enim non potest dividi, et per consequens nec intelligitur individuari nisi per subiectum. Et inde est, quod in solo quantitatis genere aliqua significantur ut subiecta, alia ut passioness.”

example, in the *secundo modo per se* proposition "The white is colored," the proper subject in the definition of colored is not "white" but rather, "surface." *Secundo modo per se* propositions that signify quantity can be distinguished from those that do not according to this predication criterion. For example, "A human being is capable of laughter" does not signify quantity even though a human being is divisible into parts and capable of laughter is a property of human beings. In this proposition, "capable of laughter" cannot be the subject of a property and "a human being" cannot be predicated *secundo modo per se* of anything else. Therefore, propositions such as "A human is capable of laughter," and "A surface is colored" both signify the category quality because both "capable of laughter" and "colored" are properties that cannot be the subject of properties. In this way, quality is derived from the mode of *secundo modo per se* predication insofar as it is made distinct from substance and quantity.

Aquinas says that quantity is derived from *per se* propositions in which the predicate is in the subject according to a material cause (which is the second criteria of *per se* predication). This relates to the characteristic of *per se* propositions that signify quantity in which the term of the predicate can both be the subject of another property and itself be a property in the following way: a quantity can be the material cause of another property. Insofar as quantities flow from the matter of a substance, it can be the material cause or subject of qualities whereas qualities cannot be. For this reason, Aquinas states in his Commentary on the *Physics* that "qualities are founded upon quantity."⁶⁸ Aquinas holds that quantity is similar to substance in that it shares the characteristic of being able to be the subject of properties.⁶⁹ Qualities are said to follow from the form of a substance because they are similar to substantial forms insofar as they cannot be the subject of properties.

Aquinas says that "a predicate is referred to a subject in a third way when the predicate is taken from something extrinsic to the subject."⁷⁰ This is directly related to *quarto modo per se* predication in the Commentary on the *Posterior Analytics* I, in which the '*per*' of *per se* "may even designate a condition of extrinsic cause."⁷¹ The remaining six categories are derived through this mode of predication.

⁶⁸ *In Phys.* 3.5, n. 322.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*

⁷⁰ *In Met.* 5.9, n. 892.

⁷¹ *Post. An.* 1.10, lines 17–24: "designat etiam habitudinem causae extrinsece."

Quarto modo per se may involve a relation of efficient causation between subject and predicate. The example that Aquinas gives of such a *per se* proposition is “Having been slaughtered, it died.” He says that “it is clear that on account of that which has been slaughtered, it [the animal] died, and it is not accidental that that which has been slaughtered should die.”⁷² Although the proposition that Aquinas cites as an example is rather awkward, he says that a relation of external cause is signified in the relationship between the predicate and subject. There are three major components in this proposition: “the animal,” “having been slaughtered” and “died.” The animal is implicit in this proposition. A relationship of efficient cause is understood between the predicate and the subject: the slaughter was the efficient cause of the animal’s death. At the same time, the predicate is universally predicated of the subject: everything that has been slaughtered has died. From *per se* propositions such as these, Aquinas supposedly understands that the remaining categories can be derived. Unfortunately, Aquinas leaves us in the dark about how specific modes of *quarto modo per se* predication signify and differentiate propositions that signify one or another of the remaining six categories. However, it would seem that the additional categories are derived from *quarto modo per se* propositions in which the external causes signified in the *per se* relationship between the subject and predicate are understood to be in common to other *quarto modo per se* propositions. For example, there may be *quarto modo* propositions in which the external relationship between the subject and predicate is understood in such a way that the predicate measures the subject in some way, and then one could derive the categories of time, place and position.⁷³

Now that I have presented Aquinas’s view, an interesting observation can be made regarding the relationship among the categories. An interesting result of Aquinas’s view concerns the question of how accidents

⁷² *Post. An.* 1.10, lines 122–35: “Deinde cum dicit: item alio modo etc., ponit quantum modum, secundum quod hec prepositio ‘per’ designat habitudinem cause efficientis uel cuiuscunque alterius <extrinsece>. Et ideo dicit quod quicquid inest unicuique propter se ipsum m, per se dicitur de eo, quod uero non propter ipsum inest alicui, per accidens dicitur, sicut cum dico: ‘Hoc ambulante coruscat’: non enim propter id quod ambulat, coruscavit, set hoc dicitur secundum accidens. Si uero quod praedicatur inest subiecto propter ipsum, per se inest, ut si dicamus quod interfectum interiit: manifestum est quod propter id quod interfectum est, interiit, et non est accidens quod interfectum intereat.”

⁷³ *In Met.* 5.9, n. 892.

can be understood to be both *per accidens* according to its metaphysical sense and, at the same time, are independent from each other as the most basic kinds of being. Accidents, although they are not *per se* beings (this is the status of substance only) they are *secundum se* in the sense that each category corresponds to a unique *per se* mode of predication. However, a discernable dependent relationship can be observed between *per se* propositions that signify accidents and those that signify substance. On one hand, 'color' is not formally reducible to the form or essence of "rational animal" because 'color' is not predicated *primo modo per se* of 'Socrates'. On the other hand, 'colored' is *secundo modo per se* predicated of 'surface.' 'Surface' is *secundo modo per se* predicated of 'body.' 'Body' is *primo modo per se* predicated of 'Socrates'. Therefore, in one way, 'color' is dependent on substance because it is the ultimate subject of predication. In another sense, 'color' is a *secundum se* being. It has 'quality' *primo modo per se* predicated of it and in this sense quality is not in any way reducible or dependent on any substance or subject insofar as it is not *primo modo per se* predicated of any substance.⁷⁴ This interesting characteristic of accidents is mentioned by Aquinas at the end of his discussion. He says that on one hand, "the word 'white' signifies a subject in as much as it signifies whiteness as an accident. Thus, it is necessary that as a consequence it includes in it the notion of a subject. For the being of an accident is 'to be in'.... [On the other hand] although whiteness signifies an accident, it does not do so only as an accident but according to the mode of a substance."⁷⁵ That which signifies according to the mode of substance is signified according to *primo modo per se* predication, which is true of "Whiteness is a color."

IV. Conclusion

In order to understand Aquinas's justification for the list of categories, I have provided an interpretation of the text that tries to make most sense of it according to its textual context rather than focusing on only

⁷⁴ In "Language and Logic," E. J. Ashworth points out that a characteristic of concrete accident terms (e.g., 'white') is that they "have a double relation, on one hand to substantial things, for only substances can be literate or white, and on the other hand to the qualities of literacy or whiteness." *The Cambridge Companion to Medieval Philosophy* (New York, 2003), pp. 73–96, p. 86.

⁷⁵ *In Met.* 5.9, n. 894.

an aspect of the text. For example, I present an account that tries to understand Aquinas's words at the beginning of the text that states both that all ten categories are *secundum se* and that *secundum se* is not understood to mean "substance" (being *per se*) but rather *per se* predication. This interpretation has been illuminated by an examination of the varieties of *per se* predication in Commentary on the *Posterior Analytics* I, 9 & 10. However, given the elliptical treatment of the topic by Aquinas, my task of trying to establish a more unified understanding of it within its textual context has come at the cost of engaging in a certain amount of reconstruction of Aquinas's thought on the matter.⁷⁶

⁷⁶ Special thanks to Jorge J. E. Gracia, Lloyd Newton, Giorgio Pini, and Jeff Brower for their careful and insightful comments and suggestions throughout various stages of this article.

READING ARISTOTLE'S *CATEGORIES*
AS AN INTRODUCTION TO LOGIC:
LATER MEDIEVAL DISCUSSIONS ABOUT ITS
PLACE IN THE ARISTOTELIAN *CORPUS*

Giorgio Pini

Some trends in the history of philosophy are so well established that, even when it is finally acknowledged that they originated from a one-sided and somehow fanciful reconstruction of the events, it may still be difficult to appreciate all the consequences of this discovery and rearrange our views accordingly. The place and role of the *Categories* in the Aristotelian corpus is a particularly good example. We are so used to finding the *Categories* as the first work in any collection of Aristotle's works that we may take this fact for granted and not pay particular attention to it. As a consequence, we may still be secretly influenced by the very specific interpretation of Aristotle's philosophy that this apparently innocent ordering conveys. In that case, we would be just the last in a very long series of readers assuming the place of the *Categories* as uncontroversial. For several centuries, generations of freshmen started their philosophical training by reading this short treatise together with its companion work, Porphyry's *Introduction* to the *Categories*. The position of the *Categories* as the first work in Aristotle's collection of logical writings, the so-called *Organon*, which was in turn posited at the beginning of the whole Aristotelian corpus, greatly contributed to its enormous success. As it happens, this short treatise (only 15 pages in Bekker's edition) was the only philosophical treatise that has been uninterruptedly read, studied and commented on since Antiquity. No other single work had a comparable influence in Western philosophy.¹ It is a well-known fact in ancient philosophy, however, that the very notion of the *Organon* owes nothing to Aristotle's intentions. By now,

¹ M. Frede, "The Title, Unity, and Authenticity of the Aristotelian *Categories*," in Id., *Essays in Ancient Philosophy* (Oxford, 1987), pp. 11–28: 11; J. Brunschwig, "Aristote de Stagire. L'*Organon*: tradition grecque," in *Dictionnaire des Philosophes Antiques*, vol. 1 (Paris, 1989), pp. 482–502: 492: "Placées par la tradition en tête du corpus aristotélicien, les *Catégories* ont été parmi les textes les plus lus, recopiés, étudiés, traduits et commentés de toute l'histoire de la philosophie."

scholars have shed some light on the philosophical significance of the order in which Aristotle's writings have come down to us. It is now clear that the prominent position the *Categories* was made to occupy in the Aristotelian corpus is the result of a systematic interpretation of Aristotle's writings which is likely to have taken shape in the Neoplatonic circles between the third and fifth centuries A.D. and whose remote origins may possibly be traced to the Hellenistic period, when some of Aristotle's interpreters came to read their master's writings in the light of Stoic doctrines. As a result of this interpretation, the *Categories* was seen as a work of logic dealing with the simple terms out of which propositions are made. Again, we are so used to such a conception that we may forget how odd this interpretation may have sounded to Aristotle's very first readers and to Aristotle himself. For sure, it should sound quite odd now to us, in the light of contemporary scholarship. For considering the *Categories* as a work of logic is an awkward view, one that surely requires some justification and that, on the face of it, is very likely to be wrong. All the same, that was the way in which the *Categories* was interpreted up to some decades ago.

What is the philosophical interest of all this? Because of some historical accident, Aristotle's *Categories* was considered as a work of logic and was posited at the beginning of Aristotle's corpus. This did not reflect Aristotle's intention but the willingness of his editors to present Aristotle's thought according to a plan that was originally extraneous to him. But one may ask: does this change anything as far as the philosophical interpretation of the *Categories* is concerned? One may suspect that the way the *Categories* was presented in ancient, medieval and modern editions, interesting as it may be, is nothing more than an historical accident of no concern for the evaluation of the arguments contained in either the *Categories* or the immense philosophical production that developed around and out of Aristotle's treatise. In this paper, it is my intention to show that, even from a purely philosophical point of view, it is important to evaluate the place assigned to the *Categories* in the Aristotelian corpus. For one thing, the assessment of the arguments present in the *Categories* depends on the role that it is supposed to play in the Aristotelian system. If the *Categories* is considered as a work of logic—and as such it is given the opening place in the Aristotelian corpus—, then the statements and arguments it contains must be assessed in the light of what logic is taken to be. This means that what generations of interpreters during the Middle Ages read in the *Categories* was not intended to be (and consequently should not

be taken to be) statements and arguments about the world but about concepts. Second and consequently, what medieval interpreters read in the *Categories* depended on their own conception of logic. So, in order to assess correctly what a medieval author said on the *Categories*, we must take into account his own idea of what logic is. According to which conception of logic was adopted, the *Categories* could be seen as a treatment either of arguments and their premises or of the basic concepts by which we represent and classify the extramental world. Since Aristotle's *Categories* undeniably exerted a fundamental influence on the thought of virtually any medieval philosopher and theologian, no matter whether he wrote a commentary on that work or not, it is evident how vital this preliminary assessment is in order to give a fair reconstruction of the opinions of many medieval thinkers.

I proceed as follows. First, I briefly recall how it came about that the *Categories* was considered as the first treatise of Aristotle's *Organon*. Second, I turn to the main focus of this paper, i.e., the thirteenth century, in order to consider the influence that the massive translation of many of Aristotle's writings hitherto lost had on the interpretation of his *Categories*. Third, I consider the impact of the notion of logic as a study of concepts (and specifically of a particular class of concepts, the so-called second intentions) on the interpretation of the *Categories* in the second half of the thirteenth century in authors such as Thomas Aquinas, Giles of Rome, Radulphus Brito, and John Duns Scotus. Fourth, I turn to the contrasting interpretations of the *Categories* in Peter of John Olivi, William Ockham, Walter Burley and the Oxford realist, Robert Alyngton. Fifth, I focus on the interpretations that Thomas Aquinas, Duns Scotus, William Ockham, Walter Burley and Robert Alyngton gave of the distinction between primary and secondary substances (*Cat.* 5, 2a11–19). By the analysis of this specific case, I hope to clarify the relevance of the view of the *Categories* as the first work of logic for the assessment of the meaning and value of the arguments that medieval authors read into that work.

1. Aristotle's *Categories* and the Origins of the *Organon*

Scholars have carefully scrutinized the authenticity, unity, title and nature of the *Categories*. If no one now seriously challenges Aristotle's authorship, it is usually recognized that this short treatise consists of two or three different sections probably assembled together by the first

editors, that the title ‘*Categories*’ only refers to one of its sections and is not the oldest title under which the work was known, and that the treatise is to be seen as closely connected with the *Topics*.² This last conclusion is particularly illuminating as far as the content of the treatise is concerned. In this short work, Aristotle did not mean to present the foundations of his ontology. Even less did he intend to provide a treatment of simple terms as a preliminary to the study of propositions and syllogism. The whole notion of logic as a discipline concerned with deductions (syllogism) and the elements out of which deductions are made (i.e., propositions and terms) seems to be extraneous to Aristotle. The very idea of a unitary *Organon* was imposed on Aristotle by successive scholarship. Aristotle did not even have a single word for what we call ‘logic’. What constituted his ‘logical’ legacy actually consists of separate studies of deduction (*Prior and Posterior Analytics*), of the rules to follow in a dialectical discussion (*Topics* and its foreword, the *Categories*), of fallacies (*Sophistical Refutations*) and of notions such as noun, verb and statement (*De interpretatione*).³

So when did the notion of a unitary *Organon* including all the writings from the *Categories* to the *Sophistical Refutations* first appear? Probably between the third and the fifth century A.D. as a result of the systematization of the study of Aristotelian philosophy as part of the standard philosophical curriculum in Neoplatonic schools.⁴ Recently, it has been interestingly argued that the core of a unitary *Organon* should be traced back to the Hellenistic period: it was probably the invention of Aristotelian scholars willing to structure their master’s writings into a system comparable to the one that the Stoics had devised after Aristotle. In order to achieve such a result, it was necessary to sort out Aristotle’s writings according to the three parts of the Stoic system, logic, physics, and ethics. It is a consequence of this Stoic influence that the

² Frede, “The Title;” R. Bodéüs, “Introduction,” in Aristote, *Catégories*. Texte établi et traduit par R. Bodéüs (Paris, 2001), pp. XXIV–XLI, LXIV–LXXX, XC–CX.

³ Brunschwig, “Aristote de Stagire,” pp. 486–488; M. Burnyeat, *A Map of Metaphysics Zeta* (Pittsburgh, 2001), pp. 87–89. Burnyeat actually argues that the *Organon* does constitute a unity and that it can be described as logical, but in a completely different sense from that of the tradition, which he explicitly criticizes.

⁴ F. Solmsen, “Boethius and the History of the *Organon*,” *American Journal of Philology* 65 (1944), 69–74; Ilsetraut Hadot, “Deuxième point du premier schéma introductif: la division néoplatonicienne des écrits d’Aristote,” in Simplicius, *Commentaire sur les Catégories*. Traduction commentée sous la direction de Ilsetraut Hadot, fascicule I (Leiden, 1990), pp. 63–93.

different treatises that now constitute the *Organon* were constructed as the elements of a single study, i.e., logic. Furthermore, it is because the Stoics conceived of logic as the study of deductions and their elements (propositions) that Aristotle's own 'logic' was constructed around the notion of syllogism and its elements (propositions and the terms out of which propositions are made, i.e., subjects and predicates). In this process a major role was probably played by Andronicus of Rhodes, who in the first century B.C. provided the most famous edition of Aristotle's corpus in ancient times. Because, in order to fill out the Stoic scheme of logic, there was a need for a treatise devoted to the study of propositions as parts of syllogism and of another treatise devoted to the study of terms as parts of propositions, the *De interpretatione* and the *Categories* came to play such a role, even though Aristotle did not apparently design them for that function.⁵ As it happens, the *Categories* is particularly ill-chosen as an introduction to the study of syllogism. Admittedly, its central part is devoted to uncombined expressions classified into ten kinds according to their meaning. But such a classification is completely irrelevant for the study of syllogism, whose terms play their role in deductions independently of their meaning, as is evident from the fact that Aristotle views them as symbolic variables expressed by letters.⁶

All the same, the place of the *Categories* in the Aristotelian system went undisputed from Andronicus of Rhodes onwards. The sequence *Categories* (study of simple terms)—*De interpretatione* (study of propositions made of simple terms)—*Prior Analytics* (study of syllogisms made of propositions) became standard. No matter how artificial this triad was and how extraneous to the others each one of its element was originally Andronicus's edition provided the definitive and standard ordering of Aristotle's writings—an ordering that conveyed an interpretation of Aristotle's corpus as a system whose first part was a logic structured around the notion of deduction.

The elements of this picture are already present in Plotinus's pupil, Porphyry. By the fifth and sixth century, the *Categories* was commonly regarded as the first work to be studied in the Neoplatonic philosophical

⁵ R. Bodéüs, "L'influence historique du stoïcisme sur l'interprétation de l'œuvre philosophique d'Aristote," *Revue des Sciences philosophiques et théologiques* 79 (1995), 553–586; Id., "Introduction," in Aristotle, *Catégories*, pp. XI–XLI. See already Frede, "The Title," pp. 20–21, for the origins of the *Organon* in the first century B.C. and the role of the *Categories* in it.

⁶ Bodéüs, "L'influence," p. 585.

curriculum.⁷ The Neoplatonic legacy was received in the sixth century by Boethius, who handed down to the Latin West the sequence *Categories—De interpretatione—Analytics* together with the implicit systematic interpretation of Aristotle's philosophy that had generated it:

Since Aristotle wanted to hand down to his successors the structure and the knowledge of both dialectical and demonstrative science, he realized that both the dialectical and the demonstrative argumentation was organized according to the same structure, i.e., syllogism. Thus, he wrote the *Prior Analytics*, which the Greek call *Ἀναλυτικόν* so that students should read them before they got any knowledge of either the dialectic or scientific discipline [...]. But since it is necessary that syllogism be made out of propositions, he wrote the book whose title is *Περὶ ἑρμηνείας*, on propositions. But all propositions are made out of expressions signifying something. Consequently the book that he wrote on the ten categories, which in Greek are called *κατηγορίαι*, is about the first names of things and their meanings.⁸

Thanks to Boethius, Latin medieval authors became familiar with the ancient opinion concerning the place and role of the *Categories* in Aristotle's *Organon*. So it happened that the role of the *Categories* as an introduction to syllogism was regarded as an undisputed truth even in an age when the largest part of Aristotle's corpus (including the last and most important part of the logical triad, the *Prior Analytics*) was unknown to the Latin West.⁹ Admittedly, it was open to debate whether

⁷ Porphyry, *In Cat.*, ed. A. Busse, CAG IV,1 (Berlin, 1887), p. 56,20–30. See the English translation in Porphyry, *On Aristotle Categories*. Translated by S. K. Strange (London, 1992), pp. 31–32. See Solmsen, “Boethius,” pp. 71, 73; Hadot, “Deuxième point,” pp. 80–84.

⁸ Boethius, *In Isagogen Porphyrii Commenta*, eds. G. Scheppss – S. Brandt (Vindobonae-Lipsiae, 1906), *Editio prima*, pp. 12–14: “Aristoteles enim quoniam dialecticae atque apodicticae disciplinae uolebat posteris ordinem scientiamque contradere, uidit apodicticam dialecticamque uim uno syllogismi ordine contineri. Scribit itaque priores Resolutorios, quos Graeci *Ἀναλυτικόν* uocant, qui legendi essent antequam aliquid dialecticae uel apodicticae artis attingerent [...]. Sed quoniam syllogismum ex propositionibus constare necesse est, librum *Περὶ ἑρμηνείας* qui inscribitur, ‘de propositionibus’ adnotauit. Omnes uero propositiones ex sermonibus aliquid significantibus componuntur. Itaque liber quem de decem praedicamentis scripsit, quae apud graecos *κατηγορίαι* dicuntur, de primis rerum nominibus significationibusque est.” See also *In Categorias Aristotelis libri quatuor*, ed. J.-P. Migne, PL 64 (Paris, 1847; reprint Turnhout, 1979), col. 161 B: “Hinc est quod ad logicam tendentibus primus hic liber legendus occurrit, idcirco quod cum omnis logica syllogismorum ratione sit constituta, syllogismi uero propositionibus jungantur, propositiones uero sermonibus constant, prima est utilitas quid quisque sermo significet, propriae scientiae diffinitione cognoscere.”

⁹ Boethius also translated the *Prior Analytics*, *Topics* and *Sophistical Refutations*, but these translations had virtually no circulation. See L. Minio-Paluello, “Note sull’Aristotele

the *Categories* dealt primarily with words or things. All the same, no one seems to have doubted that this writing was a treatment of simple elements (whether terms or things) to be read before the *De interpretatione*, which dealt with propositions. Consequently, no one seems to have seriously doubted that the *Categories* belonged to logic.¹⁰ Interestingly, this agreement is a peculiarly Western story. Among the Arabs, Avicenna clearly realized that there was no good reason to assign the *Categories* to logic and consequently he maintained that it was not to be seen as part of the *Organon*.¹¹

2. *The Thirteenth Century: The Impact of the New Aristotle*

By the first decades of the thirteenth century, most of Aristotle's works that had been unknown for centuries in the West started circulating again in new translations.¹² What influence did this new wave of texts have on the interpretation of the *Categories*, which together with the *De interpretatione* had long been the only evidence of Aristotle's teachings? Interpreters of the *Categories* were now confronted with two sets of newly translated works. First, readers of the *Categories* could now compare it to the *Prior* and *Posterior Analytics*, whose translation made available to the West the last and most important part of the logical triad of which the *Categories* was meant to be the first element. Accordingly, the logical character of the *Categories* as a study of simple terms ultimately aimed at syllogism was emphasized. It may have been a consequence of the integration of the *Categories* in the newly complete *Organon* that the contrast between realistic and nominalistic interpretations of the treatise rapidly declined.¹³ In the thirteenth century, the logical character of the

latino medievale VI. Boezio, Giacomo Veneto, Guglielmo di Moerbeke, Jacques Lefèvre d'Étaples e gli «Elenchi Sofistici»,» *Rivista di Filosofia Neo-Scolastica* 44 (1952), 398–411, repr. in Id., *Opuscula. The Latin Aristotle* (Amsterdam, 1972), pp. 164–177; Id., “Les traductions et les commentaires aristotéliciens de Boèce,” *Studia Patristica* 64 (1957), 567–584, repr. in Id., *Opuscula*, pp. 328–335.

¹⁰ On early medieval commentaries on the *Categories* see J. Marenbon, “Vocalism, Nominalism and the Commentaries on the ‘Categories’ from the Earlier Twelfth Century,” *Vivarium* 30 (1992), 51–61.

¹¹ I. Madkour, *L'Organon d'Aristote dans le monde arabe*, 2^e éd. (Paris, 1969), pp. 79–83; Bodéüs, “L'influence,” p. 585.

¹² See F. Van Steenberghen, *Aristotle in the West. The Origins of Latin Aristotelianism*, translated by L. Johnston (Louvain, 1955).

¹³ For one of the last commentaries on the *Categories* in the twelfth-century tradition,

Categories as a work dealing not with things but with logical objects (no matter what they were taken to be) was unanimously stressed. Second, readers of the *Categories* could now become familiar with the *Physics* and *Metaphysics*, whose translation made available again a treatment of categories that was in many ways different from the one with which Latin authors had long been familiar. The attempt to reconcile the old and the newly discovered treatment of categories resulted in the doctrine according to which categories can be studied in two ways, in logic and in metaphysics. In the *Categories*, categories are studied not as kinds of extramental things but as logical objects. By contrast, in the *Physics* and *Metaphysics*, categories are considered as kinds of things. This position solved any possible contrast between the treatments of the *Categories*, on the one hand, and of the *Physics* and *Metaphysics*, on the other hand. It was usually maintained that, in the two sets of works, Aristotle does not contradict himself, because he does speak of the same things (i.e., categories) but from two different points of view and insofar as categories play two distinct roles, as logical objects constituting the simple terms out of which propositions and syllogisms are made or as real objects out of which the extramental world is constituted.¹⁴

Thus, the translation of both the *logica nova* and the physical and metaphysical works resulted in a renewed emphasis on the logical character of the *Categories*. Robert Kilwardby, Robertus Anglicus, the anonymous author of the student's guide contained in the ms. Barcelona, Arxiu de la Corona d'Aragó, Ripoll 109—all writing before or around the middle of the thirteenth century—are among those who consider the *Categories* as a logical treatise dealing with simple terms insofar as they are remote parts of syllogisms, whose proximate parts are the propositions studied in the *De interpretatione*, which in turn are constituted of simple terms. So all these authors consider the *Categories* as the first part of logic, which in its integrity is the study of syllogistic deduction.¹⁵ Their conception of logic is a noteworthy formal one (i.e.,

see Sten Ebbesen, "Anonymous D'Orvillensis' Commentary on Aristotle's *Categories*," *Cahiers de l'institut du moyen-âge grec et latin* 70 (1999), 229–423.

¹⁴ Giorgio Pini, *Categories and Logic in Duns Scotus. An Interpretation of Aristotle's Categories in the Late Thirteenth Century* (Leiden, 2002), pp. 19–27.

¹⁵ Robert Kilwardby, *Notulae super Praedicamenta*, ed. P. O. Lewry in *Robert Kilwardby's Writings on the Logica Vetus, Studied with Regard to their Teaching and Method* (D.Phil. Thesis, University of Oxford, 1978), p. 370; Robertus Anglicus, *Scriptum super libro Porphyrii*, ed. D. Piché in *Le problème des universaux à la faculté des arts de Paris entre 1230 et 1260* (Paris

logic as the study of deductions) and their idea is that the *Categories* studies the simple elements out of which propositions are constituted, i.e., subjects and predicates. Accordingly, all that is said in the *Categories* must be seen as referring to terms insofar as they act as subjects and predicates in a proposition. It is neither the structure of the world nor the structure of the concepts by which our intellect knows the world that is the focus of Aristotle's treatise; it is the elements out of which formal arguments are constructed.

Around 1235, however, the Paris arts master, Jean le Page (Johannes Pagus), linked the logical interpretation of the sequence *Categories—De interpretatione—Prior Analytics* to the ontological structure of the world in a remarkably comprehensive picture. The logical sequence of terms, propositions and arguments studied in the three first works of the *Organon* is grounded on a corresponding sequence of real unities: the unity of simple things such as angels, the unity of compound things such as material substances and the unity of causality which gives coherence to the whole universe. The standard theme of the place of the *Categories* in the *Organon* and in the Aristotelian corpus is accordingly integrated in a powerful and all-encompassing view of the universe:

It is written in the second book of the *Physics* that "Art imitates nature as far as it can." Therefore, corresponding to the threefold unity that is found in things, there is a threefold unity in form. For there is a unity by indivision, such as in the angels: another unity is that by the union of matter with form, such as in compound things such as the things made out of elements; the third unity is the one that occurs because of order and causality, and it is in this way that the parts of the universe have unity, for they are ordered [to one another] and the one causes the other. To this threefold unity there corresponds a threefold unity in speech. To the first unity that occurs in simple things there corresponds the term, for the term has unity by indivision, since the logician proceeds in his divisions no further than terms. Moreover, there is a second unity in speech that corresponds to the second unity in things, and this unity occurs in propositions, for a proposition is composed of a name and a verb as of matter and form, and this unity corresponds to the unity that

2005), pp. 270–272; C. Lafleur, *Le «Guide de l'étudiant» d'un maître anonyme de la Faculté des arts de Paris au XIII^e siècle* (Université Laval, Québec, 1992), par. 503–514. See E. J. Ashworth, "L'analogie de l'être et les homonymes: *Catégories*, 1 dans le «Guide de l'étudiant», in *L'enseignement de la philosophie au XIII^e siècle. Autour du «Guide de l'étudiant» du ms. Ripoll 109*, éd. par C. Lafleur – J. Carrier (Turnhout, 1997), pp. 281–295: 286–287.

occurs in things that are compounded of matter and form, such as the things that are compounded of elements. And there is a third unity in speech, which occurs according to order and causality, and this unity occurs in syllogism, for between premises and conclusions there is order and causality, and this unity corresponds to the unity of the universe. Thus, from what has been said, the division of rational philosophy, which is called 'logic', is clear. For with regard to the first unity, we have the *Categories*, in which the uncombined is dealt with, which has unity by indivisibility. With regard to the second unity we have the *Peri hermeneias*, in which the proposition is dealt with, which has unity by the composition of form with matter. As far as the third unity is concerned, there are the other books where syllogism is dealt with, whose unity is by causality and order.¹⁶

3. Categories and Concepts

By the middle of the thirteenth century, a new conception of logic became more and more widespread among Latin authors. Largely as a result of the influence of al-Fārābī and Avicenna, logic came to be considered as the study of a particular class of concepts, the so-called second intentions. It is not necessary to dwell on the details of this

¹⁶ Jean le Page (Johannes Pagus), *Rationes super Predicamenta Aristotelis*, ed. E. Franceschini, in E. Franceschini, "Giovanni Pigo: le sue «Rationes super Predicamenta Aristotelis» e la loro posizione nel movimento aristotelico del secolo XIII," *Sophia* 2 (1934), 172–182, 329–350, 476–486: 175–176: "Ars imitatur naturam in quantum potest, scribitur *in secundo phisicorum*; secundum igitur triplicem unitatem in rebus repertam triplex est unitas in forma: est enim unitas per indivisionem ut in angelis, alia est unitas ex unione materie cum forma ut est in rebus compositis ut in elemen[ta]tis, tertia est que attenditur penes ordinem et causalitatem et sic partes mundi habent unitatem; ordinantur enim, et una causat aliam. Huic triplici unioni correspondet triplex unitas in sermone; unitati prime que est in rebus simplicibus correspondet terminus; terminus enim habet unitatem per indivisionem, cum loicus ultra terminum non dividat. Item est secunda unitas in sermone que respondet secunde unitati in rebus, et hec unitas est in enunciatione; enunciatio enim componitur ex nomine et verbo sicut ex materia et forma, et hec unitas correspondet unitati que est in compositis ex materia et forma sicut in elementatis. Et est tertia unitas in sermone que attenditur penes ordinem et causalitatem, et hec unitas est in sillogismo: est enim causalitas et ordo premissarum ad conclusionem; et hec unitas respondet unitati universi. Ex predictis ergo patet divisio rationalis philosophie que loica appellatur; nam quantum ad primam unitatem accipitur *liber predicamentorum* ubi determinatur de incompleto quod habet unitatem per indivisibilitatem; quantum ad secundam accipitur *liber perhermenias* in quo determinatur de enunciatione que habet unitatem per compositionem forme cum materia; secundum tertiam unitatem accipiuntur alii libri in quibus de sillogismo determinatur in quo est unitas per causalitatem et ordinem."

new conception of logical objects.¹⁷ What is relevant for the study of Aristotle's *Categories* is that logic was seen not only as the study of deductions and arguments but also and especially as the study of certain conceptual entities, called 'second intentions', which were taken to represent the relationships holding among concepts representing things in the world. Examples of second intentions are species (which is a concept representing the relationship holding between an individual such as Socrates and the concept of the kind to which it belongs, such as man), proposition (which is the concept representing the relationship holding between a concept acting as subject and a concept acting as predicate) and syllogism (which is the concept representing the relationship holding between the two premises and the conclusion of a syllogistic argument).

The place and role of the *Categories* in the *Organon* was accordingly reinterpreted in the light of this new doctrine of logic. Several authors of the second half of the thirteenth century (including Thomas Aquinas, Peter of Auvergne, John Duns Scotus, Thomas Sutton, and Radulphus Brito) still regarded the *Categories* as aimed at the study of syllogism, because in that treatise Aristotle deals with simple terms constituting propositions, which in turn constitute syllogisms.¹⁸ But these authors conceived of terms, propositions and syllogisms not as linguistic but as conceptual entities. So, the *Categories* was seen as focusing on the simple concepts by which our intellect represents the extramental world and out of which mental propositions are made. As Thomas Sutton observes, these simple concepts are not second intentions themselves, because they represent things in the extramental world, not relationship holding between concepts. All the same, the *Categories* is a work of logic and not of metaphysics because it studies simple conceptual terms not insofar as they represent the world but insofar as they act as the foundations

¹⁷ See Pini, *Categories and Logic*, pp. 45–137.

¹⁸ Thomas Aquinas, *Expositio libri Posteriorum*, in S. Thomae de Aquino *Opera omnia*, I* 2, ed. Commissio Leonina (Rome, 1989), p. 4; Peter of Auvergne, *Quaestiones super Porphyrium*, ed. A. Tiné, in "Le questioni su Porfirio di Pierre d'Auvergne," *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Âge* 64 (1997), 253–333, q. 3, pp. 272–275; John Duns Scotus, *Quaestiones in librum Porphyrii Isagoge*, eds. R. Andrews et al., in Ioannis Duns Scoti *Opera philosophica* I (St. Bonaventure, 1999), q. 3, n. 20, pp. 16–17; Radulphus Brito, *Quaestiones super librum Porphyrii*, in *Quaestiones subtilissimae magistri Rodulphi Britonis super arte veteri* (Venetiis, [1499]), q. 3, f. 6va–b; Thomas Sutton, *In Cat.*, ed. A. Conti in "Thomas Sutton's Commentary on the *Categories* according to ms. Oxford, Merton College 289," in *The Rise of British Logic: Acts of the Sixth European Symposium on Medieval Logic and Semantics*, ed. P. O. Lewry (Toronto, 1985), pp. 173–213: 191, 193.

for second intentions. So, for example, the simple concept of substance is studied in logic not insofar as it represents substances in the world but insofar as the logical concept of species is founded on it, as species represents the relationship between two substances of different degree of universality. In this way, Sutton recognizes some difference between the *Categories* on the one hand and the other treatises of the *Organon* on the other hand. Unlike the other logical treatises, the *Categories* does not deal with second intentions but with the foundations of second intentions, and so with concepts that, by themselves, represent extramental things and not a relationship between concepts. All the same, Sutton maintains that the *Categories* belongs to logic as a sort of preliminary treatment necessary for the study of second intentions that, properly speaking, constitutes logic.¹⁹

Thus, according to this conception, the *Categories* is a sort of preface to logic: it is the study of the simple concepts by which our intellect represents the world and out of which mental propositions are made. As I have said, late thirteenth-century authors maintain that logic itself is not so much the study of valid deductions (as it was for authors writing in the first half of the century) as the study of conceptual relationships holding among conceptual entities. Accordingly, their conception of logic is closer to what we would consider cognitive psychology than to what we call 'formal logic'.

Typically, however, the new conception of logic did not replace completely the old view according to which logic is the study of deductions. For example, both Duns Scotus and Radulphus Brito still consider syllogism as the subject matter of logic, because syllogism is what gives logic its unity. Moreover, both Brito and Scotus still maintain that the *Categories* is a part of logic because it is aimed at syllogism, since it deals with its ultimate constituents, i.e., terms. But they also consider both syllogisms and their constituents as conceptual as opposed to linguistic entities.²⁰ Consequently, in their approach to logic they emphasize not the necessary nature of the link between premises and conclusions in a valid argument but the conceptual nature of arguments and of their parts.

¹⁹ Thomas Sutton, *In Cat.*, ed. Conti, p. 191. See Pini, *Categories and Logic*, pp. 38–40.

²⁰ See above, n. 15.

Because of the new conception of logic as a study of concepts, several authors propose a reconsideration of the old triad according to which the *Organon* is organized as the study of simple terms (*Categories*), propositions (*De interpretatione*) and syllogisms (*Analytics*). Not only is this triad interpreted as concerning mental terms or concepts, as we have seen; it is also reduced to a more fundamental threefold division, which it is taken to reflect. From some elements present in Aristotle's *De Anima*,²¹ thirteenth-century authors developed a theory of three operations of the intellect: simple apprehension, composition, and argumentation. These three operations were regarded as the basic ways in which our intellect works: by forming and apprehending simple concepts, by combining simple concepts to form mental propositions, by arranging mental propositions in deductive chains. Consequently, the sequence *Categories*—*De interpretatione*—*Prior Analytics* was seen as mirroring the three basic operations of the intellect. Thomas Aquinas provides a clear statement of how the old triad was reinterpreted in a psychological way:

As the Philosopher says in the third book of *On the Soul*, there are two operations of the intellect: one that is called 'comprehension of the indivisibles', by which namely, the intellect apprehends the essence of each thing in itself; the other is the operation of the intellect that combines and divides. To these two operations, the third operation of arguing is added, according to which reason proceeds from what is known to the inquiry of what is unknown [...]. Now, since logic is called rational science, it is necessary that it consider what pertains to the three aforementioned operations of reason. Thus, in the *Categories* Aristotle deals with what pertains to the first operation of the intellect, namely, what is understood by simple apprehension. By contrast, in the *Peri hermeneias* he deals with what pertains to the second operation of the intellect, namely, affirmative and negative statements. Finally, he deals with what pertains to the third operation of the intellect in the *Prior Analytics* and in the following treatises, which deal with syllogism in general and with the various species of syllogisms and arguments by which reason proceeds from one thing to another. Therefore, according to the aforementioned order of the three operations of the intellect, the *Categories* is aimed at the *Peri hermeneias*, which is aimed at the *Prior Analytics* and at the following works.²²

²¹ Aristotle, *De Anima* III, 6, 430a26–28.

²² Thomas Aquinas, *Expositio libri Periermenias*, in S. Thomae de Aquino *Opera omnia* I*, 1, ed. Commissio Leonina (Rome, 1989), L. I, p. 5: "Sicut Philosophus dicit in III *De Anima*, duplex est operatio intellectus: una quidem que dicitur indiuisibilium intelligencia, per quam scilicet intellectus apprehendit essenciam uniuscuiusque rei in se ipsa; alia est autem operatio intellectus componentis et diuidentis; additur autem et

Basically the same scheme is present in Giles of Rome and Duns Scotus, both of whom are clearly dependent on Thomas Aquinas in this respect.²³ This shows how an old conception of the *Organon* based on purely formal criteria (the distinction between terms, propositions and syllogisms) was reinterpreted in a psychological way when some previously unknown works (such as Aristotle's *De Anima*) were integrated in the system of sciences and when a new conception of logic appeared.

By the end of the thirteenth century, then, the *Categories* came to be interpreted as the study of the simple concepts by which our intellect knows the world. This meant that most of what Aristotle says in the *Categories* was interpreted as referring neither to things in the world nor to linguistic terms but to the way in which we conceive of the world. Such an interpretation is particularly evident in Duns Scotus.²⁴ He read the discussion of equivocacy, univocity and denomination as well as the description of the predicative relationship holding between species and genera as referring to concepts. Furthermore, he presented the very description of the ten categories which Aristotle gives in chapters 4–9 as referring to the way in which our intellect understands the world by way of ten kinds of concepts.

Scotus's interpretation of the *Categories* is merely a variant of the standard thirteenth-century doctrine that categories are studied both in logic as concepts and in metaphysics as things. In this approach, a question remained implicit. Are the categories considered in logic the same items as those considered in metaphysics? Properly speak-

tercia operatio ratiocinandi, secundum quod ratio procedit a notis ad inquisitionem ignotorum [...]. Cum autem logica dicatur rationalis sciencia, necesse est quod eius consideratio uersetur circa ea que pertinent ad tres praedictas operationes rationis; de hiis igitur que pertinent ad primam operationem intellectus, id est de hiis que simplici intellectu concipiuntur, determinat Aristotiles in libro *Praedicamentorum*; de hiis uero que pertinent ad secundam operationem, scilicet de enunciatione affirmatiua et negatiua, determinat Philosophus in libro *Peryermenias*; de hiis uero que pertinent ad terciam operationem determinat Aristotiles in libro *Priorum* et in consequentibus, in quibus agitur de sillogismo simpliciter et de diuersis sillogismorum et argumentationum speciebus, quibus ratio de uno procedit ad aliud; et ideo secundum praedictum ordinem trium operationum, liber *Praedicamentorum* ad librum *Peryermenias* ordinatur, qui ordinatur ad librum *Priorum* et consequentes." See also *Expositio libri Posteriorum*, p. 2.

²³ Giles of Rome, *Expositio super libros Elenchorum Aristotelis* (Venetiis, 1500; reprint Frankfurt am Main, 1968), f. 2rb–vb; John Duns Scotus, *Quaestiones in duos libros Perihermenias Aristotelis*, eds. R. Andrews et al., in Ioannis Duns Scoti *Opera philosophica II* (St. Bonaventure, 2004), *Proemium*, p. 135, nn. 1–2.

²⁴ John Duns Scotus, *Quaestiones super Praedicamenta Aristotelis*, q. 1, pp. 249–256.

ing, there is only one sets of things, i.e., categories in the extramental world. For categories as studied in logic are not things but concepts. But categories, insofar as they are studied in logic, have certain properties that they do not have when they are considered in metaphysics. For example, substance is studied in logic insofar as a logical relation such as being predicated or being divided into species is grounded on it—because more universal substantial concepts are predicated of less universal substantial ones and generic substantial concepts are divided into specific ones. Consequently, it seems that categories in logic (i.e., as they are studied in the *Categories*) and in metaphysics are not the same but different items: in logic, categories are *entia rationis* (concepts), in metaphysics they are *entia realia* (things). This view of considering categories as things and concepts becomes particularly evident in Scotus and Brito. Brito even devotes an entire question of his commentary on the *Categories* to determine whether the notion of category is a real or a conceptual being. Symptomatically, he concludes that it is both, for categories can be considered both as the things to which the intellect attributes conceptual properties or as modified by such conceptual properties. In the former case, a category is a real being; in the latter, it is a conceptual one.²⁵

This interpretation of the *Categories* has an obvious consequence. Since the logician studies concepts and not things whereas the metaphysician considers things and not concepts, there is the possibility of a gap between logic as the study of concepts and metaphysics as the study of things. Specifically, the *Categories* says much concerning the way in which we understand the world. But is it legitimate to infer from the analysis of our concepts any conclusion concerning the structure of the world? Unlike most of his predecessors, Scotus is particularly aware of the problem implicit in the view that categories can be studied both in logic as concepts and in metaphysics as kinds of things. He is wary of bridging the gap between the two approaches. This is all the more problematic, because he maintains that the ten categories, which are studied in the *Categories* as ten concepts, are also ten kinds of extramental things. But what assures us that there are as many kinds of concepts as there are kinds of things? In principle, nothing, as Scotus knew well. So he needs to argue that there are ten kinds of thing without relying on

²⁵ Radulphus Brito, *Quaestiones super Praedicamenta*, in *Quaestiones subtilissimae magistri Rodulphi Britonis super arte veteri*, q. 4, f. 39vb.

the way in which our concepts are structured. In this respect, Scotus can be regarded as the one who took the doctrine of the twofold study of the categories (in logic and in metaphysics) to its extreme consequences and who accordingly showed the limits of such an approach. Basically, he claims that there is a close parallelism between categories as studied in logic and categories as studied in metaphysics but that this parallelism cannot be demonstrated. This is of course a problem. It is this problem which will set the philosophical agenda for those writing on the *Categories* at the beginning of the fourteenth century.²⁶

4. *The parting of the ways: Olivi, Ockham, Burley*

4.1. *Peter of John Olivi*

Scotus is among the last to maintain that a coordinated and organic treatment of categories, as both concepts and things, is possible. As a matter of fact, his treatment should probably be seen as a bold attempt to rescue the thirteenth-century doctrine of the twofold consideration of categories against the criticisms that had already been leveled against it. As I have mentioned, the weak point of that approach was the possible gap between categories as concepts and categories as things. Before Scotus, Peter of John Olivi had already noticed that there was no good reason to maintain that there are as many concepts as kinds of things. He claimed that the famous division into ten categories should not be seen as a distinction of kinds of things but of real accounts, i.e., of the different ways in which the same thing can be described. For the same thing can be accurately described in several ways. For example, a man can be described as the permanent subject of changing properties or as a thing of a certain extension or as a thing of a certain color or as the son of his father and mother and so on. This does not mean, however, that in the world there are different things corresponding to each of these different descriptions. In the world, there is only one and the same

²⁶ See Duns Scotus, *Quaest. super Praed.*, q. 10, pp. 333–342; *Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis. Libri I–V*, eds. R. Andrews et al., in Ioannis Duns Scoti *Opera philosophica* III (St. Bonaventure, 1997), L. V, q. 5–6, nn. 73–103, pp. 464–471. On the demonstration of the number of *Categories*, see G. Pini, “Scotus on Deducing Aristotle’s *Categories*,” in *La tradition médiévale des Catégories (XII^e–XIV^e siècles)*. Actes du XIII^e Symposium européen de logique et de sémantique médiévales (Avignon, 6–10 juin 2000), eds. par J. Biard – I. Rosier-Catach (Louvain, 2003), pp. 23–35.

thing, i.e., a man, which can be described in several ways. Olivi calls these descriptions ‘rationes reales’, probably because each of them is a concept by which we know and describe the world (and so it is a *ratio*) and at the same time it is not a fiction made up by our intellect but an accurate description of something in the world (and so it is *realis*). Olivi knows that the supporters of the standard view that there are ten kinds of concepts and ten parallel kinds of things base their opinion on Aristotle’s *Categories* and *Metaphysics*. Against this claim, Olivi notes that in both works Aristotle merely assumes the distinction among categories as something known but he does not seem to consider it as a distinction among different real essences. Even less does he give any argument in support of the claim that the ten categories are actually ten and no fewer than ten. Actually, Olivi notices that Avicenna already seems to have maintained that there is no demonstration of the number of categories. Accordingly, Olivi maintains that what Aristotle says in the *Categories* can be interpreted in two ways. The first possibility is that Aristotle is speaking not of kinds of things but merely of concepts, i.e., the ways we describe things; so he would not be drawing an ontological distinction but merely a distinction of concepts. It is the fault of Aristotle’s interpreters to infer a plurality of things from a plurality of concepts. The second possibility is that Aristotle himself made the mistake of inferring an ontological distinction among essences from a conceptual one among descriptions. Such a mistake, Olivi observes, was made by many ancient philosophers. The implicit suggestion seems to be that there is no justification for philosophers and theologians who still make the same mistake today.²⁷

²⁷ Peter of John Olivi, *Quaestiones in secundum librum Sententiarum*, ed. B. Jansen, I (Ad Claras Aquas, 1922), q. XXVIII, pp. 483–484: “Quidam enim sequaces Aristotelis credentes quod Aristoteles voluerit decem praedicamenta esse decem genera rerum inter se essentialiter distinctarum acceperunt quasi pro primo principio quod hoc ita se habent, quamquam Aristoteles non inveniatur multum expressisse quod dicant semper necessario diversas essentias et multo minus inveniatur aliquam rationem sive necessariam sive probabilem ad distinctionem et numerum praedicamentorum probandum alicubi adduxisse. In *Praedicamentis* enim nihil facit super hoc nisi variare, acsi quicquid dicat esset per se notum; nec in *Metaphysicis* aliquid de hoc probat, sed potius tanquam notum supponit [...]”; q. XIV, p. 264: “Haec autem distinctio conveniens esse potuit secundum modum logicalem qui plus considerat rationes rerum et intentiones quam res; et ideo rationes quae secundum modum intelligendi habebant se ad alias per modum accidentium convenienter potuerunt ponere inter praedicamenta accidentium. Aut si hoc non movit eos, dicunt quod Aristoteles fuit deceptus arguens ex pluralitate rationum realium diversitatem essentialem, quam deceptionem dicunt fuisse in multis antiquis philosophis.”

Olivi's main point is not that Aristotle's doctrine in the *Categories* is wrong. Moreover, he agrees with the view commonly adopted by his contemporaries that the *Categories* introduces not ten kinds of things but ten kinds of concepts. Starting from this standard point, however, Olivi argues that it is not legitimate to infer a plurality of things from a plurality of descriptions or concepts. Accordingly, it is the traditional doctrine of the parallelism between categories as concepts and things that in Olivi's eyes must be abandoned. Scotus and Brito made a last effort to defend it but they both were aware that the parallelism between concepts and things cannot be simply assumed; it must now be defended with good arguments and put on solid new ground.

Scotus's and Brito's attempts to defend the traditional view of the categories seem to have been isolated and, ingenious as they were, short-lived. Confronted with the crisis of the traditional conception, philosophers took two contrasting attitudes. First, the way was open for them to maintain that the *Categories* deals with concepts while denying that there is a parallel number of kinds of things. This is basically Olivi's opinion. It is also that of William Ockham (who maintains that there are only particular substances and qualities) and John Buridan (who maintains that there are only particular substances, quantities and qualities). Alternatively, it was possible to reject the traditional claim that the *Categories*, being a logical work, deals with concepts, and to maintain instead that Aristotle's treatise should be seen as a work of ontology. This is the position of Walter Burley and of the Oxford realists of the late fourteenth century (John Wyclif and his followers, Robert Alyngton, John Sharpe, William Milverley, William Penbygull, Roger Whelpdale, and John Tarteys).²⁸ It must be noted that, although the latter tended to present themselves as the defenders of the traditional opinion concerning the *Categories*, their interpretation was no less innovative and radical than that of Ockham and Buridan. Both nominalists and realists rejected the old doctrine of the twofold consideration of categories and based their interpretation of the *Categories* on such a rejection. So thinkers of both affiliations agreed that the *Categories* is not to be seen as the logical counterpart of a parallel ontological treatment of categories (given in the *Physics* and *Metaphysics*), as it was commonly held in the thirteenth century. By contrast, the *Categories* must be considered

²⁸ See Alessandro D. Conti, "Studio storico-critico," in Johannes Sharpe, *Quaestio super universalia*, a cura di A. D. Conti (Olschki, 1990), pp. 295–336.

as either a logical treatise to which there corresponds a dramatically simplified ontology (according to nominalists) or an ontological work whose logical nature consists merely in its introductory and general character, not in the fact that it deals with categories insofar as they are concepts (according to realists).

4.2. *William Ockham*

So let us now consider Ockham's position in his commentary on the *Categories*, written between 1321 and 1324.²⁹ As is well known, Ockham endorses a form of ontological reductivism. He maintains that there are only two kinds of things, i.e., individual substances and individual qualities. All the other categories are not things distinct from substances and qualities but result from a certain way of signifying a particular substance and a particular quality while signifying something else (i.e., another particular substance or another particular quality) in a secondary way.³⁰ This is the gist of Ockham's famous doctrine of connotative terms, both linguistic and mental. The main result of this doctrine is that Ockham can posit ten distinct kinds of words and their corresponding concepts, which are properly speaking the categories, while at the same time holding a noteworthy ontological parsimony. Thus, in Ockham's interpretation, the *Categories* is a treatise devoted to the study of terms insofar as they signify. Even though Ockham first describes these terms as vocal expressions (*voces*), he explicitly adds that they include both vocal and mental words (*intentiones* or *conceptus*). Accordingly, the *Categories* deals with terms both vocal and mental insofar as they signify extramental things. Ockham quotes Boethius as the source for his reading of the *Categories*: terms are considered as signs of extramental things, i.e., of individual substances and qualities, which for Ockham are the only constituents of the world. Consequently, Aristotle's *Categories* primarily concerns terms and only secondarily things, insofar as things are

²⁹ Here I do not take Buridan into consideration. See J. Zupko, *John Buridan Portail of a Fourteenth-Century Arts Master* (Notre Dame, IN, 2003), pp. 54–58.

³⁰ On Ockham's ontological program and the connection with his semantic views, see M. McCord Adams, *William Ockham* (Notre Dame, IN, 1987), pp. 143–167; C. Panaccio, *Les mots, les concepts et les choses. La sémantique de Guillaume d'Occam et le nominalisme d'aujourd'hui* (Montréal, 1991), pp. 23–67; Id., *Connotative Concepts and Their Definitions in Ockham's Nominalism*, in *La tradition médiévale des Catégories*, pp. 141–155; G. Klima, "Ockham's Semantics and Ontology of the *Categories*," in *The Cambridge Companion to Ockham*, ed. P. V. Spade (Cambridge, 1999), pp. 118–142.

signified by terms. Specifically, this implies that most of the statements that we read in the *Categories* refer to words and concepts, not to things. Ockham notes that many modern authors do not realize that Aristotle's intention is to deal with terms and not with things; as a consequence, these authors endorse a realist interpretation of Aristotle's treatise which is completely off target.³¹ This is probably a reference to Burley's first commentary on the *Categories*, which precedes Ockham's commentary by some years.

What is the function of the *Categories* and why is it the first work of the *Organon* and more generally of the entire series of Aristotle's writings? Ockham considers the short treatise as a sort of introduction to the study of philosophy. He remarks that the study of verbal and mental terms insofar as they signify things is necessary for any kind of philosophical dispute, because any philosophical dispute takes place through terms. Specifically, the study of terms according to their signification as carried out in the *Categories* allows one to distinguish between two classes of terms, i.e., absolute and connotative. Absolute terms signify what they supposit for. Connotative terms primarily signify what they supposit for but also have a secondary signification; for example, a relative term like 'son' primarily signifies all the individual men (except Adam) and secondarily signifies all the individual men who are fathers of the men primarily signified. Since the *Categories* studies terms according to their signification, the distinction between absolute and connotative signification pertains to the *Categories*. Since the confusion between these two modes of signification causes many mistakes (such as the mistake of positing as many kinds of things as there are signifying terms), the *Categories* performs a sort of therapy preliminary to any philosophical dispute. Curiously, Ockham does not seem to notice that Aristotle himself does not draw any distinction between absolute and connota-

³¹ William Ockham, *Expositio in librum Praedicamentorum Aristotelis*, ed. G. Gál, in *Opera philosophica* II (St. Bonaventure, N.Y., 1978), pp. 135–136: "Circa primum sciendum est—sequendo dictum Boethii in *Commento* suo—quod «in hoc opere haec intentio est, de primis rerum nominibus et de decem vocibus res significantibus disputare [...]» Unde sciendum est quod principalis intentio in hoc libro est de vocibus res significantibus determinare. [...] Verumtamen non obstante quod Philosophus in isto libro tractet de vocibus, tractat tamen simul cum hoc de rebus; hoc est, propositiones multas ponit accidentaliter in quibus termini non pro nominibus sed pro rebus supponunt. [...] Hoc est, secundo loco tractat de iis rebus pro quibus supponunt. Et ignorantia istius intentionis Aristotelis in hoc libro facit multos modernos errare, credentes hic multa dicta pro rebus, quae tamen pro solis vocibus—et proportionaliter pro intentionibus seu conceptibus in anima—vult intelligi."

tive terms either in the *Categories* or elsewhere. Since such a distinction is central to his own philosophical project and since he maintains that the *Categories* is a study of verbal and mental terms according to their signification, Ockham just claims that the distinction between the two kinds of terms is the main aim of the *Categories* itself.

So what is the role and place of the *Categories* in the *Organon*? What about the old triad of *Categories*—*De interpretatione*—*Prior Analytics*? Ockham still mentions it approvingly. Its influence can still be easily detected in the structure of his *Summa logicae*. And he still maintains that the *Categories* studies simple terms out of which the propositions analyzed in the *De interpretatione* are made and that in turn these propositions constitute the syllogisms studied in the *Prior Analytics*.³² This schema, however, does not play a very important function in Ockham's thought. There seem to be at least two reasons for this. The first reason is Ockham's rejection of syllogism as the subject matter of logic. For Ockham maintains that logic, like all the other sciences, does not have a single subject matter. In any science, there are as many subject matters as there are things studied. Logic does not have a single subject matter at which all its parts are aimed. Consequently, syllogism cannot play the role of the ultimate end of logic and the whole sequence *Categories*—*De interpretatione*—*Prior Analytics* loses its significance.³³ The second reason for this is Ockham's rejection of the traditional formulation of the doctrine of the three operations of the intellect. As I have mentioned, at the end of the thirteenth century it was customary to link the sequence *Categories*—*De interpretatione*—*Prior Analytics* with the three operations of apprehending, combining and arguing. Specifically, the *Categories* was taken to study the objects of apprehension, i.e., simple concepts. For only simple concepts (such as man and animal, for example) can be apprehended by the first operation of the intellect and successively combined by the second operation in the proposition "Man is an animal." Now, Ockham follows Scotus in distinguishing a mental content, which has a propositional form, from its being asserted as true or false. For not only simple concepts but also propositions can be apprehended without

³² William Ockham, *Exp. in librum Praed.*, p. 164: "[...] Philosophus principaliter in isto libro determinat de incomplexis, ex quibus fiunt propositiones et syllogismi." Ockham also constructs his *Summa logicae* out of three parts respectively devoted to the study of terms—study of propositions—study of arguments, which clearly reproduces the sequence *Categories*—*De interpretatione*—*Prior Analytics*.

³³ William Ockham, *Exp. in librum Praed.*, p. 135; cf. *Proemium Expositionis in libros Artis Logicae*, ed. G. Gál, in *Guillelmi de Ockham, Opera philosophica* II, pp. 3–7.

being the object of assertion by the second operation of the intellect. This happens when a propositional content such as man's being an animal is merely contemplated without taking any stance concerning its being true or false. Ockham concludes from this possibility (which apparently was not part of the standard picture of predication endorsed until the end of the thirteenth century, for example by Thomas Aquinas) that not only simple concepts such as man but also complexes such as man's being an animal can be the object of the first operation of the intellect.³⁴ As a consequence, the link between the first operation of the intellect and the categories is loosened. Simple apprehension is not necessarily turned to the simple concepts studied in the *Categories*; even mental propositions can be its object.

All the same, even for Ockham the *Categories* keeps its place as the opening work of Aristotle's *Organon*. But this is due not so much to the old schema according to which the *Analytics* are the culmination of logic as to the fact that, as we have seen, Ockham considers the *Categories* as a sort of therapy preliminary to the rest of philosophy, insofar as any philosophical dispute relies on signifying terms. The *Categories* is necessary in order to get rid of the fallacy that derives from not distinguishing between absolute and connotative terms. So, the main utility of the *Categories* is to make clear that there is no one-to-one correspondence between kinds of terms (verbal or conceptual) and kinds of things and that accordingly our conceptual apparatus of ten categories is compatible with an ontology comprising only individual substances and individual qualities.³⁵

³⁴ See William Ockham, *Scriptum in librum primum Sententiarum ordinatio. Prologus et distinctio prima*, ed. G. Gál, in Guillelmi de Ockham, *Opera theologica I* (St. Bonaventure, N.Y., 1967), Prol., q. 1, pp. 16–17; *Quodlibeta septem*, ed. J. C. Wey, in Guillelmi de Ockham *Opera theologica IX* (St. Bonaventure, N.Y., 1980), *Quodl.* III, q. 8, pp. 232–235; *Quodl.* IV, q. 16, pp. 376–380; *Quodl.* V, q. 6, pp. 500–503. See G. Nuchelmans, *Theories of the Proposition. Ancient and Medieval Conceptions of the Bearers of Truth and Falsity* (Amsterdam, 1973), pp. 197–199; G. Pini, “Scotus on Assertion and the Copula: A Comparison with Aquinas,” in *Medieval Theories on Assertive and non-Assertive Language*. Acts of the 14th European Symposium on Medieval Logic and Semantics, Rome, June 11–15, 2002, eds. A. Maierù – L. Valente (Olschki, 2004), pp. 307–331.

³⁵ William Ockham, *Exp. in librum Praed.*, pp. 136–137: “Utilitas istius libri est scire quae nomina quas res significant. Et hoc multum necessarium est ad omnem disputationem, cum omnis disputatio significata vocabulorum praesupponat. Et etiam ista scientia specialiter utilis est ad notitiam fallaciae figurae dictionis, cuius ignorantia multos involvit. Nam cum aliquae voces aliquas res absolutae significant et aliquae in comparatione ad alias, et alias res connotando, arguere a primis ad secundas frequenter est facere fallaciam figurae dictionis, quod est valde commune; et talia

4.3. *Walter Burley and Robert Alyngton*

Walter Burley's second commentary on the *Categories* (written in 1337) must be seen as a reaction to Ockham's views.³⁶ Burley, however, does not revive the old doctrine of the twofold consideration of categories and of the parallelism between categories as concepts and categories as things. By contrast, he maintains that Aristotle's *Categories* deals with things. Burley is aware of going against no lesser authorities than Boethius and Simplicius, who both claimed that the *Categories* deals with things only in a secondary way, namely, only to the extent in which it is inescapable to speak of things in a treatise concerned with signifying expressions. So he is aware of putting forward an innovative view of the *Categories*. But he too has some authorities in his support. He refers to Avicenna and Averroes. His main argument is that terms are necessary only for the sake of communication, but logic could dispense with them if human beings were capable of non-verbal communication.³⁷ It is remarkable that Burley, while considering the *Categories de facto* as an ontological treatise, does not deny its belonging to logic. He only modifies the conception of logic: logic itself appears to be a sort of study of the ontological structure of reality. As a matter of fact, this is not surprising in an author who speaks of such things as *propositiones in re*.³⁸

So contrary to an old tradition that goes back to Porphyry and Boethius, Burley claims that the main focus of the *Categories* is things and that terms are only secondarily dealt with. Indeed, Burley has a very good argument in his support: the very content of the *Categories*.

sophismata a multis demonstrationes creduntur. Sed qualiter hoc debeat declarari, in libro *Praedicamentorum* ostendetur."

³⁶ See Alessandro D. Conti, "Ontology in Walter Burley's Last Commentary on the *Ars Vetus*," *Franciscan Studies* 50 (1990), 121–176.

³⁷ See Walter Burley, *Expositio super Praedicamenta Aristotelis*, in Gualteri Burlei *Expositio super artem veterem Porphyrii et Aristotelis* (Venetiis, 1509), f. 17va: "Si enim esset possibile solo intellectu dicere, non indigeremus verbis. Si enim doctor artis posset illud revelare quod est in anima sua alio modo quam loquendo, semper supersederet a verbis. Unde si logica posset docere alio modo quam per voces, ut puta per signa digitorum vel per nutum oculorum, logicus non indigeret vocibus. Quod autem logicus considerat de vocibus, hoc non est ex primaria intentione, sed secundaria et ex consequenti, quia scientia logicalis non aliter commode doceri potest. Unde si aliquis surdus a nativitate posset invenire artem silogizandi et demonstrandi, tunc posset logicam sine cognitione vocum habere [...]."

³⁸ See L. Cesalli, "Le réalisme propositionnel de Walter Burley," *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Âge* 68 (2001), 155–221.

Those who maintain that the *Categories* deals with terms and not with things had always been embarrassed when trying to explain the central chapters of the treatise—devoted to the study of the ten categories—as dealing with terms and properties of terms rather than with things. Burley thinks that there is a much more straightforward reading. As he remarks, most of what Aristotle says in his short treatise is about properties of things, not properties of terms: “This view [i.e., that the *Categories* deals primarily with things] seems to agree with Aristotle’s way of proceeding. For in this book he discusses the properties and attributes of things, such as the properties of substance, quality and quantity. Now, a science is mainly about the things whose properties and attributes it mainly discusses. But in this book it is not properties of expressions that are discussed but of things. Therefore etc.”³⁹

Burley’s interpretation of the *Categories* as a treatise dealing with the basic structure of reality is the source of the realist interpretations of the *Categories* adopted by the so-called Oxford realists of the late fourteenth century. For example, Robert Alyngton (fl. ca. 1390) maintained that in the *Categories* Aristotle deals mainly with things signified by terms, even though sometimes he does speak of the expressions signifying things. Again, the traditional remark by Porphyry and Boethius is plainly contradicted. But like Burley, Alyngton does not conclude that the *Categories* is a metaphysical treatise. Quite the contrary, he claims that we must distinguish between the order in which logicians carry out their task and their aim. It is true that, as far as the order is concerned, logicians first deal with words then with things. Their aim, however, is to speak of the things as they are in the extramental world. So, what we read in the *Categories* about predications of genera and species must be interpreted as referring not to relationships among concepts but to real relationships holding among things of different degrees of universality.⁴⁰ Again, there emerges a conception of logic as a sort of ontology,

³⁹ Walter Burley, *Exp. super Praed.*, f. 17vb: “Istud videtur concordari processui Philosophi, quia Philosophus determinat in hoc libro de proprietatibus et passionibus rerum, ut de proprietatibus substantiae, qualitatis et quantitatis. Nunc autem scientia videtur de istis esse principaliter, de quorum proprietatibus et passionibus principaliter determinat in illa; sed in hoc libro non determinatur de proprietatibus vocum sed rerum; ergo et cetera.”

⁴⁰ Robert Alyngton, *Litteralis sententia super Praedicamenta Aristotelis*, in Alessandro D. Conti, “Linguaggio e realtà nel commento alle *Categorie* di Robert Alyngton,” *Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale* 4 (1993), 179–306: 251: «Quantum ad primum videtur mihi quod Aristoteles hic mixtum tractat de signis et rebus significatis; sed principalius de rebus significatis. Nam cum dupliciter potest dici prius: aut in ordine procedendi,

dealing with the structure of reality from a general point of view. In this perspective, the old sequence *Categories*—*De interpretatione*—*Prior Analytics* is to be reinterpreted as regarding simple and complex items in the world. It is the world itself that is divided into simple objects, propositional objects and complex objects linked by a relationship of implication. It is the world, not merely our conceptual framework, that is logically structured. For this reason, logic deals with things, not with concepts.

So the *Categories* deals with simple items in the world. But then, given that Aristotle deals with categories not only in the treatise of that name but also in the *Metaphysics*, what are we to say about the difference between these two treatments? For there are indeed several differences, even some contradictions between what Aristotle says in the *Categories* on the one hand and in the *Metaphysics* on the other hand. Alyngton is probably not aware of the old doctrine of the twofold consideration of categories, so he cannot explain away the contradictions between the two works as the result of treatments carried out from different points of view. By contrast, Alyngton claims that the difference between the *Categories* and the physical and metaphysical treatises is that the former work is not scientific but only probable. Indeed, the whole difference between logic and metaphysics is merely one of certitude: the logician speaks according to what is likely, the real philosopher speaks scientifically. But they speak of exactly the same things.⁴¹ What we read in the *Categories* must be interpreted as a sort of introductory treatment of the same issues that will be studied more carefully in the *Metaphysics*. The difference between the two works can also be seen as one concerning

sicut pars est prior toto cuius est pars, aut secundo modo prius intentione, sicut totum est prius sua parte. Prius ergo in ordine procedendi debet logicus tractare de vocibus quam de rebus. [...] Principalior tamen et prior in intentione est logici determinatio de rebus distinctis contra signa, quamvis posterior in ordine procedendi.”

⁴¹ Robert Alyngton, *Litt. sent. super Praed.*, ed. Conti, p. 252: “Notandum secundo quod aliter determinat hic de substantia, qualitate, quantitate etc. et aliter in V *Metaphysicae*. Nam secundum Avicennam, in principio *Metaphysicae* suae, metaphysicus procedit scientificè circa singula quae conveniunt in ente analogo, logicus autem probabiliter. Et secundum sanctum Thomam, in IV *Metaphysicae*, logica potest considerari uno modo ut est scientia docens modum probabiliter procedendi, aut modum sciendi; et tunc considerat de rebus sub ratione qua eis insunt intentiones secundae, ut sub ratione qua est commune vel singulare, genus etc. Et tunc procedit scientificè. Et tunc habet pro subiecto, ut dicit Avicenna et Lincolniensis, I *Posteriorum*, intentiones secundas prout opponuntur primis. Sed secundo modo potest logica considerari ut utens. Et tunc considerat circa subiectum aequè universale sicut metaphysicus, sed non scientificè. Et sic, secundum Lincolniensem, logica est instrumentum metaphysicae.”

their didactic destination: the *Categories* is a work for beginners, the *Metaphysics* is for advanced students.

Both the idea that logic deals with things at a higher level of generality than metaphysics and the connected presentation of the *Categories* as a work for absolute beginners are quite old. They first appeared among Neoplatonic commentators eager to reconcile Aristotle's 'logical' and metaphysical works. Curiously, this view has been recently revived in contemporary scholarship on Aristotle.⁴² Its merit is to allow for an ontological reading of the *Categories* while recognizing the contradictions with the *Physics* and *Metaphysics*. The alternative view is that the *Categories* and the physical and metaphysical treatises have only apparently the same subject, for the former adopts a logical point of view, the latter a metaphysical one.⁴³ This illustrates an obvious point which we may forget: contemporary interpretations of Aristotle are a continuation and quite often a reconsideration of ancient and medieval ones.

5. *A Case Study: The Distinction Between Primary and Secondary Substances*

So far, I have argued that the idea that the *Categories* is the first work of the logical syllabus continued to be entertained at least until the end of the fourteenth century, no matter what logic was taken to be—a formal study of arguments, a study of concepts, a study of mental language or a beginner's guide to the study of the basic structure of reality. The view that the *Categories* is a work of logic had a lasting influence on both the interpretation of that work and more in general the history of logic. On the one hand, according to which conception of logic was adopted, it was possible to read different things in the *Categories*: an introduction to arguments, a study of simple concepts, an analysis of the structure of reality. On the other hand, logic itself was construed as to include what could be read in the *Categories*. For example, the

⁴² See M. Burnyeat, *A Map of Metaphysics Zeta* (Pittsburgh, 2001), pp. 87–125. The idea that the *Categories* is a work for beginners originated from the second-century Aristotelian, Herminus, and flourished in the Neoplatonic circles from Porphyry onwards. See P. Moraux, *Der Aristotelismus bei den Griechen. Von Andronikos bis Alexander von Aphrodisias*, vol. 2 (Berlin, 1984), pp. 363–374.

⁴³ See for example Joseph Owens, "Aristotle on Categories," *The Review of Metaphysics* 14 (1960), 73–90: 83–84; Bodéüs, *Introduction*, in Aristote, *Catégories*, p. XCVI. Owens's position—which Bodéüs quotes approvingly—is directly indebted to Thomas Aquinas's commentary on the *Metaphysics* (see below n. 46).

distinctions between individuals and universals and between substance and accident were considered as parts of what logic had to account for because Aristotle introduces them in the *Categories*. The two-way influence of logic on the *Categories* and of the *Categories* on logic is of great concern to the evaluation of several arguments and positions put forward by thirteenth- and fourteenth-century authors in the realm of logic and metaphysics. In order to illustrate this point, I will consider how some of the late medieval thinkers I have already mentioned interpreted the very same lines of chapter 5 of the *Categories*. These thinkers are Thomas Aquinas, John Duns Scotus, William Ockham, Walter Burley and Robert Alyngton.

5.1. *Thomas Aquinas*

In the first lines of *Cat.* 5, Aristotle introduces the famous distinction between primary and secondary substances:

A substance—that which is called a substance most strictly, primarily, and most of all—is that which is neither said of a subject nor in a subject, e.g., the individual man or the individual horse. The species in which the things primarily called substances are, are called secondary substances, as also are the genera of these species. For example, the individual man belongs in a species, man, and animal is a genus of the species; so these—both man and animal—are called secondary substances.⁴⁴

Aristotle's point is straightforward. He distinguishes two kinds of objects, some particular and others universal. As it happens, Aristotle's endorsing of universal substances is usually regarded as one of the main points of contrast between the ontology of the *Categories* and that of the *Metaphysics*, where Aristotle holds that no universal is a substance.⁴⁵

In modern times, scholars have proposed several solutions to this predicament. The difficulty, however, was already known in the Middle Ages. Thomas Aquinas wrote no commentary on the *Categories* but in his commentary on the *Metaphysics* he tries to resolve the contradiction between the latter work and the *Categories*. It is in that context that he

⁴⁴ Aristotle, *Cat.* 5, 2a11–19 (Akrill's translation). See Aristotle's *Categories* and *De interpretatione*. Translated with Notes and Glossary by J.L. Ackrill (Oxford, 1963), pp. 5–6.

⁴⁵ Aristotle, *Met.* Z. 13. See Bodéüs, "Introduction," in Aristotle, *Catégories*, pp. XCIV–XCV. For an analysis of various contemporary interpretations see G. Galluzzo, "Met. Z. 13 in the Contemporary Debate and in Aquinas's Interpretation," *Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale* 14 (2003), 159–226: 161–185.

provides his interpretation of the distinction between primary and secondary substances as introduced in *Categories* 5.

Aquinas maintains that Aristotle's admitting of universal substances in the *Categories* must be interpreted in the light of the logical character of this work. Since logicians deal with things not insofar as they exist in the extramental world but insofar as they are understood and present in the mind, it follows that they consider substances insofar as they are understood by the intellect, i.e., insofar as substances are conceived of as universal concepts. For example, let us consider the meaning that the metaphysician and the logician give to the word 'man'. For the metaphysician, man is a real essence constituting each individual belonging in a certain natural kind. By contrast, the logician considers such an essence insofar as the intellect understands it as a universal concept, i.e., as the universal concept of man. It is this universal concept that the logician calls 'secondary substance'. Since our intellect attributes this universal concept (for example, the universal concept of man) to the real extramental thing that has been understood by way of that concept, it follows that according to the logician secondary substances are predicated of primary substances, i.e., universal concepts are predicated of the real things existing in the world. In the *Categories*, it is this logical consideration that is taken into account. Accordingly, in the *Categories* Aristotle says that secondary substances (i.e., universal concepts) are predicated of primary substances (i.e., real individuals in the world):

But it must be said that in the *Categories* the Philosopher speaks according to a logical consideration. The logician, however, considers things insofar as they are in the mind; accordingly, he considers substances to the extent that they are subject to the intention of universality insofar as the intellect conceives of them. Therefore, concerning predication, which is an act of the intellect, the logician says that secondary substances are predicated "of a subject," i.e., of the substance existing extramentally.⁴⁶

⁴⁶ Thomas Aquinas, *In duodecim libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis Expositio*, edd. M.-R. Cathala – R. M. Spiazzi (Rome, 1964), L. VII, lect. XIII, n. 1576: "Sed dicendum quod secundum logicam considerationem loquitur Philosophus in *Praedicamentis*. Logicus autem considerat res secundum quod sunt in ratione; et ideo considerat substantias prout secundum acceptionem intellectus subsunt intentioni universalitatis. Et ideo quantum ad praedicationem, quae est actus rationis, dicit quod praedicatur 'de subiecto', idest de substantia subsistente extra animam."

Things are different in the *Metaphysics*, where Aristotle focuses not on our concepts but on the way the world is. Thus, in the *Metaphysics* Aristotle only considers real individuals belonging in certain natural kinds. From that point of view, there is no room for predicating a substance of another substance, for only concepts, not things, are predicated. Consequently, the only relationship that Aristotle takes into account in the *Metaphysics* is the relationship of being in or inhering in a substance. He ignores the other relationship he had introduced in the *Categories*, i.e., being said of, which holds not between two things but between a concept and a thing or between two concepts of different universality.⁴⁷

From this passage, it appears that Thomas Aquinas interprets the distinction between primary and secondary substances drawn in *Categories* 5 as a distinction not between two kinds of extramental objects (i.e., individuals and universals) but between the real objects existent in the world (i.e., primary substances) and the universal concepts by which our mind understands them (i.e., secondary substances). So Aquinas takes Aristotle as distinguishing between things (individual and real) and concepts (universal and mental).

5.2. *Duns Scotus*

Scotus shares with Thomas Aquinas the view that the *Categories* deals with concepts. Some twenty years after Aquinas, he gives a similar interpretation of the distinction between primary and secondary substances. He states that the distinction drawn at *Cat.* 5, 2a11–19 is not to be interpreted as the division of a genus (i.e., the category of substance) into its species but as the distinction of a subject according to its accidents. Scotus is here implicitly referring to Boethius's *De divisione*, where several kinds of divisions are introduced and described. In particular, Boethius distinguishes the way in which a genus such as animal is divided into its species from the way in which a subject is divided according to which accidents inhere in it, for example when men are divided into black, white and neither black nor white according to the color of their skin. The latter division is clearly not of a genus into different species, because all men belong to the same species no matter what the color of their skin is; it is merely a division

⁴⁷ Ibid.

carried out according to whether an accidental feature does or does not inhere in a subject.⁴⁸ Similarly, Scotus maintains that primary and secondary substances are not two species of the same genus; the division of substances into primary and secondary is merely the division of a subject according to which accidents inhere in it. Scotus has an argument for his claim. He recalls that substance is considered in logic insofar as it is understood and not insofar as it is a real kind of thing. Now, he notices that substance, when considered as understood (and so as a concept and not as a thing), is divided into different varieties according to which kind of conceptual properties (*intentiones*) pertain to them: “Note that the division of substance into primary and secondary is not the division of a category into species but of a subject according to its accidents, because substance insofar as it is understood—according to which consideration it is considered by the logician—is divided into intentions pertaining to it in an accidental way.”⁴⁹

Thus a substance, for example, can be considered by the intellect according to its individual features. In that case, it is regarded as an individual within a certain kind. Alternatively, the intellect can consider the same substance by neglecting its individual features. In that way, that substance is regarded as a certain notion describing more than one individual. These two ways of considering the same substance do not have any bearing on the very essence of substance, which remains the same essence no matter how we consider it. Scotus maintains that the division of substances into primary and secondary captures exactly the two ways in which our intellect can consider substances. Granted, he does not think that the existence of individual and universal items in the world depends on the way we consider the world. He only maintains that the way in which our intellect can conceive of substances does not imply any correspondent distinction in reality. As a consequence, Scotus holds that when Aristotle distinguishes between primary and secondary substances he should not be interpreted as positing two kinds of substances, particular and universal. What Aristotle is saying is that substance can be considered in two ways and that substances can be (accidentally) divided into two classes according to whether our intellect

⁴⁸ Boethius, *De divisione liber*, ed. J. Magee (Leiden, 1998), pp. 8–10.

⁴⁹ Duns Scotus, *Quaest. in Praed.*, q. 12, n. 31, p. 363: “Nota quod divisio substantiae in primam et secundam non est divisio generalissimi in species, sed subiecti in accidentia, quia ‘substantia’ secundum quod intelligitur—secundum quam considerationem pertinet ad logicum—dividitur in intentiones sibi accidentes.”

consider them according to the properties that pertain to them insofar as they are conceived as individuals of a certain kind or as universal concepts abstracting from individual features. Accordingly, *Cat.* 5, 2a11–19 cannot be taken as evidence of the existence of universals in addition to individuals. The argument for the existence of universals as real constituents of the world (if there are any such things) must be based on a different kind of evidence, not logical (i.e., depending on the way our intellect considers the world) but metaphysical or, in alternative, concerning the very grounds and legitimacy of our conceptual framework.

5.3. *Ockham*

Ockham's interpretation of *Cat.* 5, 2a11–19 is not so different from that of Scotus. Both Scotus and Ockham maintain that the *Categories* deals not with things but with concepts. Consequently, both of them hold that the distinction between primary and secondary substances must be accounted for as a distinction between two kinds of concepts and ways of considering the world, not between two kinds of things. Of course, Ockham also thinks that in the world there are only particular substances and qualities. By contrast, Scotus maintains that there are things belonging to all the ten categories and that individuals are not the only furniture of the world. But this difference in their metaphysics has no immediate bearing on their logical conceptions as expressed in their reading of Aristotle's *Categories*. So Ockham agrees with Scotus that in *Categories* 5 Aristotle is not dividing the category of substance into two kinds, universal and individual substances. In the extramental world, there is only one kind of substances, i.e., individual substances. Aristotle is merely dividing the logical category of substance into its contents. Now, Ockham holds that in the logical category of substance there are not only things (i.e., the individual substances existing in the world) but also the names signifying them. These names are either individual, if they signify only one individual substance, or universal, if they signify many individual substances. What Aristotle calls 'primary substances' are either the real individual substances existing in the world or their names. What Aristotle calls 'secondary substances' are the concepts and the names signifying many individual substances:

First of all, it must be noted here that every substance that is a real thing contained in the category of substance is simply a primary, individual and singular substance. So, the genera, species and very category of

substance are not real extramental substances, nor are they part of the essence of particular substances. By contrast, they are concepts in the soul—which in no way exist extramentally—and expressions or signs referring to real substances. Therefore, this division of substance is not a division of substance into extramental things, each of which is a real thing, but a division of substance into what is contained in it, i.e., into what is less universal than the category of substance. And not only things but also concepts in the soul or expressions are said to be contained in the category of substance or under that category because they are less common [than the category of substance]. So primary substances are said to be either the extramental substances or their names and secondary substances are said to be the concepts or names referring to more than one substance.⁵⁰

Thus, the reason why Aristotle introduces this distinction between primary and secondary substances has nothing to do with metaphysics. He is not interested in distinguishing two kinds of substances but in sorting out two kinds of names and concepts, i.e., those signifying only one thing and those signifying many things. Since the difference between these two kinds of simple terms (both linguistic and mental) is philosophically significant and since the *Categories* is concerned with simple terms, Aristotle draws such a distinction in this place. But he certainly does not intend to claim that secondary substances are real items in the world. To say this would result in a basic misunderstanding of Aristotle's aim in his *Categories*.⁵¹

5.4. *Walter Burley and Robert Alyngton*

In the second version of his commentary on the *Categories*, Walter Burley extensively quotes and criticizes Ockham's interpretation of *Cat.*

⁵⁰ William Ockham, *Exp. in Praed.*, p. 164: "Notandum est hic primo quod omnis substantia quae est vera res contenta in genere substantiae est simpliciter substantia prima et individua et singularis. Ita quod genera et species et ipsummet genus generalissimum substantiae non sunt verae substantiae extra animam, nec sunt de essentia substantiarum particularium, sed sunt quaedam intentiones in anima, nullo modo extra existentes, et voces vel signa importantia veras substantias. Et ideo ista divisio substantiae non est divisio substantiae in res extra animam, quarum quaelibet sit vera res, sed est divisio substantiae in contenta in inferiora ad genus generalissimum, et talia contenta non sunt tantum res, sed sunt etiam intentiones in anima vel voces importantes veras res et substantias, quae ideo dicuntur contenta in genere generalissimo vel sub tali genere, quia sunt minus communia, ut sic substantiae primae dicantur vel ipsae substantiae extra, vel nomina illarum rerum, et secundae substantiae dicantur intentiones vel nomina importantia multas substantias." See also *ibid.*, p. 152.

⁵¹ See Ockham's arguments against universals *ibid.*, pp. 164ff.

5, 2a11–19. Burley's own interpretation of the distinction between primary and secondary substances is clearly ontological. By distinguishing between primary and secondary substances, Aristotle introduces a classification of two kinds of real items existing in the world: individual and universal substances. What Aristotle is talking about is not a distinction between things and concepts or between two ways of considering things; he is plainly speaking about the world and its structure.⁵² For this reason, Burley must explain the passage at 3b10–23, where Aristotle says that primary substances signify something particular (*a hoc aliquid*) whereas secondary substances signify something qualified (*a quale quid*). The reference to primary and secondary substances as signifying something was easy to explain for those who maintained that the distinction was not between two kinds of things but two kinds of names or concepts: things do not signify, names and concepts do. By contrast, Burley has to give some account of this passage, which seems to run counter to his ontological interpretation of the distinction between primary and secondary substances. Quite simply, he explains that Aristotle's reference to primary and secondary substances as signifying something must be taken as the shortening for "names of primary and secondary substances": it is the name of a primary substance that signifies something particular, i.e., a primary substance, and the name of a secondary substance that signifies something qualified, i.e., a secondary substance. Both primary and secondary substances, however, are items of the world and as such they signify nothing but are just what they are:

It must be understood that when it is said "a primary substance signifies something determinate," by 'primary substance' the Philosopher understands the name of a primary substance. Therefore, the name of a primary substance signifies something particular, and a primary substance is something particular. Similarly, when it is said that a secondary substance signifies something qualified, by 'secondary substance' the Philosopher means the name of a secondary substance. It must be understood that by 'something particular' the Philosopher means a singular, namely, something numerically one that is not predicable of several things. Hence to signify something particular is the same as to signify something particular and manifest, such as a singular manifest to the senses. But 'something qualified' is the same as 'common'; and to signify something qualified is the same as to signify something common [...]. Therefore, 'man' and 'animal' and such names of secondary substances signify something qualified, because they signify something common. But

⁵² Walter Burley, *Exp. super Praed.*, f. 18ra.

they do not signify something particular, because they do not signify a certain determinate individual.⁵³

Some fifty years afterwards, Robert Alyngton gives a particularly striking rendering of the realistic interpretation of the distinction between primary and secondary substances. A secondary substance is a common form, i.e., a real item in the world. For example, humanity is a real form common to all men. It is the existence of such common forms in the world that explains why we can attribute the predicate man to all individual men in our predications. The nominalistic view that the community on which our predications are based merely consists in our attributing the same predicate to many individuals is plainly wrong, as is the view that secondary substances are not common forms in the world but terms or concepts:

Subsequently, he [*scil.*, Aristotle] describes secondary substance—which some call ‘substantial common term’; but we maintain that it is a common form. He says that secondary substances are said to be the species in which primary substances are as subjective parts or as things that are by themselves under them, such as a certain man is in the species of man and the genus of man is an animal. Therefore, these species and their genera—such as the common form humanity, which Porphyry calls ‘common man’, and the general form animality—are secondary substances. For just as all men have in common their being men, so in all of them there is the same human nature or the same human species or the same humanity in common—which is to say the same. And such a thing is called ‘secondary substance’. For such a specific commonality is not grounded merely on a common term or on its predicability, because even when there is no common term such a specific commonality in human nature is not less strong. Therefore the human species is not a term or a concept.⁵⁴

⁵³ Ibid., ff. 25vb–26ra, quoted in Conti, “Ontology,” p. 156: “Intelligendum quod, cum dicitur ‘prima substantia significat hoc aliquid’, per ‘primam substantiam’ intelligit Philosophus nomen primae substantiae. Nomen ergo primae substantiae significat hoc aliquid, et prima substantia est hoc aliquid. Similiter, cum dicitur quod secunda substantia significat quale quid, per ‘secundam substantiam’ intelligit nomen secundae substantiae. Intelligendum est quod per ‘hoc aliquid’ intelligit Philosophus singulare sive unum numero non praedicabile de pluribus. Unde significare hoc aliquid est significare hoc aliquid demonstratum, cuiusmodi est singulare demonstratum ad sensum. Sed quale quid idem est quod commune; et significare quale est significare commune aliquid [...]. Ideo ‘homo’ et ‘animal’ et huiusmodi nomina secundarum substantiarum significant quale quid, quia significant quid commune. Sed non significant hoc aliquid, quia non significant aliquod unum individuum determinatum.”

⁵⁴ Robert Alyngton, *Litt. sent. super Praed.*, ed. Conti, p. 267: “Consequenter describit

What is the conclusion of this brief review of some readings of the distinction between primary and secondary substances in *Categories* 5, 2a11–19? At first sight, the moral could be depressing: Aristotle can be bent to any interpretation, no matter how far it is from the original sense of his words. What matters is not so much what Aristotle actually said but the philosophical presuppositions of his interpreters. This is not the only possible conclusion, however. A much more interesting possibility is to consider the vitality of Aristotle's text. So fundamental are the problems raised by Aristotle (such as the distinction between universals and particulars) that philosophers have never ceased to devise new solutions to the old problems. It must be credited to the vitality and originality of Aristotelianism that each of these solutions has a legitimate claim to reconstitute the sense of Aristotle's own words. If we take into account that the *Categories* was considered as a logical work and that the conception of logic changed all along the thirteenth and fourteenth century, the various readings of *Cat.* 5 appear not as mere distortions of Aristotle's words but as intelligible and philosophically interesting possibilities of developing his ideas in different directions. By now it should also be clear how important it is to consider the place and role that each thinker gave to the *Categories* in order to assess his own interpretation of the philosophical arguments contained in that work.

Conclusion

In this paper, I have been considering the way Aristotle's *Categories* was interpreted as the first work of the *Organon* until the end of the fourteenth century. A fact has clearly emerged: the longevity of the

substantiam secundam quam aliqui vocant terminum communem substantialem, sed nos dicimus eam formam communem, dicens «substantiae secundae dicuntur species quibus substantiae primae insunt tamquam partes subiectivae aut per se inferiora, ut aliquis homo est in specie hominis et genus hominis est animal». Hae ergo species et talium specierum genera, cuius modi sunt forma communis, quae est humanitas, quam Porphyrius vocat 'hominem communem', et forma generalis, quae est animalitas, sunt substantiae secundae. Sicut enim omnes homines in hoc conveniunt quod sunt homines, sic est eadem natura humana, vel eadem species humana, aut eadem humanitas in communi—quod idem est—in omnibus illis; et illa vocatur "substantia secunda." Non enim est talis convenientia specifica fundata solum in termino communi vel in eius praedicabilitate, cum nullo existente tali termino non eo minus forte talis convenientia in natura humana; non ergo species humana est terminus vel intentio."

idea that the *Categories* is devoted to the study of simple items and that as such it is the first part of a sequence whose other elements are the *De interpretatione* (devoted to the study of propositions made of terms) and the *Prior Analytics* (devoted to the study of syllogisms made out of propositions). This conception was completely extraneous to Aristotle's original intentions. Its origins are to be traced to the Neoplatonic circles between the third and fifth century A.D. or perhaps even earlier to a Stoic influence on Hellenistic Aristotelianism. It is remarkable how much this idea influenced the interpretation of Aristotle's *Categories* both in Antiquity and in the Middle Ages. The conception of the nature of logic changed but the idea that the *Categories* is a logical treatise devoted to the study of simple items survived all these changes and was adapted each time to a new conception of logic. So when logic was seen as the study of arguments expressed in linguistic forms, the *Categories* was interpreted as the study of simple linguistic terms aimed at the study of syllogism. When logic was seen as the study of the relationships holding among concepts (i.e., the so-called second intentions), the *Categories* was read as a treatise devoted to simple concepts out of which mental propositions and mental arguments are made. The conception of the *Categories* as the first treatise of the *Organon* devoted to simple items even survived the contraposition between nominalists and realists in the fourteenth century: nominalists thought that the simple items were mental terms, realists thought that they were simple extramental things.

As a consequence, the *Categories* uninterruptedly occupied the opening position in Aristotle's corpus. Since this editorial ordering reflected a didactic scheme, the *Categories*, together with its companion work, Porphyry's *Introduction*, was also the first treatise that students of philosophy read for several centuries. Accordingly, its influence on the molding of the Western philosophical worldview was overwhelming. This influence did not cease after the fourteenth century. As a matter of fact, it extended well into the modern era. The idea that logic is divided into a part devoted to simple terms, another one devoted to propositions and a third one devoted to arguments, which lies behind works so diverse as Peter of Spain's *Summulae logicales*⁵⁵ and Ockham's *Summa logicae*, survived even the sinking of Aristotelian logic, although that idea was originally

⁵⁵ On the structure of Peter of Spain's *Summulae logicales* and specifically on the presence of a section devoted to *Categories*, see L. M. de Rijk, "Introduction," in Peter of Spain, *Tractatus called afterwards Summulae logicales*, ed. L. M. de Rijk (Assen, 1972), p. XCII.

devised to give a systematic form to the Aristotelian corpus. The same schema is still clearly detectable in the layout of the first part of John Stuart Mill's *System of logic*, published in 1843.⁵⁶ To summarize, I tried to show that the idea that the *Categories* should be read as a work of logic and as the first part of a longer sequence according to which logic was organized had important consequences even from a purely philosophical point of view, as the example of the different interpretations of the distinction between primary and secondary substances between the thirteenth and fourteenth century should have made clear.

⁵⁶ John Stuart Mill, *A System of Logic: Ratiocinative and Inductive*, eds. J. M. Robson – R. F. MacRae in *Collected Works* VII–VIII (Toronto, 1973).

SIMON OF FAVERSHAM ON ARISTOTLE'S *CATEGORIES* AND THE *SCIENTIA PRAEDICAMENTORUM*

Martin Pickavé

I.

The question of whether Aristotle's short treatise on the so-called categories is about words or concepts or things—or in other words, whether the *Categories* belongs to logic (or even grammar) rather than to metaphysics—is a notorious one in the history of philosophy. Later medieval authors inherit the relevant debate from the ancient commentators on Aristotle's *Categories*, but their answers often differ from that of their predecessors in at least two fundamental respects: (1) Later medieval philosophers (from the 13th century onwards) are typically more inclined towards a realist understanding of the categories; for the most part they accept the idea of ten kinds of being. And although not all of them have a realist understanding of the subject-matter of the *Categories* itself, they regard the treatise as a work in which Aristotle addresses these ten kinds of being from a logical point of view.¹ (2) Later medieval authors tend to broaden the problem of the scientific status of the *Categories* insofar as they not only discuss whether the *Categories* belongs to this or that area of knowledge, but whether the doctrine described in this work can count as knowledge at all.²

¹ For a brief survey of the different ways of interpreting the *Categories* cf. Giorgio Pini, *Categories and Logic in Duns Scotus: an Interpretation of Aristotle's Categories in the Late Thirteenth Century* (Leiden, 2002), pp. 6–13; Sten Ebbesen, “Les Catégories au moyen âge et au début de la modernité,” in Otto Bruun/Lorenzo Corti, eds. *Les Catégories et leur histoire* (Paris, 2005), pp. 245–274, esp. pp. 257sqq.

² Many later medieval commentaries on the *Categories* start with questions like *Utrum de praedicamentis possit esse scientia, utrum scientia praedicamentorum sit una scientia*, etc. Cf. for instance, Peter of Auvergne, *Quaestiones super Praedicamentis*, ed. Robert Andrews, *Cahiers de l'Institut du moyen-âge grec et latin [= CIMA GL]* 55 (1987), 3–84, qq. 1–3; Anonymus Matritensis, *Quaestiones super librum Praedicamentorum*, ed. Robert Andrews, *CIMA GL* 56 (1988), 117–192, qq. 1–3; Thomas Sutton, *Expositio super Praedicamentis*, ed. Alessandro D. Conti, in Paul Osmund Lewry, ed. *The Rise of British Logic* (Toronto, 1985), pp. 173–213, prologus. Their late ancient predecessors, for example Simplicius, do of course undertake with great pains to determine the *skopos* of the *Categories*, but they

Simon of Faversham (before 1260–1306), one of the most prolific English commentators on Aristotle at the end of the 13th century, is a good example of this combination of a realist approach and of an approach that focuses on the status of our knowledge of the categories. His conception of the categories will be at the focus of this paper because it helps to understand to what extent, according to some medieval philosophers, the categories are located right at the intersection between logic and metaphysics and why the question regarding the proper scientific place of the categories (i.e., whether they properly belong to logic or to metaphysics) is not just a question which can simply be answered in one or the other direction. I chose Simon as the primary object of my paper because his commentary on the *Categories* and his other related texts are original in the way in which they synthesize different influences and because they provide an interesting example of a doctrine of the categories from around 1280, i.e., the years before Scotus's masterly commentary and before the appearance of more nominalist accounts of the categories.

The paper will begin with a discussion of Simon's general understanding of logic and its scientific status. We shall then move on to Simon's treatment of the scientific character of the doctrine developed in Aristotle's *Categories*. Like medieval commentators on Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, he asks in particular how scientific knowledge (*scientia*) of the categories (or predicaments, to use the medieval term) is able to match the general requirements for knowledge set out in the *Posterior Analytics*: What is the subject-matter of such a piece of knowledge and what are the subject's parts, properties and causes? Simon's answers will provide us with a better understanding of what he means by 'category' or 'predicament' (*praedicamentum*). We will then focus on a related problem, namely, Simon's contention that predicaments are composed of a *res praedicamenti* and a *ratio praedicamenti*. How are we to understand this theory and what role does it play? The final section of this article is devoted to answer the central question regarding the relationship between logic and metaphysics as far as the categories are concerned.

One of my aims in this article is thus expository. Somewhat undeservedly Simon's teaching on the categories is almost unknown to modern

do not discuss how the *Categories* relates to the account of knowledge provided in the *Posterior Analytics*.

historians of philosophy. I hope to show that his *Categories* commentary, like many other commentaries of the same period, is philosophically intriguing and worth studying.³ Unfortunately, though, my paper has to be limited to those commentaries that have been edited up to now. I am convinced that a study of the many commentaries that are yet unavailable in print would confirm the philosophical importance of this genre of texts.⁴ My other aim is explanatory. I want to examine what kind of knowledge we can expect, according to some 13th-century philosophers, when we pursue knowledge of the categories, the most general kinds of things that surround us in life. This examination will help to clarify the relationship between logic and metaphysics, between two disciplines which deal with the same subject-matter, namely, everything there is.

II.

There can hardly be any doubt that Simon of Faversham considers Aristotle's *Categories* as a work of logic. Logic is a 'rational science' (*rationalis scientia*) not just because every disposition of the rational soul is by definition rational or because logic proceeds (like any other sort of knowledge) according to reason, but—and here Simon follows a long tradition—because logic has to do with the different operations of reason (*ratio*). The rational powers of human beings are characterized by discursivity, as everyone can experience. We rarely experience moments in which we fully grasp an item of knowledge or belief intuitively, and although this might happen in the case of some items of knowledge (e.g., analytical truths), we normally reason by moving from one bit of knowledge or belief to another. However, there are, so Simon contends, different operations "according to which reason

³ For an overview of some of these commentaries cf. Robert Andrews, "Question Commentaries on the *Categories* in the Thirteenth Century," *Medioevo* 26 (2001), 265–326. Simon's teaching on the categories gets incidentally discussed in general articles on the categories in the middle ages and, most importantly, in a series of works by Giorgio Pini (on John Duns Scotus) but to date there is no study that is mainly devoted to Simon. The most relevant studies by Pini are: *Categories and Logic in Duns Scotus*, and "Scotus's Realist Conception of the Categories: His Legacy to Late Medieval Debates," *Vivarium* 43 (2005), 63–110. The interpretation proposed in this article is very much indebted to Pini's pioneering work.

⁴ Some information about those commentaries that are yet unedited can be gathered from Andrews, "Question Commentaries on the *Categories*."

proceeds...in moving from one thing to another.”⁵ Each of the various acts of reason is treated in one corresponding part of logic, a fact that also explains why Aristotle left us a whole series of logical works: works on rhetorical reasoning (*Rhetoric*) as well as on poetical (*Poetics*), dialectical (*Topics*), sophistical (*Sophistical Refutations*), demonstrative reasoning (*Posterior Analytics*) and on reasoning *tout court* (*Prior Analytics*).⁶ But as already granted there are also other acts of reason in which we are not (or less) discursively “moving from one thing to another.” There is one operation of reason by which reason grasps the simple quiddity of a given thing or object and another by which reason combines simple quiddities in an affirmative or negative proposition. Aristotle’s *Categories* and his treatise *On Interpretation* are about these two remaining operations, which are the basis of all the other discursive rational acts.⁷

If logic has to do with acts of reason, then it can hardly count as real knowledge in the strict sense. Consequently, medieval philosophers distinguish between *scientiae reales* and *scientiae rationales*. The natural sci-

⁵ Simon of Faversham, *Quaestiones super libro Porphyrii*, prol. in *Magistri Simonis Anglici sive de Faverisham Opera omnia*, vol. 1: *Opera logica*, ed. Pasquale Mazzarella (Padova, 1957), p. 14: “Cum autem logica sit rationalis sciencia, quia est de ipso actu rationis secundum quod ratio diversimode procedit ab uno discurrendo in aliud.” Cf. also *ibid.*, q. 2, p. 19: “Unde non dicitur esse rationalis sciencia quia per rationem procedat, quia sic omnis sciencia esset rationalis; sed dicitur rationalis, quae est de hiis quae sunt causata ab intellectu.” *Quaestiones veteres super libro Elenchorum*, prol., edd. Sten Ebbesen et al. (Toronto, 1984), p. 28: “Unde intelligendum primo quod tota logica est de actu rationis...Secundum igitur diversitatem actuum rationis accipiendae sunt diversae partes logicae...”; cf. *ibid.*, q. 2, p. 32. Please note that throughout this article I do not necessarily respect the punctuation of the editions I use. Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *Expositio libri Posteriorum*, book I, lect. 1, ed. Leonina, vol. I* 2 (Rome, 1989), p. 3sq: “Et hec ars est logica, id est rationalis, sciencia. Quae non solum rationalis est ex hoc quod est secundum rationem, quod est omnibus artibus commune, set ex hoc quod est circa ipsum actum rationis sicut circa propriam materiam...Oportet igitur logice partes accipere secundum diversitatem actuum rationis.” For Aquinas’s conception of logic cf. Robert W. Schmidt, *The Domain of Logic According to Saint Thomas Aquinas* (The Hague, 1966), esp. pp. 49sq.; for Simon of Faversham, cf. also Costantino Marmo, “*Suspicio*: A Key Word to the Significance of Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* in Thirteenth Century Scholasticism,” *CIMAGL* 60 (1990), 145–198, esp. pp. 170–175.

⁶ Simon of Faversham, *Quaest. super lib. Porph.*, prol., p. 14.

⁷ Cf. *Quaest. super lib. Porph.*, prol., p. 14sq.: “Quando autem ratio non procedit discurrendo ab uno in aliud, sed absolute accipit simplicem quidditatem rei, considerando ipsam ut est ordinabilis in genere secundum sub et supra, et de tali actu rationis est liber Predicamentorum, cuius subiectum est ens dicibile incomplexum ordinabile in genere. Quandoque autem ratio simplicia comprehensa ad invicem componit vel dividit, et de tali actu rationis est liber peryhermeneias, cuius subiectum est enunciatio affirmativa vel negativa.” Cf. *id.*, *Quaest. vet. super lib. Elench.*, prol., p. 28.

ences and metaphysics are examples of the first group since they deal with real extra-mental objects; rational ‘sciences’ only deal with something in the mind. Simon adopts this distinction,⁸ yet he also seems to radicalize it. For there is a sense in which logic is not real knowledge because it is not really knowledge at all! Knowledge (*scientia*) is a type of intellectual cognition⁹ and as such it must be related to the object of the intellect. Yet the primary objects of the human intellect, Simon explains, are “things that really exist outside the soul.” Nothing inside the intellect can therefore be the object of the intellect. According to Simon (who quotes Aristotle in support), acts of the intellect are only perceived insofar as something external is perceived. There is no self-cognition prior to the cognition of some external object. Logic cannot, therefore, be knowledge because its objects do not straightforwardly fall under the object of the intellect. So Simon concludes, logic can only be called knowledge (*scientia*) if we allow for a less rigid use of the label ‘knowledge’.¹⁰

At this point, however, someone might raise an obvious objection: Even if acts of the intellect exist in the intellect they are nevertheless real things in a strict sense because they are real qualities inhering in the soul. There seems to be no reason for regarding mental states as having a diminished degree of being. Moreover, my intellectual acts may not be something outside of my soul, yet other persons’ acts are (outside of my soul). From this perspective it looks as if there could, at least in principle, be knowledge in the proper sense of the objects of logic. Since even logic seems to be about things that fall under the object of the intellect. Although Simon himself does not address this objection, there can be no doubt about his reply: Intellectual acts or

⁸ Cf. *Quaest. vet. super lib. Elench.*, q. 2, p. 32.

⁹ Cf. *Quaest. super lib. Porph.*, q. 2, p. 19: “Sciencia quedam cognitio intellectualis est”; *Quaestiones super libro Praedicamentorum*, q. 1, ed. Pasquale Mazzarella in *Magistri Simonis Anglici... Opera omnia* I, p. 72.

¹⁰ *Quaest. vet. super lib. Elench.*, q. 2, p. 31: “Scientia enim proprie est de hiis quae possunt esse obiectum intellectus; talia autem sunt res verae existentes extra animam. Cum vero intellectus intelligat alia <et> intelligendo alia intelligit se, ut potest haberi ex III *De Anima* [III 4, 429b9], nihil quod est in intellectu poterit esse obiectum intellectus. Cum igitur intentiones non sunt vera res, non poterunt esse proprium obiectum intellectus. Et ideo sophistica... est modus sciendi et non scientia... Extendendo tamen nomen scientiae, scientia est.” Although Simon develops these ideas in answering the question of whether the discipline described in the *Sophistical Refutations* can be a science, it is obvious that these thoughts apply to logic as a whole.

other states of the mind are indeed real existing qualities of the mind. Yet, insofar as they are representative, i.e., insofar as they are intentional states of the mind, they are mind- or soul-dependent in a particular way and not just insofar as they inhere in the cognizing faculty as in a subject. In this sense intellectual acts and their content are not just simple extra-mental objects like this lamp in front of me, this tree outside my window, or this color of the wall in my room. A characteristic feature of cognitive acts is that they are intentional; they produce or express what Simon and other medieval thinkers call 'intentions' (*intentiones*) and these intentions are different in kind from any other form of extra-mental existence. They cannot simply be reduced to extra-mental objects.¹¹ Moreover, that acts of reason are linked to the production of intentions explains why Simon sees no difficulty in saying both that logic has to do with the operations of reason and that it deals with intentions. Both descriptions mean the same insofar as every act of reason involves the production of intentions.

But if logic is just a *scientia rationalis* and not about objects of our extra-mental world, does this not mean that logic is just about inventions of the mind? Is logic fiction and completely arbitrary? Of course Simon denies this conclusion. The human intellect is fundamentally receptive, i.e., it is normally determined by its objects. The acts of the intellect must therefore be taken as to follow the objects and to be grounded in them. When logic studies the acts of the intellect it considers products of the mind that are nevertheless not wholly independent of the extra-mental world (even though the intentions that are produced in the mind are completely external to the objects themselves). Simon even goes so far as to say that the intentions the logician examines are attributed by the intellect to its objects because of certain properties of these objects. In Simon's understanding, these intentions are some sort of second order properties of the extra-mental objects themselves. "The whole of logic is thus taken from the properties of the objects."¹²

¹¹ For Simon's definition of 'intention' or more precisely 'first' and 'second intentions' cf. his *Notulae super Summulas Petri Hispani*, ed. Lambert Marie de Rijk, *Vivarium* 6 (1968), 69–101, esp. p. 94.

¹² *Quaest. super lib. Porph.*, q. 1, p. 17: "Logica considerat intenciones, quas intellectus fundat in rebus et <que> sunt extranee rei"; *ibid.*, q. 2, p. 19: "Cum autem intellectus causat tales intenciones, et movetur ab apparentibus in re; et propter hoc intellectus diversas intenciones logicales attribuit diversis rebus propter diversas proprietates. Unde logicus non diceret hanc esse veram, Homo est genus, sed hanc, Homo est species. Ideo tota logica accipitur a proprietatibus rerum, quia aliter logica esset

But despite these last claims about logic's foundation in extra-mental objects, logic does not deal with these objects in any direct way. The logician, Simon emphasizes, "does not consider the nature of things but only intentions. Or if the logician were to consider extra-mental things, then [he does so] only insofar as they are related to intentions."¹³ This seems to settle the question of the scientific status of the categories: as a part of logic, namely, that part of logic that is related to the first act of the intellect, the kind of knowledge described in the *Categories* considers primarily intentions. If the *Categories* contains a metaphysical doctrine, then it does so only incidentally.

III.

In the first question of his commentary on the *Categories*, Simon explicitly addresses the problem of whether the doctrine laid out in the *Categories* qualifies as proper knowledge (*scientia*). From the point of view of his general ideas about logic we expect him to give a negative or, at least, a qualified answer. Moreover, to know something means to have a clear grasp of it and a grasp of why it is this or that. Proper knowledge entails knowledge of causes. Someone who knows that x is y can say why x is y, otherwise we can, strictly speaking, only attribute to her the belief that x is y. But what could count as the causes of the categories or predicaments? This line of reasoning leads, for instance, Peter of Auvergne to conclude that there cannot be—in the strict sense—any knowledge of the categories. When we speak of a *scientia praedicamentorum* we use *scientia* merely as an expression signifying a cognition that is certain (*certa cognitio*), but not as referring to (proper) knowledge through causes.¹⁴

figmentum intellectus, quod non dicimus." For a more detailed discussion of Simon's views about intentions cf. Pini, *Categories and Logic in Duns Scotus*, pp. 72–80.

¹³ Ibid., q. 2, p. 19: "Logicus secundum quod logicus non considerat de naturis rerum, sed intenciones solas; vel si res consideret, hoc solum est ut sub intencionibus sunt." *Quaest. super lib. Praed.*, q. 23, p. 98: "...cum logicus non consideret essentias rerum..."

¹⁴ Peter of Auvergne, *Quaestiones super Praedicamentis*, qq. 1+2, p. 10: "Nihilominus tamen potest esse scientia de aliquo, quae idem est quod certa cognitio ipsius, et haec datur per definitiones et descriptiones; et hoc modo potest esse scientia de praedicamentis; cognoscuntur enim per quasdam definitiones et descriptiones. Et cum non habeatur de praedicamentis scientia per causam, cum ipsa non habeant causam, tamen isto modo per definitiones et descriptiones potest de hiis esse scientia."

However, Simon's evaluation of the scientific status of such a *scientia* is quite positive: He unambiguously affirms that there can be proper knowledge of the predicaments (*scientia de praedicamentis*). Simon lays out three criteria any piece of cognition has to fulfill in order to count as proper knowledge (*scientia*) and he then goes on to show that knowledge of the predicaments satisfies all of them. Simon does not inform his reader of whether he thinks this list of criteria is exhaustive, but there seems to be a progress from more general criteria to more specific ones. The first criterion for knowledge proper demands that (1) knowledge has to be about something that exists, i.e., something that is a being (*ens*). We cannot positively know anything of what is non-existent. Knowledge, he explains, can only be had of something we grasp intellectually. Yet, if there is nothing to be grasped, there can be no knowledge.¹⁵ (2) Knowledge is necessarily of something intelligible. This criterion is derived from the fact that knowledge is an intellectual habit and a kind of perfection of the intellect. But only what is accessible to the intellect can be involved in causing such a habit or perfection.¹⁶ (3) The object of knowledge has to have parts and properties. Properties are what we know of the object or what we pursue or try to demonstrate when we acquire knowledge of a given object. Arithmetical knowledge, for instance, is about the properties and features of numbers. Without properties there would simply be nothing left to know. It is less obvious why the object of knowledge is supposed to have parts. Simon explains this requirement by pointing to definitions. The pursuit of knowledge aims at definitions. Only if I really know what x is, am I able to give a definition of x; and only if I am able to give a definition of x do I really know what x is. A definition, however, is composed out of parts, for instance, a genus and a difference. But it is not instantly clear why it follows that the objects of knowledge have to have parts too. Simon provides his readers with no further argument for this conclusion. He

¹⁵ Simon of Faversham, *Quaest. super lib. Praed.*, q. 1, p. 71sq.: "Ad hoc enim quod de aliquo possit esse scientia tria requiruntur, scilicet quod ipsum sit ens et quod ipsum sit intelligibile et quod habet partes constituentes ipsum, proprietates et passiones que possunt probari de hoc. Quod oporteat ipsum esse ens apparet, quia quod non est non contingit scire; et ratio huius est quia nihil scitur nisi quod intelligitur; omne autem quod intelligitur est ens; et ideo quod quid scitur necesse est esse ens; et ideo bene dixit Philosophus quod non est non contingit scire."

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 72: "Item quod oporteat illud de quo est scientia esse intelligibile, patet quia scientia habitus quidam intellectualis est; est enim perfectio intellectus; et ideo scibile oportet esse intelligibile; et ideo illud de quo est scientia oportet esse intelligibile."

might have had in mind that a satisfactory definition requires that the definition corresponds to the thing to be defined. Thus, the parts mentioned in the definition have to be real or at least conceptual parts (*partes rationis*) of the thing to be defined.¹⁷ Yet, this seems to contradict what he says on other occasions where he explicitly holds that a definition is not an aggregation of things but merely of concepts.¹⁸

Whatever we make of this last problem, it is obvious for Simon that the *scientia de praedicamentis* fits all three criteria. Such a knowledge is (1) about something that exists or, to be more precise, something that exists outside the mind. According to Simon, the ten categories or predicaments really exist outside the mind; they do not just exist because of the mind.¹⁹ Naturally, this kind of knowledge is (2) also about something intelligible. For the intellect assigns genera and species to all the ten predicaments. That is, there are genera and species of substances (e.g., animal, human being), qualities (e.g., color, whiteness) and of all the remaining predicaments. But the intellect can only assign intentions such as ‘genus’ and ‘species’ to the predicaments if the predicaments themselves are accessible for it. Or in Simon’s more technical language: everything in which the intellect can ground the intentions ‘genus’ and ‘species’ must be intelligible to the intellect.²⁰ Last but not least, (3) the

¹⁷ Ibid.: “Item oportet quod tale habeat partes constituentes ipsum. Illud enim quod scitur oportet quod sciatur per diffinitionem; diffinitio autem est sermo habens partes...; et ideo illud quod scitur oportet quod habeat partes rei vel partes rationis (quod dico propter intelligentiam). Item oportet quod illud de quo debet esse scientia habeat proprietates et passiones demonstrabiles de ipso, si ipsum per demonstrationem sciatur.” In stipulating that the object of knowledge has to have properties and parts Simon is basically following Aristotle. Cf. *Analytica Posteriora* I 10 (76b11–16) and I 28 (87a38–39). For the medieval understanding of these passages cf. Albert Zimmermann, *Ontologie oder Metaphysik? Diskussionen über den Gegenstand der Metaphysik im 13. und 14. Jahrhundert: Texte und Untersuchungen*, 2nd ed. (Leuven, 1998), pp. 130sqq.

¹⁸ *Quaest. super lib. Porph.*, q. 21, p. 41: “...in diffinitione non est aggregatio plurium rerum, sed plurium intellectuum...”

¹⁹ *Quaest. super lib. Praed.*, q. 1, p. 72: “Nunc autem quodlibet predicamentum est ens, non quidem ens in anima, sed verum ens extra animam. Dicit enim Philosophus quinto [sic] *Metaphysice* [VI 2, 1026a33] quod ens verum extra animam est quod dividitur in decem figuras predicamentorum. Voco autem illud ens verum extra animam, cuius esse non ab anima dependet; illa autem voco encia per animam, quorum esse ab anima dependet, cuiusmodi sunt intentiones logice, sicut genus, species et talia.”

²⁰ Ibid.: “Item quodlibet eorum quod ponitur in predicamento est aliquid intelligibile; et huius probatio est quia genera et species solum ponuntur in predicamento; illa ergo que ponuntur in predicamento oportet esse talia quod supra ipsa intellectus fundet intencionem generis et speciei. Ex hoc arguo: omne illud supra quod intellectus fundat intencionem generis et speciei est intelligibile ab intellectu; intellectus enim in nulla re fundat intencionem generis et speciei nisi cum est in actu; sed singulum eorum que

predicaments have properties and parts. Simon does not provide his reader with examples of such properties, he just broadly refers to the examples Aristotle gives in the *Categories*. There, Aristotle mentions, for instance, the property ‘not to have contraries’ and the property ‘not to be in a subject’ as characteristic properties of substances.²¹ Finally predicaments have parts for they are composed, according to Simon, of two elements: a “predicamental thing” (*res predicamenti*) and a mode of being (to which he also refers to as *ratio predicamenti*). For example, an accident is a ‘thing’, to which the mode of being ‘to be in something else’ (as a subject) is added, whereas a substance is a ‘thing’ with the superadded mode of being ‘to be not in something else’ (as a subject).²²

Before we have a closer look at Simon’s three criteria for proper knowledge, we should first try to get a clear idea of what Simon means with the term ‘predicament’. This is of course crucial for our understanding of what a *scientia de praedicamentis* really is about. *Praedicamentum*, however, is a notoriously ambiguous term.²³ In his description of the first criterion, Simon insists that “every predicament is a being, not however a being in the soul, but a real being outside the soul.”²⁴ One way to understand this statement is to take him as speaking about the members or tokens of classes of beings. These singular things exist indeed outside the soul. But we can also understand Simon here as making a claim about the classes, or better, types or modes of beings. According to this sense he would emphasize that each of these types or modes of beings is real, they are not just an invention of the soul or the mind. It is obvious that Simon’s remark cannot be about classes (genera) of *predicates* (or predications). Predicates or predications always presuppose an activity of the mind and the properties of *praedicamenta* that, according to Simon, are known in a *scientia de praedicamentis* (e.g.,

ponuntur in predicamento est tale quod supra ipsum intellectus fundat intencionem generis et speciei.”

²¹ Ibid., p. 72sq.: “Quod habeant proprietates manifestum est ex processu Philosophi. Dat enim proprietates substantie, quantitatis et aliorum.” For properties of substances, for instance, cf. *Categoriae* 5 (3a7sq.). Cf. also Simon’s discussion of the properties of substance in *Quaest. super lib. Praed.*, q. 10, p. 79sq.

²² Ibid., p. 73: “Iterum quodlibet predicamentum habet partes constituentes ipsum: quodlibet predicamentum constituitur ex duobus, scilicet ex re et ex modo essendi sibi superaddito. Unde res cui competit talis modus essendi, qui est esse non in alio, est substantia; res autem cui competit iste modus essendi, qui est esse in alio, est accidens... Sic igitur de predicamentis potest esse scientia.”

²³ Cf. the illuminating remarks in Pini, *Categories and Logic in Duns Scotus*, pp. 14–16.

²⁴ Cf. supra fin. 19.

‘not to be in a subject’ or ‘not to have contraries’) are not properties of classes of predicates (or predications). The *scientia de praedicamentis* cannot, therefore, be about concepts or other items that require a productive role of the mind. However, the description of the second criterion makes it clear, I think, that what Simon has primarily in mind when he talks about *praedicamenta* are types or modes of beings (and not particular categorical beings). For what sense could it make to say about the tokens of a class of beings that genera and species are “only posited” *in* each of those?²⁵ But it makes perfect sense to understand him stating that genera and species are “only posited” *in* the ten different types or modes of beings, i.e., that they apply only to them.

But if the focal meaning of *praedicamentum* is something like ‘type of beings’, why are these types of beings referred to by an expression that is so obviously derived from the purely mental act of predicating? Simon’s answer is very sketchy but he seems to subscribe to the one given by Thomas Aquinas: He assumes that there is an intimate relationship between the modes of being (*modi essendi*), the modes of predicating (*modi praedicandi*), and the modes of signifying (*modi significandi*). Language mirrors reality, so there should be no surprise that the ten fundamental modes of being are reflected in ten distinct modes in which *x* can be said to be *y*. Because of this relationship and because of the fact that our encounter with reality and its foundations happens through language, the fundamental types of being are first known to us by means of knowing the modes of predication. This is the reason why we refer to these ten types of being as the ten predicaments, although the different ways of predication are strictly speaking derived from and ontologically later than the modes of being.²⁶

²⁵ Cf. supra fn. 20.

²⁶ Cf. Simon of Faversham, *Quaest. super lib. Praed.*, q. 12, p. 85: “Predicamenta enim distinguuntur penes modos essendi, quia distinguuntur penes modos predicandi; propter hoc enim distinguitur substantia ab aliis. Sed modi predicandi sumuntur a modis essendi sicut modi significandi; et propter hoc predicamenta distinguuntur penes modos essendi et non penes quoscumque modos essendi, sed penes tales modos essendi qui in nullo communicant.” Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *In V Metaph.*, lect. 9, edd. M.-R. Cathala/R. M. Spiazzi (Turin, 1950), p. 238, n. 890: “Unde oportet quod ens contrahatur ad diversa genera secundum diversum modum praedicandi, qui consequitur diversum modum essendi; quia quoties ens dicitur, idest quot modis aliquid praedicatur, toties esse significatur, idest tot modis significatur aliquid esse. Et propter hoc ea in quae dividitur ens primo dicuntur esse praedicamenta, quia distinguuntur secundum diversum modum praedicandi.”

This last remark also leads us to the solution of another puzzle. As we have just seen, Simon considers the *scientia de praedicamentis* as real knowledge because it has to do with something extra-mental. But if predicaments are types of beings, then what keeps us from saying that they are classes or *genera* of being? Indeed, Simon constantly follows the traditional usage and refers to the different categories as (highest) genera.²⁷ Now, Simon also holds that it is the intellect which causes universality and that in order to avoid Plato's "mistake" we are bound to say that nothing universal exists outside the soul.²⁸ But would positing real genera of being outside the soul not contradict his conviction that nothing that is properly universal exists outside the soul? The reply to this puzzle is clear from Simon's distinction between two kinds of meanings of the term 'universal'. According to the first meaning, 'universal' stands for the *intentio universalitatis*, i.e., that which makes something universal; according to the second meaning, 'universal' signifies that very thing which underlies the *intentio universalitatis* and which is made universal by it.²⁹ Insofar as the *intentio universalitatis* is something that is produced by the mind alone, it cannot exist outside the soul. A universal concept 'dog', a concept of a species, includes an *intentio* that makes it into a species. The concept 'dog' thus does not exist outside the soul. But for a realist like Simon there is of course something extra-mental that corresponds to such a (true) concept, i.e., something like 'dogness'. This is the basis for the intellect's forming a universal concept.³⁰ In itself something like 'dogness', a real property all dogs in the world share, is not a universal. As something on which a universal is founded it might, however, be called a universal too. I take it that Simon has exactly this in mind when he calls substance and other predicaments 'genera'.

²⁷ Cf. e.g., Simon of Faversham, *Quaest. super lib. Praed.*, q. 13, p. 86: "Intelligendum est hic quod substantia est genus primum et est genus unum..."; *ibid.*, q. 33, p. 113: "...quantitas est genus generalissimum et est genus unum..."

²⁸ Cf. *Quaest. super lib. Porph.*, q. 5, p. 26sq.: "Unde non est ponere hominem universalem quia universaliter existat, sed est universale quia universaliter intelligitur circumscribendo omnes condiciones individuantes. Ideo dicit Philosophus quod homo et asinus et que universaliter in singularibus dicuntur non sint encia, sed sint intellecta, quia que sunt encia extra, particularia sunt, unde universalia sunt alia, quia sunt intellecta."

²⁹ Cf. *ibid.*, q. 2, p. 18sq.: "Dicendum est quod universale potest nominari duo, scilicet intencionem universalitatis et rem subiectam intencioni." For Simon's account of universals cf. also *ibid.*, qq. 3, 12, and 20. Cf. also Pini, *Categories and Logic in Duns Scotus*, pp. 75sqq.

³⁰ Cf. *ibid.*, 19: "Nunc autem res subiecta intencioni universalitatis est per se intelligibilis ab intellectu, aliter enim intellectus non fundaret in ea intencionem universalitatis."

Furthermore, when predicaments are referred to as highest genera this simply means that they are irreducible types of being.³¹

However, at this point we are left with yet another puzzle. If for Simon logic is a *scientia rationalis* but the *scientia de praedicamentis* is knowledge in the proper sense, then we seem to be forced to conclude that knowledge of the categories or predicaments is not a part of logic! Applied to Simon's understanding of the works of Aristotle's *Organon* this amounts to saying that the first work of the *Organon* is not a work of logic but of metaphysics. But how then can the different works making up the *Organon* represent the different operations of reason?

IV.

Simon is not the first who came forward with the idea of settling the question of whether there can be a *scientia de praedicamentis* by putting forward a list of criteria. The anonymous author of a *Categories* commentary in ms. Madrid BN 1565 [= Anonymous of Madrid] offers a list that is strikingly similar. He too mentions intelligibility of the object of knowledge and the requirement that the object has to have properties. But the Anonymous of Madrid adds as a third condition that there have to be causes by means of which the properties can be demonstrated to belong to the object.³²

This last condition is obviously a reference to the kind of objection against the scientific status of the *scientia de praedicamentis* that we found expressed by Peter of Auvergne. In light of the Anonymous' position, however, Peter must be regarded as overshooting the mark when he denies that there can be proper knowledge of the predicaments because there are no causes at hand through which we know.³³ The Anonymous answers by putting forward a couple of clarifications. (1) In talking about causes we have to be more precise. What knowledge requires are strictly speaking causes by means of which the properties of the

³¹ For the aspect of irreducibility cf. the quotation *supra* in fn. 27.

³² Anonymus Matritensis, *Quaest. super lib. Praed.*, q. 1, p. 122: "Sciendum quod tria requiruntur ad hoc quod de aliquo sit scientia, et si illa tria habuerit, de illo potest esse scientia. Primum est quod sit intelligibile. Secundum est quod proprias habeat proprietates per se inhaerentes illi, et non per accidens... Tertium est quod habeat causas per quas illae proprietates probantur de illo."

³³ Cf. *supra* fn. 14.

object of knowledge can be demonstrated to inhere in the object.³⁴ Other causes are irrelevant. But why shouldn't it be possible that there are causes which we use in demonstration? Definitions, for example, can play this role. And by means of them we can demonstrate that predicaments have certain properties.³⁵ (2) But even if there were no robust causes, i.e., real causes of the object of knowledge itself: it is simply not true that those are required for knowledge. The Anonymous reminds his readers that there are two kinds of knowledge: *propter quid* knowledge and *quia* knowledge. Only the former is knowledge through real causes. The latter is the kind of knowledge that we have of something through its effects.³⁶ Knowledge that God exists, to use a famous medieval example, is a case of *quia* knowledge. Since God himself has no causes there can be no proper causal explanation of his existence and therefore no *propter quid* knowledge. But it can be demonstrated from God's effects that there has to be a first cause etc. By this line of reasoning we only understand that (*quia*) God exists and not why (*propter quid*) he exists. (3) There is a point of view from which Peter of Auvergne's objection is simply wrong. The predicaments have causes or have at least one cause, namely, God who is the efficient cause of there being something like predicaments. In this sense we might consider *propter quid* knowledge of the predicaments as possible.³⁷ But the Anonymous admits that God is only prior to the predicaments insofar as God is outside the "line of predication" (*linea praedicamentalis*). First, God is not a genus that can account for properties of things and species that fall under it. Second, there is nothing in the "line of predication" that is prior to the predicaments. For the ten predicaments are ten highest genera.³⁸ To sum up, according to the Anonymous, proper

³⁴ Cf. supra fn. 32.

³⁵ Anonymus Matritensis, *Quaest. super lib. Praed.*, q. 1, p. 122: "Habent etiam causas ut definitiones per quas tales proprietates et passiones de ipsis probantur."

³⁶ Ibid., p. 122sq.: "Dicendum est ad hoc quod duplex est scientia, scilicet propter quid et quia, ut habetur primo *Posteriorum* [I 13, 78a22–23]. Scientia propter quid procedit per causam; scientia quia per effectum. Et ideo absque hoc quod generalissimum non haberet causam, non sequeretur propter hoc quod de ipso non possit esse scientia saltem quia, per effectum."

³⁷ Ibid., p. 123: "Ergo [*lege etiam?*] de praedicamentis potest esse scientia propter quid, quia habent causam saltem effectivam, ut quoniam deus est causa efficiens omnium et non est in aliquo praedicamento... Et sic de ipsis poterit esse scientia propter quid." This hypothetical idea is however already mentioned by Peter of Auvergne himself: cf. *Quaest. super praed.*, qq. 1+2, p. 10.

³⁸ Anonymus Matritensis, *Quaest. super lib. Praed.*, q. 1, p. 123: "Modo quamvis [enim] praedicamenta non habeant aliqua priora in linea praedicamentali, tamen habent aliqua priora quae non sunt in linea praedicamentali."

knowledge of the categories is possible. There are causes; maybe not causes that are absolutely prior to the object of knowledge, but causes that are prior for us (i.e., for us rational beings) and known prior. This is enough for the *scientia predicamentorum* to qualify as knowledge³⁹ and not just as certain cognition.

If we compare the Anonymous of Madrid to Simon of Faversham we are tempted to say that Simon deliberately drops the requirement for causes from his list of criteria for knowledge. But Simon does not ignore this requirement. In the rest of the question, in which he provides the list, he deals extensively with it and he gives a reply to Peter's objection that looks very similar to that of the Anonymous. Knowledge, Simon begins, is a habit acquired through demonstration and since there are two kinds of demonstration there are consequently two kinds of knowledge. All demonstration proceeds from what is prior and what is better known to what is posterior and less known; but since there are things that are by nature prior and better known and things that are, on the opposite, prior to us and better known for us, we get two kinds of demonstrations, which Simon, with their traditional names, calls demonstrations from causes and demonstrations from effects.⁴⁰ Thus far, Simon is very much in accord with the Anonymous. He seems to agree that there is proper knowledge, although not *propter quid* knowledge, of the predicaments. But Simon also partially consents to Peter's view. If our knowledge of the predicaments is not by means of causes and thus is not strict *propter quid* demonstration, what can serve as the basis of such knowledge? Peter holds that we have such knowledge only on the basis of "definitions and descriptions."⁴¹ On this point Simon seems to agree with Peter. Although Simon doesn't explicitly conclude that the two kinds of knowledge we can acquire following the two kinds of demonstration are, on the one side, demonstrative and, on the other side, "definitive" or "descriptive," he comes very close to this when he

³⁹ Cf. *ibid.*

⁴⁰ Simon of Faversham, *Quaest. super lib. Praed.*, q. 1, p. 73: "Cum scientia sit habitus ageneratus per demonstracionem, sicut est duplex demonstracio sic est duplex sciencia. Quedam est demonstracio que procedit ex prioribus et nocioribus simpliciter, alia que procedit ex prioribus et nocioribus quoad nos. Prima demonstratio fit per causam, secunda per essentiam." Cf. also Pini, *Categories and Logic in Duns Scotus*, pp. 164–166.

⁴¹ Peter of Auvergne, *Quaestiones super Praedicamentis*, qq. 1+2, p. 10: "...et hoc modo potest esse scientia de praedicamentis, cognoscuntur enim per quasdam definitiones et descriptiones. Et cum non habeatur de praedicamentis scientia per causam, cum ipsa non habeant causam, tamen isto modo per definitiones et descriptiones potest de hiis esse scientia."

remarks that Aristotle here in his *Categories* “does not proceed demonstratively but rather by means of explanations and examples.”⁴²

Simon of Faversham and Peter of Auvergne are by no means the only medieval authors who draw a distinction between knowledge (*scientia*) that is demonstrative and knowledge that falls short of being demonstrative and is therefore only descriptive or “definitive.” The anonymous *Metaphysics* commentary in Escorial h.II.1, for instance, makes a similar distinction with regard to the scientific status of metaphysical knowledge. There the commentator, sometimes believed to be Henry of Ghent, has particular problems with Aristotle’s claim according to which every knowledge is about the properties and parts of its proper object. But what is a property of being, the subject-matter of metaphysics? Properties are normally ‘outside’ the object in the sense that the property adds something to the object. The object of a science thus has “to leave behind” (*derelinquere*) something. To have angles equal to two right angles is, for instance, a property of triangles. Yet, insofar as this property is not already expressed by the definition of the triangle one might say that it is added. But what could be added to being? Moreover, the subject to which a property belongs can normally never be predicated of its property. It is plainly wrong to say that to have angles equal to two right angles is a triangle. But insofar as properties of beings exist, they have to be said to be. This finally suggests that being cannot be the subject-matter of metaphysics.⁴³ The Escorial commentator proposes a radical solution to these problems. He plainly denies that the requirement to have parts and properties, a requirement for demonstrative sciences, applies to metaphysics and its

⁴² Simon of Faversham, *Quaest. super lib. Praed.*, q. 1, p. 73: “Unde Philosophis hic non procedit demonstrative, sed magis nominative et exemplariter.”

⁴³ For further information regarding the Escorial commentary on the *Metaphysics* and a partial edition, cf. Pasquale Porro, “Le *Quaestiones super Metaphysicam* attribuite a Enrico di Gand: elementi per un sondaggio dottrinale,” *Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale* 13 (2002), 507–602. Cf. also the appendix in my *Heinrich von Gent über Metaphysik als erste Wissenschaft. Studien zu einem Metaphysikentwurf aus dem letzten Viertel des 13. Jahrhunderts* (Leiden, 2007), pp. 360–374. Anonymus Escorial (Ps.-Henry of Ghent), *Quaestiones super Metaphysicam*, q. 119 [IV, q. 1], in *supra*, p. 576: “Omnis scientia extra ambitum sui subiecti aliquid debet derelinquere. Extra ambitum entis simpliciter nihil potest derelinqui: ergo ens simpliciter non potest esse subiectum alicuius scientiae, et sic idem quod prius. Maior patet, quia «scientia una debet esse unius generis subiecti partes et passionem considerans». Passio autem est aliud a subiecto.”

object. According to him, metaphysics is simply not a kind of demonstrative knowledge but merely “definitive” knowledge.⁴⁴

The Escorial commentator on the one hand and Simon of Faversham on the other hand might have very different reasons for why they regard the particular knowledge they are dealing with as merely “definitive.”⁴⁵ But what they both have in common is the idea that there are more forms of proper knowledge than just strictly demonstrative knowledge. This is, I think, one of the main reasons why Simon dropped the cause-requirement from the requirements for *scientia*. Why drop this requirement (and not others)? Well, to restrict the label *scientia* to *propter quid* knowledge seems most at odds with the medieval views about actual scientific disciplines. Obviously, being *qua* being, for instance, does not have *propter quid* causes either, nor are there any real causes of God, the subject-matter of theology. But metaphysics and theology are surely to be counted among the theoretical sciences. This last point is worth being emphasized. Medieval authors from the 13th century onwards are very keen to show how the many different scientific disciplines match Aristotle’s criteria for demonstrative knowledge from the *Posterior Analytics*. That is, the *Posterior Analytics* became especially important for medieval accounts of the scientific status of metaphysics and theology where it is less clear how these two could count as knowledge proper.⁴⁶ Texts such as the Escorial commentary and the commentaries on Aristotle’s *Categories* that are discussed in this paper show a growing awareness that our knowledge of what is first and most fundamental cannot be strictly speaking of the same kind as our knowledge of what is less fundamental. These works counterbalance the optimistic views expressed in many 13th-century *Metaphysics* commentaries.

⁴⁴ Ibid., p. 578: “Duplex est modus scientiae principalis, demonstrativus scilicet et definitivus. De scientiis vero demonstrativis solum verificatur illa propositio, unde sumitur ex illo verbo I *Posteriorum* «scientia una est unius generis subiecti partes et passionem considerans» [*An. Post.* I 28 87a38sq.], ubi principaliter docet modum scientiae demonstrativae. Talis autem non est ista scientia de ente simpliciter: non enim est demonstrativa sed definitiva, docens investigare quidditates substantiarum et accidentium, unde nihil considerat nisi quod sub suo subiecto includitur.” Cf. also *ibid.*, q. 122 [IV, q. 4], p. 587; q. 303 [VI, q. 2], p. 595.

⁴⁵ It should be clear that Simon does not regard the *scientia praedicamentorum* as “definitive” knowledge because there are no real properties or parts of the predicaments!

⁴⁶ For the relevant discussion regarding metaphysics cf. Zimmermann, *Ontologie oder Metaphysik?*; for theology cf. the classical study by Marie Dominique Chenu, *La théologie comme science au XIII^e siècle*, 3rd ed. (Paris, 1969).

V.

There are two further points that become clearer when we compare Simon of Faversham's account of a *scientia praedicamentorum* with that of his contemporaries. Let's first look at the reasons why, according to Simon, there can be no proper demonstrative knowledge of the categories. One of Simon's arguments reminds us that "the predicaments have no (common) genus."⁴⁷ Notice that he does not say that predicaments are the highest genera and that there is thus by definition no higher genus which could be like a cause for the genus of each predicament. Simon's ontological understanding of predicaments as types of being (and not as highest logical genera) precludes this line of reasoning. For Simon *propter quid* knowledge ultimately provides us with an insight into what the thing known really is. In other words: such knowledge provides us with a definition of the thing we know. Now, there cannot be any definition of the predicaments, for the predicaments are ten different and irreducible types of beings. They have nothing really or intrinsically in common. The commonness of the different types, i.e., the reason why they are called types of being, is grounded in the fact that they form a unity by attribution:⁴⁸ Substances are beings in the proper sense; qualities, quantities etc. are things that are said to be (beings) because they exist in something else etc. So, according to Simon, the ontological diversity of the subject-matter of a science of the predicaments rules out any *propter quid* knowledge of them. This argument nicely underlines Simon's ontological understanding of the predicaments: predicaments are types of being.⁴⁹

In his list of the three criteria for knowledge, Simon further emphasizes his ontological understanding of the predicaments and the *scientia*

⁴⁷ Simon of Faversham, *Quaest. super lib. Praed.*, q. 1, p. 73: "Predicamenta autem non habent genus; et ideo de eis non est scientia ex prioribus et nocioribus simpliciter."

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 74.

⁴⁹ In his rejection of the possibility of *propter quid* knowledge of the predicaments, Simon also argues that there cannot be such knowledge because the essences of the predicaments are hidden to us (*occultae*) "like the essences of every other thing" (*ibid.*, p. 73). I don't think this is a helpful line of reasoning. If the principal inaccessibility of the essences of things is an argument against *propter quid* knowledge in this case, then it seems to rule out every possible kind of *propter quid* knowledge. Or maybe Simon simply wanted to say the essences are unknown to us, i.e., the logicians who study the categories. This reading, however, is equally problematic, for in the context there is nothing that indicates that the claim is limited to the perspective of the logician.

praedicamentorum. Remember that the first criterion demanded that the object of knowledge has to be something existing outside the mind. I already mentioned that this criterion does not appear on the similar list of the Anonymous of Madrid. But its appearance on Simon's list gives the author the occasion to explicitly state that predicaments are extra-mental entities and that the knowledge concerned with them is about an extra-mental reality.

My second remark is related to Simon's contention that the *scientia praedicamentorum* also deals with the parts of its subject-matter, i.e., the parts of the predicaments. Here again, a comparison with the Anonymous of Madrid is interesting. The Anonymous mentions in an argument in oppositum that knowledge is also concerned with the parts of its object but he never takes this up again.⁵⁰ In fact, the whole commentary is quiet about what could possibly be regarded as parts of predicaments. As we already noticed earlier, Simon takes the idea of parts of predicaments seriously. For him predicaments are composed of two elements: a *res praedicamenti* and a *ratio praedicamenti* (a mode of being). This compositional view of the categories can be found not only in Simon but also in the works of Henry of Ghent and, to a certain lesser extent, in the writings of Thomas Aquinas.⁵¹

Henry of Ghent, however, is not concerned with the scientific status of knowledge of the categories. His starting point is the compositional nature of creatures. For Henry, creatures are not only composed out of being (existence) and essence; essences themselves are composed. In order to make this last claim more convincing, Henry goes on to develop a theory according to which every being falling under a category (i.e.,

⁵⁰ Anonymus Matritensis, *Quaest. super lib. Praed.*, q. 1, p. 122: "Oppositum per Aristotelem et etiam per rationem arguitur. Quia de illo quod habet partes et proprietates, et causas et principia per quae illae proprietates de partibus probantur, est scientia."

⁵¹ One of the most obvious differences between Henry of Ghent and Thomas Aquinas on this matter is terminology: Whereas Henry (cf. *infra*) distinguishes between a *res praedicamenti* and a *ratio praedicamenti*, Aquinas talks about a composition of *ratio* and being. Cf. e.g., *Summa theologiae* I, q. 28, a. 2, the emphasis is here on the accidental predicaments, but the basic idea also applies to substances: "Ad cuius evidentiam, considerandum est quod in quolibet novem generum accidentis est duo considerare. Quorum unum est esse quod competit unicuique ipsorum secundum quod est accidens. Et hoc communiter in omnibus est inesse subiecto, accidentis enim esse est inesse. Aliud quod potest considerari in unoquoque est propria ratio uniuscuiusque illorum generum." On this passage cf. Mark Henninger, *Relations: Medieval Theories 1250–1325* (Oxford, 1989), pp. 13–17.

every creature) is composed out of *res praedicamenti* and a mode of being or *ratio praedicamenti*.⁵² But why are predicamental beings composed at all? For Henry this follows from the fact that predicaments are neither only pure modes of being nor merely different things or essences.⁵³

To understand this better, let us begin by focusing on the first part of this disjunctive claim: that predicaments cannot be understood as pure modes of being. In a way this seems to contradict Aristotle's account of the categories, for Aristotle "defines" substance, for instance, as that which does not exist in something else.⁵⁴ The properties *esse in subiecto* and *non esse in subiecto* characterize accidents and substances. The main reason why the division of the predicaments cannot be derived solely from the modes of being is that being itself is not a genus. Although this argument is only alluded to in Henry's work,⁵⁵ it is fairly well known from the works of Thomas Aquinas. Predicaments are types of being. However, were the properties *esse in subiecto* and *non esse in subiecto* meant to divide being adequately into substances and accidents, then it would follow that 'being not in a subject' (*ens non in subiecto*) would be considered as something like the "definition" of substance. Now every definition is composed of a genus and a specific difference. But being, (*ens*), as Aristotle argued, does not have the character of a genus (or of a most general type).⁵⁶ For there is nothing outside of being that would be able to play the role of a restricting differentia. Likewise, the other part of the stipulated "definition", i.e., 'not in a subject' (*non in subiecto*), can also not constitute a genus or type of being. For it is merely a negative qualification, and such a qualification cannot stand

⁵² Cf. Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet V*, q. 2, ed. J. Badius Ascensius (Paris, 1518, repr. Leuven, 1961), fol. 154rD–vE: "Res creata in simplicitate essentiae suae absque essentia actuali considerata rationem compositionis habet ex eo quod est et quo est, sive ex essentia inquantum est ipsa realitas dicta et ipso esse participato... Et secundum illa duo quae cadunt in creatura secundum esse quidditativum considerata, constituitur natura praedicamenti, et hoc ex illis duobus quae sunt res praedicamenti et ratio praedicamenti." For Henry's understanding of the categories cf. Henninger, *Relations*, pp. 48–52 and my *Henry of Ghent on Categories* (forthcoming).

⁵³ Ibid., fol. 154vE: "Res enim sive essentia, inquantum res ist, non est praedicamentum, neque esse neque ens inquantum ens est."

⁵⁴ *Categoriae* 5 2a11–13.

⁵⁵ Henry of Ghent, *Summa quaestionum ordinariarum*, a. 32, q. 5, ed. Raymond Macken (Leuven, 1991), p. 79sq.

⁵⁶ Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa contra Gentiles* I, cap. 25: "Dicendum est ex dictis quod in definitione substantiae non est ens per se. Ex hoc enim quod dicitur ens non posset esse genus: quia iam probatum est quod ens non habet rationem generis." For the Aristotelian proof of the claim that being is not a genus cf. *Metaph.* III 3 998b22–28.

for a genus, since then “the genus would not express what something is but only what it is not.”⁵⁷ Consequently, in order for there to be a genus ‘substance’, an essence has to have generic features; the mode of being (for instance, ‘to be in a subject’) is then only added to this essence or thing (*res*). The same is true for the “definition” of accidents. Aquinas can thus conclude:

‘Substance is what exists by itself’ is not a true definition of substance, and ‘Accident is what exists in something else’ is not a true definition of accidents, but only a circumlocution of the true account. The true account has to be understood like this: ‘Substance is a thing (*res*) whose nature requires that it does not exist in something else,’ ‘An accident, however, is a thing (*res*) whose nature requires that it does exist in something else’.⁵⁸

Henry of Ghent is in complete agreement with Aquinas’s analysis and it is on this background that we have to understand his claim that it is not just in virtue of being a thing (*res*) or some nature that something has the character of a type of being, nor is it in virtue of its being in a subject or not being in a subject, but insofar as it is composed out of both aspects.⁵⁹

The meaning of this last statement becomes clearer if we look at why it is impossible for Henry to give a distinct account of each of the ten predicaments only by their *res praedicamenti*. Aquinas seems to hold that each predicament has its own characteristic ‘thing’ or essence, *ratio* in

⁵⁷ Thomas Aquinas, *Summa contra Gentiles* I, cap. 25: “Similiter nec ex hoc quod dicitur per se. Quia hoc non videtur importare nisi negationem tantum: dicitur enim ens per se ex hoc quod non est in alio; quod est negatio pura. Quae nec potest rationem generis constituere: quia sic genus non diceret quid est res, sed quid non est.” Cf. also Henry of Ghent, *Summa quaestionum ordinariarum*, a. 26, q. 2 ad 1, ed. J. Badius Ascensius (Paris, 1520, repr. St. Bonaventure, N.Y., 1953), fol. 159rT.

⁵⁸ Thomas Aquinas, *Quodlibet* IX, q. 3, a. 1, ed. Leonina, vol. 25 (Rome, 1996), p. 99, 83–90: “Et ideo haec non est vera definitio substantiae: ‘Substantia est quod est per se’, vel accidentis: ‘Accidens est quod est in alio’, sed est circumlocutio verae descriptionis, quae talis intelligitur: ‘Substantia est res cuius naturae debetur esse non in alio’; ‘Accidens vero est res, cuius naturae debetur esse in alio.’” For Aquinas’s “definitions” of the categories cf. John Wippel, *The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas. From Finite Being to Uncreated Being* (Washington, D.C., 2000), pp. 228–237; Etienne Gilson, “Quasi Definitio Substantiae,” Armand Maurer et al., eds. *St. Thomas Aquinas 1274–1974. Commemorative Studies* (Toronto, 1974), vol. 1, pp. 111–129.

⁵⁹ *Summa quaestionum ordinariarum*, a. 32, q. 5, p. 79: “Non enim ex hoc quod aliquid sit res et natura aliqua, sive substantiae sive accidentis..., habet rationem generis praedicamenti, neque similiter ex hoc quod est esse non in subiecto vel esse in subiecto, quoniam esse ex se nullo modo potest habere rationem generis..., sed natura generis praedicamenti ex utroque simul, scilicet ex re et ratione praedicamenti constituitur.”

his terminology.⁶⁰ This would allow us, at least, to distinguish the ten predicaments by their essences. For Henry, however, this is impossible because there are only three different kinds of *res*. Only the categories of substance, quality, and quantity, which he calls absolute categories, contain their own *res praedicamenti*; the remaining seven relative categories (relation, location, time etc.) do not possess any ‘real content’ on their own, rather they owe their ‘reality’ to a *res* of the first three predicaments, on which they depend as their foundation. Henry tries to defend his view of the ‘unrealness’ of relations (and the relational categories) by a series of arguments. I will only focus on two of them here.

One of Henry’s arguments advances the idea that there is nothing specific to understand when our intellect understands relations themselves: “If the thing (*res*) of substance, quantity, and quality is completely set aside by the intellect and if a notion of a relation or a respect towards something else is grasped precisely as such, then it is impossible to assign to the relation any specific difference.”⁶¹ Relations, according to Henry’s view, are not by themselves relations of a specific type, say, relations of similarity, identity, temporal priority, etc. They owe their specific character to the entities which they relate to one another. In this respect he treats relations as similar to certain second order concepts such as the concept of species: “In the same way in which being a species does not differ in character regarding man, donkey, and cattle...so being-towards-something-else does not differ in character regarding master and servant.” What is responsible for the fact that the master is related to the servant by a specific relation, the relation of dominion, is not the relation itself, but the power to dominate in which the relation is founded in the master and in the inability to resist the master, in which the relation is founded in the servant.⁶² But since a relation as such (i.e., simply as a relation) lacks any features that determine it

⁶⁰ Cf. *supra* fn. 51.

⁶¹ *Quodlibet VII*, qq. 1+2, ed. Gordon A. Wilson (Leuven, 1991), p. 23: “Quod clare patet ex tribus rationibus philosophicis. Primo quoniam si circumscribatur per intellectum omnino *res substantiae, quantitatis, et qualitatis* et concipitur intellectus relationis sive respectus ad aliud praecise, sub illa impossibile est assignare aliquas differentias specificas. Ipsum enim ad aliud esse, quantum est ex se, eiusdem rationis est, si nullam contrahat differentiam ab eo super quod fundatur.”

⁶² *Ibid.* “Sicut enim esse speciem non est alterius rationis circa hominem, circa asinum et circa bovem...sic esse ad aliquid [*lege aliud*] non est alterius rationis circa dominum et circa servum...circumscripta realitate aliorum praedicamentorum quae importatur nomine domini et servi, quae est dominandi potentia in domino et impotentia resistendi in servo, quae pertinent ad secundam speciem qualitatis.”

to something specific, and since entities belonging to a category are specified by something real, it follows that there is nothing real in the category of relation except that which belongs to another category on which a relation is founded.⁶³

Another argument against the idea that relations have their own “thing” (*res*) runs like this: Let’s assume that relations have their own “thing” (*res*) or “reality” in things they relate and that this *realitas* is different from the “reality” of the related thing. In this case, an object not related to something else—say, the white Socrates who is not related to the black Plato—cannot enter in a relation if there is not something newly produced in it that hasn’t been there previously. There has to be some kind of transmutation, a real change; Socrates who is not similar to Plato cannot become similar without him being transformed. For Henry, however, this conclusion is wrong. For imagine that a quality in Plato is changed so that he, Plato, becomes white. Socrates will then immediately become similar to him, and this without any kind of real change in Socrates.⁶⁴ This argument shows that a too realist conception of relations would lead to the absurd consequences that things are constantly changing and being transformed because they constantly enter into new relations.

For Henry of Ghent it is thus clear that relation and relational categories do not possess their own *res*. These relations are “real” insofar as they are grounded in the *res* of their foundations (i.e., in the *res* of one of the absolute predicaments). Considered in themselves, relations only express a mode of being or a *ratio praedicamenti*, namely, a being toward something else (*esse ad aliud*).⁶⁵ Henry adopts a very restricted

⁶³ Ibid., p. 24: “Quare, cum nihil est reale in praedicamento, nisi illud penes quod accipiuntur differentiae specificae in illo et specierum distinctio, nihil igitur procul dubio reale est in praedicamento relationis, nisi id quod est res alterius praedicamenti.”

⁶⁴ Ibid., p. 24sq.: “Si relatio poneret propriam realitatem a realitate sui fundamenti in suo subiecto relato, tunc de se non relatum aliqua relatione, puta similitudine, quia nullum habet in se respectu alicuius alterius, puta Sortes albus in respectu ad Platonem nigrum, non fieret relatum ad illud similitudine quam haberet in se de novo et prius non habuit, nisi quia res aliqua de novo facta est in eo, quae prius in eo non fuit. Hoc autem non est possibile fieri in aliquo sine propria sui transmutatione. Sortes ergo similis Platoni non posset fieri similis eidem sine sua transmutatione reali. Consequens falsum est, quia Platone transmutato . . . , ut de nigro fiat albus, statim Sortes sine omni sua transmutatione de novo factus est similis Platoni.”

⁶⁵ *Quodlibet IX*, q. 3, ed. Raymond Macken (Leuven, 1983), p. 56: “Propter quod saepius alibi diximus quod relatio realitatem suam contrahit a suo fundamento et quod ex se non est nisi habitudo nuda, quae non est nisi modus quidam rem habendi ad aliud.” For more on Henry’s understanding of relations cf. Henninger, *Relations*, pp.

use of the term *res*. Of course he does not deny that relations are real; relations are not nothing, they are just not things (*res*).⁶⁶ It is therefore wrong and exaggerated to conclude Henry is cutting down the list of categories to just three when he says that “there are, in the totality of creation, only three genera of things, namely, substances, quality, and quantity.”⁶⁷ This statement, however, emphasizes that the division of the ten predicaments or categories cannot solely be based on the division of the *res*. For a complete classification of the predicaments we need a combination of *res praedicamenti* and *ratio praedicamenti*.

VI.

To my knowledge, Simon of Faversham is the first and only commentator in the 13th century who uses Henry of Ghent’s doctrine of the categories affirmatively in a *Categories* commentary.⁶⁸ Simon too thinks that the different predicaments cannot be distinguished on the basis of their respective essences alone but only insofar as they form a composition of essences and modes of being. He even goes beyond Henry and interprets the composition along the lines of the composition between matter and form. The mode of being is of course not a form but it can be considered as a formal constituent in the composition, whereas the underlying *res* or essence is like a material constituent. And like Henry

40–58; Rolf Schönberger, *Relation als Vergleich. Die Relationstheorie des Johannes Buridanus im Kontext seines Denkens und der Scholastik* (Leiden, 1994), pp. 86–102; and the many articles by Jos Decorte, e.g.: “Giles of Rome and Henri de Gand on the Reality of a Real Relation,” *Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale* 7 (1996), 183–211; “Avicenna’s Ontology of Relation. A Source of Inspiration to Henry of Ghent,” in Jules Janssens/Daniel De Smet, eds. *Avicenna and his Heritage. Acts of the International Colloquium, Leuven – Louvain-la-Neuve, September 8–September 11, 1999* (Leuven, 2002), pp. 197–224; “*Relatio* as *Modus Essendi*: The Origins of Henry of Ghent’s Definition of Relation,” *International Journal of Philosophical Studies* 10 (2002), 309–336.

⁶⁶ According to Henry they can only be called *res* if we allow for a broader use of the term, namely, one that applies *res* also to modes of being. Cf. *Quodlibet IX*, q. 3, p. 56: “... nisi extendendo rem ut etiam modus rei dicatur res.”

⁶⁷ *Quodlibet V*, q. 6, fol. 161vO. The misunderstanding mentioned can, for instance, be found in Wippel, *The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas*, p. 225 and fn. 98.

⁶⁸ But maybe I should be more cautious given that in this paper I only study edited commentaries.

(and unlike Aquinas) he refers to the two constituents of predicaments as *res praedicamenti* and *ratio praedicamenti*.⁶⁹

Further evidence that Simon follows Henry's stricter version of the compositional view of predicaments can be gathered from Simon's statements on relations.⁷⁰ Like Henry, Simon denies that relations import their own distinctive 'thingness'. He offers three main arguments for this claim. His third argument is absolutely identical with one of the above mentioned arguments Henry gave for the same conclusion: Whenever a thing is added to something else we say a transformation or change has occurred. But something can become related to something else without itself being changed. Suppose "that Socrates is white right now and that tomorrow the white Plato will be generated;" what will happen in this case is that Socrates will then become related to Plato by the relation of similarity, but nothing really happened in Socrates himself. Thus, such a relation does not add a 'thing' to Socrates, although it adds a real relation to him. For he is now really (and newly) related to Plato and this is not just a matter of an observing mind (i.e., a rational relation).⁷¹

The other two arguments seem to be Simon's own creations. The first runs like this: Suppose the opposite, namely, that a relation, e.g., the relation of similitude, adds some thing to that in which it is founded, e.g., the whiteness. Of what kind is this added thing (*res*)? Simon assumes that it would be a quality. But every quality can be the basis of a relation

⁶⁹ Simon of Faversham, *Quaest. super lib. Praed.*, q. 13, p. 86sq.: "Predicamentum enim substantie constituitur ex duobus, scilicet ex re et ex modo essendi sibi superaddito; illa enim requirantur in omni predicamento, per que predicamenta ad invicem distinguuntur; sed predicamenta non distinguuntur solum penes essencias, quia videmus diversas essencias contineri sub uno predicamento... requiruntur ergo diversi modi essendi per quos distinguuntur, et iste modus essendi est formalior in predicamento quam res, et dicitur ratio predicandi [*lege* predicamenti]; et ideo quodlibet predicamentum constituitur ex re et ex ratione predicandi [*lege* predicamenti]." Cf. also q. 20, p. 93.

⁷⁰ Although Aquinas too holds the view that the predicaments are composites, Henry's version of this view is more radical, for, unlike Aquinas (cf. text *supra* in fn. 51), he does not hold that there is one specific essence (*ratio* in Aquinas's words) for each predicament. There are fewer essences than predicaments.

⁷¹ *Quaest. super lib. Praed.*, q. 42, p. 135: "Nulla res potest de novo advenire alicui <sine> transmutatione facta in eo; sed similitudo fundata supra albedinem potest advenire alicui absque aliqua transmutatione facta in eo. Ponamus enim quod Socrates nunc sit albus, et cras generetur Plato albus; Socrates fit similis Platoni, et tamen nulla transmutatio fit in Socrate. Similitudo ergo fundata supra albedinem non est res et natura albedini addita; et quamvis illa similitudo non sit res et natura, est tamen aliquod ens reale." For Henry's argument cf. *supra* fn. 64.

of similitude. So, if a relation adds a quality to the thing that it relates to something else, then this quality can itself become the basis of another relation and so forth. According to Simon's argument, the realist account of relations leads into an infinite regress and must therefore be wrong.⁷² I am not convinced that any defender of the view that real relations add some thing to their foundations would be convinced by Simon's reasoning, since it assumes the highly controversial claim that such an added entity would be a quality, i.e., something belonging to a different category. But why should this be so? Proponents of a strong realist view of relations characteristically hold that the added thing is a *res relativa*, an entity which cannot be reduced to the thing of any other category.

Simon's second argument is based on the idea of composition. If relations add real things to their foundations, then they cause a greater degree of composition in them. To use the example of the arguments discussed before: if the relation of similitude adds a thing to the white Socrates, then Socrates is no longer simply the entity composed of matter, form, and a series of characteristic accidents (snub-nosed, bald etc.), he is now this whole composition plus the new thing. But this, so Simon contends, is counter-intuitive. Socrates himself does not seem to have changed with regard to the things out of which he is composed. The same is true in other cases. Once an agent causes an effect, the agent is related to its effect. But the agent is then not more composed than in the moment before the agent acted.⁷³ Imagine a natural agent like the sun, which has many different effects. It should exhibit a very high degree of composition were it true that relations themselves add 'things' to their foundations.

⁷² Ibid., p. 134sq.: "Si illa similitudo fundata super albedinem esset res addita albedini, illa res esset de genere qualitatis; sed supra omnem rem de genere qualitatis potest fundari similitudo, quia proprium est qualitatis secundum eam simile vel dissimile dici; ergo supra eam similitudinem fundatur similitudo. Quero tunc de illa similitudine, aut illa similitudo sit res addita priori similitudini per quam fundatur, aut non. Si sic, erit de genere qualitatis, et cum supra omnem rem de genere qualitatis contingat fundare similitudinem, queram de illa similitudine; et sic erit procedere in infinitum, aut erit dare quod relatio fundata supra rem aliquam non est res addita ei."

⁷³ Ibid., p. 135: "Omnis res addita rei maiorem facit compositionem in re; si ergo similitudo esset res aliqua addita albedini, tunc similitudo adveniens alicui maiorem compositionem causaret in eo; nunc autem similitudo adveniens albedini non causat maiorem compositionem in re; Socrates enim similes et albus non est composicius in re quam si sit albus solum; sicut aliquod agens non est composicius ex hoc quod habet formam et agit per illam quam ex hoc quod habet illam solum."

No doubt, Henry of Ghent and Simon of Faversham are proponents of the same view of the predicaments. So far I tacitly assumed, in accordance with the traditional opinion, that Simon's teaching on this issue is posterior to and dependent on Henry's. But nothing rules out that the dependence is in the opposite direction. Simon's *Categories* commentary is generally believed to have been composed in the years around 1280, but this dating is pretty vague.⁷⁴ The relevant works of Henry of Ghent can be dated with a bit more precision: The fifth *Quodlibet* was held either Christmas 1280 or Easter 1281, the seventh *Quodlibet* Christmas 1282, and art. 32 of the *Summa quaestionum ordinariarum* is considered as having been disputed in the year 1279;⁷⁵ thus the dates do not preclude any of the alternatives. Of course, this whole question about possible sources and dependencies needs some further investigation, but for now I favor the view that Henry was at the origin of the strong compositional account of the predicaments. The theory is much more developed in his works and the bits and pieces in Simon's commentary are only fully comprehensible against the background of Henry's works.

If that is true, then we can see Simon not just borrowing a philosophical theory of Henry's; he also engages critically with what he takes from his contemporary. This is obvious in Simon's discussion of the difference between a relation and the absolute thing (*res*) in which the relation is founded. For Henry it was obvious that this distinction could not be a real distinction. If the relation does not add another thing to its foundation, then relation and foundation cannot be "really" distinct, i.e., distinct in the way one thing is distinct from another. In the case of a real distinction the two items which are distinct bring with them their own natures or essences. But a relation does not have its own essence besides the essence of its foundation.⁷⁶ Neither is the distinction between a relation and its foundation a purely rational distinction. It's not a matter of how our intellect looks at relations and

⁷⁴ Cf. Introduction in *Quaestiones super libro Elenchorum*, p. 5; I find it highly unlikely that both authors came up on their own with their respective teaching on the categories. But it should not be ruled out that both depend on an yet unknown source.

⁷⁵ Cf. Matthias Laarmann, *Deus, primum cognitum: Die Lehre von Gott als dem Ersterkannten des menschlichen Intellekts bei Heinrich von Gent* († 1293) (Münster, 1999), p. 50sq.

⁷⁶ Cf. *Quodlibet* V, q. 6, fol. 161rK: "Unde re differunt quaecumque <quae> diversas naturas et essentias important secundum rem, sive fuerint simplicia, ut materia et forma, sive composita, ut homo et asinus... Nullus enim respectus aliquid rei ponit praeter rem eius super quod fundatur."

their foundations. The distinction is real in the sense that it is not completely mind-dependent. The distinction between them must, therefore, be weaker than a real distinction but stronger than a purely rational one. Henry allows for such an intermediate distinction; he calls it an intentional distinction.⁷⁷

Simon of Faversham takes up this line of argument. Using in part the very same words as Henry, he agrees with Henry that relations are not “really” distinct from their foundations.⁷⁸ However, Simon goes on to deny that there is, in this case, an intentional distinction. His description of the intentional distinction follows closely that of Henry’s fifth *Quodlibet*. There, Henry explains that different intentions are found in the very same thing (or essence). Intentions are, so to speak, different eidetic aspects of the very same thing, such as ‘animal’ and ‘rational’ of an individual human being. ‘Animal’ and ‘rational’ are not really distinct since both elements do not carry along their own essences. They are simply parts of the one essence ‘human being’. Without the intellect we would, of course, never be able to distinguish ‘animal’ and ‘rational’; it doesn’t follow, however, that their distinction is purely a matter of the mind. There is something *ex parte rei* that corresponds to this distinction. That is the reason why Henry distinguishes the intentional distinction from the rational distinction, which imports a distinction that is completely mind-dependent. Yet, the role of the intellect in “discovering” intentions (although not in “producing” them) explains why Henry defines intentions by introducing a reference to concepts: “An intention is something that really belongs to the simplicity of an essence and that can be conceived in a precise way without conceiving of something else from which it doesn’t differ as a real absolute

⁷⁷ Henry of Ghent explains this using the example of a relation of similitude (between two white objects); *Quodlibet V*, q. 6, fol. 162vS: “Similitudo ergo sic supra esse qualitatis fundatur, ut sit omnino extra conceptum esse qualitatis secundum rationem essentiae suae, ut qualitas est simpliciter. Talia autem... necesse est saltem secundum intentionem differe inter se.” For Henry’s famous intentional distinction cf. John Wippel, “Essence and Existence,” in Norman Kretzmann et al., eds. *The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy. From the Rediscovery of Aristotle to the Disintegration of Scholasticism 1100–1600* (Cambridge, 1982), pp. 385–410; for Henry on the distinction between relations and their foundations cf. Henninger, *Relations*, p. 54sq.

⁷⁸ *Quaest. super lib. Praed.*, q. 42, p. 136: “Illa differunt secundum rem que important diversas essentias secundum rem, sive sint simplicia sicut materia et forma, sive composita ut homo et equus... Modo dico quod relatio et res supra quam fundatur non differunt secundum rem... relatio non est res et natura diversa a re supra quam fundatur.” Cf. Henry’s words in fn. 76.

thing.”⁷⁹ It is interesting to see that Simon does not simply reject the very idea of an intentional distinction; he just denies that it applies to the distinction in question. In order to show this he uses Henry’s own description of the intentional distinction. For Henry, as we just saw, the intentional distinction is a distinction that applies to items that have the same essence. But, for Simon, the foundation of a relation is the cause of the relation, while the relation itself is something like the effect of the foundation in a different relata. Cause and effect, he adds, have their own essences.⁸⁰ Thus relations and their foundations cannot differ intentionally.⁸¹ Now the only remaining possibility seems to posit a rational distinction between the two items in question. And this is exactly the way Simon goes. But he rejects the traditional understanding of the rational distinction as a distinction between different ways of understanding one and the same thing. In his version of the rational distinction the distinction applies to things and their modes and is thus in a sense real because it is not just caused by the intellect alone.⁸²

Simon’s account of the distinction between relations and their foundations is a bit odd for at least two reasons. (1) Simon’s idea about the nature of a rational distinction as a distinction between things and their modes seems to be *ad hoc*. It departs radically from the way other people in his time used the concept of a rational distinction. According to this traditional understanding, a rational distinction is a distinction

⁷⁹ *Quodlibet V*, q. 6, fol. 161rL: “Sed appellatur hic intentio aliquid pertinens realiter ad simplicitatem essentiae alicuius natum praecise concipi absque aliquo alio a quo non differt re absoluta quod similiter pertinet ad eandem... De eis enim quae sunt idem re in eodem, aliquando sic formantur conceptus diversi, ut neutrum eorum in suo conceptu alterum includat, ut sunt conceptus diversarum differentiarum quae concurrunt in eodem... et similiter conceptus generis et differentiae.”

⁸⁰ Think of the case of parents and their children. The parents and the children have their own individual essences. Otherwise they would be identical!

⁸¹ *Quaest. super lib. Praed.*, q. 42, p. 136: “Secundum intencionem differunt illa quae important diversam [*lege* eandem] essenciam sub diversis conceptibus, quorum unum non includitur in alio; et isto modo genus et differentia differunt... Nec differunt secundum intencionem, quia illa differunt secundum intencionem quae important eandem unam essenciam et naturam sub diversis rationibus; sed similitudo et res supra quam fundatur non important eandem essenciam, quia causa et effectus per se aliam et aliam essenciam important; nunc autem relatio et res supra quam fundatur differunt sicut causa et effectus per se.” Cf. supra fn. 79 for a comparison with Henry’s account of the intentional distinction.

⁸² *Ibid.*: “Oportet ergo ponere quod relatio et res supra quam fundatur differant secundum rationem, quia illa differunt secundum rationem quorum unum comparatur ad aliud sicut modus rei ad rem; sed sic se habet relatio et res supra quam fundatur... Et dico quod relatio et res differunt secundum rationem, non ita quod differant secundum rationem intelligendi solum, sed differunt secundum rationem, quia unum non est de essencia alterius.”

applying to the different ways something is grasped by the intellect. A human being and a rational animal, for instance, are two things that are only rationally distinct, for it is exactly the same thing that is both. But a rational animal is not simply identical with a human being. For then everybody who intellectually perceives a human being would also right away perceive his definition. It is obvious why this distinction is rational, but what is the reason for calling the distinction between thing and mode of thing “rational”? (2) Furthermore, Simon’s argument is inconsistent. He rejects the intentional distinction on the basis that it applies only to objects that have the same essence, whereas in relations and their foundations there must be more than one, because they relate to each other as effect to cause. This, however, contradicts what he says elsewhere about relations. And, even more problematic, this seems to rule out the rational distinction as well. For Simon explicitly says in his initial description that a rational distinction only applies to things with one and the same essence.⁸³ But if this very fact counts against the intentional distinction it should also count against the rational one.

It is hard to imagine how an author committing such crude mistakes could have been at the origin of the elaborate compositional view of the predicaments that we find in Henry of Ghent’s writings. If Simon were the origin of this theory, the weakness of this argument would surely not have gone unnoticed in Henry’s *Quodlibet V*, q. 6, a text that has so many resemblances to q. 42 of Simon’s *Categories* commentary. I assume, though it is little more than just an assumption, that it is therefore more plausible to regard Simon’s discussion as dependent on Henry’s.

VII.

We still have not answered one of the central puzzles of Simon’s understanding of a *scientia de praedicamentis*. Does such knowledge qualify as logical knowledge or does it belong to metaphysics? Furthermore, can Simon’s understanding of the place of the *Categories* in logic, which is a *scientia rationalis*, be harmonized with his insistence that the knowledge

⁸³ Ibid.: “Illa differunt secundum rationem que important eandem essenciam; sed unum se habet ad alterum sicut modus rei ad rem.” Compare with the text supra in fn. 81.

of the predicaments is real knowledge? I can imagine some reader objecting at this point, for someone might consider the problem in question a pseudo-problem and one that is purely my own construction. After all, Simon's description of logic as a discipline that falls short of being proper knowledge is mostly developed in his commentaries on Porphyry's *Isagoge* and on the *Sophistical Refutations*. How can I assume that ideas developed in those works apply equally to Simon's *Categories* commentary? Maybe Simon changed his mind? I acknowledge I do not take such a consideration seriously, nor do I think that it should be taken seriously by others. It is justified only if there is absolutely no other (and better) way to make sense of Simon's understanding of the categories. If such a consideration is meant as a starting point for an interpretation, it destroys every need for a thoroughly philosophical interpretation of the kind I intend to provide here.⁸⁴ So, in this sense, there is a real problem here: The way in which Simon describes the *scientia de praedicamentis* (i.e., as knowledge about something extra-mental that has real properties and parts etc.) makes it sound as if it is at least partially identical with metaphysics. Of course, the subject-matter of metaphysics is, according to most 13th-century philosophers, being *qua* being and not the predicaments as such. But insofar as the predicaments are referred to as parts (or modes) of being, the study of the predicaments is part of the study of being and thus part of metaphysics. From this perspective it looks as if the *scientia de praedicamentis* is something like a *metaphysica specialis*, to use a term that became fashionable in the early modern period.

The impression that the *scientia de praedicamentis* belongs to metaphysics is almost reinforced by Simon's treatment of its unity. Knowledge is not about particular items as such but of something universal. It applies to particulars only insofar as they fall under a certain universal genus. There is no knowledge of this individual tree in front of my window, but knowledge of trees also covers this individual tree. In other words, the object of knowledge has to be some universal genus, and from the unity

⁸⁴ There is, however, a more sophisticated version of this objection. It is based on the story, often repeated at the end of the 13th century, according to which Aristotle wrote the *Categories* as a young man and not everything in the *Categories* has to be taken as his own considered opinion. On this legend (and its origin) cf. Ebbesen, "Les Catégories au moyen âge," p. 247sq. Simon quotes it in *Quaest. vet. super lib. Elench.*, q. 15, p. 67sq. Whatever one might think of this story, I don't consider it as crucial for Simon's understanding of the *Categories*. I expect he would have mentioned it in his *Categories* commentary itself, had he really given it more than just anecdotal value.

of this genus derives the unity of the corresponding knowledge. But how can there be any unified knowledge of the predicaments if there is no common genus for them? Some commentators on the *Categories* simply avoid this problem by denying that real being is the subject-matter of the *scientia praedicamentorum*. For Martin of Dacia, for instance, the subject-matter of this *scientia* is an “intellectual being considered by the soul,” a “logical concept.” Only this kind of being, but not real being, matches the criterion to be common to all the predicaments. More precisely, “that which is sayable without a connection” (*dicibile incomplexum*) is the subject-matter of the knowledge exposed in the *Categories*.⁸⁵ But for Simon, as well as for Peter of Auvergne and the Anonymous of Madrid, there is a simple response to the problem of the non-existing generic subject-matter. It is not true in every case that knowledge has to have a subject-matter that has the unity of a genus (i.e., is *unum genere*). There are forms of knowledge, such as metaphysics, for instance, which have a non-generic object. The object of metaphysics is being (*ens*), which, however, is not a genus. Nevertheless metaphysics is one unified science of being. The unity of metaphysics derives from the fact that everything that is, is said to be by attribution to substance, the first kind of being. In this way being has quasi-generic features and is an object that is at least one by attribution (*unum secundum attributionem*). Consequently the knowledge of being is one unified knowledge, for everything that is considered in metaphysics is considered insofar as it can be related by attribution to substance, the primary kind of being.⁸⁶ In the same way, we are to understand that there is one unified form of knowledge of the predicaments even though there is no common genus.⁸⁷

⁸⁵ Martin of Dacia, *Quaestiones super librum Praedicamentorum*, q. 1, ed. Heinrich Roos (Copenhagen, 1961), p. 155: “Duplex est ens, scilicet ens commune et intentionale apprehensum ab anima et ens speciale et reale ponens aliquid in praedicamento. Unde cum dicitur: omnis scientia est de ente, concede quod <non> est de ente aliquo reali, quod ponit aliquid in praedicamento; sed est de ente intellectuali considerato ab anima, et istud ens nihil aliud est quam ratio quaedam logica.” Ibid., q. 2, p. 156: “Subiectum cuiuslibet scientiae logicalis debet esse res logica. Sed dicibile incomplexum est huiusmodi... Et hoc est subiectum libri Praedicamentorum.”

⁸⁶ *Quaest. super lib. Praed.*, q. 1, p. 74: “Non requiritur quod subiectum sit unum in genere, quia scientia divina [i.e., metaphysics] est una, tamen subiectum eius non est unum genere, cum eius subiectum sit ens; ens autem non est unum genere. Sed ad hoc quod aliqua scientia sit una, sufficit quod subiectum sit unum secundum attributionem. Hoc modo scientia divina est una, quia omnia que ibi considerantur habent attributionem ad unum primum ens quod est substantia.”

⁸⁷ Ibid. Cf. also Peter of Auvergne, *Quaestiones super Praedicamentis*, qq. 1+2, p. 10; Anonymus Matritensis, *Quaest. super lib. Praed.*, q. 2, p. 124.

There is, however, a traditional view, according to which the predicaments can be considered in (at least) two ways. The metaphysician considers them according to their being and their essences, whereas the logician considers them insofar as second intentions, with which logic deals primarily, are grounded in them.⁸⁸ In one form or another, this view gets repeated in most of the *Categories* commentaries in the 13th century⁸⁹ and we will not be surprised to find it in Simon of Faversham's commentary too. Note, however, that Simon turns the idea of a twofold consideration of the categories in a special direction. When he mentions the idea, his exact words are:

And from this it is clear how this *scientia* and the *scientia divina* (i.e., metaphysics) consider the predicaments in different ways. For metaphysics considers them insofar as they are certain essences and parts of being; in this book however the predicaments are not treated insofar as they are things of some absolute matter (?), but insofar as they have this or that mode of predication. And therefore we speak of the Book of Predicaments.⁹⁰

There are two things worth mentioning: (1) Simon is more precise than many of his contemporaries insofar as he tells us exactly how the predicaments are considered in metaphysics. They are not the subject-matter of metaphysics, but they fall under the study of being because the predicaments are conceived of as parts of being.⁹¹ (2) Surprisingly, Simon does not mention logic at all, but instead talks about "this *scientia*," i.e., the *scientia de praedicamentis*, and the way "this *scientia*" is concerned about the predicaments in opposition to metaphysics. I believe Simon's

⁸⁸ Cf. e.g., Peter of Auvergne, *Quaestiones super Praedicamentis*, q. 3, p. 11: "De praedicamentis possumus loqui dupliciter: aut secundum sui entitatem et essentiam, et sic sunt de consideratione ipsius metaphysici; aut secundum quod in ipsis fundantur secundae intentiones, et sic ea logicus considerat." Cf. Avicenna, *Liber de philosophia prima*, tract. I, cap. 1, ed. Simone van Riet (Leuven, 1977), p. 10. for the view that logic considers second intentions as its subject-matter.

⁸⁹ On the origin of this distinction cf. Pini, *Categories and Logic in Duns Scotus*, pp. 40–44 (with an explicit discussion of this distinction in Peter of Auvergne and the Anonymous of Madrid).

⁹⁰ *Quaest. super lib. Praed.*, q. 1, p. 74: "Et ex hoc apparet quomodo diversimode considerat ista scientia de praedicamentis et scientia divina [i.e., metaphysics], quoniam scientia divina considerat de eis ut sunt quedam essencie et partes entis; in isto autem libro non determinatur de praedicamentis secundum quod sunt res materie absolute [*sic*], sed secundum quod habent talem modum predicandi vel talem; et ideo dicitur liber Praedicamentorum."

⁹¹ Peter of Auvergne (cf. supra fn. 88) and the Anonymous of Madrid (p. 125), for instance, simply say metaphysics considers the predicaments "according to their being and their essence" (Peter) or "insofar as they are beings."

choice of words is intentional. For if logic is primarily about what is caused by the intellect,⁹² then “this *scientia*,” whose subject-matter is something that is explicitly said to be mind-independent, cannot be identical with logic!

But what exactly does the *scientia de praedicamentis* study? According to Giorgio Pini, the passage just quoted is the key for understanding how Simon conceives of logic’s approach to the categories:

Logic deals with categories insofar as they have a certain mode of predication, but Simon also maintains that categories are composed of an essence and of a mode of being, which is either identical to or is parallel to a mode of predication, as we have seen. It can be said, therefore, that logic studies categories not according to their essences but according to their modes of being, and such modes of being are as real as the essences of categories.⁹³

To fully appreciate Pini’s point we have to go back to the place where Simon draws the connection between modes of being and modes of predication. Like Aquinas, Simon considers modes of being (*modi essendi*) and modes of predication (*modi praedicandi*) to be parallel. And because the former are made manifest by the later, we refer to the different types of being by the term ‘predicament’.⁹⁴ According to Pini, Simon even identifies the modes of predication with the modes of being, and if we replace the one by the other, the quote mentioned above makes a clear case: metaphysics deals with essences of the predicaments, logic with their being. We might still go further and say that this twofold examination of predicaments is required by the composition of predicaments out of *res praedicamenti* and *ratio praedicamenti*. At any rate, Pini’s interpretation seems to make excellent sense of the fact that the *scientia de praedicamentis* is real knowledge, i.e., knowledge of an extra-mental reality.

However, I do not think Pini’s account of what the *scientia de praedicamentis* studies is completely adequate. One problem is the identification of modes of being and modes of predication on which the account at least partially rests. I can see no clear passage in which Simon really identifies the two. The one passage at which Pini points contains most likely a misreading on the part of the editor.⁹⁵ But even if the text in the

⁹² Cf. the texts *supra* in fn. 5.

⁹³ Pini, *Categories and Logic in Duns Scotus*, p. 154.

⁹⁴ Cf. *supra* fn. 26.

⁹⁵ Cf. the text *supra* in fn. 69. The text almost definitely has “...ideo quodlibet predicamentum constituitur ex re et ratione *praedicamenti* [instead of Mazzarella’s *praedicandi*].”

passage in question is correct there is a further problem. For the study of the modes of beings seems already included in the task assigned to metaphysics. In the quotation Simon does not limit metaphysics to the study of the essences of the predicaments; he says too that metaphysics studies predicaments insofar as they are parts of being (*partes entis*). Yet, it seems artificial to exclude the *modi essendi* from the inquiry into the parts of being. Moreover, if we compare Simon's teaching about the composition of the predicaments with Henry of Ghent's, then it becomes clear that the modes of beings out of which predicaments are composed belong to the side of essences as opposed to existence. As part of the essence of a predicament, the modes of being were then, according to Pini's division of labor, to be studied together with the essence in metaphysics and not in logic. Finally, if we look carefully at what Simon exactly says, he neither says that metaphysics studies the categories according to their essences nor is it immediately clear (and I rather doubt) that Simon really intends to talk about metaphysics as opposed to logic.

VIII.

In order to get a clearer idea of what the *scientia de predicamentis* is supposed to be about for Simon I, once more, propose to start by looking at another contemporary *Categories* commentary. When the Anonymous of Madrid puts forward the "double consideration" view, the commentator ascribes to logic (or in his words 'dialectics') the consideration of the predicaments "insofar as there are things falling under the predicaments (*res praedicamenti*) that underlie intentions and insofar as they are things which can become a subject [in a predication] or can be predicated [of a subject] (*subicibiles vel praedicabiles*)."⁹⁶ The exact meaning of this passage is not very clear and if we consider the context of this statement we may be tempted to render it as: "...insofar as they (i.e., the predicaments) are predicamental things (*res praedicamenti*)..." Despite the

⁹⁶ Anonymus Matritensis, *Quaest. super lib. Praed.*, q. 3, p. 125: "Praedicamenta possunt dupliciter considerari. Uno modo inquantum sunt entia, et sic pertinent ad metaphysicum, alio modo inquantum sunt res praedicamenti subiectae intentioni et secundum quod sunt res subicibiles vel praedicabiles... Et sic pertinet considerare de hiis ad dialecticum." The Anonymous then goes on to talk about a third mode of considering predicaments (namely, as principles of movement and rest), a mode that is proper to natural philosophy.

fact that this breaks up the series of analogous statements regarding metaphysics and natural science, I chose the translation above because it is otherwise hard to make sense of the expression *res praedicamenti* in the Anonymous's explanation and because the phrase "...insofar as they are predicamental things..." is awkwardly redundant.⁹⁷ But whatever we make of this, the Anonymous clearly hints at an understanding of concepts (and especially universal concepts) that we have already encountered earlier. In ordinary concept formation the intellect produces a concept (or an act of understanding) on the basis of an extra-mental object. There are thus two related items, the extra-mental reality and the intention in the intellect. In the case of a universal concept, Simon of Faversham (as we saw earlier) refers to these two items as the *intentio universalitatis* and as the (extra-mental) 'thing' underlying such an intention (*res subiecta intentioni*).⁹⁸ Employing this use of expression we are now able to say that, according to the Anonymous, logic considers the categories only insofar as the things falling under the categories serve as the basis for our concepts and for propositions in which we predicate one thing of another.⁹⁹ This brings us closer to what proper knowledge of the predicaments is about but it does not lead us all the way. For if all we can say is that there is a twofold consideration of the predicaments, then the *scientia de praedicamentis* should strictly speaking either belong to metaphysics or to logic (since there is apparently no room for a third way of considering them). Both alternatives, however, seem unpromising.

In the passage quoted above, the Anonymous of Madrid employs the expression *res subicibiles et praedicabiles* to characterize logic's way of looking at the predicaments. This expression is often used in apposition to a classic answer concerning the subject-matter of the *Categories*, according to which the *Categories* studies "that which is sayable without a connection and orderable within a genus" (*dicibile incomplexum ordinabile in genere*).¹⁰⁰ This leads me to the central passage in which Simon describes the *scientia de praedicamentis*:

⁹⁷ Although this passage might remind the reader of the distinction between *res praedicamenti* and *ratio praedicamenti* it has to be noted that there is no such distinction in this commentary.

⁹⁸ Cf. supra p. 194 and fn. 29.

⁹⁹ This passage also confirms that the Anonymous of Madrid, like Simon, has a realist understanding of predicaments. Predicaments are extra-mental things.

¹⁰⁰ This formula concerning the subject-matter of the *Categories* goes back at least to John le Page. Cf. Ebbesen, "Les *Catégories* au moyen âge," pp. 257–267.

All things which are considered here [i.e., in the *scientia de praedicamentis*] are attributed to one thing, and this is being which is sayable without a connection and orderable within a genus according to below and above. Therefore, we here deal with substance and the other predicaments insofar as in each of them something orderable according to below and above can be found.¹⁰¹

Even if Simon does not explicitly refer here to the *dicibile incomplexum* as the subject-matter (*subiectum*) of the *scientia de praedicamentis* as it is laid down in Aristotle's *Categories*, he does so elsewhere.¹⁰² The first thing to notice is, again, that for Simon the knowledge of predicaments is about (extra-mental) being. Nothing here forces us to consider the *ens dicibile incomplexum* as a linguistic expression or a mental entity.¹⁰³ This definitely rules out that the *scientia de praedicamentis* is a proper part of logic. But, as Simon goes on to say, in this *scientia* the modes of being, like substance, quality, quantity and so on, are dealt with insofar as in each of them there is a certain property, namely, insofar as we are able to find in them something that can be ordered in a genus according to below and above and that can serve as the basis of a predication. Of what kind is this property or these properties by means of which we create a hierarchical order? Are they mental products? Surely not. According to Simon's view regarding the origin of logical concepts, the extra-mental objects serve as a basis for both first-order (first intentions) and second-order concepts (second intentions). This leads us to the conclusion that the *scientia de praedicamentis* is knowledge of extra-mental objects, but knowledge that is concerned with those properties of reality which are the basis of predication and acts of thought. The knowledge of the predicaments is thus a *scientia realis* in the strict sense, for it studies features of reality. However, it does not study being insofar as it is being; therefore it is not identical with metaphysics. But it studies being insofar as it is the basis for the acts of the intellect and insofar as it can be referred to in meaningful speech and predication.¹⁰⁴

¹⁰¹ *Quaest. super lib. Praed.*, q. 1, p. 74: "Omnia que hic considerantur, habent attributionem ad unum, et illud est ens dicibile incomplexum ordinabile in genere secundum sub et supra. Unde determinatur hic de substantia et de aliis secundum quod in quolibet eorum invenitur aliquid ordinabile secundum sub et supra."

¹⁰² Cf. *Quaest. super lib. Porph.*, prol., p. 14sq. (text quoted supra in fn. 7).

¹⁰³ This is in line with how other authors understand the meaning of the formula *dicibile incomplexum*. Cf. Ebbesen, "Les Catégories au moyen âge," p. 259sq.

¹⁰⁴ Cf. also *Quaest. super lib. Porph.*, prol., p. 15: "...liber predicamentorum qui est de ente ut in eo intellectus fundat intencionem suam subiecti et predicati..."

This allows us now to appreciate better the small yet crucial difference between the Anonymous and Simon regarding the double consideration view. If the logician, as the Anonymous believes, were really examining the *res subiectae intentioni*, the extra-mental features that underlie concepts, then the logician would also examine the origin of logic itself. Simon, however, denies this conclusion: the logician is only concerned with intentions and not with the nature of things, and an inquiry into the origins of logic would be an inquiry into the nature of things.¹⁰⁵ The examination of the *res subiectae intentioni* is business of a different discipline, i.e., the *scientia de praedicamentis*, and for this reason Simon applies the double consideration view no longer to the predicaments with regard to metaphysics and logic, but with regard to metaphysics and “this *scientia*.”

For the very same reason for which knowledge of the predicaments is not strictly speaking part of logic, such knowledge has an intimate connection to logic. One cannot study those properties which are at the basis of intellectual apprehension without talking about the fundamental acts of understanding and similarly one cannot examine the extra-mental foundations of predication without studying the fundamental concepts of predication such as ‘subject’ and ‘predicate’ etc.¹⁰⁶ It is in this respect that the *Categories* and the knowledge laid down in it overlap with logic proper, a fact which also explains its inclusion in the *Organon*. Moreover, this last line of thought can also be taken as an explanation why it is finally in vain to ask whether the categories belong to logic or metaphysics.

Simon of Faversham might generally not have been a very influential and original philosopher. Yet, I hope to have shown that his understanding of the categories is more original than expected. Maybe his conception of a *scientia de praedicamentis* cannot withstand further scrutiny, but at least he has tried to provide a more sophisticated response to the notorious question about the content of the *Categories* than many of his contemporaries.

¹⁰⁵ Cf. *Quaest. super lib. Porph.*, q. 2, p. 19: “Qui logicam invenit, logicus non fuit; ex quo enim consideravit naturas rerum, logicus non fuit, cum logicus, secundum quod logicus, non considerat de naturis rerum, sed intenciones solas.”

¹⁰⁶ This is how I understand the quotation supra in fn. 104.

DUNS SCOTUS'S ACCOUNT OF A *PROPTER QUID* SCIENCE OF THE CATEGORIES

Lloyd A. Newton

Far from detracting from the study of the *Categories*, the introduction of the rest of Aristotle's writings in the West provided new venues for studying what was, for many medievals, one of the first works in philosophy. Consequently, the literal commentaries that were common at the beginning of the 13th century quickly gave way to question commentaries, which allowed philosophers a greater opportunity to explore issues than was available with a literal commentary.¹ Examples of those issues included the derivation of the categories; the relation between logic and metaphysics; whether being is univocal, or the extent to which there is a science of the categories. It is this last topic that I am interested in here: whether there is a science of the categories, and if so, what kind of science it is. By looking specifically at this question, I hope to show the ways in which philosophical debates typically progressed in medieval works and the originality of Scotus.

As Martin Pickavé previously points out in his article on Simon Faversham,² it is typical for late medieval commentaries on the *Categories* to start with a question concerning the scientific nature of the categories. Although this particular question was not asked by late ancient philosophers, such as Simplicius, the question most likely developed out of their consideration of the *skopos* of the text. More obviously, the question is formed by topics discussed in the *Posterior Analytics* regarding the nature of science, and hence is subsequent to a thorough familiarity with this latter text. However, it is the science of metaphysics, more than any other science, that definitively frames what a science of the

¹ The flexibility available in a question commentary can be seen in both the variety and nature of the questions raised (virtually none of the questions is designed to help a beginning student better understand Aristotle's text, since a basic mastery of the text is taken for granted) and in the sheer size of the commentary (e.g., Scotus's question commentary is over 250 pages in the critical edition, whereas Aristotle's short text is less than 25 pages).

² Cf. Pickavé's article *supra*, fn. 2.

categories will look like.³ As we will see in the following sections, the science of the categories is often conceived after, and modeled upon, the science of metaphysics, especially insofar as both sciences resort to a unity of attribution when a generic unity is unavailable. Be that as it may for his contemporaries, Scotus will have none of it. Rather for him, the science of the categories will have a greater unity, a unity proper to a *propter quid* science. It is this last claim, I think, that stands out as one of the most salient features (among many) that is philosophically important in Scotus's commentary on the *Categories*.⁴ And even though Scotus specifically denies that being is univocal in this early commentary—in contrast to his more (in)famous claim to the contrary—it is quite clear that he is already moving in that direction.

In order to understand and appreciate Scotus's unique understanding of a science of the categories, I will proceed as follows. In the first section, I quickly cover the requirements for a science, the difference between a science and a syllogism, and the two main kinds of science.⁵ In the second section, I chart the development of the science of the categories through three of his contemporaries: Martin of Dacia, Peter of Auvergne, and Simon of Faversham. In the third section, I indicate what Scotus takes to be the subject of logic as a whole, and how the categories are understood to be parts of that generic science. In the fourth section, I show how Scotus adopts and tweaks the Avicennian doctrine of the threefold understanding of essence. Finally, in the last section I demonstrate how Scotus employs these various distinctions to advance his novel claim that the ten categories are the single subject of a *proper quid* science.

³ It is perhaps unfortunate that the *Posterior Analytics* and the *Metaphysics* had such an influential role in the ways in which medieval philosophers conceived of the *Categories* (to the near exclusion of any influence from the *Physics*), especially concerning the derivation of the *Categories*. For had the *Physics* been more influential, it would, I suspect, have been easier to defend a more robust realist ontology, especially insofar as it would be nearly impossible to conflate or reduce quantity to substance.

⁴ An English translation of Scotus's commentary on the *Categories*, as well as a discussion of many of the issues raised in this article, is available in: Lloyd A. Newton, *Duns Scotus's Questions on the Categories of Aristotle: A Translation of the Whole, Together with a Philosophical Analysis and Commentary on Questions 1–8*, Dissertation: University of Dallas, 2003.

⁵ I apologize for the elementary nature of some of the material presented in this section. I have included it for two reasons: First, it is helpful to understand the subsequent sections, especially since our notion of science, which is drawn largely from the empirical disciplines, is radically different from the ancient / medieval view; and second, while some of it may be fairly common knowledge, I know of no other short article that summarizes the relation between science and demonstration.

1. *The Nature of Science*

By the time Scotus writes his *Categories* commentary, the sciences are typically divided into two broad classes: practical and speculative.⁶ The practical sciences are then subdivided into: A) moral philosophy, which is further divided into 1) ethics, 2) economics, and 3) politics; and B) mechanics. In a similar way, the speculative or theoretical sciences are divided into: A) a science of the real, which is subdivided into 1) natural science (physics), 2) mathematics, and 3) metaphysics; and B) a science of reason, i.e., logic.⁷ Furthermore, logic can be considered in two ways: as it is applied (*logica utens*), and as it is pure (*logica docens*). Like many of his contemporaries, Scotus thinks that only in the latter way is logic truly a science in itself.

It must be understood that logic is considered in two ways. In one way insofar as it is pure [*docens*], and in this way it proceeds from necessary and proper principles to necessary conclusions, and thus it is a science. In another way, insofar as logic is used, by being applied to those things in which it is used, and in this way it is not from proper [principles] but from common [principles], nor is it a science.⁸

⁶ There are several different ways to locate the study of logic within the various sciences. For example, depending on whether that which is taken into account is the differences of logic from all other sciences or the similarities of logic to all the other sciences. The division provided here is based on a consideration of logic as one of the speculative sciences, which is how Scotus portrays it in his commentaries on Porphyry's *Isagoge* and Aristotle's *Categories*. Although a bit dated, Robert Schmidt's work on logic is still very informative. See in particular: Robert W. Schmidt, *The Domain of Logic* (The Hague, 1966), pp. 26–31. For a more recent discussion, see Marmo's article on Rhetoric (Costantino Marmo, "Suspicio: A Key Word to the Significance of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* in Thirteenth Century Scholasticism," *CIMAGL* 60 (1990), 145–198, pp. 148–152.) At the beginning of the thirteenth century, according to Marmo, at least four alternative general divisions of the sciences were advocated by different philosophers.

⁷ Noticeably absent in this division, as well as in all the classifications provided by Schmidt, is a science of grammar. The rise of a science of grammar, the so-called *Logic der Modistae*, which was influenced by the reception of the Arabic division of logic, is discussed by Marmo (*ibid.*, p. 158) and by Pinborg. Cf. Jan Pinborg, *Die Logik der Modistae*, *Studia Mediewistyczne* 16 (1975), 39–97; Costantino Marmo, "A Pragmatic Approach to Language in Modism," in *Sprachtheorien in Spätantike und Mittelalter*, ed. Sten Ebbesen (Tübingen, 1995), pp. 169–83; Costantino Marmo, "The Semantics of the *Modistae*," in *Medieval Analyses in Language and Cognition*, Acts of the Symposium, 'The Copenhagen School of Medieval Philosophy', January 10–13, 1996, eds. Sten Ebbesen and Russell L. Friedman (Copenhagen, 1999), pp. 83–104.

⁸ *Quaestiones in librum Porphyrii Isagoge*, eds. Robert Andrews et al. (St. Bonaventure, 1999) q. 1, n. 7: Intellegendum tamen quod logica dupliciter consideratur. Uno modo in quantum est docens, et sic ex necessariis et propriis principiis procedit ad necessarias conclusiones, et est scientia. Alio modo in quantum utitur logica, applicando ad illa in quibus est usus, et sic non est ex propriis sed ex communibus, nec est scientia.

Insofar as it is pure, Scotus adds:

logic is a science since those things which are taught in it are concluded by a demonstration, just as in other sciences; therefore they are known since 'a demonstration is a syllogism that makes one to know'.⁹

Thus, logic is both a tool used in the other sciences and something known in itself. In the former way, it is an art, in the latter, it is one of the sciences. Before we look at the science of logic in particular, it may be helpful to define each of these technical terms.

In English, the word 'science' does not have the same associations as its Latin cognate, *scientia*.¹⁰ In Latin, *scientia* is an abstract noun derived from the word *scio*, *scire*, 'to know'. Like its Latin cognate, 'science' is an abstract noun; in English, its best synonym is the word 'knowledge', an abstract noun derived from 'to know'. In its broadest sense, to know something is to have a knowledge of something that could not be otherwise. In this sense, knowledge includes both '*scientia*' and 'intuitive' cognition of something.¹¹ In its narrower sense, to know something, to have *scientia* of something, is to have a certain cognition of that thing by means of a syllogism. Accordingly, in its narrower sense, science is the knowledge of something derived from self-evident principles, whereas the self-evident principles are not said to be known demonstratively but intuitively. Thus, knowledge, in its narrower sense, is a mediated cognition of something that could not be otherwise, as opposed to an immediate cognition of it.¹² More importantly, one needs to distinguish between science as the certain cognition of something and a syllogism, which is a mode of acquiring knowledge or science. In either sense of

⁹ Ibid., n. 6: Dicendum quod logica est scientia, quia quae docentur in ea demonstratione concluduntur sicut in aliis scientiis; igitur sciuntur, quia 'demonstratio est syllogismus faciens scire'. Sunt etiam in logica omnia requisita ad demonstrationem: ut subiectum, passio demonstrabilis de subiecto per medium, quod est definitio.

¹⁰ From here on out, I will be using the terms 'science' and 'knowledge' in the Aristotelian / pre-Cartesian sense of the terms, which include an understanding of all four causes. This conception of knowledge or science is in sharp contrast with the typical post-Cartesian conception derived from the empirical disciplines.

¹¹ I am using the term 'intuitive cognition' in the broad, non-technical sense for the understanding of any self-evident statement (such as "Equals added to equals are equal") and not in the more technical sense, which is in contrast to abstractive cognition, and for which Scotus is famous.

¹² For a more analytic treatment of the difference between mediate and immediate cognition, see Scott MacDonald, "Theory of Knowledge," in *The Cambridge Companion to Aquinas*, eds. Noman Kretzmann and Eleonore Stump (Cambridge, 1993), pp. 160–195, pp. 168–174.

the word, the opposite of knowledge is either opinion or belief, both of which lack certainty.

The fact that knowledge is a mediated cognition of something raises the question of the way in which it is mediated, which is through a syllogism, or deductive reasoning.¹³ A syllogism is defined as a set of statements, one of which, the conclusion, follows of necessity from the other two, which are the premises. Based on Aristotle's *Posterior Analytics*, one can also define a statement as a complex enunciation, which is resolved into two simple or non-complex terms, i.e., the subject and the predicate.¹⁴ Finally, every categorical syllogism consists of only three terms:¹⁵ A) a minor term, which is the subject of the conclusion; B) a major term, which is the predicate of the conclusion; and C) a middle term, which connects the minor to the major term. A commonplace example of a first figure syllogism is:

All living things are mortal. (major premise)
 All men are living things. (minor premise)
 ∴ Therefore, all men are mortal. (conclusion)

What we are interested in here is one specific type of deductive argument: a demonstration, which is distinguished from other types of syllogisms by the fact that its middle term defines its subject. For by means of a demonstration, one has certain knowledge of something that could not be otherwise, which knowledge is obtained through knowing the essence of that thing. As Aristotle states it, "By demonstration I mean a scientific deduction; and by scientific I mean one in virtue of which, by having it, we understand something."¹⁶ In his commentary on Porphyry's *Isagoge*, Scotus adds that "logic is a science since those things which are taught in it are concluded by a demonstration. . . . [for] in logic, there are also all the requisites for a demonstration: a subject and attributes that are demonstrated of the subject through a middle term, which is a definition."¹⁷ As one can see from this last statement,

¹³ The word 'syllogism' is etymologically derived from the Greek word συλλογισμός. It is synonymous with 'deductive argument', which is derived etymologically from the Latin word 'deductus'.

¹⁴ Cf. *Posterior Analytics*, I, ch. 1, 24b18.

¹⁵ A categorical syllogism is one that consists of simple declarative statements, as opposed to hypothetical or disjunctive statements.

¹⁶ *Posterior Analytics*, I, ch. 2, 71b 18–19.

¹⁷ *Quaestiones in librum Porphyrii Isagoge*, q. 1, n. 6: Dicendum quod logica est scientia, quia quae docentur in ea demonstratione concluduntur sicut in aliis scientiis; igitur sciuntur, quia "demonstratio est syllogismus faciens scire". Sunt etiam in logica omnia

Scotus mentions three elements required for a demonstration: 1) a subject; 2) attributes; and 3) these attributes being demonstrated through a middle term, which is a definition of the subject. Let us briefly look at each of these three elements.

The subject of a demonstration is the minor term. It is also that of which the proper attributes, or properties, are predicated. In fact, it is often said that properties are predicated of a subject in the same way as the nine accidents inhere in a substance. The second element, on the other hand, is an attribute, or affection (*passiones*), caused by the subject. Due to the causal relationship between the subject and the attribute, there is also a corresponding necessity for the inherence of a property. As Schmidt describes it, "A property necessarily follows from the nature or essence of a being and is caused by the nature or essence. But science is knowledge from causes. Hence a property will be shown to belong to a subject by expressing its cause, the essence of the subject."¹⁸ The third element of a demonstrative syllogism is that the middle term must be a definition of the subject. Again, Schmidt describes it this way: "The middle term in this syllogism must therefore be the definition of the subject. Since in the conclusion the property will be predicated of the subject, the property will be the major term and the subject will be the minor term."¹⁹ However, to say that the middle term is a definition of the subject does not necessarily mean that the middle term must consist of a genus and a differentia. Rather, the middle term may be taken from any one of the four causes, even though it is generally taken from the formal cause.²⁰ As we will see later, the middle term may even be taken from an effect nearer and better known to us. To return to the previous example, the subject of the conclusion, 'men', is the subject of the argument. The predicate of the conclusion, 'mortal', is the attribute demonstrated of the subject by a middle term defining the subject.

requisita ad demonstrationem: ut subiectum, passio demonstrabilis de subiecto per medium, quod est definitio.

¹⁸ Schmidt, *The Domain of Logic*, p. 267.

¹⁹ Ibid., p. 268.

²⁰ Cf. Paul Symington's article on Aquinas, *supra*, for a discussion of the three different types of essential or *per se* predication and how those three ways are related to the ten categories.

A demonstration, though, is not the same thing as science. Science is the knowledge of something, whereas a demonstration is the means of acquiring knowledge. Nevertheless, there are similarities between knowledge or *scientia* on the one hand and demonstration on the other. Knowledge also has three requirements that parallel the three requirements of a syllogism. These requirements are: 1) that which is known, 2) that from which it is known, and, 3) that about which it is known, which is the subject of the science.²¹ The first requirement, that which is known, is composed of a subject and a predicate.²² The predicate, Schmidt adds, stands “for a proper accident (*id quod per se inest*) or property (*propria passio*) of the subject.”²³ However, since that which is known is principally the attribute or property, this first requirement of a science is parallel to the major term of a syllogism. For the major term of a syllogism is a property demonstrated to inhere in its subject.

The second requirement for a science is that it have axioms or common principles, a requirement similar to the middle term of a syllogism. The difference between the two is that an axiom or common principle includes definitions as well as the general laws of logic, whereas a middle term is, strictly speaking, only a definition.²⁴ For example, every science is based on the law of non-contradiction, the law of identity, and the law of excluded middle. However, these laws are neither proper to a demonstration nor are they definitions. Rather, a demonstration presupposes these general laws. One example, taken from mathematics, is that geometry requires certain common notions, such as ‘equals added to equals produce equals’, as well as axioms or postulates, such as ‘all right angles are equal to one another’. The former are common

²¹ For more on these three requirements, see Schmidt, *The Domain of Logic*, pp. 10–12.

²² *Ibid.*, p. 11.

²³ *Ibid.*

²⁴ Cf. the following two syllogisms taken from Euclid, *The Thirteen Books of the Elements*, ed. Thomas L. Heath, 2nd ed. (New York, 1956), bk. I, prop. 1: The radii of a circle are equal to one another; line *A* and line *B* are the radii of a circle, therefore, line *A* and line *B* are equal to one another. Things equal to one and the same thing are equal to one another, line *A* and line *B* are equal to one and the same thing, therefore line *A* and line *B* are equal to one another. The former syllogism is a demonstration, since the two lines are defined as the radii of a circle, whereas in the latter syllogism the subject is not defined. There is a parallel, though, between the two insofar as the second example uses the first common notion, which is an axiom, as the predicate of the middle term, whereas the former uses the middle term as a definition of the minor term.

to all the mathematical sciences, whereas the latter are proper to the science of geometry.

Most importantly, the third requirement for a science is that it have an appropriate subject.²⁵ But, what exactly is the subject of a science? Unfortunately, the term is rather ambiguous. In a broad sense, the subject of a science is whatever enters into the consideration of the science.²⁶ In this sense, the subject of a science includes the axioms and properties demonstrated of the subject. In a more restricted sense, however, it signifies what the science principally considers. It is this latter sense that interests us here.

Because a science is the knowledge of something by means of a demonstration, the subject of a science is often identical to the subject of a demonstration. That the subject of a science need not always be identical to the subject of a demonstration is so only because a subject of one demonstration may well be the predicate of a previous conclusion. As a result, a property or attribute demonstrated of one subject may be a cause or subject of another attribute of a subsequent demonstration. For example, mortality, the property demonstrated of men above, is the subject of the following argument:

To be in need of a redeemer is to be in need of Christ. (major premise)
 Mortals are in need of a redeemer. (minor premise)
 Therefore, mortals are in need of Christ. (conclusion)

This example illustrates that the mortality concluding the previous argument is now used as the subject of another demonstration. Consequently, in a science one could connect the two arguments to show that men are in need of Christ. This kind of logical progression is best seen in geometry, in which one proposition after another forms the premises in subsequent demonstrations. Aquinas explains the reason for this logical progression as follows: "But in those sciences which bear upon accidents, nothing prevents a same thing from being taken as a subject in reference to one proper attribute, and as an attribute in reference to a more basic subject."²⁷ A property, then, is essentially an effect that is itself the cause of something else.

²⁵ The 'subject' of a science for Scotus is what modern terminology often refers to as the 'object' of a science.

²⁶ Schmidt, *The Domain of Logic*, p. 14.

²⁷ Thomas Aquinas, *Commentary on the Posterior Analytics of Aristotle*, trans. Larcher, I, lect. 2 (New York, 1970).

Although the property of one demonstration may be the cause of a subsequent demonstration, and vice versa, nevertheless, there must be some one subject that is itself not caused by a previous argument. For just as there cannot be an infinite regress of causes in the natural order, so there cannot be an infinite regress of subjects in the order of predications. Rather, some subject must be the ultimate cause of all the other attributes in subsequent demonstrations. "Nevertheless," Aquinas points out, "this [progression] must not develop into an infinite process, for one must arrive at something which is first in that science and which is taken as a subject in such a way that it is never taken as a proper attribute, as is clear in the mathematical sciences, which treat of continuous or discrete quantity. For in these sciences those things are postulated which are first in the genus of quantity; for example, unit and line and surface and the like."²⁸ Thus, the primary subject of a science is, so to speak, essentially the first uncaused cause of that science.

What is the ultimate or first subject of a science? It is the first or primary subject to which all subsequent demonstrations are finally reduced. In his commentary on Porphyry's *Isagoge*, Scotus adds that there are three requirements for a primary subject of a science: 1) the existence and the nature of the subject must be better known than the attributes; 2) the attributes must be demonstrated through the nature or essence of the subject in that science; and 3) all the things demonstrated in that science must be reducible to that subject as to a first principle, which is required for the unity of the science.²⁹ In his work on medieval logic, Schmidt describes it this way: "It is the subject about which knowledge is sought. And though we come to understand a thing by knowing its causes, and thus in a science seek causes, still it is not the causes which we are seeking to know, but the subject of our science."³⁰

The primary subject of a science, then, is that which specifies the science and gives it its true nature. Furthermore, the subject of a science is what distinguishes one science from another science, since the

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ *Quaestiones in librum Porphyrii Isagoge*, q. 3, n. 13: Ad videndum quae positio sit verior, notandum quod tres condiciones sunt requisitae subiecti in scientia, videlicet quod sit notum 'quid est' et 'quia est', nam haec duo oportet praesupponere demonstrationi, ut dicitur I *Posteriorum*. Secunda est quod per eius 'quid est' demonstrantur in scientia passiones illius subiecti de eo. Tertia est quod ad ipsum omnia alia determinata in scientia reducuntur et propter ipsum considerentur. Aliter enim ab eius unitate non esset unitas scientiae.

³⁰ Schmidt, *The Domain of Logic*, pp. 11–12.

subject of a science stands in the same relation to a science as the formal object of a power or habit stands in relation to that power or habit. For example, although the power of sight has, when considered materially, various objects, such as a stone, a person, or a house, each of these objects has only one specific form that is the proper object of sight, namely, color. Likewise, the proper object of hearing is the formal object of sound, regardless of the material diversity of the objects that produce sounds. Finally, the formal object of the habit of moderation is 'easily obtainable pleasure', even though, considered materially, there may be many pleasurable objects that are easily obtainable. These examples illustrate that just as the unity of a power or habit is taken from its formal object, so the unity of a science depends on the unity of the subject: a science is one to the extent to which its subject is one. As we will see in the next section, the requirement for a unified subject presents a special obstacle to the claim that the categories are the subject of a science.

These three requirements of a science may also be illustrated with a couple of examples taken from the science of geometry. A geometer can demonstrate that the interior angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles. In this example, being 'equal to two right angles' is an attribute of the 'interior angles of a triangle'. However, in a given demonstration the subject is a particular figure, often referred to simply as ABC, which is then defined by the middle term as a triangle.³¹ In this demonstration, the geometer makes use of other propositions, some of which in turn make use of common notions and postulates. He also makes use of the notion 'triangle, which, in an earlier demonstration, is shown to be constructed such that its three angles are equal to a given straight line. In this latter case, the existence of the 'triangle' is said to be the attribute and the 'straight line' the subject.³² Again, in this instance, the subject is a particular figure, referred to simply as AB, which is then defined by the middle term as a straight line. In these two examples, though, neither 'the angles of all triangles' nor 'straight lines' are the ultimate subject of geometry. Rather, the ultimate subject of geometry, as a science, is 'continuous quantity', to which both the straight lines and the angles of triangles are finally reduced.³³

³¹ For an example of this demonstration, see Euclid, *The Thirteen Books of the Elements*, bk. 1, prop. 32.

³² For a fuller discussion of this point, see Thomas Aquinas, *Commentary on the Posterior Analytics of Aristotle*, bk. I, lect. 2.

³³ Ibid.

Having clarified the differences between ‘science’ and ‘demonstration’, there is one last distinction that needs to be made: that between a demonstration of the fact (*quia*) and a demonstration of the reasoned fact (*propter quid*). The latter proceeds from a knowledge of causes to a knowledge of their effect, whereas the former, (*quia*), or demonstration of the fact, proceeds from a knowledge of effects to a knowledge of their causes.³⁴ In a demonstration *quia*, the middle term is still said to define the subject since it is that which is better known to us. Aquinas explains the reason for this possibility: “in the case of two things equally predicable, i.e., convertible, one of which is the cause and the other the effect, there is nothing to preclude that now and then the better known will not be the cause but the effect.”³⁵ In a demonstration *quia*, the attribute is not said to be an effect caused by the subject but rather a cause known by the effect. Aristotle himself provides the classic examples illustrating the differences between *scientia quia* and *scientia propter quid*.³⁶ Here are the two examples in syllogistic form:³⁷

scientia propter quid

Near (things) are non-twinkling.

The planets are near (things) (cause).

∴ The planets are non-twinkling (effect).

scientia quia

Non-twinkling (things) are near.

The planets are non-twinkling (effect)

∴ The planets are near (cause)

As one can see, in the first example the fact that planets are non-twinkling is demonstrated by their being near, whereas in the second example, the fact that planets are near is explained from the fact that they are non-twinkling. Obviously, the nearness of the planets is not caused by their failure to twinkle but rather their failure to twinkle is caused by their nearness. These two types of demonstration correspond to two types of science: *scientia propter quid* and *scientia quia*. As we will see in the next two sections, Scotus and his contemporaries disagree as to which type of science pertains to the categories.

³⁴ Technically speaking, *scientia quia* is also any knowledge that proceeds from mediate principles as opposed to proceeding from immediate principles. See Thomas Aquinas, *Commentary on the Posterior Analytics of Aristotle*, bk., I, lect. 2.

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ *Posterior Analytics*, I, ch. 13, 78a 30–5.

³⁷ For the sake of clarity, I have placed these in the form of Barbara. Two things should be kept in mind: First, all the statements are to be understood as affirmative declarations, even when the predicate is negative, i.e., ‘non-twinkling’ is the predicate. Second, the attribute of ‘non-twinkling’ must be construed as a property of ‘nearness’, such that they have the same extension and hence are convertible.

2. *The Science of the Categories According to Scotus's Contemporaries*

By the time Scotus composes his *Categories* commentary, logic is typically subdivided into three different parts or sciences, each with its own specific subject, corresponding to the three acts of the mind: 1) the act of simple apprehension, which grasps simple concepts, corresponds to the ten categories; 2) the act of judgment, which combines two simple concepts into a judgment, corresponds to statements; and 3) the act of reasoning, from which one proceeds from two known statements to a third unknown statement, corresponds to the syllogism. The following examples, taken from Scotus's commentary on the *Categories*, exemplify a demonstration corresponding to each of the three acts of the mind: First, every term, which is grasped by simple apprehension, is orderable within a genus. Animal is such a term, therefore, animal is orderable in a genus. Second, every statement, which is a product of judgment, is either true or false. Sentence 'A' is such a statement, therefore, sentence 'A' is either true or false. Third, an invalid syllogism, which is produced by the act of reasoning, does not produce a necessarily true conclusion. That particular syllogism is invalid, therefore that particular syllogism does not produce a necessarily true conclusion.

As one can see from these instances, attributes are demonstrated of the subject term by means of a first figure syllogism. More importantly, the attributes only pertain to things insofar as those things are acts of the mind.³⁸ That is, being 'orderable in a genus', 'true or false', or 'invalid' does not pertain to either things considered as individuals or to common natures, which are neither individual nor universal. Since this chapter is principally about Scotus's commentary on the *Categories*, let us focus on the science of the categories to the exclusion of the other two sciences, viz., a science of judgments and a science of reasoning.

As previously mentioned, most medieval commentaries on the *Categories* raise a question or two concerning whether or not a science of the categories is possible, to which many—Martin of Dacia, Peter of Auvergne, Simon Faversham, Radulphus Brito, and Duns Scotus—all respond affirmatively. As we will see, Scotus's position is quite unusual among these others in several ways.³⁹ To appreciate the uniqueness of

³⁸ I will return to this point at the end of this chapter.

³⁹ Ockham is unique for a completely different reason, namely insofar as he denies that there is a single subject of the categories. Cf. William of Ockham, *Expositio in librum Praedicamentorum Aristotelis*, in *Guillelmi de Ockham Opera philosophica et theologica*, *Opera*

his position, we will first look at the different conceptions of the science of the categories put forth by three of his contemporaries: Martin of Dacia, Peter of Auvergne, and Simon of Faversham.

Martin of Dacia composed his commentary on the *Categories* sometime between 1270 and 1275.⁴⁰ Although he does not specifically ask whether the categories are the subject of a science, he does ask two related questions. The first is whether being is the subject of the categories. The first of two arguments for the negative is that the subject of a logical science is a second intention. However, based on the authority of Avicenna, second intentions are not real things, whereas being (*ens*) is a real thing, not an intention. The conclusion is that the subject of this work is not being. The second argument is that a subject of a science must be univocal; being is not univocal; therefore, being is not the subject. The one opposing argument is that for something to be the subject of a science, it must exist. In his solution, Martin concedes to the arguments for the negative, namely, that being is not the subject of the categories since it is not predicated univocally of them. In response to the opposing argument, he points out that being can be considered in two ways: 1) insofar as it is common and intentional, which is apprehended by the intellect; and 2) insofar as it is specific and real, positing something in one of the ten categories. In the latter way, so Martin concedes, being is not the subject of the categories. However, he contends that being is the subject of a science in the former way.

Martin's second question is whether the subject of the categories is an incomplex, univocal entity that is sayable and orderable within a genus (*ens incomplexum univocum dicibile ordinabile in genere*). Although Martin does not spell out what this phrase means, Andrews notes that it is a "version of a traditional summarizing expression."⁴¹ Other commentators sometimes drop the word *univocum*, so that the whole expression is simply '*ens incomplexum dicibile ordinabile genere*'. According to Lewry, John Pagus, Nicholas of Paris, and Gerard Nogent first formulated this phrase

philosophica II, ed. Gedeon Gál (St. Bonaventure, 1978), *Prooemium*: Unde suppositis quibusdam communibus omnibus libris philosophiae in libro Porphyrii determinatis—sicut nec aliorum librorum, ita nec scientia praedicamentorum est unus habitus numero; nec habet unum subiectum, sed multa; nec habet plures causas essentielles quam duas, proprie loquendo de causis.

⁴⁰ Martin's commentary on the *Categories* is in Martin of Dacia, *Opera omnia*, ed. Roos, pp. 153–231, and his first two questions are on pp. 155–6.

⁴¹ Robert Andrews, *Peter of Auvergne's Commentary*, p. 14.

to account for the material cause of a science of the categories.⁴² The phrase is based on the standard position, first articulated by Porphyry, that the *Categories* is about the ten utterances signifying the ten genera. It entails the following: first, ‘*ens*’, or being, signifies that the subject is something that exists as opposed to being a figment of someone’s mind. Furthermore, being is posited because the first requirement for a science is that the subject must exist prior to, and be better known than, the attributes demonstrated of it. The second word, ‘*incomplexum*’ signifies that the subject is the ten categories which are apprehended by the first act of the intellect. The third word, ‘*dicibile*’, is said to reflect Boethius’ description of logic as “words signifying things.”⁴³ However, ‘*dicibile*’ also implies that what is signified is predicable of others, thus this word is added to the phrase to exclude proper names which are not predicable of others.⁴⁴ Finally, the words, ‘*ordinabile in genere*’ signify the fact that the categories, taken as the whole hierarchy of the ten various kinds of things as opposed to simply the ten highest genera, are ordered to one another as above and below within those most common genera. For example, the word ‘animal’ is ordered to the word ‘living’ above it and to the word ‘man’ below it.

To return to the question of the proper subject of the categories, Martin provides only one dubious argument on each side of the question. His solution is equally dubious: the subject of a logical science, he says, ought to be a logical thing. An incomplex expression is a logical thing, therefore, an incomplex expression is the subject of this science.⁴⁵ As one can see, Martin’s two questions concerning the science of the categories leave much to be desired. Taken together, he offers only three arguments for the negative and two arguments for the affirmative. His responses leave even more to be desired. Overall, he indicates no awareness in his commentary concerning the various requirements of a science nor how those requirements pose specific problems for a science of the categories.

⁴² P. O. Lewry, “Robert Kilwardby’s Writings on the *Logica Vetus*, Studied with Regard to their Teaching and Method,” (Unpublished D.Phil. thesis, University of Oxford, 1978), p. 91.

⁴³ Andrews, “Peter of Auvergne’s *Commentary on Aristotle’s Categories*,” p. 14.

⁴⁴ De Rijk, *Logica Modernorum*, vol. 2, part I, p. 470.

⁴⁵ I follow Martin of Dacia’s lead in reducing this phrase simply to ‘*dicibile incomplexum*’.

Within a few years of Martin's commentary on the *Categories*, Peter of Auvergne composed his own commentary (circa 1275).⁴⁶ Unlike Martin, though, Peter is aware of two key difficulties concerning the claim that there is a science of the categories, and he raises them in the first two questions. The first question is whether there can be a science of the categories. He gives only one argument for the negative, viz., that the categories do not have a cause, and therefore a science of them does not exist. His opposing argument is an appeal to the authority of Aristotle. In his solution to the question, Peter argues that even though the categories do not have a cause, there is still a science of them, just not an unqualified demonstration based on causality. Rather, the science of the categories, according to Peter, is only a certain cognition of them based on their definitions and descriptions.

The second question he raises is whether there can be one science of the categories. Again, the one argument for the negative is that the categories are not one but many, so there cannot be one science of them. The reason supporting this argument, as we saw earlier, is that in order for a science to be one, its subject must also be one. However, since there is nothing common to the ten categories, they cannot be the subject of one science. The opposing argument claims that the nine accidents are one insofar as they are all attributed to substance, and therefore some sort of unity inheres in them. In his own personal solution to the argument, Peter adopts the main argument to the opposite with a slight modification. According to the argument to the opposite, the categories are the subject of one science since they are all attributed to substance. According to Peter's own solution, the categories are the subject of one science since they are all attributed to a single subject, although not to substance. What is this subject to which all the categories are attributed? Peter says it is an incomplex entity orderable in a genus (*ens incomplexum ordinabile in genere*), a solution essentially the same as the one adopted by Martin of Dacia. For reasons not explained, though, Peter drops the words '*dicibile*' and '*univocum*' from the phrase.

Peter's solutions present three important elements. First, he does not think that the categories are the subject of an unqualified demonstration, but simply says the categories are the subject of a descriptive science. Second, the unity of the categories is a unity based on attribution to a

⁴⁶ Peter of Auvergne's commentary is translated as part of Andrews' dissertation. See Andrews, "Peter of Auvergne's *Commentary on Aristotle's Categories*," pp. 469–70.

first subject, which is an incomplex entity orderable in a genus. Finally, although he does not use the word ‘analogy’, Peter’s argument is similar to the way in which ‘being’ is said to be predicated analogously of the ten categories in the science of metaphysics.⁴⁷ The difference is that in the latter science, the ten categories are each attributed to a primary substance, whereas here they are each attributed to an incomplex entity which exists only objectively, not really. Nevertheless, it is important to note that the science of the categories is modeled on, and parallels, the science of metaphysics. That is, even though the two sciences may be really distinct from one another, the two are isomorphic to one another.

Although Martin and Peter ask different questions, their basic positions do not essentially differ. Both agree that there is a science of the categories whose subject is either an incomplex entity orderable in a genus, or an incomplex univocal entity, sayable and orderable in a genus. Overall, though, Peter’s arguments are more developed since he is at least aware of the fact that a science must have a cause and that its subject must have an appropriate unity, items which Martin either is unaware of or overlooks. Finally, Peter’s solution to these arguments has the effect of making the science of the categories similar to the science of metaphysics, whereas Martin’s basic position seems to keep the two sciences more separated.

Within a decade or so of Peter’s and Martin’s commentaries, Simon of Faversham composes his own commentary on the *Categories* (circa 1280).⁴⁸ Although Simon raises only one question concerning whether a science of the categories exists, that one question shows a marked development in the awareness of the various problems associated with a science of the categories. To the question: whether there can be a science of the categories?, there are two arguments to the negative which claim that the categories are not the subject of a science. We have seen the first argument before in Peter’s commentary, viz., a science must have a cause. The second argument, however, is new: every science is had through a demonstration in which the middle term is a definition. Since the categories are the highest genera, they do not have a definition, for every definition is through a genus and a differentia. The conclu-

⁴⁷ Ibid., pp. 12–18.

⁴⁸ Simon of Faversham, *Quaestiones super librum Praedicamentorum*, in *Opera omnia*, vol. I, ed. P. Mazzarella (Padova, 1957), q. 1, pp. 263–7.

sion is that there cannot be a science of the categories. Like Peter's and Martin's commentaries, Simon only gives one opposing argument. Unlike Peter's argument, though, his opposing argument does not simply appeal to the authority of Aristotle but actually indicates some original thinking on the issue. According to this argument, there is a science of everything that can be done correctly or incorrectly. Things within a category can be ordered correctly or incorrectly when compared to those things above and below them. Therefore, there must be a science of the categories. Whatever its strengths may be, it is certainly better than Martin's claim that "the subject of a logical science ought to be a logical thing."

More important still, Simon provides eight separate arguments on behalf of a science of the categories. Out of the eight separate arguments, four things stand out in his solution to this initial question.

First, he is aware that a science must meet three conditions: 1) its subject must exist; 2) it must be intelligible; and 3) it must have constitutive parts. These parts, Simon says, are properties demonstrated of the subject.⁴⁹ Not surprisingly, Simon thinks that the categories meet these three requirements. Regarding the first requirement, Simon emphatically argues that every category is a true being that exists outside the soul, '*ens verum extra animam est*'.⁵⁰ By 'true being', Simon refers to the categories as they are studied in metaphysics, which he calls divine science. In contrast, those things whose being depends on the soul and whose mode of being are logical intentions, such as genus and species, he calls beings, *entia*, not being, *ens*. Nevertheless, whether they exist outside the soul or depend on the soul, the fact remains that they are, i.e., they exist in some sense.

Regarding the second requirement, i.e., intelligibility, Simon maintains that the categories are intelligible because genus and species are posited in the categories. The intellect, however, does not base the intention of

⁴⁹ Simon is not too clear on the three conditions required for a science. The Latin is: "Ad hoc enim quod de aliquo possit esse scientia tria requiruntur, scilicet quod ipsum sit ens et quod ipsum sit intelligibile et quod habeat partes constituentes ipsum, proprietates et passiones que possunt probari de hoc" q. 1, p., 263–4. Based on the construction of the Latin, it seems that constituent parts are synonymous with properties and attributes. However, in the arguments that follow this paragraph, it seems as if there are four requirements for a science: 1) being; 2) intelligibility; 3) constituent parts, which he identifies with a definition; and 4) properties and attributes. In his previous article, Martin Pickavé takes parts and definitions to be identical. See, supra, p. 265.

⁵⁰ Simon of Faversham, *Quaestiones super librum Praedicamentorum*, q. 1, p. 264.

genus and species on something unless it is intelligible; therefore, the categories must be intelligible.

Regarding the last requirement, that it have parts, Simon claims that the categories have properties attributed to them. The proof of this claim is that Aristotle gives various properties of substance, quantity, quality, etc. What are these properties? In a subsequent argument, Simon gives two examples taken from Aristotle's *Categories* pertaining to the category substance: 1) it 'receives more and less'; and 2) 'nothing is contrary to substance'.⁵¹

Second, Simon next points out that since a science is a habit based on a demonstration, there are as many types of sciences as there are types of demonstration. According to Aristotle, there are two types of demonstration: one that reasons from effects to causes, and one that reasons from causes to effects. As Simon states, "science is twofold: one that proceeds from things that are nearer and prior in themselves, and another which proceeds from things nearer and prior with respect to us."⁵² The former, which is an unqualified demonstration, is not the kind of science that pertains to the categories, for that kind of science requires a definition constituted by a genus and differentia, and the categories, as the highest genera, do not have a higher genus. Accordingly, the science of the categories is a science of the fact, a *scientia quia*, not a science of the reasoned fact, a *scientia propter quid*. Proof of this claim is that we do not know the essences of the categories in themselves. Rather, what we know about the categories are their properties, which are nearer to us.⁵³

⁵¹ Contrary to Simon's claim, however, it would seem that these two properties of substance pertain to the category of substance as it exists *extra animam*, not insofar as it is a being of reason.

⁵² Simon of Faversham, *Quaestiones super librum Praedicamentorum*, q. 1, p. 265: Similiter duplex est scientia, una que procedit ex prioribus et nocioribus simpliciter, et alia ex nocioribus et prioribus quoad nos, et nociora nobis quandoque sunt ignociora et posteriora quoad nos.

⁵³ The importance of this claim, and the extent to which Scotus' account differs from Simon's, is highlighted by Pini, who states that: "In the *Categories*, much space is devoted to the properties pertaining to categories, but not much else is said concerning each category. Why does Aristotle consider the properties pertaining to categories in more detail than he considers categories themselves? Simon of Faversham maintains that the science of categories deals with the properties of categories because their essence is unknown to us. Consequently, in order to know something about categories, the only viable option is to study their properties. Scotus, however, does not agree with this position, for he maintains that the logical consideration of categories has nothing to do with the study of their essence. The fact that the essence of categories is unknown to us does not explain why the *Categories* studies the properties of categories more than

Third, Simon maintains that each of the ten categories consists of two parts: a thing, or essence, and a mode of being.⁵⁴ The essence of a category is studied in metaphysics, or, as he prefers to call it, divine science. A category's mode of being, which is either identical to or is the basis of its mode of predicating, is studied in logic.⁵⁵ If a category's mode of being is not to be in another, then that category is a substance. If a category's mode of being is to be in another, then it is an accident. Not surprisingly, in his twelfth question Simon thinks that he can deduce the ten categories from the different ways in which the categories are predicated of something.⁵⁶

Finally, Like Peter of Auvergne, Simon also thinks that the unity of the science of the categories is a unity of attribution. In the divine science, where the essences of categories are studied as things in themselves, the categories are attributed to God, not simply to substance. In logic, where the categories are not studied as things in themselves but in light of their mode of predicating, all things are attributed to one subject. That subject, as one might suspect, is an incomplex entity sayable and orderable within a genus. As Simon states, "all things which are considered here have an attribution to one thing, and that is an incomplex being that is sayable and orderable in a genus according to

categories themselves." Pini, *Categories and Logic in Duns Scotus*, p. 163. In the preceding paragraph, Pini also points out that "Scotus thinks that those properties [of the individual categories] are intentional whereas others maintain that they are real."

⁵⁴ The belief that a category consists of a thing and its mode is shared by Thomas Aquinas and Henry of Ghent as well. For a detailed discussion of Simon's view on the categories, see Pini, *Categories and Logic in Duns Scotus*, pp. 152–4. Scotus, on the contrary, does not think that a category consists of a thing and a mode. As Pini points out, "According to Scotus, categories are not constituted by two metaphysical aspects. Instead, categories, metaphysically speaking, are simple things and essences. Everything is identified as something thanks to its essence, which is an essence of a certain type. Scotus seems to maintain that it is not possible to divide a thing from its mode, and this may be the reason for Scotus's suspicion concerning the distinction between being and essence." p. 147.

⁵⁵ Pini points out the inconsistency in Simon's account: "Simon adds, however, that a category's mode of being is identical to its *ratio praedicandi*, that is to the mode in which that category is predicated of the things that are contained in it. Other times, he says that the mode of predicating is not identical to the mode of being, but is nonetheless derived from it. Be that as it may, it is clear that Simon maintains that categories consist of modes of predication that are either based on or identical to the modes of being." Pini, *Categories and Logic in Duns Scotus*, p. 153.

⁵⁶ For a discussion of how this is carried out by Aquinas, see Symington's article above.

above and below.”⁵⁷ Because each of the categories is attributed to this incomplex entity, he adds,

the diverse ways in which this science and the divine science considers the categories is obvious, for the divine science considers them insofar as they are certain essences and parts of being; however, in this book the categories are not considered insofar as they are simply material things, but insofar as they have some mode of predicating, which is why this book is called ‘Of the Predicaments’.⁵⁸

Thus, Simon “maintains that the categories are composed of an essence and of a mode of being, which is either identical to or is parallel to a mode of predication, as we have seen. It can be said, therefore, that logic studies categories not according to their essences but according to their modes of being, and such modes of being are as real as the essences of categories.”⁵⁹ In this way, Simon moves closer than either Martin or Peter in holding to a similarity or parallel between both a logical and a metaphysical consideration of the categories.

From Martin of Dacia to Simon of Faversham, the science of the categories has made a marked development in a relatively short period of time. Martin seems to be unaware of the problems concerning the claim that the categories are the subject of a science. Peter, on the other hand, is aware of the two fundamental problems, viz., that they have neither a cause nor an appropriate unity to satisfy the basic requirements of a science. Although he does not offer any original contributions, Peter’s solutions to these problems are obviously taken from the science of metaphysics, with the consequence that the science of the categories resembles the science of metaphysics. This similarity is not

⁵⁷ Simon of Faversham, *Quaestiones super librum Praedicamentorum*, q. 1, p. 266. The quotation in question comes at the end, the context of which is Simon’s comparison of the unity found in the science of logic to the unity found in theology or divine science: Sed ad hoc quod aliqua scientia sit una, sufficit quod subiectum sit unum secundum attributionem. Hoc modo scientia divina est una, quia omnia que ibi considerantur habent attributionem ad unum primum ens quod est substantia, et non (2) ad quamcumque substantiam, sed ad primam que est Deus, ut apparet ex suo processo.—Similiter omnia que hic considerantur, habent attributionem ad unum, et illud est ens dicibile incomplexum ordinabile in genere secundum sub et supra.

⁵⁸ Ibid.: Et ex hoc apparet quomodo diversimode considerat ista scientia de predicamentis et scientia divina, quoniam scientia divina considerat de eis ut sunt quedam essencie et partes entis; in isto autem libro non determinatur de predicamentis secundum quod sunt res materie absolute, sed secundum quod habent talem modum predicandi vel talem; et ide dicitur liber Praedicamentorum.

⁵⁹ Pini, *Categories and Logic in Duns Scotus*, p. 154.

surprising given that he is an early representative of the Modistae.⁶⁰ Simon of Faversham then works out the most sophisticated discussion of the issue. In addition to the problems raised in Peter's commentary, Simon is aware of the three conditions required for a science and of the distinction between a *scientia propter quid* and *scientia quia*. To no surprise, Simon's solution to these difficulties borrows heavily from the science of metaphysics, with the result that a science of the categories is almost identical to the divine science. The reason for this parallel is that, for Simon, categories consist of two things: an essence and its mode of existence. The essences of the categories are considered in the divine science, while their modes are considered in logic. Accordingly, Simon also claims that the logician can deduce the number of categories based on an analysis of their modes of being or being predicated.

When one turns from Scotus's contemporaries' accounts of a science of the categories to Scotus's own account of this same issue, one can see that Scotus makes by far the most remarkable progress and has the most sophisticated view on this issue. Unlike his contemporaries, who devote at most five pages to this issue in their commentaries on the *Categories*, Scotus devotes twenty pages to the science of the categories and another twenty pages to a related question concerning the univocity of being. Moreover, these pages do not include his discussion of the three requirements of a science, which are addressed in his commentary on the *Isagoge*.⁶¹

To begin with, Scotus criticizes the standard position that maintains the subject of the categories is an incomplex entity sayable and orderable in a genus. He also thinks that the categories are the subject of a *scientia propter quid*, not just a *scientia quia*. However, the nature of the categories and the requirements for any kind of science are such that a number of difficulties face Scotus in demonstrating successfully that the categories are the subject of science. Consequently, in the remaining sections of this chapter I focus on three portions of Scotus's argument. First, I look at how the categories are part of the overall science of logic. Second, I show how Scotus appeals to the role of the intellect as the cause of the various properties, thereby establishing a foundation for the unity of this science. Finally, I focus on the unity of the categories as second intentions. By covering these points, we will see that Scotus

⁶⁰ Andrews, "Peter of Auvergne's *Commentary on Aristotle's Categories*," p. 12.

⁶¹ Cf. q. 1–3, which are another eighteen pages.

successfully demonstrates that the categories are the subject of a *scientia propter quid*, a science that he calls simply the ‘categories’.

3. *The Science of Logic according to Scotus*

As I previously mentioned, by the time Scotus composes his commentary on the *Categories*, it is commonly accepted that logic is not only a speculative science but also that it is divided into three separate parts comparable to the three operations of the intellect. In spite of this general agreement, considerable disagreement remains over what constitutes the primary subject of logic, to which all the various properties are finally reduced. In his commentary on the *Isagoge*, Scotus reminds us that the nature and existence of this primary subject must be better known than all of its properties, which are demonstrated of it. Furthermore, all the attributes demonstrated of that subject must ultimately be reduced to that primary subject as to a first principle. Scotus’s contemporaries, however, disagree on what the primary subject of logic is. Prior to writing his logical commentaries, various philosophers proposed six different possibilities. In his commentary on Porphyry’s *Isagoge*, Scotus rejects five of these possibilities on grounds that they are insufficient.⁶² Let us first look at these six possibilities.

The first position, held by Aquinas, contends that the acts of reason are the first subject of logic. Just as the acts of reason are threefold—namely, the act of simple apprehension, judgment, and reasoning—so the parts of logic are threefold, which are treated by Aristotle in three different books, i.e., the *Categories*, *On Interpretation*, and *Prior Analytics*, respectively. The second opinion, which Scotus incorrectly attributes to Boethius but was actually put forth by Avicenna, is that the subject of logic consists of second intentions applied to first intentions. The third position, also held by Aquinas, maintains that beings of reason are the subject of logic. Scotus thinks that these three positions are equivalent to one another and are all insufficient on the same grounds, namely, that they do not satisfy the first two requirements of a subject of a science.⁶³ That is to say, the nature and existence of these three things is not better known than their attributes, nor are properties demonstrated

⁶² *Quaestiones super Porphyrii Isagoge*, q. 3, nn. 7–20.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, n. 13–17.

of them through their definitions. In fact, says Scotus, their definitions are not even given in logic.

The fourth opinion, first articulated by Boethius, is that the subject of logic is speech (*sermo*).⁶⁴ According to Scotus, though, speech is not the subject of logic, for it fails to satisfy the second and third requirements of the subject of a science. That is, the definition of speech is not given in logic nor are the attributes reduced to it as to a first principle. As Pini describes it, “logical demonstrations are not about the properties of speech and what is studied in logic cannot be reduced to speech.”⁶⁵ Scotus confirms this point in his commentary on the *Categories*, since the properties demonstrated of the categories exist even if one never speaks.⁶⁶

The last opinion Scotus rejects is the one held by Albert the Great—the subject of logic is reasoning or argumentation.⁶⁷ Scotus mercilessly disproves this position: it fails to satisfy all three conditions. Neither is the existence and nature of argumentation known in logic, nor are properties demonstrated of it through a definition, nor are the attributes demonstrated in logic reducible to argumentation as its first subject.

According to Scotus, the only possible candidate that satisfies the necessary and sufficient conditions for the primary subject of a science is the syllogism, since only it satisfies all three requirements.⁶⁸ The

⁶⁴ Ibid., n. 18: Quarto, scilicet orationi, deficit secunda condicio et tertia. Et quando accipitur quod convenit syllogismo, dico quod nonnisi aequivoce ei et enuntiationi; et aequivocum non est subiectum, quia nec definibile; sumitur enim in definitione syllogismi pro argumentatione.

⁶⁵ Pini, *Categories and Logic in Duns Scotus*, p. 35.

⁶⁶ Q 1, n. 11: Ad quaestionem dici potest quod iste liber non est de decem vocibus ut de primo subiecto—nec aliqua pars logicae est de voce, quia omnes passionis syllogismi et omnium partium eius possunt sibi inesse secundum esse quod habent in mente etsi non proferantur, ut patet inductive—, sed est de aliquo priore, quod respectu vocis significativae tantum habet rationem significati.

⁶⁷ *Quaestiones in librum Porphyrii Isagoge*, q. 3. n. 19: Quinto, scilicet argumentationi, deest primum. Non enim ab Aristotele usquam definitur argumentatio in communi, nec ponitur eius definitio ut principium scientiae; sed Boethius definit eam in *Topicis* suis. Secundum etiam deest sibi, ut manifestum est secundum rationem generalem. Tertium etiam proba: quia vel est aequivocum, et tunc manifestum est quod ab eius unitate non est scientia una, cum tunc non sit unum scibile nec unum intelligibile; vel est analogum ad contenta sub ipso, et tunc scientia non erit una ab ipso sed ab unitate primi ad quod alia attribuuntur,—et illud est syllogismus—sicut unitas metaphysicae est ab unitate substantiae ad quam alia entia attribuuntur.

⁶⁸ Ibid., n. 20: Dicendum ergo quod subiectum primum et proprium est syllogismus. Habet enim primam condicionem, quia statim post determinationem de partibus eius in veriter logica, in principio *Priorum*, praemittit eius definitioem. Et secundum, quia

existence and nature of a syllogism are better known than the attributes demonstrated of it. Whether they are trained in logic or, as Aristotle says, simply “attempt to discuss statements and to maintain them,” all men proceed from the known to the unknown.⁶⁹ Accordingly, the existence and nature of syllogisms are obvious. Those who study logic also know that “the subject can plainly be handled systematically,”⁷⁰ such that properties are shown to inhere in various syllogisms, e.g., ‘to be from three terms’, ‘to be valid or invalid’, and ‘to have a middle term’. These properties demonstrated in logic are demonstrated through the definition of a syllogism. Finally, all things studied in logic are reduced to a syllogism as to a first subject.

This last criterion is of interest here. According to this condition, everything considered in logic must either be a syllogism or something that can be reduced to a syllogism, as “a part is reduced to a whole.”⁷¹ As we saw above, though, the immediate parts of a syllogism are propositions, namely, the two premises and the conclusion. As the immediate parts of a syllogism, each proposition also has its own attributes, such as being ‘either true or false’.⁷² Since a proposition is itself not a simple part, but is resolved into subject and predicate terms, the parts of propositions also have properties in their own right. Scotus claims that, “that which is treated here [in the *Categories*] is essentially [*per se*] part of the subject considered in the book *On Interpretation*, and that [subject] is part of that which is considered in the book *Prior Analytics*, which is the syllogism.”⁷³ Thus, categories and statements are studied in logic to the extent to which they are parts of syllogisms.

in eodem multas passiones de illo ostendit per illam definitionem, ut modum et figuram, in illis de inesse et modo—ut habere tres terminos—in illo capitulo “Quoniam iūtur in his” per hoc quod est de necessitate accidere conclusioni etc. Et tertiam, quia propter ipsum determinatur de partibus eius, scilicet de incomplexo et enuntiatione et integralibus partibus eius subiectivis in libro *Priorum* et *Posteriorum*; et de aliis speciebus argumentationis, quia illa reducuntur ad ipsum ut imperfectum ad perfectum; et de syllogismo sophistico, ut de privatione eius, quia eiusdem est cognoscere habitum et privationem. Sic ergo penes eius divisionem et attributa illi patet divisio logicae.

⁶⁹ *Rhetoric*, I, ch. 1, 1354a 5–6.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 1354a 9–10.

⁷¹ Pini, *Categories and Logic in Duns Scotus*, p. 34.

⁷² Duns Scotus, *Quaestiones super Praedicamenta Aristoteles*, eds. Robert Andrews et al. (St. Bonaventure, 1999), q. 1, n. 9: Ad ista duo potest dici quod ‘esse ex tribus terminis’ est passio syllogismi ut est in voce, sicut ‘verum vel falsum significare’ est passio enuntiationis, et sic de ceteris passionibus huiusmodi.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, n. 7: Item, illud de quo hic agitur est per se pars subiecti considerati in libro *Perihermenias*, et illud est pars eius quod consideratur in libro *Priorum*, quod est syllogismus; sed illud omnes suas passiones habet sibi inhaerentes, ut manifestum est, nulla voce

According to many medieval Aristotelians, the primary subject stands in the same relation to a science as an object stands in relation to a power. For example, there is a generic power of sensation, which includes the particular powers of seeing, hearing, smelling, etc. Moreover, as particular powers, each one has its own formal object distinguishing one sensation from another. Nevertheless, the ability to see and to hear share in the common power of sensing. In the same way, the subject of logic as a whole is the syllogism, but since the syllogism is comprised of various parts, there are also various subordinate sciences, such as a science of complex concepts and a science of incomplex concepts.⁷⁴ The former is dealt with in Aristotle's work *On Interpretation*, while the latter is treated in the *Categories*.

One may argue, however, that just as Aristotle discusses a part of logic in the *Categories* and another part in *On Interpretation*, so he discusses a part of logic in the *Prior Analytics*, namely, the formal nature of the syllogism. If so, it would seem to follow that the syllogism is the subject of a part of logic and not of the whole of logic. Would it not be unreasonable to have the same subject for a part and for a whole? Such an objection is actually raised in Scotus's commentary on Porphyry's *Isagoge*: "Nothing is the subject of the whole and of the part; but a syllogism is the subject of a part of logic, namely, of the book *Prior Analytics*, therefore, etc."⁷⁵ Scotus responds that the syllogism is the subject of a part of logic as it is considered formally. However, it is the subject of the whole of logic with respect to all the attributes in it or in its integral parts or in its integral subjects, or in the parts reducible to it. Thus the syllogism, considered formally, is a part of

existente nec possibile esse. Similiter, enuntiatio suas habet. Ergo utrumque illorum est prius naturaliter voce significativa Et quod hic consideratur, est prius naturaliter utroque istorum, sicut pars integralis toto; ergo quod hic consideratur primo est naturaliter prius voce significativa quacumque. Ergo non est hic subiectum vox significativa.

⁷⁴ Ultimately, Scotus thinks that there is a specific science corresponding to each of the books in Aristotle's *Organon*. Altogether, these separate sciences comprise the whole science of logic, which has the syllogism as a whole for its proper subject. Cf. *Quaestiones in librum Porphyrii Isagoge*, q. 3, n. 24: Ad secundum argumentum principale dico quod syllogismus quoad proprietates formaliter ipsum consequentes est subiectum libri *Priorum*. Est autem subiectum totius logicae quoad omnes passionem in se vel in suis partibus integralibus vel subiectivis vel reducibilibus ad ipsum. Nec oportet subiectum praedicari de omnibus consideratis in scientia, sed esse propter quod alia considerantur; ut patet de subiecto naturalis scientiae, quod est corpus mobile, ubi tamen agitur de motu et natura, quae non sunt corpus mobile.

⁷⁵ *Quaestiones in librum Porphyrii Isagoge*, q. 3, n. 4: Item, nihil est subiectum totius et partis; sed syllogismus est subiectum partis logicae, scilicet libri *Priorum*, itigitur, etc.

logic and considered as a whole it is the primary subject of logic. With these distinctions in mind, let us now look more closely at the science of the categories.

4. *The Cause of Second Intentions*

Unlike the other parts of logic, a science of the categories presents several major problems that Scotus must solve. Those problems include the following: 1) The categories, as the highest genera, do not have a higher genus. 2) The categories are not specifically, or even generically, one since there is nothing common to them. 3) The categories are not definable by a genus and differentia since, again, they do not have a higher genus. 4) The categories, as the principles and causes of everything else, do not have a cause. Although these problems take different forms, they all essentially amount to one problem: the categories, as extramental beings, are not one but many, yet a primary subject of a science must essentially be one, or have an essential unity.⁷⁶ To see how Scotus solves these basic problems, it will be necessary to review what Scotus has to say about the three considerations of an essence and about concepts.

Like many of his contemporaries, Scotus accepts the Avicennian doctrine of a threefold consideration of an essence: 1) as it exists in a physical thing, in which case it is a material being; 2) as it exists on its own, in which case it is simply a common nature; and 3) as it exists in the mind, in which case it is a universal.⁷⁷ In his commentary on the *Isagoge*, Scotus states:

Nevertheless it must be known that a significate of a common term, which signifies a true nature, can be considered in three ways. In one way, according to its being which exists in its supposit, which is said to be its material being, and in this way, common accidents inhere in it. In a second way, it is considered simply according to its essential being, and in this way the essential predicates inhere in it. In a third way, [it is considered] as it is apprehended by the intellect through an intelligible

⁷⁶ If the categories had a higher genus, or could be defined by means of a genus and differentia, or had a cause, they would all have an essential unity. However, the diversity or plurality of the ten categories is essentially related to the fact that they do not have a higher genus, or a single definition, or a cause.

⁷⁷ For Avicenna's influence on Albertus Magnus, compare Bruno Tremblay's article above.

form, which is its cognitive being, and in this way intentions are attributed to it.⁷⁸

In the second way, i.e., in itself, an essence or common nature is neither particular nor universal. As that nature exists in individual things, however, it is particular and has a numerical unity to it corresponding to its material being. Finally, as it exists in the mind, it is universal and has an objective or quidditative being.

Just as one can consider an essence in three ways, one can consider its attributes in the same three ways. For example, the essence considered in itself has certain essential properties, namely, those properties that are contained in a definition, such as the property of risibility as a necessary attribute of the nature of man. Then there are the properties or accidents that are present in individuals which pertain to the essence insofar as it is considered to exist in individuals. For example, the accident of being white pertains to the essence of man as it exists in a particular person. Finally, there are also certain properties or attributes that pertain to the essence insofar as it is considered to exist in the mind, such as the attribute of being predicable of many. For Scotus, though, the ability to be predicated of many is neither a property of the common nature as it exists in itself nor as it exists in a particular person. Rather, it is only a property of the common nature insofar as that nature is apprehended by the intellect.

As an essence exists in the mind, it is a concept or intention—that is, the thing considered insofar as it is understood. Without going into Scotus's theory of knowledge in detail, it is important to remember that Scotus accepts that there is an identity between the knower and the known.⁷⁹ Thus, when the essence of something is presented to the knower by way of an intelligible species, which is a real property inhering in the soul, it exists in the soul as a universal. The essence, as a universal, however, does not have real, extramental being but only cognitive, or objective, being. That is, an essence so considered only exists to the extent that it is an intention. In this way, the essence is said

⁷⁸ *Quaestiones in librum Porphyrii Isagoge*, q. 9–11, n. 16: Sciendum tamen quod significatum termini communis, significantis veram naturam, tripliciter potest considerari. Uno modo secundum esse in suppositis, quod dicitur esse materiale eius, et hoc modo insunt ei accidentia communia. Secundo modo consideratur absolute secundum esse quidditativum, et sic insunt ei praedicata essentialia. Tertio modo ut per formam intelligibilem ab intellectu apprehenditur, quod est esse cognitum, et sic insunt ei intentiones.

⁷⁹ Pini, *Categories and Logic in Duns Scotus*, p. 105.

to be an intention or concept. To be more precise, it is a first intention, since that which is first known is a real, extramental being. According to Scotus, however, one must distinguish between an essence, which is neither universal nor individual, and its mode, which is universal. As Pini states it, "Scotus draws a distinction between essence and universal: the essence is the object of the intellect and what the intellect understands, whereas the universal is the mode in which the intellect understands an essence. Since the object and its mode of understanding are essentially distinct, the intellect can acquire a concept of each of them and can understand each of them distinctly."⁸⁰ In his commentary on the *Isagoge*, Scotus states:

It must be said that a universal is *per se* intelligible. This is evident thus: The first object of the intellect, namely, the 'what it is' is understood under the aspect of a universal. However, that aspect is not essentially the same as that 'what it is', but is its accidental mode. Therefore, the intellect can recognize a difference between its first object and that mode, since it can distinguish between all things which are not essentially the same. But every power, recognizing a *per se* difference between two other things, recognizes each extreme under its proper aspect.⁸¹

When the intellect considers not the essence of the extramental thing but the mode in which that thing exists, it forms a new concept of this second object. This new concept is a second intention, which is essentially a concept of a concept. As a second intention, that which is known is not an extramental being, but the mode of knowing an extramental being, which mode is really distinct from the essence of the first object known.

The formation of second intentions is described by Pini as follows: "when the intellect considers an essence as universal, it distinguishes the essence and the mode in which that essence is understood. The prop-

⁸⁰ Ibid., p. 108.

⁸¹ *Quaestiones in librum Porphyry Isagoge*, q. 5, n. 4: Dicendum quod universale est per se intelligibile. Quod patet sic: primum obiectum intellectus, scilicet 'quod quid est' intelligitur sub ratione universalis. Illa autem ratio non est idem essentialiter cum illo 'quod quid est', sed modus eius accidentalis. Igitur intellectus potest cognoscere differentiam inter suum primum obiectum et illum modum, quia potest distinguere inter omnia quae non sunt essentialiter eadem. Sed omnis virtus, cognoscens per se differentiam inter aliqua duo, cognoscit utrumque extremum sub propria ratione, per Aristotele II *De anima*. Per hoc enim probat sensum communem esse. Igitur intellectus potest cognoscere illum modum sive rationem univarsalis per se et sub propria ratione. Hoc modo, reflectendo, cognoscit intellectus se et suam operationem et modum operandi et cetera quae sibi insunt.

erty that moves the intellect to cause a second intention is a property pertaining to an essence only as conceived under the mode in which it is understood. It is such a property that moves the intellect to cause a second intention."⁸² To illustrate the formation of second intentions, consider the category of substance. As an extramental thing, substance is neither particular nor universal. When this essence is conceived in such a way that it can be predicated of many it has the attribute of being universal. The property of being predicated of many, though, is an accidental mode that is caused by the intellect.

To say that the intellect causes second intentions, however, is not to maintain that these intentions are fictions of the mind. On the other hand, as Pini emphasizes, "because extramental things are not the causes of second intentions, there is no one-to-one correspondence between intentions and extramental things or properties."⁸³ It must be asked, then, how these intentions are related to real beings. According to Scotus, an extramental thing is not the total cause of a second intention, but is only an occasion, namely, insofar as it moves the intellect so that it considers in act, while the intellect is the principle cause.⁸⁴ To illustrate, when the intellect understands that 'man is a substance', it is the common natures of man and substance, as extramental things, that are the principle causes of the intellect's first intentions, i.e., of the concepts 'man' and 'animal'. When it comes to items of second intention, however, the extramental object is only the occasion, not the primary cause. The primary cause is the intellect itself. In his commentary on the *Isagoge*, Scotus describes it thus: "For the intellect, considering the nature of man as one in many and said of many, is moved by some property found in the nature so considered to cause an intention. And that cause is attributed to the nature of which it is a property and from which it is taken."⁸⁵ Thus, unlike the primary cause of first intentions, the primary cause of second intentions is the intellect, not an extramental thing.

⁸² Pini, *Categories and Logic in Duns Scotus*, p. 108.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, p. 110.

⁸⁴ Cf. also, John Duns Scotus, *God and Creatures: The Quodlibetal Questions*, trans. Felix Alluntis and Allan B. Wolter (Princeton, NJ, 1975), q. 15, nn. 40–63; and Scotus, *Questions on the Metaphysics*, VII, q. 18, nn. 47–8, and q. 19, nn. 17–19.

⁸⁵ *Quaestiones in librum Porphyry Isagoge*, q. 9–11, n. 17: Intellectus enim, considerans naturam hominis unam in multis et de multis, ab aliqua proprietate reperta in natura sic considerata movetur ad causandum intentionem; et illam causatum attribuit illi naturae cuius est proprietas a qua accipitur.

Because the act of reflection is involved in the formation of second intentions, Scotus maintains that a lesser unity suffices in the thing than the unity that is associated with the first intention. As Scotus states it, the “intellect considering through that one species, can reflect innumerable times upon itself by considering its own operation, and whatever consideration there is, it has nothing extrinsic corresponding to itself, except only the first object for the occasion, insofar as that [thing] moves the intellect initially to consider it.”⁸⁶ The following example helps illustrate Scotus’s point. Suppose that while visiting a zoo, a man sees a number of particular animals that he had never seen before. Since the sign on the cage informs him that these particular animals are ferrets, he recognizes the general truth that ‘ferrets are animals’. Then, at some time after he has left the zoo, this same man reflects upon his initial observation that ‘ferrets are animals’, and notices that a relation exists between the subject and the predicate, namely, that the subject points to or signifies fewer things while the predicate points to more things. Or, to use the technical terms, the subject is a species and the predicate a genus. If this same man were then to reflect upon similar statements, such as ‘all triangles are shapes’, and ‘every shade of blue is a color’, he would realize that this same relation is involved in all these propositions, even though these statements are about different categories. As this example illustrates, the terms ‘species’ and ‘genus’ have a greater unity than the objects of first intention, since the objects of first intention are in three separate genera. To paraphrase his response in his commentary on the *Categories*, it suffices for the intellect to be moved by something extrinsic for the causing of many notions through the simple consideration of that which is extrinsic, to which nothing corresponds in the thing.⁸⁷ In other words, the reason for this unity, so Scotus argues, is that the objects of first intention are only the occasion that moves the intellect to form these terms. As Scotus states, the “intellect, by considering one concept as related to another, establishes a relationship between them. That relationship is the second intention.”⁸⁸

⁸⁶ Ibid.

⁸⁷ *Quaestiones super Praedicamenta Aristoteles*, q. 3, n. 13: Ad tertium dico quod res non est tota causa intentionis, sed tantum occasio, scilicet in quantum movet intellectum ut actu consideret, et intellectus est principalis causa. Ideo minor unitas sufficit in re quam sit intentionis, quia sufficit intellectum ab aliquo extrinseco moveri ad causandum multa per considerationem, quibus non correspondent aliqua in re.

⁸⁸ Pini, *Categories and Logic in Duns Scotus*, p. 113.

That second intentions are relations formed by the intellect, however, is not new to Scotus. Aquinas, as Pini documents, “had already maintained that the intellect forms second intentions by an act of self-reflection. He had maintained that the intellect, after a first operation by which it turns towards extramental things, reflects on itself and compares the concepts it has formed to the extramental things those concepts represent. By this comparison, the intellect understands and forms an intention following from the mode in which it understands.”⁸⁹ For Aquinas, a second intention is essentially a comparison between the intellect’s understanding of something and that something itself.⁹⁰ By contrast, Scotus maintains that a second intention is not a comparison of the intellect and an extramental thing, but simply a comparison between two things insofar as they are both understood.⁹¹ That is, second intentions, such as genus and species, are relations between two concepts, not between a concept and an extramental thing, as Aquinas holds. Stated another way, what is new to Scotus is his claim that the intellect is the cause of the properties that pertain to essences as they exist in the mind. For, according to Scotus, the attribute of being universal is not something that pertains to the common nature as a common nature, but rather it is something that is caused by the intellect when it compares two concepts, i.e., to things considered insofar as they are understood.

Thus far, then, we have seen that Scotus accepts the Avicennian notion that an essence, along with its properties, can be considered in three ways: as it exists in itself, as it exists in an individual, and as it exists in the mind. As it exists in the mind, the essence must be distinguished from the mode in which it exists. That distinction allows the intellect to form second intentions, which are concepts of concepts. While these second intentions do not have real, extramental

⁸⁹ Ibid., p. 107.

⁹⁰ Although Aquinas typically describes second intentions as relations between the intellect and the extra mental thing, Gyula Klima points out that in *De potentia*, Aquinas does claim that a second intention is *either* a relation between a concept and an extra mental thing, or between two concepts formed by the intellect [emphasis added]. See, Thomas Aquinas, *De potentia*, in *Quaestiones disputatae*, vol. 2, (Rome, 1953), q. 7, a. 11: “Uno modo secundum quod iste ordo est adinventus per intellectum, et attributus ei quod relative dicitur; et huiusmodi sunt relationes quae attribuuntur ab intellectu rebus intellectis, prout sunt intellectae, sicut relatio generis et speciei: has enim relationes ratio adinvenit considerando ordinem eius quod est in intellectu ad res quae sunt extra, vel etiam ordinem intellectum ad invicem.”

⁹¹ Pini, *Categories and Logic in Duns Scotus*, p. 125.

being, they are nevertheless not fictions created by the mind. For real beings are the occasion of these second intentions, which intentions are caused by the intellect reflecting on itself. Finally, because it is the intellect, when it compares two things as they are understood, that causes second intentions, these second intentions have a greater unity than the external objects that serve as the occasion for their existence. With these distinctions in mind, let us now see how Scotus solves these fundamental problems relating to a science of the categories.

5. *The Unity of the Categories*

As I said at the beginning of the last section, a science of the categories presents several major problems that Scotus must address. In one way or another, these problems can be reduced to the fact that the categories, as extramental beings, are not one but many, whereas a primary subject of a science must essentially be one. As we have seen, Scotus's contemporaries—Martin of Dacia, Peter of Auvergne, and Simon Faversham—solve this problem by claiming that the categories have a unity of attribution or an analogous unity; a position that is similar to their view regarding the science of metaphysics.⁹² Scotus, however, rejects the similarity between logic and metaphysics for the following three reasons.

First, while the categories of quantity, quality, relation, etc., exist metaphysically or ontologically only in substances, the logical concepts of quantity and quality do not inhere in a substance in the same way. In other words, as beings of reason—as logical concepts, the categories exist as products of the intellect. This is seen most evidently in the category of substance, which, as a logical concept, depends upon the activity of the intellect, even though ontologically a substance is what exists in itself. As second intentions, all ten of the categories inhere equally in a subject, namely, in the one who conceives of them. As

⁹² Following Aristotle, most medievals claim that 'being' is said analogously of the ten categories, not univocally, both insofar as they are studied in metaphysics and insofar as they are studied in logic. In this early commentary on the *Categories*, Scotus will grant that, metaphysically speaking, 'being' is said 'analogously' of the various categories. However, he will argue that they have a greater unity, a univocal unity, when they are studied in logic. As is well known, Scotus will later affirm that being is said univocally of the various categories, both when studied in logic and when studied in metaphysics.

an item of first intention, however, substance signifies something that is more fundamental than the other nine accidents since these latter inhere in substances. Nevertheless, as second intentions, they all are equal since their properties are caused by the intellect.

The second reason why Scotus rejects the similarity between metaphysics and logic is that an appeal to a unity of attribution will not work in logic as it does in metaphysics. Metaphysically speaking, the existence of accidents and the existence of substance is not the same kind of existence. Accidents exist in a substance, whereas a substance is something that exists in and of itself. Thus, the kind of unity that the categories share metaphysically is a unity of attribution or a unity of analogy, since the accidents are attributed to substance or exist in a substance. However, when someone predicates 'genus' of substance, quantity, and quality, etc., this predicate term is not simply analogous to each subject. That is, the nine accidental genera are not attributed, as logical entities, to substance. Rather, substance (and quantity, quality, etc.) is a highest genus in exactly the same way as every other category is a highest genus. As Scotus points out, the term 'genus' is univocal to all the ten categories since each one of them is a highest genus in exactly the same way as every other one is a highest genus. Thus, it is true that, metaphysically speaking, the categories, as items of first intention, do not have anything predicated of them univocally, all that can be said is that they have a unity of analogy or a unity of attribution. As items of second intentions, however, they have a greater unity, namely, a generic, or perhaps even a specific unity. For when I say that 'substance is a highest genus' and 'quantity is a highest genus', there is a univocal term that is predicated of each of these intentions.

Third, Scotus rejects his contemporaries view in part because he does not agree that the mode of signifying is parallel to the mode of being, a position which is intricately related to many of his contemporaries' belief that a thing is constituted by two really distinct metaphysical principles, i.e., essence and existence.⁹³ In fact, where Thomas Aquinas, Henry of Ghent, Simon of Faversham, and others all think that the categories are constituted by two metaphysical principles, an essence or *ratio* studied in metaphysics and existence or mode of being studied in

⁹³ It is not entirely clear whether the lack of a parallel between signifying, understanding, and being is caused by or results from Scotus' denial of a real distinction between essence and existence. Nevertheless, that the two are related is suggested by Pini, *Categories and Logic in Duns Scotus*, pp. 147–9.

logic, Scotus thinks that the categories, insofar as they exist apart from the intellect, are simple essences in themselves.⁹⁴ According to Scotus, though, the categories can also be considered in logic: not insofar as they are simply diverse, but insofar as some property caused by the intellect is attributed to them.

For Scotus, then, categories can be considered in two ways: insofar as they are extramental beings and insofar as they have objective being.⁹⁵ As simple essences, the categories are studied in metaphysics, and have a unity of attribution.⁹⁶ Considered as they are understood, categories are studied in logic, and have, as we saw, a greater unity than the unity of attribution. For Scotus, the categories are not constituted by two metaphysical principles but are simply considered in two different ways. As Pini says, "Scotus maintains that categories can be considered in two ways, logically and metaphysically, and not that they are constituted by two metaphysical components. According to Scotus, Aquinas and Henry confuse the way in which we consider categories—i.e., as classifying notions—and the way categories are—i.e., as essences and mind-independent things. Categories, metaphysically considered, differ from one another by themselves and as immediately diverse things, not because of a mode of being that somehow pertains to and is separated from them."⁹⁷

⁹⁴ Ibid., pp. 144–54. According to Wolter, a real distinction between essence and existence is, as Scotus says, a "fiction of which I know nothing." Quoted in Wolter, *Transcendentals and their Function*, p. 66; see also Joseph O'Brian, "Duns Scotus's Teaching on the Distinction Between Essence and Existence," *New Scholasticism* 38 (1964), 61–77. As Paul Symington points out in his article above, the parallel between signifying and the modes of being allows for many medieval philosophers to deduce the number of categories from their modes of being. In this case, the 'mode of being' seems to function as a univocal genus from which the ten categories are ultimately derived by a process of division. For a detailed discussion of this topic, see Giorgio Pini, "Scotus on Deducing Aristotle's Categories," in *La tradition médiévale des Catégories XII^e–XIV^e siècles*. Actes du XIII^e Symposium européen de logique et de sémantique médiévales Avignon, 6–10 juin 2000, eds. J. Biard and I. Rosier-Catach (Louvain, 2003), pp. 23–35.

⁹⁵ *Quaestiones super Praedicamenta Aristoteles*, q. 2, n. 5: Dicitur ad quaestionem quod decem praedicamenta possunt dupliciter considerari: uno modo in quantum sunt entia; alio modo in quantum considerantur a ratione, sive in quantum aliqua proprietas causata ab intellectu eis attribuitur.

⁹⁶ Ibid., q. 2, n. 6: Primo modo de eis considerat metaphysicus; subiectum enim eius primum est ens in quantum ens; q. 2, n. 8: Sed cum ista decem non sint subiectum unius scientiae realis, scilicet metaphysicae, nisi in quantum est in istis unum primum ad quod alia attribuntur, ut habetur IV *Metaphysicae*; et in quantum considerantur a ratione nullum est ad quod attribuantur, quomodo sunt unum subiectum.; Cf. also q. 4, n. 37.

⁹⁷ Pini, *Categories and Logic in Duns Scotus*, p. 148.

In order for him to explain how the categories have a univocal subject without reducing them to some higher genus, Scotus makes a crucial distinction between something predicated univocally of many and a univocal term predicated of many. As he states it in question three of his commentary on the *Categories*, "it is one thing to say 'something is predicated univocally of many', and [another thing to say] 'there is a univocal predicate of many'."⁹⁸ According to Scotus, in the first way a denominative [term] can be predicated univocally, in the latter way it is not.⁹⁹ Scotus provides several arguments to substantiate his claim that a denominative term can be univocally predicated of a subject, even though it is not a univocal predicate. Here, it will suffice to look at two of these arguments.

The first one is taken from a comparison to the denominative term 'white'. According to Scotus, 'white' can be predicated equally of a man and of a surface, insofar as it is true to say both that 'a man is white' and that 'the man's skin, or surface, is white'. In this example, the term white signifies the same common nature, and hence is predicated univocally. However, in this example the two things of which white is predicated are of two different genera, i.e., substance and quantity, respectively. Because it is predicated of things in other genera, it is also a denominative term. Nevertheless, in these two examples the term 'white' signifies one and the same thing and hence is predicated univocally. However, it is true that neither a man nor his skin is a color, which would follow if the term were a univocal predicate, as opposed simply to being predicated univocally. Applying this distinction to the categories, Scotus argues that 'highest genus' is also a denominative term since it is univocally predicated of ten diverse genera. Nevertheless, the term is not univocal insofar as it is predicated of these ten categories in exactly the same way, even though it is predicated of them univocally. Once again, the reason that it is predicated univocally is that it signifies the same common account when it is predicated of each of the ten categories. The reason that it is denominative is not that it receives its name from an abstract accident, as grammarian does from grammar, nor from the fact that it has a different ending, as Aristotle claims, but

⁹⁸ *Quaestiones super Praedicamenta Aristotele*, q. 3, n. 14: Aliud est dicere 'aliquid univocum praedicari de multis', et 'esse univocum praedicatum de multis'.

⁹⁹ *Quaestiones super Praedicamenta Aristoteles*, q. 3, n. 14: Ad quantum dico quod aliud est dicere 'aliquid univocum praedicari de multis', et 'esse univocum praedicatum de multis'. Denominativum primo modo est univocum, secundo modo non, ut ostendit ratio.

that it is predicated of things in diverse genera in the same way that the quality 'white' inheres in the categories of substance and quantity.

The second argument in behalf of his claim that a denominative term can be predicated univocally is taken from a comparison between a circle and the matter of a circular object. The remote genus of a circle is quality, while its proximate genus is shape. What differentiates a circle from other plane figures is that it is contained by one line such that all the straight lines falling upon it from the center among those lying within the figure are equal to one another. Of course, a particular circle may exist in copper as well as in silver. The difference between a circle that exists in copper, however, is purely accidental to one that exists in silver, for silver and copper are material differences, whereas the formal differentia is that which differentiates a circle from other plane figures. Furthermore, the material differences of various circular things do not essentially inhere in the nature of a circle, whereas a formal differentia does necessarily inhere in the essence of a circle. In a similar way, Scotus argues, the difference between the categories as extramental beings and the categories as they are studied in logic is analogous to the material differences of various circular objects and the nature of a circle in itself. For as they are in themselves, the categories are simple essences that are completely diverse from one another. In fact, they are more different from one another than any two material things are from one another. However, as they are studied in logic, there is a formality to the ten categories. That formality is the nature of genus, which is a second intention. For insofar as they are conceived, the categories have a formal unity to them. What is that formal unity? To the extent that they are all conceived, they are all concepts, or second intentions. Consequently, the fact that the categories are essentially diverse does not prevent something from being predicated of them univocally.

In these last two sections, we see a number of distinctions, some borrowed from the tradition and some that are new to Scotus, that are foundational to his claim regarding the knowledge of the categories. These distinctions include: 1) the threefold consideration of an essence; 2) a distinction between an essence as a simple thing and its mode of existence in the mind; 3) the reflection of the intellect on its concepts, thereby causing second intentions; 4) second intentions as relations between things understood; 5) a greater unity in second order concepts than exists in their occasions; 6) the twofold consideration of the categories; and finally 7) the distinction between a univocal predicate and

something predicated univocally. With these distinctions in mind, let us briefly return to some of the various questions involved in a *propter quid* science of the categories.

To the claim that the categories, as highest genera, do not have a higher genus, Scotus responds by pointing out that the categories can be considered in two ways: in metaphysics and in logic.¹⁰⁰ In the former, they do not have a higher genus, since they are simply diverse. In the latter, though, they do have a genus, namely, the genus 'category'. To the claim that the categories are not specifically, or even generically, one since there is nothing common to them, Scotus responds by claiming that they do have a unity, one caused by the intellect when it reflects upon first intentions.¹⁰¹ Considered as second intentions applied to first, the ten categories have the common aspect of second intention. To the claim that the categories are not definable by a genus and differentia, Scotus responds that they are definable as one subject, namely, as 'predicaments' or 'categories'.¹⁰² To the claim that the categories, as the principles and causes of everything else, do not have a cause, Scotus responds that although the categories themselves do not have a cause, the properties inhering in them do have a cause, namely, the intellect.¹⁰³ Taken together, these claims amount to the fact that the categories is the subject of a science, not just a descriptive science or a *scientia quia*, but a *scientia propter quid*. What is the name of this science? According to Scotus, it should simply be called "the *Categories*."

¹⁰⁰ *Quaestiones super Praedicamenta Aristoteles*, q. 2, n. 5: Dicitur ad quaestionem quod decem praedicamenta possunt dupliciter considerari: uno modo in quantum sunt entia; alio modo in quantum considerantur a ratione, sive in quantum aliqua proprietates causata ab intellectu eis attribuitur.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, n. 9: Oportet dicere quod maior est unitas eorum in aliqua proprietate causata ab intellectu quam in quantum sunt entia. Et ita, cum haec scientia non sit una unitate analogiae, oportet assignare aliquid intentionale quod sit commune istis, et primum subiectum, quia de solo tali per se considerat logicus.

¹⁰² *Ibid.*, n. 29: Ad secundum patet quod primum subiectum hic est aliquid univocum istis decem, ut 'praedicamentum'.

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, n. 19: Ideo dici potest quod hic consideratur de decem praedicamentis in quantum eis attribuitur aliquid causatum a ratione, quia aliter non possunt considerari a logico. Et illo modo non habent tantum unitatem analogiae, sed etiam univocationis; et illud univocum istis illo modo est aliquod intentionale, quod est hic primum subiectum. Illud potest nominari 'praedicamentum' vel 'generalissimum', quia omnes proprietates quae per se determinantur hic de istis, determinantur de eis in quantum habent rationem generalissimi vel praedicamenti.

6. *Summary*

Considered in metaphysics, the categories, as extramental beings, are simply diverse from one another and have only a unity of attribution. Considered in logic, the categories have a unity caused by the intellect when it considers them as highest genera. The difference between items of first intentions and items of second intention, however, should not be construed to imply that there is absolutely no parallel between the orders of being, understanding, and signifying, simply that one should not presume that such a parallel exists. As Pini puts it, “Scotus does not deny that sometimes there may be a correspondence between an intentional property of the categories and a real thing in the extramental world. His point is that, since such a correspondence is not something regularly found, it would be misleading to rely on a general parallelism between the intentional and real plain.”¹⁰⁴ To see how extensive this lack of a parallelism is, one needs to examine his commentary on the *Categories* in its entirety.

¹⁰⁴ Pini, *Categories and Logic in Duns Scotus*, p. 148.

FINE-TUNING PINI'S READING OF SCOTUS'S *CATEGORIES* COMMENTARY¹

Todd Bates

In his *Categories and Logic in Duns Scotus*, Giorgio Pini offers a cogent and persuasive interpretation of Scotus's thorny and difficult *Categories* commentary. Nevertheless, I shall argue that his interpretation is flawed. Pini claims that Scotus distinguishes the domain of logic from that of metaphysics in a different manner from his most notable modist contemporaries, such as Martin of Dacia, who argue that there is a strict isomorphism between words, concepts and things. In particular, Pini reads Scotus as saying that categories taken logically, like species and genera of substances, do not correspond to distinct proper parts in the thing cognized; I shall contend that they do.

On my interpretation, Scotus holds that some distinct common entity in the thing corresponds to each of our generic or specific logical concepts. For instance, I hold that Scotus believes there is both a foundation for our concept of the genus—say, *animal* in the substance cognized and a distinct foundation in the thing cognized for our concept of the most specific species, say, *human*. The foundation in neither case simply has the universality belonging to the respective logical category. For instance, there is no generic proper part with universality in the thing that corresponds to the logical genus' universality. Indeed, with Pini, I read Scotus as saying there is a common proper part that corresponds to the logical genus in the intellect. I depart from Pini by adding that Scotus implies that a universal species in the intellect, *human*, has its foundation in a corresponding common entity distinct from the entity corresponding to the genus, *animal*.

Scotus is not concerned to establish a foundation in the thing cognized with a universality that matches the universality of the concept. Rather, I argue that Scotus is concerned to show there is a foundation

¹ Editor's note: The following article by Bates is directed against Pini's book *Categories and Logic in Duns Scotus* (Boston, 2002), not his article in this book. To the extent, however, that the previous article by Newton draws heavily on Pini's work, Bates is thus also indirectly attacking part of the thesis set forth in that article.

in the thing cognized that can be the very same item as that which is present in the cognizing intellect. Scotus' *desideratum* is not a matching correspondence with respect to universality, but rather unity between an entity in the thing cognized and the concept in the intellect.

1. *Pini's Reading of Scotus*

I shall begin by explaining Pini's interpretation of Scotus, with emphasis on the problem of how Scotus portrays the relationship between logical features of our concepts and features of things apart from the intellect. Pini argues that Scotus does not claim something universal in the thing corresponds to any of our specific or generic concepts—Pini successfully makes that point. However, I contend that he has not succeeded in two other parts of his argument. First, Pini locates the essence of the thing as the foundation for the universality of all of our logical concepts; I disagree. Second, he claims that no proper parts of the essence correspond with our logical concepts—here I disagree as well.

Pini points out that Scotus shared with his contemporaries a conviction that Aristotle's *Categories* was primarily a work of logic, not of metaphysics. Logic considers properties, for example the universality of generic concepts, attributed to items from the activity of the intellect. Scotus writes:

Between a thing and speech, or voice, is a concept. Thus, just as there is a science *per se* of things, and some sciences *per se* of significant speech, like Grammar and Rhetoric which consider the passions of the voice... so there can be a science *per se* of the concept, and this is logic. Whence it follows necessarily that logic is called a rational science not only as it is carried on through reason, as is every other science, but because of this: that it is about concepts formed through an act of reason.²

As the logician seeks knowledge of properties of our concepts, and our concepts belong to the intellect, the properties that the logician studies are mental entities. These latter are to be distinguished from the properties that the metaphysician studies, the properties of beings independent of the operations of our intellects.³

² Duns Scotus, *Quaestiones super Praedicamenta Aristoteles*, eds. Robert Andrews et al. (St. Bonaventure, 1999), q. 1, n. 4.

³ In their understanding of the *Categories*, Scotus and his contemporary logicians diverge from our contemporaries—among whom there is a consensus around taking the work as a piece of Aristotle's early ontology. In addition, what Scotus and his

While Scotus and his contemporaries share a reading of Aristotle's *Categories* as a work of logic rather than metaphysics, Pini argues that they did not share Scotus's understanding of logic, which stood out from among his contemporaries as carrying relatively modest ontological commitments.⁴ Scotus's contemporaries understood logical properties attributed to items from the activity of the intellect to be causally tied to a foundation in properties those items had independently of the intellect. In contrast, according to Pini, Scotus posits no such ties: in particular, there need be no correspondence between the *modi intelligendi* and the *modi essendi*.

For instance, Scotus's modist contemporaries saw the universality of a species-concept as requiring for its foundation in reality some universality in the thing. They required a correspondence between the modes of conceiving, or *modi intelligendi*, and the modes of being, or *modi essendi*. In addition, Scotus's modist contemporaries were characterized by their giving "a special ontological interpretation to the *modi significandi*, one that determines the ontological interpretation of logic."⁵ *Modi significandi* were types of grammatical distinctions in actual spoken language like declensions of nouns and tenses of verbs. According to them, "*modi significandi* correspond to *modi intelligendi*, which in turn correspond to *modi essendi*."⁶ For instance, a certain type of concept corresponds to a singular nominative noun, and another type of concept to a singular accusative noun. To each type of concept, there corresponds some type of being in the thing. For the modists, metaphysics' proper study took up the being of things outside the intellect; logic considered the features of types of concepts—which were called second intentions. However "according to the logician, genus and species are not to be explained only as concepts of concepts...they reflect features of the object to

contemporaries call "logic" would not be called that today. In the shadow of Frege, most philosophers today would reject this conception of logic as mistakenly tying it to the realm of human psychology.

⁴ Thus, Pini says "I have also made a special effort to avoid general tags such as 'nominalism' and 'realism', which may be helpful in other contexts but here may mislead. For example, Scotus is usually classified as a realist, but his logical doctrine of categories turns out to have remarkably weak presuppositions." (2)

⁵ Christian Knudsen, "Intentions and Impositions," in Norman Kretzmann et al., eds. *The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy: From the Rediscovery of Aristotle to the Disintegration of Scholasticism 1100–1600* (Cambridge, 1982), pp. 479–95, p. 486.

⁶ Jan Pinborg, "Speculative Grammar," in Norman Kretzmann et al., eds. *The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy: From the Rediscovery of Aristotle to the Disintegration of Scholasticism 1100–1600* (Cambridge, 1982), pp. 254–70, p. 262. For more on the *modistae*, cf. Irène Rosier, *La grammaire spéculative des modistes* (Lille, 1983).

which they refer.”⁷ For the modists, “[a]ll the intentional entities, first intentions as well as second intentions, are drawn from the properties of the object signified.”⁸ Thus, the universality of a logical species would be drawn from a corresponding universal species in the object.

It may seem that on Pini’s reading Scotus, in contrast to the modists, cuts logical features of concepts like universality loose from reality. Pini writes “Scotus maintains that the object of the intellect, considered insofar as it is understood, is a mental entity, a sort of internal object, whose being is identical to its being understood.”⁹ Pini here seems to claim that there is nothing more to the universality of the concept *animal* than its being understood, such that any correspondence to things outside the intellect is accidental, like the broken clock that happens to be right twice each day. Again, Pini writes: “Species and genera, by themselves, however, are logical notions depending not on the way the essence is, but on the way it is understood.”¹⁰ Pini seems to say that the intellect just makes up universality by instituting a purely mental relation of predicability between conceptual predicates and subjects. One might worry that inasmuch as this universality matches nothing about objects, it is fictitious.

Pini thinks Scotus has a reply to this worry. Scotus finds a foundation in the thing for our specific and generic concepts: the thing’s essence. Categories admit what Pini calls a “twofold consideration” for Scotus, as logical and as metaphysical entities. In support of this view, Pini cites Scotus’s commentary on the *Categories* when he claims: “[f]irst, metaphysics studies categories as types of beings. Second, logic studies categories insofar as our intellect understands them and attributes some properties to them.”¹¹ Pini elaborates that Scotus “identifies a [metaphysical] category with a type of essence, which is neither individual nor universal,”¹² i.e., what becomes known in Scotus’s commentaries on the *Sentences* as the common nature.

In his logical work, a theory of common natures is not fully articulated, yet a form of the theory is present in Scotus’s theory of the threefold signification of the term *human*, in which Scotus recognizes¹³

⁷ Ibid., p. 262.

⁸ Knudsen, “Intentions and Impositions,” p. 487.

⁹ Pini, *Categories and Logic*, p. 124, emphasis mine.

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 148, emphasis mine.

¹¹ Ibid., p. 19.

¹² Ibid., pp. 147–8.

¹³ Cf. his *Quaestiones in librum Porphyrii Isagoge*, q. 9–11, n. 16: Sciendum tamen quod significatum termini communis, significantis veram naturam, tripliciter potest

three ways in which the human essence can be signified. First, it may be signified according to its "material being," i.e., its actual existence in the thing to which it belongs. Thus, the term *human* may signify the essence of man as it exists in actual humans. Second, the term *human* may signify the essence of man according to the essence's "quidditative being." In this sense the term *human* signifies the essence of man taken "absolutely" apart from its actual existence in the thing or its existence in the intellect—it is taken simply as it is in itself. Third, the term *human* may signify the essence of a man insofar as it is a "cognized being," i.e., the existence it has in the intellect, with an accident of universality. Here the term *human* signifies the essence *human* insofar as it is a concept.

The theory of the threefold signification of the term *human* implies that the essence, taken simply as it is in itself, is indifferent to being universal in the intellect or being in the thing. That is, it can exist in either the intellect or the thing, but need not exist in the intellect or the thing. Existence in the thing is accidental to the essence, as well as existence in the intellect. Thus, to conceive the essence as universal is not to have a false or fictitious cognition of it, since the essence taken absolutely can have universality as an accident. Consequently, Pini has a reply ready to anyone who might worry that his account of Scotus would render our concepts fictitious. He writes, "[t]his [there being a thing as a necessary condition for the production of a second intention] is enough to give some real ground to second intentions and to differentiate them from fictitious concepts."¹⁴

As one can see, according to Pini's understanding of Scotus, the intellect adds universality to the essence—universality is not taken from the essence absolutely as it exists in the thing apart from the intellect. Thus, Pini writes: "[a]n intention [like the universality of a species or genus] is founded not on a property of an extra-mental thing but on a property of a thing as understood by the intellect, which for Scotus is a concept and a mental entity, as we have seen."¹⁵ The essence exists in the thing apart from the intellect, and need not be actually universal

considerari. Uno modo secundum esse in suppositis, quod dicitur esse materiale eius, et hoc modo insunt ei accidentia communia. Secundo modo consideratur absolute secundum esse quidditativum, et sic insunt ei praedicata essentialia. Tertio modo ut per formam intelligibilem ab intellectu apprehenditur, quod est esse cognitum, et sic insunt ei intentiones.

¹⁴ Pini, *Categories and Logic*, p. 113.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 110.

in the thing. The essence in the thing is the occasion for the intellect to produce universality. "Occasion" is Scotus's term; e.g., he writes, "a thing is not the whole cause of the intention, but only an occasion, inasmuch as it moves the intellect, as it considers in act, and the intellect is the principal cause."¹⁶ According to Pini, Scotus holds that the existence of an essence in a thing is merely a necessary condition for the essence to be universal in the intellect, but not a sufficient condition.¹⁷

Thus, the intellect is the efficient cause of the universality of the logical concept, and the essence in the thing is merely the occasional cause of that universality. Again, Pini writes, "Although Scotus's doctrine of the threefold consideration of a thing is not new, what is peculiar is his insistence on the intellect's role in forming second intentions."¹⁸ That is, the intellect forms second intentions of universality from reflecting on its understanding of essences. The intellect without the essence in the thing actually produces the logical concept's universality when it takes up the essence in the thing for its consideration. I concede to Pini that in places Scotus seems to talk this way, as when Scotus writes

Similarly, the intellect considering a thing, through that one species, can reflect thousands of times on itself about its operation, in considering, and any consideration is something having nothing extrinsic corresponding to it, except only the first object for the occasion, inasmuch as that first [occasion] moves the intellect to consider.¹⁹

Moreover, as Pini sees it, Scotus holds that one and the same essence in the intellect may receive different intentions of universality produced by the intellect. Uncovering additional properties of the thing is not required—only reflection on the intellect's own operation: "it [the intellect] reflects on its activity and takes into account the mode in which it understands extramental things." The point is, as Pini claims, Scotus

¹⁶ Scotus, *Quaestiones super Praedicamenta Aristoteles*, q. 3, n. 13: Ad tertium dico quod res non est tota causa intentionis, sed tantum occasio, scilicet in quantum movet intellectum ut actu consideret, et intellectus est principalis causa. Ideo minor unitas sufficit in re quam sit intentionis, quia sufficit intellectum ab aliquo extrinseco moveri ad causandum multa per considerationem, quibus non correspondent aliqua in re.

¹⁷ Thus, Pini writes "These adverbs suggest that a thing is a material or necessary condition for the production of intentions." Giorgio Pini, *Categories and Logic*, p. 110.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 104.

¹⁹ Scotus, *Quaestiones super Praedicamenta Aristoteles*, q. 3, n. 13: Similiter, intellectus considerans per illam unam speciem, potest millesies reflectere se supra suam operationem considerando, et quaelibet consideratio aliquid est, nihil habens extrinsecum sibi correspondens, nisi tantum primum obiectum pro occasione, in quantum illud movet primo intellectum ad considerandum.

holds "the intellect can form several second intentions to which there corresponds one and the same extramental thing."²⁰

For example, consider substance and accident. In metaphysics, according to Pini, a substance is an entity which "exists in itself and not in another". Likewise, accidents are said to "exist in another". In these cases, "existing in itself" and "existing in another" are features that items in the world have apart from any influence of the intellect. In logic, however, the study of substance and accident does not involve being in itself or being in another apart from the intellect; rather, logic takes up inherence as a relation between subjects and predicates in the intellect. Thus, Pini argues that according to Scotus there are two relations of inherence, one real and one logical. The logical relation of inherence between a predicate and a subject differs from the relation of inherence that exists between accidents and substances. For in a predication, such as "Socrates is human," the predicate concept *human* inheres in the subject concept *Socrates*. This merely logical inherence is expressed in the relation of predicability between the predicate and the subject: we say the concept *human* is predicable of the concept *Socrates*. But the concept *human* bears predicability to many distinct substance-concepts; for instance, we may predicate the concept *human* of the subject concepts *Xanthippe*, *Plato*, and *Alcibiades*.

For a concept to be predicable of many distinct concepts of individual substances is for it to be universal. Scotus calls the feature of universality possessed by the species *human* a second intention. Pini writes, "According to Scotus, however, not only does the intellect understand, it also causes a second intention as a relation. Thus, a second intention is a relation and a comparison established by the intellect."²¹ Scotus writes "Every second intention is a rational relation...pertaining to the act of the intellect composing and dividing one extreme and another."²² The intellect considers the concept *human*. Noting that the concept *human* can be related to many subjects such that it is predicable of each, the intellect possesses a universal concept of humanity. The universality of the species is just its predicability, its being able to be related by the intellect to numerous subject concepts in predications by the intellect. The intellect did not discover the universality of the

²⁰ Pini, *Categories and Logic*, p. 112.

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 116.

²² John Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio*, in *Opera omnia* (Vaticana, 1950), I, d. 23, n. 10.

concept as something universal existing in the external thing. As Pini reports, "...the relation of predicability the intellect establishes does not depend on the nature of animals and men taken as extramental things; it depends on the intellect's understanding of animals and men in a certain manner (specifically, animal is understood as a universal as compared to men)."²³ Other mental items, say the concept of Socrates, cannot be related by the intellect in predication like the concept *animal* can—the concept *Socrates* is not predicable, and so cannot be universal. Quite apart from the intellect deriving its understanding of a genus' universality from the consideration of things and their real properties, the intellect forms second intentions, like the species with its note of universality, remaining within its own mental realm.

Thus, although there is, on Pini's reading of Scotus, a metaphysical correlate in the substantial thing for our specific and generic concepts, it would be wrong to infer that there are distinct metaphysical correlates in the thing corresponding to each of our distinct concepts of species and genera. Apparently supporting Pini's interpretation, Scotus writes, "Thus, a lesser unity suffices in the thing than the unity of the intention. For it suffices that the intellect is moved by something extrinsic to cause many things through consideration, to which there do not simply correspond many things in the thing."²⁴ No universal entity *animal* in the thing corresponds to the universal concept *animal*—to all these concepts in the intellect there corresponds only one entity in the thing, the essence. Thus, according to Pini, "There is, however, only one extramental thing corresponding to all intentions, for each one of these intentions represents neither a different extramental thing nor a different mode of being but the mode in which the intellect understands an extramental thing."²⁵

To sum up, as Pini sees it, Scotus says that the universality of logical categories does have a metaphysical presupposition—an essence existing in the thing cognized. That essence in the thing cognized is not itself universal, and does not contain universal parts corresponding to the other universal concepts the intellect may form while cognizing specific

²³ Giorgio Pini, *Categories and Logic*, p. 119.

²⁴ Scotus, *Quaestiones super Praedicamenta Aristoteles*, q. 3, n. 13: Ad tertium dico quod res non est tota causa intentionis, sed tantum occasio, scilicet in quantum movet intellectum ut actu consideret, et intellectus est principalis causa. Ideo minor unitas sufficit in re quam sit intentionis, quia sufficit intellectum ab aliquo extrinseco moveri ad causandum multa per considerationem, quibus non correspondent aliqua in re.

²⁵ Pini, *Categories and Logic*, p. 107.

and generic concepts. And it does not contain any proper parts corresponding to the various logical concepts of a thing we may form in the intellect. As Pini writes, "On the other hand, because extramental things are not the causes of second intentions, there is no one-to-one correspondence between intentions and extramental things or properties, and it may happen that one and the same thing corresponds to many intentions."²⁶

2. *An Alternative Reading of Scotus*

My reading of Scotus overlaps Pini's in our agreement that the essence of the thing cognized is a foundation for our generic and specific concepts. Nevertheless, I regard Pini's interpretation of Scotus as flawed in arguing that the essence in the thing is the *only* foundation of our specific and generic concepts. Indeed, I hold that Pini's interpretation produces a tension between Scotus's logic, on which the essence is without proper parts, and a plausible reading of his metaphysics which I shall present, on which the essence has proper parts. On my reading of Scotus, there is one entity in the thing that is a foundation for the concept of the species, and another distinct entity that is the foundation for the concept of the genus. For each higher generic concept, there is still another entity serving as a foundation in the thing. For instance, the essence in humans is the foundation for our concept of the species *human*, the generic entity *animal* in humans is a foundation—"a" inasmuch as it could have a foundation as well in other species of animals—for our generic concept *animal*, and the generic entity *substance* in humans is a foundation for our generic concept *substance*. These foundational entities are all proper parts of the substance—and the foundational entities for our generic concepts are all proper parts of the essence.

I argue that in Scotus's metaphysics, the logical, generic concept in the intellect has a foundation in a common entity, the metaphysical genus that is a proper part of the substance's essence. When Scotus writes, "And this must be understood so as to make clear what it is in the singular [the thing external to the intellect] that corresponds to the common concept of the genus, as was explained in reading the text"²⁷

²⁶ Ibid., p. 110.

²⁷ John Duns Scotus, *Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis, Libri I–IX*, in *Opera philosophica*, vols. 3 and 4, eds. R. Andrews, G. Etzkorn, G. Gál, R. Green, F. Kelley, G. Marcil, T. Noone, and R. Wood (St. Bonaventure, 1997–1998), bk VII, q. 19, n. 58.

He implies that there is some item in the thing corresponding to the generic concept. No mention is made of its corresponding to the concept of the essence. This item in the external thing I take to be the metaphysical genus.

Again, in a text from Scotus's *Ordinatio* (Vaticana, 1950; I, d8, n16), he writes: ...in some creatures the genus and difference are taken from one and from another thing [*res*], just as in positing a plurality of forms in a man, animal is taken from the sensitive and rational from the intellective [items in the soul]. Then, that thing from which the genus is taken is really potential to and perfectible by that thing from which the difference is taken. Consider the essence *human* for example, and let it be defined as *rational animal*, with *animal* being the genus. We move merely within the logical realm: the genus *animal* as it is a part of the definition is a logical genus. Consider the generic concept *animal* alone. As we saw in the two previous texts, Scotus implies that some item in the external thing corresponds to the logical genus in the intellect—that is, the logical genus is “taken” from an item which he calls a “reality.” Presumably the reality is the item in the external thing to which the logical category corresponds. I read Scotus to be referring with “reality” to a metaphysical genus, *animal*, which is a proper part of the external thing. On my reading, we may put Scotus's point by saying that the real, metaphysical category, the generic entity *animal* in Socrates, corresponds to the logical category, the genus concept *animal* in the intellect.

On Pini's interpretation, the item in the external thing to which the concept of the genus corresponds would simply be the essence. Indeed, on Pini's reading, the essence in the external thing also corresponds to the concept of the species. Making my case against Pini's reading, I will sketch Scotus's metaphysics of the composition of substances. Let us interpret his *Categories* commentary against the background of his metaphysics of composition. If we do so, we shall see that by following Pini's interpretation of Scotus's logic rather than my own a tension is introduced between Scotus's logic and his metaphysics.

Note additional texts from Scotus where he explicitly implies the essence in the thing is complex and includes its genus as an entity and proper part. First, consider Scotus's discussion of the common nature in his *Ordinatio*; Scotus writes:

I say that ‘composition’ can be understood either properly, as is a composition out of an actual thing and a potential thing, or else less properly,

as is the composition out of an actual reality and a potential reality in the same thing. In the first sense, the individual is not a composite with respect to the specific nature. For it adds no reality, because it adds neither matter nor form nor a composite, as the argument goes on to show. In the second sense, the individual is necessarily a composite. For the reality the specific difference is taken from is potential with respect to the reality the individual difference is taken from, just as if they were two 'things'. For the specific difference does not have the wherewithal to include through an identity the individual reality. Instead, only some third factor includes both of these through an identity.²⁸

Note that in this text, Scotus recognizes a type of composition proper to "realities," such as the generic and difference entities. This is a composition in the external, substantial thing, not a logical relation in the intellect. In this long quote, Scotus implies that the generic reality—*realitas* in Scotus's text—is a proper part of the external thing along with the difference-reality.

According to Scotus these realities are related to each other as potency to act—the generic entity *animal* is in potency to the entity of the difference, *rational*, so that the two may be unified, made one. *Animal* is perfected by being unified with *rational* in that the two realities together compose a third item, a thing (*res*). Unified, neither reality is actual with its own proper entity. For instance, in an actual composition, even the difference *rational*, which is actual with respect to the generic reality *animal*, is in turn potential in that it can stand as a proper part in a whole with the genus. This whole, in the case of *rational* and *animal*, is the essence *human*.²⁹

Having argued that Scotus considers the genus of a metaphysical essence to be a proper part of that essence, I shall make a second argument from Scotus's texts in the *Ordinatio* showing that he considers not only the immediate genus in the definition of the essence to be a proper part of that essence, but also that he takes a series of genera up to the highest genus substance to be proper parts of the essence. Scotus means to extend his picture of the composition of the essence

²⁸ Scotus, *Ordinatio*, II, d. 3, qq. 5–6, n. 189, trans. Spade, *Five Texts on the Medieval Problem of Universals* (Indianapolis, 1994).

²⁹ There is no absurdity here that would block my interpretation of Scotus' text such that one and the same item is simply both potential and actual. For instance, the difference is *potential* with respect to the whole of which it is a constituent, in that it has the capacity to be part of such a whole. In addition, the difference is *actual* with respect to the genus with which it composes a whole. Thus, the difference-reality is not both actual and potential with respect to the same item.

to include higher genera. That is, the metaphysical genus *animal* is in turn a species with respect to its genus, call it "G1." That is, *animal* as a proper part of the essence is itself a composite consisting of G1 and some difference, call it "D1," as proper parts. G1 in turn will be a composite entity, consisting of a different genus, G2 and difference, D2, as its proper parts. This scheme of composition continues, but not infinitely—after a finite series of steps, we reach a stopping point with the highest genus; in the case of material substances, this would be the genus *substance*. That genus is a proper part of both the genus *animal* and the common nature *human*. I take such a scheme of composition to be what Scotus refers to when he speaks of a categorical hierarchy, a Porphyrian tree consisting of species and genera: "So I say the ultimate distinction in a categorical hierarchy is the individual distinction, and it occurs through the ultimate act that pertains of itself to the categorical hierarchy. But the actual existence does not by itself pertain to this hierarchy. Actual existence is the ultimate act, but it is posterior to the whole categorical hierarchy."³⁰

He distinguishes the items of the Porphyrian tree, the real genera and species that are proper parts of external things, from what actually exists. The items of the tree go to make up what he calls "the whole hierarchy of quidditative being"³¹ to which actual existence only contingently belongs. Thus, Scotus writes "This distinction [between quidditative and actual existence] is accidental in a certain sense. Granted, it is not truly accidental."³² Thus, his discussion of the categorical hierarchy of quidditative being is consistent with his threefold distinction of the signification of *human*. That is, the items in the quidditative hierarchy are each specific or generic entities taken as they individuate in themselves rather than as they exist individuate in things or as they exist logically in the intellect.

Scotus gives some real status to items taken quidditatively—they are not merely artifacts of the intellect. It follows, the items on this hierarchy that are proper parts of the essence of a substance have a real status as proper parts apart from the intellect.

Using a general principle which I take to confirm my interpretation of him on metaphysical genera, Scotus notes that: "Every quidditative

³⁰ Scotus, *Ordinatio*, II, d. 3, q. 2, trans. Spade.

³¹ Ibid.

³² Ibid.

entity (whether partial or total) in some genus is of itself indifferent as a quidditative entity to this or that individual entity and that one, in such a way that as a quidditative entity it is naturally prior to this individual entity insofar as it is 'this'. As naturally prior, just as it does not belong to it to be a 'this', so the opposite of being a 'this' is not incompatible with it from its very notion."³³

That is, metaphysical genera and species both have the feature of indifference or equivalently, community, according to which they have their own proper entity and may exist as proper parts in different composite substances, or as concepts in the intellect. More importantly for my case, the genus as indifferent is given its own natural priority. That is, the genus taken absolutely as it is in itself is naturally prior to the genus in the intellect, just as the essence taken absolutely as it is in itself is naturally prior to the essence in the intellect. In both cases, Scotus means to imply that the naturally prior item has its own being apart from whatever else it may otherwise exist in, whether that be the intellect or substances. In addition, on the basis of the genus' natural priority, I infer we must see Scotus as holding that genera are real entities in external things, just as the essence taken absolutely.

Finally, arguing again that the genus exists as a real proper part of the metaphysical essence, I shall refer to a discussion³⁴ from Scotus of genera and intrinsic modes. I do not wish to defend the soundness of his rather arcane reasoning, but merely wish to use it to point out how he seems to have thought of metaphysical genera. If the distinction between a genus and difference were the same type of distinction that obtains between a color and its intrinsic mode of luminosity, then there would be no real composition between the genus and the difference. At most, their distinction would be an artifact of the intellect, and we would be confused if we took the genus as a real, distinct entity in its own right. In fact, Scotus is careful to point out that the difference which combines with the genus is not an intrinsic mode of the genus; he writes (n. 16), the *differentiae* are not said to be an intrinsic mode of a genus, since regardless of the grade in which animality is understood, it is not on account of that grade that either rationality or irrationality is found with it...."

³³ Ibid., d. 3, qq. 5–6, n. 187, trans. Spade.

³⁴ Scotus, *Ordinatio*, (Vaticana, 1950), I, d. 8, q. 3, nn. 16–17, my translations.

Scotus uses the example of a color such as a shade of white; he writes (n. 17) “[f]or example, if there were white under the tenth grade of intensity, however much it was simple in itself, it could be conceived merely under the nature *white*...” In cases where the intellect distinguishes an item X from its intrinsic mode, Y, as with a shade of white and its intensity, the intellect is able to conceive of X, the shade of white, apart from its intrinsic mode. But according to Scotus, this conception of X is confused; he writes (n. 17), “if there were a distinction in the thing as that which holds between a reality and its intrinsic mode, the intellect could not have a proper concept of that reality and have a [proper] concept of that intrinsic mode of the thing...” for while one intellect is able to distinguish X and Y, in reality apart from the intellect, there is no distinction between X and Y. Between X and Y there is merely a rational distinction. Scotus uses the example of a color such as a shade of white. That shade of white admits varying intensities, such that it may be brighter or dimmer. For Scotus, the intensity of a shade of white is an intrinsic mode of that shade of white, but there is no real distinction in the color itself between the shade and its intensity. Let us accept his account for the sake of argument.

In contrast, the intellect’s apprehension of the genus apart from the difference is not confused. Scotus claims that rational and irrational, which he treats here as differentiae of the genus *animal*, are not intrinsic modes of *animal*. Rather he claims that *animal*, as it is in itself, is in potentiality to either. That is, *animal* as a genus would stand in potency to the differentia *rational*—and though they are distinct, they could combine to make a composite. Where there is a potentiality between items for a composition, that composition is not merely an artifact of the intellect. Thus, Scotus implies that genera are real, not merely conceptual, proper parts of external things and of essences. That is, for instance, the essence *human* in a substance has the genus *animal* as a proper part, and that genus constitutes the essence with the differentia in a reality/reality composition.

On the sketch of Scotus’s metaphysical picture of the composition of material substances I have offered, Scotus believes the essence in the substance is not simple, but contains the differentia taken absolutely and its genus taken absolutely as proper parts. Not only that, the essence in the thing contains a set of genera as proper parts, from the first genus to the highest genus, *substance*. Given this metaphysical complexity on the side of the external thing, it is odd to hold, as Pini does, that there is no correspondence between our logical generic concepts and the metaphysical genera in things.

One might have received the impression that the essence in the thing lacks proper parts from Pini's reading of Scotus's logic. Pini finds that the essence *alone* corresponds to all of our logical concepts, whether generic or specific. On Pini's interpretation, Scotus's logic implies no metaphysical complexity in the essences of external things. Nevertheless, as I have argued, Scotus considers the essence in the substance to be complex, consisting of genera and differences as its proper parts. We would do well, I suggest, to interpret Scotus's logic with charity, in such a way that we do not introduce any tension between his logic and his metaphysics, provided such tension can be avoided on an alternative interpretation.

What prevents us from admitting a correspondence between logical and metaphysical genera, thereby eliminating the tension between his logic as Pini sees it and his metaphysics? We took note above of several texts in which Scotus seems explicitly to affirm Pini's interpretation. I shall offer an alternative reading of Scotus's texts congruent with my reading of Scotus, in hopes that under my alternative reading, we may not be obstructed by these problematic texts from affirming a correspondence between logical and metaphysical genera.

First, consider this text: "Similarly, the intellect considering a thing, through that one species, can reflect thousands of times on itself about its operation, in considering, and any consideration is something having nothing extrinsic corresponding to it, except only the first object for the occasion, inasmuch as that first moves the intellect to consider."³⁵

It may seem that Scotus means to say here, in line with Pini's reading, that the essence alone is a sufficient foundation for all of our logical concepts, including those we have of genera. However, there is another way to read Scotus. I concede that no generic thing (*res*) corresponds to the logical genus in the intellect. As we saw above, the genus taken absolutely is not in Scotus's sense a thing, but a reality (*realitas*). It is a different type of item in Scotus's ontology.

If we take Scotus to mean there is only one thing that is a foundation for our concepts, we may agree, while insisting that Scotus is not implying that there is no other foundation. Yes, he implies no other thing or *res* is a foundation, but not that there is no other foundation—he leaves open that there may be another foundation not in any thing or *res*, but in what Scotus calls *reality*. As a genus is a reality in Scotus' ontology, there is no inconsistency in his maintaining that both

³⁵ Scotus, *Quaestiones super Praedicamenta Aristoteles*, q. 3, n. 13.

the essence and the genus are together the foundation of our logical concept of a genus. The essence is the thing which is the foundation of our logical concept, while a metaphysical genus is the reality which is the other part of the foundation of our concept.

Second, consider this text: "Thus, a lesser unity suffices in the thing than the unity of the intention. For it suffices that the intellect is moved by something extrinsic to cause many things through consideration, to which there do not simply correspond many things in the thing."³⁶ Presumably, we should read Scotus to mean here that the metaphysical essence moves the intellect as an occasional cause. Again, I emphasize that the genera I claim to be real proper parts of the essence are not things on Scotus's ontology, but a different type of entity: realities. It may be true that no thing corresponds to our logical concept of a genus, while some item that is not a thing does correspond to the logical genus, a reality. Provided we do not accept the notion that according to Scotus an entity must be a thing, such passages as the ones above can be read so as to be consistent with my interpretation. That is, I can reply in the face of such passages by conceding that no thing corresponds to the logical concept, but only an item that is a reality.

Having argued that Scotus accepts the reality of metaphysical genera as proper parts of essences and removed certain textual impediments to accepting a correspondence between logical and metaphysical genera, I recall Scotus's answer in his *Categories* commentary to the worry that our logical concepts are fictions, confident that I can offer a positive reason to accept the correspondence I propose as Scotus's intention. The charge that our logical concepts are fictions arose from their possessing a universality matching nothing outside the intellect; the community essences and genera possess in themselves is not universality for Scotus. In response, Scotus drew on the theory of a threefold signification of the term *human*. According to that theory, the essence *human* taken absolutely as it is in itself has neither universality nor particularity. However, it can have either universality or particularity as accidents, though not in exactly the same way. Thus, the essence in the intellect is *the very same entity* as the essence in the substance, despite the fact that as it is individuated in the thing the essence is individual and in the intellect the essence is universal. As the essence in the intellect is the

³⁶ Ibid.

same entity as the essence in the thing, and the essence in the thing is not a fiction, neither is the essence in the intellect.

But on Pini's interpretation of Scotus, this reply will not work for our concepts of genera. If there is no generic entity in the thing to which a generic concept may correspond, but only the essence, there is no entity outside the intellect with which our generic concept can be one. Thus, on Pini's interpretation, it seems to me that Scotus does not have a reply to the charge that our generic concepts are fictions, or at least he does not have the reply that he makes on behalf of essences. If we admit that Scotus intended our generic concepts to correspond with generic entities, we may retain his reply to the charge of fiction for our generic concepts.

HOW IS SCOTUS'S LOGIC RELATED TO HIS METAPHYSICS? A REPLY TO TODD BATES¹

Giorgio Pini

It is usually contended that one of the central tenets of Scotus's metaphysics is what I will refer to as 'the formalistic view'. According to this view, reality is sliced up in items that closely parallel the concepts by which we understand it. So for example an individual such as John is constituted of an individual property that he does not share with anything else (call it 'Johneity') and a specific component that he has in common with other human beings (humanity). The specific component *humanity* is in turn constituted of a generic component that John shares with other animals (animality) and an item that differentiates John as an animal of a certain kind (rationality). The claim of the formalistic view is that we can go on with this analysis until we reach the ultimate kind to which John belongs, i.e., substance. To this ultimate kind there corresponds in John a certain item called 'substantiality'. The reason I call this view 'the formalistic view' is that each of John's components (his individual property, humanity, animality, rationality, and so on up to substantiality) is called, in Scotus's jargon, a formality. Formalities have two defining features. The first defining feature of a formality is that it cannot exist independently, i.e., without the individual that it constitutes. The second defining feature of a formality is that it is nevertheless distinguished from the individual that it constitutes and from the other formalities within that individual no matter whether we think of it as a separate constituent of reality or not. In Scotus's terms, each formality has some degree of mind-independent unity.

The formalistic view is a metaphysical view, i.e., it speaks of how reality is structured independently of the way we understand it. Todd Bates argues that Scotus subscribes to this view in the form that I have described. As I will make clear at the end of this paper, I think that

¹ I wish to thank the editor of the present volume, Lloyd Newton, for giving me the opportunity to answer Todd Bates's criticism to my book *Categories and Logic in Duns Scotus. An Interpretation of Aristotle's Categories in the Late Thirteenth Century* (Leiden, 2002).

Bates's arguments in favor of Scotus's endorsement of the formalistic view are not conclusive.² But this is a secondary point in the disagreement between Bates and me. The main point of disagreement is that Bates maintains that Scotus's logic, and specifically his interpretation of Aristotle's *Categories*, implies this metaphysical view; by contrast, I think that it does not. So what is at issue in Bates's criticism of my interpretation of Scotus is not whether or not Scotus holds the formalistic view—a point about which I did not take a position in my interpretation of Scotus's *Categories* commentary. For the sake of discussion, in what follows I will assume that this is indeed Scotus's position. As I said, this is not the issue of our disagreement. What is at issue is whether Scotus's logic implies this view.

On the face of it, Bates's argument has a strong appeal. On the one hand, there is the world, which is constituted of mind-independent formalities. Accordingly, these formalities can be seen as modes of being (*modi essendi*). On the other hand, there are our concepts, by which we understand the world. The concepts can be seen as modes of understanding (*modi intelligendi*), i.e., the way we understand the world. Now it is the claim of the formalistic view that to each concept in our mind (e.g., the generic concept *animal*) there corresponds a certain formality in reality (i.e., the formality *animality*). So we can say the modes of being closely parallel the modes of understanding. Why is there such a parallelism? Clearly, our modes of understanding are shaped to mirror the modes of being on which they are grounded. If our modes of understanding did not mirror the modes of being—it is claimed—, they would not be representations of reality and as a consequence they would not fare better than fictitious concepts such as *chimera*, which have no correlate in extramental reality. Since logic is the science that deals with our modes of understanding, we seem to be entitled to conclude that, according to Scotus, logic is grounded on metaphysics. Specifically, Scotus's logic implies the formalistic view.

Bates admits that some passages in Scotus's *Categories* commentary seem to favor my interpretation. But he also maintains that, in order to avoid the alleged tension between Scotus's logic and his metaphysics, we had better adopt a "charitable reading" of his *Categories* commentary.

² I also think that Scotus endorsed a metaphysical view of the way in which reality is structured more sophisticated than the rather crude form of Platonism that the formalistic view amounts to. But I will not argue for this point in this paper, as it is irrelevant to the defense of my interpretation of Scotus's *Categories* commentary.

The charitable reading that Bates upholds is supposed to eliminate any tension and to eliminate the apparent anomaly of Scotus's *Categories* commentary in the light of his metaphysical teachings.

So the issue that Bates raises is serious and central to the interpretation of Scotus's thought, as it concerns nothing less than the relationship between Scotus's logic and metaphysics. The question is: Is Scotus committed to a specific metaphysical view in his logic? My claim is that he is not, and that this is one of the great attractions of his view. By contrast, Bates argues that Scotus, even when doing logic, is committed to a specific metaphysical view, i.e., the formalistic view, and that if we fail to recognize this, there arises a problem of coherence both within Scotus's logic (i.e., generic concepts fall short of any foundation in reality and must be considered as fictitious) and, more in general, between his logic and metaphysics.

Before addressing Bates's criticism of my interpretation of Scotus's *Categories* commentary and of his logic in general (or what Scotus and his contemporaries called 'logic'), I have to address a preliminary problem, which will turn out to be quite revealing of what I take to be Bates's misunderstanding of both my position and, more importantly, Scotus's position. This problem concerns the way Bates presents my interpretation of Scotus's logic. As it happens, Bates presents two different accounts of my position. At times, he says (correctly) that I maintain that what Scotus says in his *Categories* commentary does not commit him to *any* metaphysical view concerning the way the world is. Specifically, I maintain that Scotus, in his logic, does not need to deal with the problem whether essences are simple entities or whether they are divided into formalities (e.g., whether *human being* is a simple entity or whether it is constituted of two mind-independent formalities, *animality* and *rationality*). Scotus's logic, we can say, is metaphysically neutral. However, the view against which Bates argues in most of his paper is not this one. What he apparently attributes to me in most of the paper is the claim that Scotus's logic implies a metaphysical view that is incompatible with the metaphysical views that he presents in his most celebrated works, i.e., his commentary on the *Sentences* and, we can add, his commentary on the *Metaphysics*. So this time the claim that Bates attributes to me is that Scotus's logic implies the view that extramental essences are simple and not divided into further mind-independent formalities. It is this claim, not the claim that Scotus's logic is metaphysically neutral, that posits a "tension" between Scotus's logic and metaphysics.

The two claims that Bates attributes to me are clearly different. As a matter of fact, I am ready to defend the first, but not the second one. It is one thing to say, as I say, that Scotus's logic does not require that essences are compound (for it does not require that essences are simple either; in his logic Scotus is non-committal with regard to this issue). It is another thing to say, as Bates has me saying, that Scotus's logic requires that essences are not compound. Saying that *a* does not entail *b* is clearly different from saying that *a* entails not-*b*.

So what are we to make of this preliminary problem? Does it mean that Bates's criticism is directed against a straw man and that I can ignore it as irrelevant to my interpretation of Scotus? In fairness to Bates, I think that, should I take this line of defense, I could be charged with avoiding the real issue. For it can be contended that what Bates actually means to say is that, even though I explicitly endorse the view that Scotus, in his *Categories* commentary, is not committed to any metaphysical view, what I attribute to Scotus as a matter of fact commits him (I suppose, unbeknown to me) to a certain metaphysical view, which is at odds with his metaphysical positions as he states them elsewhere. So, I will have to argue that my reconstruction of Scotus's *Categories* commentary does not surreptitiously imply any commitment to a specific metaphysical view on Scotus's part. Specifically, Scotus does not have to decide whether essences are simple or compound of formalities, contrary to what Bates thinks.

Accordingly, I construe Bates's criticism as consisting of the following three claims:

- (1) My reading of Scotus's *Categories* commentary implies a certain metaphysical view, namely, the view that extramental essences are simple entities.

This reading must be rejected for the following two reasons.

- (2) If Scotus is indeed committed to the view that essences are simple entities, he does not have an answer to the charge that generic concepts are fictitious (and so a concept such as *animal* would be grounded in reality no more than a concept such as *chimera*).
- (3) If Scotus is indeed committed to the view that essences are simple entities, what he says in his *Categories* commentary is at odds with his standard metaphysical views as stated in other works, where he seems to be committed to the idea that essences are entities compounded of distinct formalities.

Accordingly, it will be enough for me to argue against point (1). If it is not the case that my interpretation of Scotus's logic commits him to any specific metaphysical view (and so it is compatible with more than one, including the formalistic view), the second and third point lose the premise on which they are grounded and so do not follow. All the same, for the sake of clarity, I will also say something concerning point (2) and (3).

1. *Logic as a Second-Order Activity*

So let me begin with the first point. Bates thinks that my reading of Scotus's *Categories* commentary commits him to the metaphysical view that extramental essences are simple, so that, for example, the essence *humanity* is not composed of two distinct formalities, *rationality* and *animality*.

In my opinion, Bates's criticism arises from his failure to appreciate the significance of Scotus's view that logic is a second-order activity, concerned with second-order concepts such as *species*, *genus*, and *universal*. First-order concepts such as *human being* and *animal* interest the logician only to the extent that they are the subject of second-order concepts, not as they are applied to extramental things. Thus, in Scotus's and his contemporaries' opinion, the logician is typically concerned with statements such as 'Human being is a species' (*homo est species*), 'Animal is a genus' (*animal est genus*), 'Rational is a differentia' (*rationale est differentia*), not with statements such as 'Socrates is a human being', 'Human being is an animal', 'Human being is a rational animal'. To the extent that logic is a second-order activity dealing with second-order concepts, it can remain non-committal about the specific way in which first-order predications are carried out, i.e., the way in which first-order concepts such as *human being*, *animal*, and *rational* are said of extramental things and capture aspects of reality.³

In order to see that this is the case, we must recall that Scotus, like most of his contemporaries, subscribes to the view that Aristotle's

³ The distinction between first and second intentions is clearly drawn by Scotus, among other places, in his *Questions on the Metaphysics*, VII, q. 18, nn. 38–39 (*Oph* IV, p. 347), with regard to the term 'universal'. Logicians are concerned with the second-order concept *universal*, metaphysicians are concerned with first-order concepts such as *human being* and *animal*, insofar as they capture an aspect of reality.

Categories is a work of logic.⁴ Similarly, and again like most of his contemporaries, he thinks that this implies that the *Categories* deals *neither* with things in the world (such as human beings or horses) *nor* with our concepts of such things insofar as they represent such things. The latter point is worth stressing, as I think that it is its misunderstanding that caused Bates's criticism of my interpretation. Scotus subscribes to a view that was pretty standard in his time. This view, derived from Avicenna and ultimately from Alexander of Aphrodisias, held that what we think of can be considered in two ways.⁵ First, it can be considered as the object of our thought and as what we think of, independently of the fact that we think of it. In this first consideration, what we think of is viewed as something in the extramental world. Second, what we think of can be considered not as it is something in the world but just insofar as it is the object of our thought, i.e., insofar as we think of it. For example, let us posit that we think of what human beings have in common (without being concerned with its specific ontological status). We can consider such an entity in two ways. First, we can consider what we think of, i.e., the common nature or property *human being* as something independent of the fact that we think of it or not. Second, we can consider the same nature or property just with respect to the fact that we think of it. This distinction, commonly adopted in Scotus's times, is quite important to appreciate how metaphysics differs from logic in the understanding of Scotus's contemporaries. For the same object has different sets of properties according to whether it is considered in the first or in the second way. Specifically, when the nature

⁴ See *Categories and Logic*, pp. 19–44, as well as my contribution to the present volume.

⁵ See G. Pini, "Absoluta consideratio naturae: Tommaso d'Aquino e la dottrina avicenniana dell'essenza," *Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale* 15 (2004): 387–438. In what follows I give a simplified description of this view, which Scotus presents, among other places, in his *Isagoge* commentary, q. 9–11, n. 21 (*OPh* I, p. 46). See Pini, *Categories and Logic*, pp. 100–102. In the complete picture, what we think of can be considered in three, not just two ways: as it exists in individuals, as it is in itself, and as a concept in the mind. Here only the last two considerations are relevant. It must also be noticed that Bates takes the passage from Scotus's *Isagoge* commentary I have just referred to as evidence that Scotus subscribes to his famous doctrine of essence, as classically stated in his commentaries on the *Sentences*, already in his logical writings. This is not correct. What Scotus provides in the passage from his *Isagoge* commentary is the standard doctrine taken from Avicenna, which can be found in most authors of the thirteenth and early fourteenth century, including Thomas Aquinas. What is peculiar to Scotus in his mature writings is the claim that the essence, as considered in itself, has a less-than-numerical unity quite independently of our mind's consideration. I find no trace of this latter claim in Scotus's logical writings.

human being is considered independently of whether we think of it or not, it has properties such as being mortal, being rational, and being an animal. By contrast, when the nature *human being* is considered with respect to the fact that we think of it it has the property of being a species and being universal. These two sets of properties are clearly different. On the one hand, we have properties such as *being John*, *being a human being*, *being an animal*, *being a substance*. On the other hand, we have properties such as *being an individual*, *being a species*, *being a genus*, *being a category*. Can we account for the diversity between these two sets of properties? Thirteenth-century thinkers thought that we can, as we have seen, on the basis of the subject to which these properties are attributed. The first set of properties is attributed to what we think of as it is a component of the extramental reality and independently of the fact that we think of it. The second set of properties is attributed to what we think of insofar as we consider it as what we think of. The first consideration is what Scotus and his contemporaries call a 'real' or 'metaphysical consideration', and the properties connected to it are real or metaphysical properties. The second consideration is what Scotus and his contemporaries call 'logical consideration', and the properties connected with it are called 'logical properties'. The same points can be made by using the sometimes discredited vocabulary of first and second intentions. Our thoughts concerning the world are called 'first intentions'. These thoughts can be considered either as they concern the world or as they are thoughts that we have. According to the first consideration, first intentions are considered by the metaphysician, who studies them as representations of items in the mind-independent world. According to the second consideration, first intentions are considered by the logician, who regards them insofar as they are concepts and as they are the subjects of properties that pertain to them as they are concepts. These logical properties are called 'second intentions'. Accordingly, the metaphysician studies first intentions (i.e., concepts) such as *human being* as they represent the extramental reality. The logician studies first intentions such as *human being* only to the extent that they are subjects of second intentions, i.e., of properties such as *being a species* and *being universal*.

If we apply all this to the *Categories*, Scotus and his contemporaries maintained that, since the *Categories* is a work of logic and not of metaphysics, whatever Aristotle says about substances such as human beings or accidents such as white should be interpreted as referring to these substances and accidents insofar they are known by us and, moreover,

not as they represent something in the extramental world but as they are the subjects of logical or second-intention properties such as *being a species*, *being a genus*, *being universal*. As I have said, it was commonly agreed that the latter properties are properties not of the human beings or animals we think of but of the concepts in our minds by which we think of human beings or animals. In other terms, second-intention properties such as *being a species* or *being a genus* were considered not as properties of things or modes of being (*modi essendi*), but as ways in which we look at things or modes of understanding (*modi intelligendi*).

So far, there was agreement among thirteenth-century thinkers. The disagreement started when the cause of these second-intention properties was inquired. Some thought that the main cause of properties such as *being a genus* is the way things are. Our mind merely abstracts the concept of genus by considering the real properties in things.⁶ Others thought that the main cause of properties such as *being a genus* is our mind. In extramental reality there are human beings and animals, not species and genera. Species and genera are concepts that our mind produces when it focuses on the way in which it conceives and classifies things in the extramental world. Admittedly, things may be classified into the same species or into the same genus because they share some common *real* properties. But the supporters of this second view contended that this is not relevant when we are doing logic. When we say that both horses and human beings are animals we are indeed taking into account their common *real* properties. In that case, we are doing metaphysics, and we may indeed wonder about the ontological status of those properties. In logic, however, we are not interested in these properties, but in the fact that the concept of human being is a species and the concept of animal is a genus. Why is this the case? The supporters of this view maintained that the answer does not have anything to do with the fact that all human beings existing in the world have some real properties in common. By contrast, they maintained that the correct answer is that the concept of human being is predicated of some entities (individuals) while at the same time some other concepts (generic concepts) are predicated of it. Even though the ultimate reason why a concept is predicated of something may lie in the metaphysical structure of things, all we need to know in logic is not *why* a concept is predicated of something, but just *that* and *how* (i.e., with which degree

⁶ See *Categories and logic*, pp. 68–98.

of universality) it is predicated of something. And we can know that this is the case without inquiring into the metaphysical structure of the world, but merely by comparing concepts and their predicability. So whether a concept is the subject of the second-intention concept of species is decided on the basis of a comparison among concepts, not a consideration of real properties of things. For this reason, the supporters of this view maintained that our intellect, and not the way things are, is the main cause of second-intention concepts.⁷

Scotus is among the supporters of this view (but he is not alone, contrary to what Bates seems to think; as I stressed in my book, he shares company with Thomas Aquinas and Peter of Auvergne). This view has a very interesting consequence. We can speak of concepts such as *species* and *genus* while remaining metaphysically neutral. In other terms, when we are doing what Scotus and his contemporaries call 'logic', we do not have to take a stance concerning the way things are in the world, for we are talking about the modes or ways things are understood, not the modes or ways things are in the world independently of the way we think of them.

It is this point that Bates does not accept. He contends that, even when doing logic, Scotus cannot remain metaphysically neutral. But I think that this criticism stems from a failure to understand what the subject matter of logic is, according to Scotus and his contemporaries. Logic—and consequently, Aristotle's *Categories*—is not concerned with concepts such as *human being* and *animal* insofar as they represent extramental things. These concepts are dealt with in logic only to the extent that they serve as foundations of concepts such as *species* and *genus*. So Scotus (and in this respect he is in complete agreement with all his contemporaries) thinks that the real focus of Aristotle's *Categories* is on concepts such as *individual*, *species*, and *genus*. John, human being and animal are dealt with only to the extent that they serve as foundations to such concepts. It is consequently not relevant to say—as Bates does—that if there is no common formality corresponding to our generic concept of animal such a concept is fictitious. This is not what Scotus is concerned with in his *Categories* commentary. If he were, he would be doing metaphysics, not what he calls 'logic'. What Scotus is interested in it is not generic concepts such as *animal*, but second-intention concepts such as *genus*. First-intention concepts such

⁷ Ibid., pp. 45–67, 99–137.

as *animal* are interesting for him only insofar as they play the role of foundations of second-intention concepts. But it is quite irrelevant to consider their real foundation in extramental reality (i.e., whether there is a mind-independent formality or instead there is something else corresponding to the concept of animal).

Bates seems to be confusing first-intention concepts such as *animal* with second-intention concepts such as *genus*. This is clear from his frequent reference to the distinction between logical genus and metaphysical genus. From what I can understand, he thinks that this distinction amounts to the distinction between a generic concept such as *animal* (which, as a concept, is in our mind, but nonetheless represents something outside our mind) and its foundation in reality, i.e., what Bates takes to be the formality *animality*. So the distinction between logical and metaphysical genus for Bates amounts to the distinction between a concept representing something outside the mind and the feature in reality that corresponds to that concept. To my knowledge, however, there is no talk of this kind in Scotus. He does talk of the distinction between a generic concept and its correlate in reality. But such a distinction is not drawn in terms of logical *versus* metaphysical genus.⁸ When Scotus speaks of genus in logic, he usually intends to refer to the second-intention *genus*, not the concept *animal*. Also, Scotus does sometimes speak of a logical and a metaphysical consideration of terms, for example when he speaks of the term 'being' or the term 'body' as considered logically or metaphysically.⁹ But when Scotus speaks in this way, he is not contrasting two distinct entities (a concept in the mind and a thing in reality), as Bates maintains. He is merely distinguishing between two ways of considering the *same* term, i.e., insofar as it signifies something outside the mind and insofar as it signifies something in our mind. It is because Bates fails to appreciate this point that he thinks that Scotus should address the question of the real foundation of generic concepts in his logical works. Bates thinks that Scotus is talking about concepts such as *animal*. Consequently,

⁸ See Scotus's *Questions on the Metaphysics*, VII, q. 19 (*Oph* IV, pp. 356–379). The contrast between metaphysical and logical genus can indeed be found in the *De rerum principio*. But this work, present in Wadding's and Vivès's editions of Scotus's *Opera omnia*, is not by Scotus. Even there, however, the distinction concerns being and the categories, not the relationship between a generic concept and its real correlate. See C. R. S. Harris, *Duns Scotus* (Oxford, 1927), vol. 2, p. 59.

⁹ See for example Scotus's *Questions on the Sophistical Refutations*, q. 15, n. 20 (*Oph* II, pp. 337–338).

the question naturally arises, what does correspond in reality to such concepts? But this is not what Scotus is interested in in his logical works. Scotus is interested in concepts such as *genus* and in concepts such as *animal* not as they represent something outside our minds but only to the extent that they serve as foundations for concepts such as *genus*. Now, Scotus explains in clear terms that a concept such as *genus* is caused by the intellect by way of a comparison between concepts, e.g., *animal* and *human being*. These two concepts are compared only to the extent that they have a more or less universal application—*animal* has a wider extension than *human being*. But the reason why *animal* has a wider extension than *human being* is of no concern to the logician. To ask why *animal* has a wider extension than *human being* is indeed a very good question. But it is a metaphysical question. The logician can be content with sorting out concepts into generic and specific with no concern for the metaphysical reason why this is so. The logician only needs to know that a concept is generic if it is predicated of other concepts that are classified as specific. And a concept is specific if it is predicated of other entities that are classified as individual and if concepts classified as generic are predicated of it. But the logician does not have to take any stance about the deep metaphysical reason why a concept such as *animal* is predicated of more items than a concept such as *human being*. Granted, there must be a reason. But to ascertain what this reason is, is the concern of the metaphysician. As a consequence, Scotus does not have to commit himself to any specific metaphysical view in his logic. Of course, he does have to assume that there is an ultimate metaphysical reason why a concept such as *animal* has a larger extension than a concept such as *human being*. But, while doing logic, he does not have to concern himself with any of the available explanations. It is enough for him to know that there is an explanation. It is when doing metaphysics that he will have to do so. This is most clear in this important passage from Scotus's *Categories* commentary:

I say that the <extramental> thing is not the whole cause of an intention. It is only its occasion, i.e., to the extent that it moves the intellect to the actual consideration <of something>. It is the intellect that is the principal cause. Therefore, in reality there need not be as much unity as the intention has, because it will be sufficient that the intellect will be moved by something external to cause several <concepts> by its own act of considering <that same external thing>. And to <each of> these concepts there does not correspond a separate entity in reality (*aliqua in re*)...the intellect, when it considers <something> in virtue of the one and only image <that it has received from the extramental thing>, can

turn to its own operation a thousand times by its act of considering <that operation>. *Each act of considering is something, but it has nothing external corresponding to it except the first object as an occasion (quaelibet consideratio aliquid est, nihil habens extrinsecum sibi correspondens, nisi tantum primum obiectum pro occasione)*, to the extent that <that object> first moves the intellect to the act of considering.¹⁰ (Italics mine)

Scotus does not need to posit a separate entity in the extramental reality corresponding to each separate second intention. So there need not be separate entities corresponding to the concepts *species*, *genus*, *differentia*. All Scotus needs, in order to rule out the charge that these concepts have no ground in reality and are therefore fictitious, is that there is *some* extramental thing corresponding to them. But no additional requirement is needed concerning the internal structure of this external thing (the occasion of second intentions). To say, as Bates does, that Scotus does not need a separate external *thing* corresponding to each of these concepts but nevertheless he needs an external *formality* is to miss the point. This may be true when Scotus is talking about first-intention concepts such as *human being* and *animal*. But this is not what Scotus is talking about here. In my opinion, Bates's criticism fails to take into account the subtle but not at all gratuitous way in which Scotus and his contemporaries distinguished between logic and metaphysics. When Bates thinks that he is talking about logic, he is actually talking about what Scotus and his contemporaries would call 'metaphysics'. The reason why he thinks that Scotus's logic is committed to a specific metaphysical view is that he mistakes what Scotus would call 'metaphysics' for his logic.

Bates's difficulty with grasping the full extent of the idea that logic is a science concerned with second-intention concepts and that as such it is not committed to any specific metaphysical framework is not new. As it happens, Scotus himself reports and criticizes a view that is very similar to Bates's argument.¹¹ Some could argue—says Scotus—that logic deals with concepts, but, since concepts are in turn signs of things, logic must also consider the way in which things are in the world. In other words, the claim is that logic, even though it is a science of concepts or modes of understanding, cannot remain neutral

¹⁰ Scotus's *Categories* commentary, q. 3, n. 13 (*OPh* I, 270–271). I have modified the translation I provided in *Categories and Logic*, p. 112.

¹¹ I am grateful to Lloyd Newton for bringing this point to my attention.

with regard to modes of being, namely, the structure of the things of which logical concepts are signs. The argument in favor of this claim is straightforward. A sign is a relative item; a relative item is known only if its correlate is known; since logicians study concepts as signs of things, they must assume some specific explanation about how things are. Interestingly, Scotus remarks that this argument is an objection to the very view that logic is a science dealing with concepts. We may say that this claim—which bears a striking resemblance to Bates's criticism to my interpretation of Scotus—eliminates the distinction between logic and metaphysics. Scotus's reply is that this claim is based on a fallacious argument. If we intend to know a relative item we must indeed know its correlative term. However, we do not need to know the correlative term according to all its features, as the objection assumes, but only with regard to the properties that inhere in it insofar as it is correlated to the relative item we are studying. Specifically, logic deals with concepts that are ultimately signs of things. It is true, therefore, that logic must deal with things. But this does not mean that logic must deal with the structure of things considered in themselves and is consequently committed to a certain metaphysical view. Things are considered only with regard to the properties that pertain to them as they are signified by concepts. These properties are second-intention properties such as 'being universal', 'being predicable', 'being a subject'. Even though it can be argued that the extramental things to which these properties pertain must have a certain metaphysical structure, Scotus's point is that it is the task of the metaphysician, not of the logician, to study that structure. Logicians can and must remain metaphysically neutral unless they intend to stop doing logic and start doing metaphysics.¹²

¹² Scotus's *Categories* Commentary, q. 1, nn. 22–26 (*Oph* I, 255–256): “Contra: conceptus est ulterius signum rei; igitur adhuc sequitur quod oportet rem cognosci. Istud argumentum non est tantum contra Boethium, sed etiam contra dicentes logicam esse de conceptibus. Ideo potest dici quod non oportet propter unius relativi cognitionem alterum cognosci quantum ad omnia quas sibi insunt in se, sed tantum quantum ad illa quae insunt ei in quantum refertur ad aliud. Hoc autem modo non est inconveniens rem cognosci in logica in quantum est significatum per conceptum.” Bates's position is strikingly similar to Radulphus Brito's view, which is quite different from Scotus's one, as I argue in my book. See Pini, *Categories and Logic*, pp. 168–169.

2. *Why Logical Notions Are Not Fictions*

Bates's second point concerning my reading of Scotus's *Categories* commentary can be dealt with more briefly. Once it is clear that it is not Scotus's job in his logic to say anything about the real foundation of our first-intention concepts, it follows that we should not look there for a justification that generic concepts such as *animal* are not fictitious, i.e., have no foundation in reality.

Bates contends that, in my reading of Scotus's *Categories* commentary, I cannot rescue Scotus from the charge that a generic concept is fictitious. Why a generic concept and not, for that matter, a specific concept? Because Bates thinks that my reading implies that Scotus is committed to the view that the essence of an extramental thing is a simple entity, not composed of further formalities. So, in the extramental world, there should be just essences such as *humanity*, and that these essences are not further composed of formalities such as *animality* and *rationality*. As a consequence, a specific concept such as *human being* is grounded in reality, for there is a real entity corresponding to it, i.e., the essence *humanity*. But a generic concept such as *animal* is not grounded on any such real foundation, because (in Bates's rendering of my interpretation) there are no distinct components of the world corresponding to it.

As is clear, Bates thinks that what Scotus is talking about is first-intention concepts such as *animal*. Moreover, he assumes that if there is no separate entity corresponding to such concepts, they fare no better than fictitious concepts such as *chimera*. This latter claim seems to be unjustified, but I do not intend to focus on it. What I would like to stress again is that, in his logical writings, Scotus is interested in generic concepts such as *animal* not as they represent real features of the world but as they play the role of foundations of second-intention concepts such as *genus*. Consequently, what he is worried about is that second-intention concepts, being representations not of ways things are but of ways of understanding, may turn out to be fictitious just as the concept *chimera*. It is this worry concerning second intentions that Scotus evokes in his *Isagoge* commentary. And it is to this worry that he answers with regard to the second-intention concept *universal* (but what he says can be easily applied to other second intention concepts such as *genus* and *species*). Such second-intention concepts are not fictitious, Scotus claims, because, unlike a concept such as *chimera*, they are founded on first-intention concepts, which, in turn, are grounded on reality—even though it is not insofar as these latter concepts are

grounded in reality that they are the subjects of second intentions.¹³ For example, the concept *genus* is not fictitious, because it is grounded on the first intention concept *animal*, which in turn is grounded on real animals. How is the first intention concept *animal* grounded on real animals? What is the relationship between our concept (generic, specific, or whatever) and extramental reality? Scotus does not approach this topic here, nor does he need to. All he needs to say to differentiate second intentions from fictitious concepts is that there is something in reality that plays the role of a necessary condition for their existence. This necessary condition is indeed a real property existing in the world independently of the way in which we consider it. But as to what this property is (i.e., whether it is really, formally or only rationally different from the reality from which the species and the specific difference are taken), Scotus does not have to say anything. This is an issue for the metaphysician to tackle. The logician only needs to know that there is something, but whether it is an essence considered in abstraction from some of its feature or a separate formality or anything else, this is not something that is of any relevance for him. This is the reason why Scotus, in his logical writings, does not deal with the question of what corresponds in reality to first-intention generic concepts such as *animal*. As a matter of fact, he does not deal with the question of what corresponds in reality to first-intention *specific* concepts either. Likewise, there seems to be no mention, in Scotus's logical writings, of his doctrine of the less-than-numerical unity pertaining to essences independently of our consideration.

3. *Bates's Evidence for the Formalistic View*

I think that what I have said so far is enough to defend my reading of Scotus's *Categories* commentary from Bates's criticisms. Nonetheless, Bates briefly sketches a view that, even though it is in no way opposed to what I say in my book, is worth considering in itself. This is the metaphysical position that I have called 'the formalistic view'. Bates thinks that there is good evidence that Scotus is committed, especially in his commentaries on the *Sentences*, to the view that each individual is constituted not

¹³ See Scotus's *Isagoge* commentary, q. 4, n. 12 (*Oph* I, 25); Pini, *Categories and Logic*, p. 110.

only of two formalities, i.e., an essence and an individuating feature, but of many others, for the essence is in turn constituted of a formality corresponding to the genus into which that individual falls and of the relevant specific difference, and the formality corresponding to the genus is in turn constituted of other formalities, up to the formality corresponding to the category to which the individual belongs. So for example John is constituted of his individuating difference and of *humanity*, which is in turn constituted of *animality* and *rationality*, and so on until we reach the ultimate formality *substantiality*. At this point, I hope that it should be clear that this view is perfectly compatible with my reading of Scotus's *Categories* commentary, as it is a metaphysical view concerning the structure of the world and its items, and Scotus's logic, in my interpretation, is not committed to any specific metaphysical view nor is it incompatible with any (at least, with any of the most common Aristotelian metaphysical views, and certainly not with the formalistic view). But it is a problem in itself worth investigating to see whether Scotus does endorse the formalistic view. Here I will not try to give a full treatment of this interesting topic. I will just limit myself to a few remarks concerning the evidence Bates uses to argue that this is the case.

It seems to me that the evidence that Bates brings in support of Scotus's endorsement of the formalistic view is not conclusive. Bates lays the burden of proof on an important passage in *Ord.*, II, d. 3, qq. 5–6, n. 189, which he quotes extensively. In that passage, Scotus says that 'composition' can be intended as a composition of different things or as a composition of two components within the same things. As we know from other passages, although these components of the same thing cannot exist the one without the other, they are indeed distinguished from each other independently of whether we think of them as distinct or not. This is the gist of Scotus's famous doctrine of the formal distinction. In the passage Bates quotes, Scotus argues that the reality from which the individual difference is taken and the reality from which the specific difference is taken are distinguished in this way within the same individual. So, for example, in John we must posit a mind-independent distinction between that reality from which his individual difference (Johneity?) is taken and the reality from which rationality is taken. No mention is made of the relationship between the reality from which the specific difference is taken and the reality from which the genus is taken. But this is what Bates needs in order to argue for his point. He may have been confused by Scotus's talk

of the specific difference, but in this passage the specific difference is contrasted with the individual difference, not with the genus. Thus, I cannot see how this passage, in itself, can support the formalistic view. What it supports is clearly a composition of a specific element and an individuating element within the same individual thing. More than this cannot be argued for on the basis of this passage. Of course, this passage is not incompatible with the view that more formalities are to be found within the same thing. But that Scotus subscribed to such a view must be argued for on the basis of evidence other than this.¹⁴

This does not mean, of course, that no evidence can be given for Scotus's endorsement of the formalistic view. There may be other passages more cogent than the one on which Bates bases his interpretation. I only want to stress that no such passage is to be found in Scotus's logical commentaries. Quite the contrary, in his *Isagoge* commentary Scotus holds that a generic concept such as *animal* and a specific difference such as *rational* differ only to the extent that the intellect abstracts matter from the difference whereas it does not from the genus. So, the difference between the two concepts seem to amount to a distinct consideration of the intellect (this is what Thomas Aquinas had maintained).¹⁵

4. Conclusion

In this paper, I have responded to the main criticism that Bates moves against my interpretation of Scotus's *Categories* commentary, i.e., that my reading commits Scotus to a specific metaphysical view which is incompatible with what I have called 'the formalistic view'. Moreover, I have showed that the evidence on which Bates grounds his claim that Scotus endorsed the formalistic view is not conclusive. I hope that, in the light of what I have said, Scotus's view on the relationship between

¹⁴ Bates also refers to Scotus's claim that genera are not distinguished among themselves by way of intrinsic modes, i.e., as a color is distinguished into different shades. Bates maintains that the distinction between a color and its intrinsic mode is not real (in the sense of mind-independent, I assume). This is at best controversial. From this, Bates concludes that the distinction between a genus and its specific *differentiae* is real (in the sense of mind-independent). I think that here Bates is making a mistake. From "if a, then not-b" (i.e., if a genus and its difference are distinguished as a color and its mode, then it is not the case that they are distinguished mind-independently) does not follow "if not-a, then b" (i.e., if it is not the case that a genus and its difference are distinguished as a color and its mode, then they are distinguished mind-independently).

¹⁵ See Scotus's *Isagoge* commentary, q. 20, n. 5 (*Oph* I, pp. 128–129).

logic and metaphysics has emerged as more sophisticated and, possibly, defensible than it is usually assumed. Scotus's logic does not imply his metaphysics. Of course, it presupposes that some metaphysical account of reality can be given. Accordingly, logic is not a merely conventional discipline whose concepts are merely fictitious. But, in logic, we do not have to commit to any specific metaphysical account of the structure of reality. To inquire how the world is structured is the task of the metaphysician, not of the logician. Scotus, like most of his contemporaries, carefully distinguishes between logic and metaphysics. Logic is a metaphysically neutral tool that we can use well no matter where our metaphysical preferences lie.

JOHN BURIDAN: ON ARISTOTLE'S *CATEGORIES**

Alexander W. Hall

Inspired by William of Ockham, fourteenth-century nominalists denied the existence of extramental universals and generally avoided reifying things in the accidental categories.¹ This raises difficulties in the face of Aristotle's ambiguous claim that things that are (*ta onta*)² comprise substances and the nine categories of accidents. Aristotle describes accidents as dependent on substances for their existence, though the converse does not hold. Since they are inherent in substances, accidents along with their genera and species are said to be *in* substances. Again genera and species are described as *said of* the particulars that are under them, thus genera in the category of substance are *said of* particular substances, while genera in the category of quality are *said of* particular qualities, etc.³ Commentators have long debated whether Aristotle's "things that are" are types of entities, significative utterances, or a combination of both.⁴ For his part, Buridan maintains that Aristotle's categories comprise certain types of significative utterances and he interprets being *said of* and *in* as relations that hold among terms, explicable via the semantic properties of supposition, signification, appellation, and

* I am grateful to Gyula Klima for suggestions on the orientation of Buridan's approach, and especially to Jack Zupko for encouraging me to undertake this work, commenting on several earlier versions, and giving freely of his time and expertise on numerous occasions.

¹ In some cases, this was not possible. For instance, the subsistence of the accidents of bread and wine apart from the host during the miracle of transubstantiation was generally held to require that certain accidents could exist apart from a subject through divine agency. See Paul J. H. M. Bakker, "Aristotelian Metaphysics and Eucharistic Theology: John Buridan and Marsilius of Inghen on the Ontological Status of Accidental Being," in *The Metaphysics and Natural Philosophy of John Buridan*, eds. Johannes M. M. H. Thijssen and Jack Zupko, *Medieval and Early Modern Science* (Leiden, 2001), pp. 247–64.

² *Categories* (*Cat*) 1^a20.

³ *Cat* 1^a16–^b19.

⁴ See section 2. For arguments in favor of granting extramental existence to genera and species in the accidental categories, see Gyula Klima, "Buridan's Logic and the Ontology of Modes," in *Medieval Analyses in Language and Cognition*, eds. Sten Ebbesen and Russell L. Friedman, *Acts of the Symposium of the Copenhagen School of Medieval Philosophy* (Copenhagen, 1999), pp. 473–95.

connotation (*Summulae de dialectica* (S) 3.1.5), thus presenting a coherent nominalist reading of Aristotle's work.

As concerns these semantic properties, a term's supposition is what it picks out or refers to,⁵ and its signification is what it brings to mind. Yet sentential context delimits signification, as 'wealthy' in 'Socrates is wealthy' does not signify being wealthy in general but the state of being wealthy as it relates to Socrates, or Socrates' wealth. This signification in relation to some individual, a product of sentential context, is a term's appellation. Appellation thus brings to mind some general characteristic inasmuch as that characteristic is related to or joined with an individual, as 'white' in 'Socrates is white' brings to mind being white as this characteristic relates to Socrates, or Socrates' whiteness. Finally a term's connotation seems to be its indirect or oblique reference, which, in relation to a term's appellation, is the general characteristic that a term signifies independent of sentential context. Thus, in 'Socrates is happy', 'happy' supposits for Socrates while appelling the quality of being happy (or simply happiness) as it is joined with Socrates (i.e., while appelling happiness with respect to Socrates or Socrates' happiness) and connoting or having indirect reference to happiness in general (the signification of 'happy' divorced from sentential context):

Every term connoting something other than what it supposits for is called 'appellative' and appellates that which it connotes as pertaining to that which supposits for, as when 'white' appellates whiteness as pertaining to that which the term 'white' is apt to supposit for (S 4.5.1).⁶

Précis

This essay discusses Buridan's explication of being *said of* and *in* along semantic lines, which enables him to read the *Categories* as concerned with properties of terms rather than things in the world, effectively nipping realist interpretations in the bud. Substance terms are essential predicates, conceiving only their supposita⁷ and thus functioning as rigid

⁵ This is leaving aside cases of material supposition which I discuss below (see *infra* fn. 38).

⁶ All translations of Buridan's *Summulae* are quoted with permission from Gulya Klima, trans. and ed. *John Buridan: Summulae de Dialectica* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001), copyright 2001 by Yale University.

⁷ This comment only holds in the context of a proposition. Divorced from sentential context, terms such as 'animal' may signify a number of things, but not in the proposition 'A man is an animal': "Although the term 'animal' signifies more [things] than the

designators.⁸ Unlike accident terms they cannot cease to supposit for their suppositum unless their suppositum ceases to exist. The syntactic sign of this is that substance terms lack appellation, suppositing only for their subject, they bring nothing else to mind. Thus appellation or the lack thereof is the criterion for distinguishing between accident and substance terms, respectively. On the other hand, generic and specific terms are quidditatively predicable of individual terms and thus *said of* the latter, which will require a looser sense of quidditative predication in the case of generic and specific accident terms.

Section 1: Nominalism

In denying the existence of real universals, Buridan is committed to the thesis that universal terms ultimately refer to individuals that are conceived indistinctly under general concepts, and is opposed to realists such as John Duns Scotus and Walter Burley who believe in the existence of general natures that are in some way common to a variety of individuals.⁹ Thus for Buridan, generic and specific substantial terms do not pick out shared general natures, instead they supply different ways to speak of one and the same thing in terms of greater or lesser degrees of generality:

Since universals (that are principally so called according to predication) do not exist outside the soul, they are nothing but the concepts of the soul,

term 'man', nevertheless, it does not appellate over and above the signification of the term 'man' anything having to do with man, i.e., as something pertaining to man [*per modum adiacentis homini*].... Therefore the predication 'A man is an animal' is essential." Buridan, *Summulae de Dialectica* (S) 2.5.2.

⁸ See Klima, "Buridan and Modes;" and "Buridan's Theory of Definitions in his Scientific Practice," in *The Metaphysics and Natural Philosophy of John Buridan*, pp. 29–47.

⁹ For a discussion of the development of medieval nominalism, see Calvin G. Normore, "The Tradition of Medieval Nominalism," in *Studies in Medieval Philosophy*, ed. John F. Wippel, *Studies in Philosophy and the History of Philosophy* 17 (Washington, DC, 1987), pp. 201–217. For an overview of some of the disputes between fourteenth-century nominalists and realists, see Marilyn McCord Adams, "Universals in the Early Fourteenth Century," in Norman Kretzmann et al., eds. *The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy: From the Rediscovery of Aristotle to the Disintegration of Scholasticism 1100–1600* (Cambridge, 1982), pp. 411–39; and Adams, *William Ockham*, 1 (Notre Dame, 1987). Of course the general natures in which these realists believed were not Platonic universals, i.e., eternally existent, self-subsistent, immaterial entities or 'forms', which are themselves the perfect and only true instances of certain general properties such as goodness, wisdom, humanity, etc. Medieval thinkers in general believed that Aristotle had disproved the existence of Platonic forms in his *Metaphysics* (see, e.g., *Met* 1, 7, 13, and 14).

by which the soul conceives indifferently of several things, as it conceives indifferently all men by means of the concept whence the name 'man' is imposed, and the same is the case with the concept of animal with respect to animals. Therefore, since species and genera are universals according to predication, it is evident that species and genera are such concepts of the soul (S 4.3.2).

Whereas Ockham's efforts to establish the legitimacy of his nominalist framework met with opposition by realists such as Walter Burley, Buridan writes during a period when nominalism had gained currency¹⁰ and is freer to apply its tenets without arguing in favor of his approach.¹¹ Yet given his denial of real universals, Buridan needs to explain how we form general concepts. An overview of his response may clarify his nominalist perspective.¹²

Buridan draws on psychology and metaphysics to explain why we have universal concepts, providing both a mechanism whereby we abstract these concepts along with an external ground for our ability to relate these concepts back to the multiplicity of individuals that they characterize.

Buridan's psychological thesis maintains that:

When the intellect receives from the phantasm the appearance or understanding of Socrates as fused together with size and location, making the thing appear in the way something exists within the prospect of the cognizer, the intellect understands him in a singular manner. If the intellect can untangle that fusion and abstract the concept of substance or of whiteness from the concept of location, so that the thing is no longer perceived in the way something exists within the prospect of

¹⁰ Which is not to say that realism was no longer a viable alternative. See E. A. Moody, "Ockham, Buridan, and Nicholas of Autrecourt," in *Inquiries into Medieval Philosophy*, ed. James F. Ross (Westport, Conn., 1971), pp. 275–314; Jennifer Ottman and Rega Wood, "Walter Burley: His Life and Works," *Vivarium* 37 (1999), 1–23; and Mieczysław Markowski, "Johannes Buridans Polemik gegen die Universalienlehre des Walter Burleigh," *Mediaevalia Philosophica Polonorum* 26 (1982), pp. 7–17.

¹¹ Note though that Buridan does not reject plausible realist interpretations out of hand. See, e.g., S 3.2.9 (discussed below). Moreover, the beginning of his career is marked by several polemical treatises: *De dependentiis, diversitatibus et convenientiis* (1332), *Quaestiones de universale* (also known as *De differentia universalis ad individuum*) (1332), *Defensiones determinationis de diversitate generis ad speciem* (1333), and *De relationibus* (1334) (see Dirk-Jan Dekker, "John Buridan's Treatise *De dependentiis, diversitatibus et convenientiis*: An Edition," *Vivarium* 42 (2004), 109–149, esp. p. 109; and Markowski, "Johannes Buridans," pp. 7–8).

¹² The following discussion is indebted to King, "John Buridan's Solution to the Problem of Universals," in *The Metaphysics and Natural Philosophy of John Buridan*, pp. 1–27.

the cognizer, then it will be a common concept. Accordingly, once the concept of Socrates has been drawn out abstractly from the concepts of whiteness and of location and of other accidents or extraneous features, it will then no more represent Socrates than Plato: it will be a common concept, one from which the name 'man' is derived. *Quaestiones in libros Aristotelis De anima [tertia sive ultima lectura]*, ed. Zupko (Ithaca, N.Y., 1989), 3.8, ll. 391–403, trans. King, "Universals," pp. 14–15.

Our experiences are with particular individuals characterized by unique features. Via abstraction we peel away features specific to one individual and thereby conceive of traits that this individual shares with others to whom it bears certain resemblances. For the realist, this commonality suggests the existence of shared general natures, yet Buridan grounds it in specific and generic likenesses:

Now if it were the case that there are many items similar to one another, then anything similar to one of them, with respect to the feature in which they are similar, is similar to any one of them. Hence if all asses have in reality an agreement and likeness with one another, when the intelligible appearance represents some ass in the intellect by means of a likeness, it must simultaneously represent any given ass indifferently. . . . An intention becomes universal in this way (*Quaestiones super octo Physicorum libros Aristotelis* (Paris, 1509), 1.7, fol. 8vb, trans. King, "Universals," 2001, p. 18).

We thus attain generic and specific concepts through a process of abstraction that relies on resemblances. Yet given Buridan's denial of shared general natures, he needs to explain why these particulars resemble one another so as to give rise to these concepts. As King suggests, Buridan may look on resemblances as primitives or unexplained brute facts.¹³ If this is so, such reliance would seem to highlight Buridan's conviction that the realist position is untenable owing to its needless hypostatization of universals: "It is pointless to hold that there

¹³ King, "Universals," pp. 25–27. King also suggests that Buridan's approach may be modal, grounding similarities in how things exist rather than what they are (*ibid.*). For an examination of Buridan's modal approach, see Klima, "Buridan and Modes," p. 490, where Klima discusses Buridan's consideration of the mode of existence of a spherical piece of wax (in *Quaestiones Physicorum*, 2.3). Quoting Klima: "It may seem obvious that a quantity which is now a sphericity may remain in existence without remaining a sphericity, on account of simply changing the distance of its outermost points from a given point in space. However, this of course will not cause its perishing, it will only change the *way* it is arranged in space, its *modus*. But this *modus* does not have to be another thing over and above the quantity of a body thus and so arranged in space." By parallel reasoning, Socrates may resemble Plato with respect to arrangement and this arrangement need not itself be any real thing.

are universals distinct from singulars if everything can be preserved without them—and indeed it can.”¹⁴ Ultimately, we live in a world of individuals, generic and specific concepts (i.e., concepts of secondary substances) arising from how we attend to impressions, which are “the medium through which we arrive at the concepts by which those [universal] names are imposed.”¹⁵

Secondary substances signify the same substances as primary ones, but differently, for primary substances signify one substance in a singular manner, whereas secondary substances signify many commonly, and indifferently. Since when the word ‘this’ is added to a common term, it turns it into a singular term, therefore we say that a primary substance more properly signifies this something than does a secondary substance, because it signifies a singular substance existing in a singular manner (*S* 3.2.6).

Section 2: Aristotle’s Categories

Aristotle’s *Categories* divides “things that are” into four classes: “[1] Some are said of a subject but are not in any subject. . . . [2] Some are in a subject but are not said of any subject. . . . [3] Some are both said of a subject and in a subject. . . . [4] Some are neither in a subject nor said of a subject (1^a20–b9).”¹⁶

This classification suggests that things that are fall into four distinct groups.¹⁷ Yet, commentators have long debated whether Aristotle intended to discuss actual things or simply the utterances with which we signify them.¹⁸ The difficulty is compounded by the fact that Aristotle’s

¹⁴ *In Metaphysicen* (Paris, 1518), 7.16, fol. 51vb (trans. King, “Universals,” p. 1). For an analysis of Buridan’s critique of realism, see King, “Jean Buridan,” in *Individuation in Scholasticism: The Later Middle Ages and the Counter-Reformation, 1150–1650*, ed. Jorge J. E. Gracia, SUNY Series in Philosophy (Albany, N.Y., 1994), pp. 397–430, esp. §4.

¹⁵ *Quaestiones in Isaogogen Porphyrii* 11:173, ll. 1853–54 (trans. Zupko, in Zupko, *John Buridan: Portrait of a Fourteenth-Century Arts Master* (Notre Dame, 2003), p. 341, n. 35).

¹⁶ Brackets mine. The passage is translated from the Greek by J. L. Ackrill, in *Aristotle’s “Categories” and “De interpretatione,”* trans. and ed. J. L. Ackrill, Clarendon Aristotle Series (Oxford, 1963). All translations from the Greek are noted as such and taken from Ackrill.

¹⁷ J. L. Ackrill, for instance, believes that this is the case: “It is perfectly clear that Aristotle’s fourfold classification is a classification of things and not names,” *Aristotle’s “Categories,”* p. 75.

¹⁸ Porphyry for example holds that the work concerns significative utterances (see below). For discussion of competing ontological and linguistic interpretations, see Mohan Matthen, “The *Categories* and Aristotle’s Ontology,” *Dialogue* 17.2 (1978), 228–41; and

language appears to allow for either interpretation, or a combination of both,¹⁹ and even for those who believe that the *Categories* concerns significative utterances, several paths unfold. Yet, before we explore these, let us consider the motivation behind Aristotle's work.²⁰

In *Categories* 2^b4–6, Aristotle writes: "All the other things are either said of the primary substances as subjects or in them as subjects. So if the primary substances did not exist it would be impossible for any of the other things to exist."²¹ This statement looks to be an attack on Plato's middle-period theory of forms, which has it that universals possess real existence apart from particulars, with respect to which the forms are ontologically prior.²² The *Categories* reverses this picture by granting ontological priority to primary substances. Essences are inherent, existing only in subjects, and it is these subjects that are responsible for the essences' existence, not the other way around. Aristotle fleshes this out with the notion of priority "by nature (*tē phusei*)": "Of things which reciprocate as to the implication of existence, that which is in some way the cause of the other's existence might reasonably be called prior by nature" (*Cat* 14b11–13).²³ Thus, not only are forms inseparable from substances, but it is the latter that are responsible for the existence of the former.

J. M. E. Moravcsik, "Aristotle's Theory of *Categories*," in *Aristotle: A Collection of Critical Essays*, ed. Moravcsik, Modern Studies in Philosophy (Garden City, 1967), pp. 125–45.

¹⁹ In any case, the *Categories* is generally held to fit with Aristotle's logical works, supplying a discussion of the relations that hold among terms, which are the building blocks of both propositions and demonstrative syllogisms (see Marc S. Cohen, "Aristotle's *Metaphysics*," *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Winter 2003 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2003/entries/aristotle-metaphysics>, esp. §2). Regarding the medieval ordering of the *Categories* in relation to Aristotle's other logical works, see Ebbesen, "Ancient Scholastic Logic as the Source of Medieval Scholastic Logic," in Norman Kretzmann et al., eds. *The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy: From the Rediscovery of Aristotle to the Disintegration of Scholasticism 1100–1600* (Cambridge, 1982), pp. 101–127.

²⁰ The following discussion draws primarily on Giorgio Pini, *Categories and Logic in Duns Scotus: An Interpretation of Aristotle's Categories in the Late Thirteenth Century* (Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters) 77 (Leiden, 2002), pp. 1–18; and Steven K. Strange, introduction to *Porphyry "On Aristotle's 'Categories,'" trans. Strange* (London, 1992), pp. 1–12.

²¹ Translated from the Greek.

²² See, e.g., *Republic* 504e–518c and 596e–597a, *Phaedo* 100b–102a3, and *Phaedrus* 247c3–247e6. For the dating of these works in Plato's middle-period (c. 365–c. 347), see Richard Kraut, ed. *The Cambridge Companion to Plato* (Cambridge, Eng., 1992), p. xii.

²³ Translated from the Greek. Cf. *Met* 1019^a1–4.

Aristotle introduces the categories themselves as a list of “things said [*legomenōn*] without any combination.”²⁴ This language suggests that the work is concerned with significative utterances. Such a reading survived into the Middle Ages in Boethius’ *Categories* commentary (written c. 509–511), which in turn was greatly influenced by the surviving commentary of Porphyry, who believed that the *Categories* had to do with “the primary imposition of expressions.... For [the work] concerns simple significant words insofar as they signify things.”²⁵ Still, even allowing that the *Categories* discusses significative utterances, it is unclear what these utterances signify. Duns Scotus, for example, believes that the expressions under consideration ultimately refer to extramental essences.²⁶ Buridan, however, denies the existence of general essences that are somehow common to a variety of individuals, and this denial is reflected in his claim that the *Categories* treats the relations that arise among significative utterances owing to the semantic properties of terms, which rules out a realist interpretation of the work.

Buridan wrote two works on the *Categories*: *De Praedicamentis*, which is the third treatise of his *Summulae de Dialectica*, and his *Quaestiones in Praedicamenta*. This study follows Buridan’s treatment of *Cat.* 1a20–b9 in *Summulae* 3.1.5, supplementing the discussion with material from a parallel passage in *De Praedicamentis*, where Buridan offers substantially the same account (QC 4).

The first version of the *Summulae de dialectica* was probably not written before 1325, when Buridan began his career, and the editor of the critical edition of the *De praedicamentis* suggests a possible *terminus ante quem* for the *Summulae de dialectica* as sometime between 1325 and 1360.²⁷ The work is a commentary on Peter of Spain’s *Tractatus* or

²⁴ The exact meaning of ‘without any combination (*kata mēdēman sunplokēn*)’ is unclear. Aristotle may have in mind terms that pick out just one member of a category, or he could simply be distinguishing single words from groups of words. See Ackrill, *Aristotle’s “Categories,”* p. 73.

²⁵ *In Aristotelis Categorias Commentarium* 58, 4–6, ed. A. Busse (Berlin, 1887), (trans. Strange, p. 34). See above, n. 20.

²⁶ As Pini notes with reference to Scotus: “To say that logic considers categories as the most common genera is to say that logic considers categories not as essences but as the most universal univocal concepts by which our intellect understands the extramental essences,” *Categories and Logic in Duns Scotus*, p. 143.

²⁷ E. P. Bos, ed. *Johannes Buridanus “Summulae in Praedicamenta,”* (Aristarium) 10–3 (Nijmegen, 1994), p. xvi.

*Summulae Logicales*²⁸ (composed around 1250),²⁹ yet Buridan thoroughly revises Peter's text in light of new developments in logic during the first half of the fourteenth century, regrouping material, on occasion providing his own source text (as may be the case with the gloss of *Cat* 1^a20–b9), and even adding entire treatises (such as that on supposition, discussed below).³⁰

Section 3: Buridan's Summulae commentary

Buridan's aforementioned tendency simply to advance a nominalist interpretation of canonical texts rather than push for the legitimacy of his approach is evident early in the *Summulae* commentary, when he comments on a gloss of *Cat* 1^a16–b9, a passage central to Aristotle's text. Here, Buridan suggests a dichotomy between his own reading and an unlikely alternative, never considering a realist interpretation. The passage in question presents Aristotle's aforementioned claim that "things that are" fall into four classes. Buridan (or his source text) summarizes Peter's gloss of the passage as follows: "Of those [things] that there are, some are said of a subject, but are in no subject, others are in a subject, but are said of no subject, still others are said of a subject and are in a subject, and yet others neither are in nor are said of a subject." (*S* 3.1.5)³¹

Buridan construes this passage as explicating the role of primary substance terms as the ultimate locus of predication (i.e., as 'principally subjected'),³² general terms being *said of* and accident terms being *in* subject terms, while subject terms themselves are neither *said of* nor *in* anything. Thus Aristotle's "things that there are" are of four types: "Some [things] are said of a subject and are in no subject, namely, common terms from the category of substance.... Others are in a subject and are said of a subject, as are common terms in the categories of

²⁸ See Peter of Spain, *Tractatus: called afterwards Summule logicales*, first critical edition from the manuscripts with an intro. by L. M. De Rijk (Assen, 1972), §6.

²⁹ See Bos, *Summulae in Praedicamenta*, p. xiii.

³⁰ See Zupko, *John Buridan*, pp. 44–48; Klima, *Summulae*, pp. xxx–xxxii; and Bos, *Summulae in Praedicamenta*, pp. xiv–xv. On Buridan's authoring the treatise on supposition, see Zupko, *John Buridan*, p. 59.

³¹ Cf. *Tractatus* 3.3, pp. 28–29.

³² See *S* 3.2.1 and 3.2.9.

the accidents.... Others are in a subject, but are said of no subject, namely, singular terms of accidental categories.... Still others neither are in nor are said of a subject, namely, singular terms of the category of substance.” (§ 3.1.5)

Underpinning this explication is Buridan’s interpretation of *Cat* 1^a16–^b9 as having to do with the properties of terms:

[This passage] is easy to expound if it is interpreted as being about significative terms. But it cannot be correctly expounded as being about other things, since a man is no more said of a subject than is Socrates, for a man is the same as Socrates, but the term ‘man’ is said of a subject, namely, of an inferior term, for example, of the term ‘Socrates’. Further, it is reasonable that the whole [passage] be interpreted as concerning significative terms.... Therefore, by ‘those that there are’ we understand nothing but significative terms that can be subjects or predicates (§ 3.1.5).

Terms are not individuals, only the former are predicable. While one cannot *say* a flesh and blood man, one can say ‘man’ of him. Buridan thus concludes that Aristotle is discussing terms. Of course a realist might contend that in the sentence ‘Socrates is a man’, ‘man’ signifies a shared general nature, viz., humanity, and that there is nothing odd about claiming that this immanent universal is *said of* subjects. Yet Buridan omits mention of this possibility and closes abruptly: “If Aristotle’s examples appeared *prima facie* to require another exposition, I would reply that examples need not be verified [*non requiritur verificatio*], as Aristotle himself says in bk. 1 of the *Prior Analytics*.”³³

Buridan distinguishes between substance and accident terms as only the latter are *in* subject terms, and will develop the technical sense of being *in* a subject term along the lines of Aristotle’s discussion of denominative expressions: “When things get their name from something, with a difference of ending, they are called ‘denominatives’. Thus, for example, the grammarian gets his name from grammar, the brave get theirs

³³ *Prior Analytics*, I 41, 49^b34–37. Compare Buridan’s question commentary: “It is necessary that by ‘being in a subject’ we understand denominative predication, and by ‘being said of a subject’ we understand essential predication. And if you do not wish to agree, go your own way, because names are conventional (*oportet, quod per esse in subiecto intelligamus praedicationem denominativam, et per dici de subiecto intelligamus praedicationem essentialem. Et si tu non vis hoc recipere, vadas vias tuas, quia nomina sunt ad placitum*)” (*QC* 4, ll. 55–58, p. 32, trans. mine). See §§3.4–5 *infra* for denominative and essential predication.

from bravery.”³⁴ In addition, Buridan's use of this passage to interpret the groupings that lie at the heart of the categories employs signification, supposition and appellation, which we may consider in this order.

§3.1 *Signification*

Terms are utterances imposed to bring to mind or signify concepts.³⁵ What terms bring to mind are their ‘immediate significata (*significata immediata*)’ (*S* 4.3.2), and when terms signify extramental entities, these entities are called their ‘ultimate significata (*significata ultimata*)’ (*S* 4.3.2).

§3.2 *Supposition*

A term's supposition, on the other hand, is what it picks out or that for which it stands. Buridan's nominalist ontology allows for the existence of certain substances, viz., God, angels, souls, and composites. In addition the accidents of bread and wine,³⁶ certain magnitudes and motions, and prime matter are capable of existence through divine agency;³⁷ apart from these, there are no independent, extramental entities for a term to pick out. Buridan describes the difference between signification and supposition as follows:

Any word that is a part of a proposition not taken materially³⁸ signifies and gives rise to some concept in the person hearing it according to the

³⁴ *Cat* 1*12–15. I have replaced Ackrill's ‘paronymous’ with ‘denominatives’ to bring his translation of the Greek ‘parōnuma’ in line with Klima's translation of ‘*denominativa*’, its Latin counterpart.

³⁵ Of course concepts do not have to be of extramental entities. Buridan thus distinguishes between categorematic and syncategorematic terms, denying that the latter refer to extramental entities. The function of syncategorematic terms “is not to represent something by themselves but to modify the representative function of *per se* representative concepts [i.e., the representative function of categorematic concepts]” (Klima, *Summulae*, xl, brackets mine).

³⁶ See n. 1.

³⁷ See King, “Universals,” p. 3. The addition of magnitudes and motions is taken from Calvin Normore, “Buridan's Ontology,” in *How Things Are: Studies in Predication and the History of Philosophy and Science*, eds. James Bogen and James E. McGuire, Philosophical Studies Series in Philosophy 29 (Dordrecht, 1981), p. 197.

³⁸ The notion of material supposition is related to (though not identical with) our contemporary distinction between a term's use and mention; for, on some occasions, when a term supposits materially, it is mentioned rather than used, i.e., it stands for itself or a similar token-term, as the term ‘man’ in “Man” has three letters’ (See

signification conventionally given to it. But not every such word has supposition, for only such a term is apt to supposit that, when something is pointed out by the pronoun 'this', or when some things are pointed out by the pronoun 'these', can truly be affirmed of that pronoun. Therefore the term 'chimera' cannot supposit, for whatever is pointed out, it is false to say 'This is a chimera', and whichever things are pointed out, it is false to say 'These are a chimera'. (*S* 4.1.2)

§3.3 *Appellation*

Sentential context delimits a term's signification via the term's supposition, that is, that to which a term refers limits what the term brings to mind. For example, in the proposition 'Socrates is white' the word 'white' leads one to think of the quality of being white as it pertains to or is *in* Socrates rather than simply the quality of being white in general. This delimited signification is a term's appellation, while the general quality that the term signifies independent of sentential context is obliquely referred to via the term's connotation:

Some terms are appellative and others are not. For substantial terms in the nominative case³⁹ or terms not connoting anything at all beyond the things for which they supposit are not appellative terms properly speaking.

Klima, *Summulae*, xlix). However, Buridan's notion of material supposition conveys more than just this. For he believes that a term also stands in material supposition when it picks out "its immediate significate, which is the concept according to which it was imposed to signify, as the term 'man' in the proposition 'Man is a species'" (*S* 4.3.2). Other thinkers, such as Ockham, refer to this latter type of supposition as 'simple', but Buridan views this designation as a holdover from realist semantics, which requires a special type of supposition to pick out immanent universals (*ibid.*). Material supposition is contrasted with personal supposition, in which "the subject or the predicate of the proposition supposits for its ultimate significates or for its ultimate significate, as the term 'man' supposits for men in the proposition 'A man runs'" (*ibid.*). Personal supposition, in turn, admits of further divisions which need not concern us here. Henceforth, my comments pertaining to supposition refer exclusively to personal supposition.

³⁹ The reason for this qualification is that "a substantive oblique term appellates what its nominative form would supposit for as pertaining to [*adiacens*] what the nominative term governing it supposits for" (*S* 4.5.4). For example, "If I say: 'Socrates' donkey runs', the whole [phrase] 'Socrates' donkey' supposits for a donkey, and not for anything other than a donkey, but the term 'Socrates' signifies something other than a donkey; therefore the term 'Socrates' appellates Socrates as pertaining to [*adiacentem*] a donkey, i.e., as its owner, though not as something inhering in it" (*S* 4.1.4). On the other hand, why substantive terms in the nominative case do not appellate will become clearer when we turn to Buridan's discussion of the phrase 'in a subject', which phrase distinguishes between substantial and accidental terms. For now we may note that substantial terms pick out unique individuals and thus conceive only that for which they supposit. What makes Socrates uniquely Socrates belongs to no other, hence a term

But every term connoting something other than what it supposits for is called 'appellative' and appellates that which it connotes as pertaining to [*adiacens*] that which it supposits for, as when 'white' appellates whiteness as pertaining to that which the term 'white' is apt to supposit for. (S 4.5.1)⁴⁰

Appellation then may be described as a property of terms whereby they evoke a general characteristic in relation to a particular individual, as 'Socrates is healthy' evokes health in relation to Socrates, or Socrates' health.

§3.4 *Essential predication*

Appellation, supposition, and signification are linked with essential and non-essential predication. A predication is essential when, with respect to its subject and predicate terms: "Neither of these two terms adds some extrinsic connotation to the things they supposit for. Therefore, although the term 'animal' signifies more [things] than the term 'man', nevertheless [in the proposition 'A man is an animal'], it does not appellate over and above the signification of the term 'man' anything having to do with man, i.e., as something pertaining to man [*per modum adiacentis homini*]." (S 2.5.2, second brackets mine)

In an essential predication, neither term appellates, for in Buridan's nominalist framework essences are particular and there is nothing for an essential term to bring to mind apart from the entity it uniquely characterizes. Moreover, as essential predicates most appropriately answer the question 'What is it?',⁴¹ and thus signify characteristics that uniquely determine an individual, essential predicates refer to an individual in all circumstances in which that individual exists, and while a subject can subsist apart from the significata of its non-essential predicates, the destruction of the ultimate significatum of an essential predicate entails the destruction of its subject.⁴² By contrast, in a

that refers only to Socrates—an essential predicate—cannot bring to mind anything other than Socrates himself.

⁴⁰ Cf. S 4.1.4: "Every term that supposits for something and signifies something else for which it does not supposit appellates everything it signifies other than that for which it supposits as pertaining [*adiacens*] to that for which it supposits."

⁴¹ S 2.1.3. Strictly speaking, there are two species of essential predication. Predication *in quid* most properly answers the question 'What is it?'. Predication *in quale*, on the other hand, answers the question 'What is it like?' by supplying a specific difference.

⁴² Thus Klima points to the correspondence between non-essential and essential predicates, on the one hand, and non-rigid and rigid designators, on the other: "A

non-essential predication, “one term of it adds some extrinsic connotation over the signification of the other” (§ 2.5.2), as when ‘white’ supposit for a person while appelling whiteness in relation to that person and connoting whiteness in general. Of course these accidental terms can pick out individuals, though as Peter King notes “those for which it does supposit may be picked out more directly by an absolute (i.e., non-appellative term).”⁴³ Yet, when a non-essential predicate ceases to apply to an individual, it is not because an accident has passed out of existence, rather the individual has ceased to be included in the accidental term’s ultimate significata owing to an alteration in the way or mode in which that individual exists,⁴⁴ and discussions of change need not reify accidental predicates. Let us now consider how Buridan applies these notions to account for Aristotle’s distinction between what is *said of* and *in* “things that are.”

§3.5 *Denominative terms*

The *Categories* opens with a distinction between three types of utterances: equivocal, univocal, and denominative. Equivocal utterances bring to mind diverse concepts, e.g., ‘bank’ can signify either a financial institution or a steep incline, and thereby supposit differently in different contexts. Likewise, things themselves can be termed ‘equivocals’ “because they are equivocally signified by some utterance” (§ 3.1.1). Univocals, on the other hand, signify many things under one concept,

connotative term is what in the modern parlance we would call a non-rigid designator of its supposita: it can cease to supposit for its supposita without their destruction, as a result of removing its connotata. Take away a wealthy man’s wealth, and the man, while he will still go on existing, will cease to be supposited for by the term ‘wealthy man’” (Klima, “Buridan’s Theory of Definitions,” p. 38). See also Klima, “Buridan and Modes.”

⁴³ “Between Logic and Psychology: Jean Buridan on Mental Language” (paper, presented at John Buridan and Beyond, Copenhagen, September, 2001), 8–9; accessed at http://individual.utoronto.ca/pking/presentations/Buridan_on_Mental.pdf.

⁴⁴ See n. 13. Compare Ockham’s characterization of the realist position as mistakenly multiplying entities in correspondence with the diverse ways in which we use language: “A column is to the right by to-the-rightness, God is creating by creation, is good by goodness, just by justice, mighty by might, an accident inheres by inherence, a subject is subjected by subjection, the apt is apt by aptitude, a chimera is nothing by nothingness, someone blind is blind by blindness, a body is mobile by mobility, and so on for other, innumerable cases,” *Summa Logicae* (St. Bonaventure, N.Y., 1974), p. 169, trans. Klima, “Buridan and Modes,” p. 475. As to whether the realists are genuinely committed to this overpopulated ontology, see Klima, “Buridan and Modes,” and *Summulae*, intro.

as when Plato and Socrates are subordinated to the concept 'man'. As with equivocals, entities can be called 'univocals' when univocally signified by some utterance.

Denominative terms are crucial to Buridan's distinction between substance and accident terms. Denominatives are "those [terms] that differ from some [other] only in *casus*⁴⁵ in respect of [the formation of the] name, [and] have appellation [from the other], as 'literate' from 'literacy' and 'strong' from 'strength', are called 'denominatives'." (*S* 3.1.3)

Terms must meet two conditions in order to be denominative. First, a denominative term differs only morphologically from its abstract counterpart, as 'white' differs from 'whiteness'. Second, a denominative term must "appellate, or connote, some external disposition besides what it supposits for" (*ibid.*), meaning denominatives conceive a general characteristic in relation to the subject that they pick out, as 'Socrates is happy' conceives the general characteristic of being happy in relation to Socrates, or Socrates' happiness (while obliquely referring to or connoting happiness in general).

Speaking of the grammatical connection between concrete terms and their abstract counterparts, Buridan claims that the concrete form derives "with respect to its formation from the abstract form" (*ibid.*), which seems to disagree with our understanding of the derivation of abstract terms: "The grammarian reasonably derives 'whiteness' from 'white', namely, the abstract [form] from the concrete. For we have the concept of 'white' or of 'just' naturally prior to the concept of 'whiteness' or of 'justice'.... Therefore it is understandable that the names 'white' and 'just' were the ones earlier imposed to signify." (*ibid.*)

Buridan does not want to challenge the grammarian. Rather he is exploiting the sense of 'derivation (*casus*)' where concrete accident terms derive their predicability from the signification of their abstract counterparts, viz., the general non-essential characteristics that concrete

⁴⁵ '*Casus*' may be translated as 'case' or 'ending'. But, as Klima notes, Buridan draws on a broader sense of the term, where its etymological connection with the verb '*cadere* (to fall)' brings to mind derivation. Both senses are at play in this passage. The sense of '*casus*' as 'ending' means that denominatives must be morphologically related to their abstract counterparts (as 'white' and 'whiteness'), while '*casus*' as 'derivation' provides Buridan the opportunity to note that concrete accident terms derive their appellation from their abstract counterparts (*S* 3.1.3), as, in sentential context, the appellation of 'white' is whiteness in relation to the subject for which 'white' supposits. Klima thus leaves '*casus*' untranslated (see Klima, *Summulae*, p. 145, n. 3).

accident terms relate to particular subjects: “This [talk of derivation] does not contradict the grammarian, for we are not talking about *casus* in the sense of [a word’s] derivation from [the first] imposition; rather, by *casus* we mean its application to the subject in predicating it thereof. For an abstract term is not posited in order to be predicated of a subject, but a concrete term is; thus a man is said to be white, but not whiteness.” (ibid., first brackets mine)

Denominative terms supposit for their subjects only via non-essential predicates such as skin color or position in space. These non rigidly designating characteristics are the denominatives’ *appellata*, which may be understood as general characteristics signified in relation to particular individuals, as ‘wealthy’ in ‘Socrates is wealthy’ brings mind not just wealth in general (its connotation) but particularly the wealth of Socrates. In this sense, denominatives derive their supposition, and thus their predicability, from their abstract counterparts, which signify the characteristics by which denominatives are related to their subjects.

In some cases, a concrete term is not morphologically related to its abstract counterpart; when this happens the concrete term is not the denominative form of the abstract term: “For example, even if someone is virtuous [*studiosus*] because of his virtue [*virtutem*], the name ‘virtuous’ [*studiosus*] is not the denominative of the name ‘virtue’ [*virtus*].” (ibid.).⁴⁶ Moreover, not all concrete terms that are morphologically related to an abstract counterpart are denominative. Buridan considers ‘*homo* (man)’ in relation to its abstract counterpart ‘*humanitas* (humanity)’. Despite their obvious morphological similarity, ‘man’ is not denominative, for it is an essential predicate and hence does not appellate.

§3.6 *Terms said of and in*

Immediately following his discussion of denominatives, Buridan turns to terms *said of* and *in* a subject.⁴⁷ Here again is the gloss: “Of those

⁴⁶ The use/mention quotes and first brackets are mine. Klima brackets the English and has the Latin in the text.

⁴⁷ Note that here and throughout Buridan is speaking not of ontological but of grammatical subjects: “In connection with the whole chapter, we should take good notice of the fact that ‘substance’ is taken in two ways. In one way it supposits for real substances that subsist on their own, and for their parts. . . . In the second way, ‘substance’ is taken to supposit for terms in the category of substance, i.e., for terms that signify substances in the first sense without extraneous connotation. . . . Correspondingly, the term ‘accident’ is taken as it supposits for terms in the *Categories* of accidents. . . . It is

[things] that there are, some are said of a subject, but are in no subject, others are in a subject, but are said of no subject, still others are said of a subject and are in a subject, and yet others neither are in nor are said of a subject.” (S 3.1.5)

He interprets this text in light of the notions of denominative and essential predication: “By ‘being said of a subject’ we understand being predicated quidditatively of an inferior term, and by ‘being in a subject’ we understand being predicated denominatively, and not quidditatively of a subject. (ibid.)

These distinctions are then applied to the four classes of terms in order to explain the difference between substance and accident terms on the one hand, and common and particular terms on the other.

3.6.a *Terms in a subject*

Substance terms do not appellate, which is to say that in the context of a proposition, they signify only that for which they supposit. Accordingly substance terms cannot be *in* a grammatical subject. Accident terms do appellate, conceiving general non-essential characteristics in relation to particular individuals, as in ‘Socrates is white’, ‘white’ brings to mind the quality of being white in relation to Socrates, or Socrates’ whiteness. Hence accidental terms can be denominative, and thus *in* a subject (provided they likewise meet the first requirement of morphological similarity to an abstract counterpart).

Where does this leave abstract accident terms? Failing to meet the requirement of derivation, they are non-denominative, yet as accident terms they should be *in* a subject. Buridan recognizes this difficulty and responds that such predications are “denominative from the point of view of intention but...not denominative properly speaking” (S 3.1.3). Strictly speaking, for such predications to be denominative we must understand these abstract terms as being predicated via their concrete counterparts. Buridan acknowledges that such predications are improper (*impropriae*) but allows that when an abstract accident term is predicated of some subject, we can understand its concrete form in its stead: “Every accidental term is in a subject, for it is predicated denominatively of

in this second way that ‘substance’ is taken here. And [what is so called] is not called ‘substance’ by reason of its ‘underlying’ [‘sub-standing’, *substare*] in the sense of subsisting on its own.... Rather, it is called ‘substance’ because of its ‘underlying’ in the sense of *being subjected*, for substantial terms in denominative propositions are subjected [i.e., serve as subject terms with respect] to accidental terms” (S 3.2.1).

a substantial term, at least, either itself, if it is a concrete term, or its concrete form, if it is an abstract term, such as ‘whiteness’” (S 3.1.5).

3.6.b *Terms said of*

To be ‘said of a subject’ is to be “predicated quidditatively of an inferior term” (ibid.). Quidditative predication is the species of essential predication designed to answer the question ‘What is it (*quid est*)?’⁴⁸ Accordingly in quidditative predications “neither term adds some extraneous connotation to the signification of the other” (S 2.1.3). In the case of common terms in the category of substance, it is easy to see how this condition applies. In sentential context substantial terms are non-connotative and thus function as rigid designators, conceiving nothing apart from their subjects. Yet generic and specific terms in the accidental categories conceive general non-essential characteristics. This seems to render them unfit to answer the question ‘What is it?’ with respect to their subordinate concrete accident terms. The latter supposit for individuals yet in the context of a proposition an abstract accident term will retain oblique reference to the general quality that it signifies in relation to this individual, that is the abstract term will always appellate some disposition in relation to its subject and thus should be unable to function as an essential predicate. For example, in the proposition ‘A white thing is a thing colored by whiteness’, ‘white thing’ supposits for an individual, while ‘thing colored by whiteness’ appellates something over and above this individual, viz., whiteness in general. Buridan circumvents this difficulty by allowing for a broader sense of quidditative predication: “In this connection we have to note that in the case of connotative terms, the genus is not predicated of its species *in quid* in the strictest sense, but broadly speaking it is” (S 8.2.5). While it is true that ‘thing colored by whiteness’ appellates whiteness, nonetheless the predicate indicates what the subject is (*quid est*) with respect to the subject’s suppositum and connotatum, for predicate and subject both supposit for the same entity (some white thing) and appellate the same quality (whiteness). Thus the predication is broadly construed as quidditative.

⁴⁸ S 2.1.3. On the various species of essential predication, see n. 42.

§3.7 *Summary*

To review, Buridan presents the *Categories* as a work about significative utterances and thus explains the divisions between substances and accidents on the one hand and general and concrete terms on the other with reference to appellation, supposition, and signification. General and concrete terms are distinguished insofar as the former are quidditatively predicable, and hence *said of* the latter, either owing to the general terms being essential predicates or, in the case of general terms from the accidental categories, because the accident term indicates what the subject is (*quid est*) as concerns both the subject's suppositum and connotatum. Substance and accident terms, on the other hand, are distinguished because accident terms signify non-essential and thus denominative predicates. This creates a difficulty, as abstract accident terms, which are *in* their subjects are derived for the purpose of signifying general non-essential characteristics rather than an individual in relation to such characteristics. Buridan addresses this by allowing that these terms can be denominative in an improper sense as their concrete counterparts may be taken in their stead. The end product is a coherent reading of *Cat* 1^a20–^b9 as a text concerned with semantic properties:

Some [things] are said of a subject and are in no subject, namely, common terms from the category of substance, such as 'man' or 'animal'; others are in a subject and are said of a subject, as are common terms in the categories of the accidents, e.g., 'white' or 'colored', or even 'whiteness' and 'color', which do not denominate substances by themselves but by means of their concrete forms; others are in a subject but are said of no subject, namely, singular terms of accidental categories, e.g., 'this white', 'this runner'; and still others neither are in nor are said of a subject, namely, singular terms of the category of substance, as with the terms 'Socrates', 'Plato', 'this man', 'this horse' (S 3.1.5).

Section 4: The Sixth Property of Substances

In closing, let us consider Buridan's reading of *Cat* 4^a10–21. His commentary on this passage not only showcases his nominalist semantics, but likewise draws attention to the fact that he is not so close-minded as completely to dismiss an apparently straightforward realist interpretation. This section of the *Categories* discusses the sixth and most distinctive property of substances: "The sixth property is what Aristotle states in

the following terms: 'it seems to be most proper to substance that while it remains numerically one and the same, it is susceptible of contraries by its own change'." (S 3.2.9)

Buridan is quick to admit that this passage seems to refer to real substances and not the terms that signify them, for it seems odd to say that a term receives contraries "by its own change:" "It is difficult to expound this property correctly... It seems to be obvious that this sixth property is assigned to substance insofar as the name 'substance' supposits for true, *per se* subsisting substances. For the term 'man' is not changed... when a man now becomes white and then black, or warm, or lukewarm, or cold." (ibid.)

But before explaining how this phrase can be taken as applicable to terms, Buridan first argues against this seemingly obvious realist interpretation. He does this by noting that the term 'most (*maxime*)' in the phrase 'most proper to substances (*maxime substantiae proprium*)' can be construed in only two ways, and in either case the ascription of the ability to receive contraries turns out to be false. First, 'most' can be understood as an adjective in the genitive case modifying 'substance'. In this case, Aristotle is to be read as asserting that 'Of what is most a substance, it seems to be proper, etc.'. What is most, or maximally, substance is God or the heavens, and neither is susceptible of contraries. Accordingly we should not suppose that Aristotle is discussing *per se* subsistent substances. On the other hand, 'most' can be taken adverbially with 'proper', in which case Aristotle is saying that it is most proper for substance to receive contraries, etc. Yet, again the proposition would be false because there are substances to which this property does not apply, viz., God and the heavens. Thus, it appears that Aristotle is not speaking of *per se* subsistent substances.

Nevertheless, Buridan allows that a realist could account for these difficulties by restricting the supposition of 'substance' to generable and corruptible substances.⁴⁹ Then, without criticizing this account, Buridan offers his own interpretation, suggesting that 'most' be taken adverbially, while modifying the sense of 'proper (*proprium*)'. Rather

⁴⁹ Buridan undoubtedly has in mind Aristotle's own examples of one and the same generable and corruptible substance receiving contrary qualifications at different times while remaining numerically one and the same, e.g.: "An individual man—one and the same—becomes pale at one time and dark at another, and hot and cold, and bad and good" (*Cat* 4^a19–22, translated from the Greek).

than understand 'proper' in its technical sense where what is proper, viz., a property (*proprium*), "applies to all and only [those things that are contained under a species]" (S 2.5.1), Buridan suggests that here 'proper (*proprium*)' means 'applicable (*conveniens*)', and that what is 'most proper' is 'most applicable'. Then, understanding 'substance' to stand for a primary substance term, Buridan points out that: "[What is most applicable to a primary substance term] is that it is susceptible of contrary predications by denominative predication, as when, for example, of the term 'Socrates' first [the term] 'white' is predicated, and then 'black', or [first] 'warm' and [then] 'cold', because of its own change, i.e., on the basis of the subjective change of that for which it supposits." (S 3.2.9, first brackets mine).⁵⁰

Against the objection that accidental as well as substantial terms are thus susceptible of contrary predications, as, e.g., when a white thing is now warm and later cold, Buridan notes that "an accidental term is not principally subjected" (*ibid.*). A term is subjected when it stands in a proposition's subject position. Earlier, Buridan explains that: "[A primary substance term is] what properly, primarily, and maximally 'underlies', i.e., is subjected, both in quidditative propositions, for then it is subjected to secondary substances, and in denominative propositions, for then it is subjected to accidental terms." (S 3.2.1, brackets mine)

Thus propositions properly concern substances. Buridan illustrates this in a paraphrase of *Met* 5.7, 1017^a7–10 (quoting Buridan): "If someone educated [*musicum*] is said to be white, then this is because both, namely, 'educated' and 'white' are said of another, namely, substantial, subject, as of 'Socrates' or 'Coriscus'" (S 3.2.9). That is, as accidents do not exist independently of substances,⁵¹ terms significative of accidents cannot have extramental signification unless they are predicated of

⁵⁰ Cf. *QC* 6, ll. 100–106, p. 46: "And because we explain this characteristic with respect to terms, and terms do not change, it is necessary to provide the sense of 'by a change with respect to itself', i.e., with respect to its formal signification, in this way, viz., that it agrees appropriately with substantial terms to receive predications of contrary terms. And this is said to be proper as concerns these terms not because it pertains to all of them, but because it does not pertain to others, viz., accidental terms (*et quia de terminis exponimus hanc proprietatem, et non oportet terminum mutari, oportet exprimere 'secundum sui mutationem', id est secundum mutationem eius, quod significat secundum suam formalem significationem, ita quod terminis substantialibus appropriate convenit recipere praedicaciones terminorum contrariorum. Et dicitur hoc proprium illis terminis, non quia conveniat omnibus eis, sed quia non convenit aliis, scilicet terminis accidentalibus*" (trans. mine).

⁵¹ Again, leaving aside miraculous cases.

substance terms, which terms ultimately supposit for the *per se* subsistent substances on which accidents depend. Thus while we may say that a white [thing] is now warm and later cold, it is not a quality which is undergoing change, but rather a substance of which that quality is a mode.⁵² Accordingly, it is substantial rather than accidental terms which admit of contraries.

⁵² See n. 13.

A REALIST INTERPRETATION OF THE *CATEGORIES*
IN THE FOURTEENTH CENTURY:
THE *LITTERALIS SENTENTIA SUPER PRAEDICAMENTA*
ARISTOTELIS OF ROBERT ALYNGTON

Alessandro D. Conti

Introduction

In the *Categories* Aristotle draws the main features of his metaphysics and semantics, since he (1) sets out the basic items of the world (individual and universal substances, individual and universal accidents) in their mutual relationships, and (2) shows their links to language. So the categorial table is a division both of things and the signs signifying them. Unfortunately, Aristotle does not clarify whether such a division is first of all a partition of things made on the basis of ontological criteria and only secondarily a classification of (mental, written, and spoken) terms, or vice versa.¹ Consequently, from late antiquity onwards there were many disputes about whether the treatise was primarily concerned with existent things or with their signs. According to the answer, it is customary to classify medieval philosophers as being Realists (things) or Nominalists (signs) concerning categories. This categorization is questionable. On the one hand, some authors, following Boethius,² support a nominalist solution of the problem of the *intentio* of the book (which would deal with non-compounded utterances in their capacity for being significant—*voces res significantes in eo quod significantes sunt* according to Boethius's formula), while they (1) offer a realist reading

¹ See J. L. Ackrill, *Aristotle's Categories and De interpretatione*, translated with notes by J. L. Ackrill, Oxford 1963, pp. 80–81.

² Cf. Boethius, *In Categorias Aristotelis libri quattuor*, PL 64, 159C and 160A. On Boethius's interpretation of Aristotle's *Categories* see James Shiel, "Boethius' Commentaries on Aristotle," *Mediaeval and Renaissance Studies*, 4 (1958), 217–244; Henry Chadwick, *Boethius. The Consolations of Music, Logic, Theology and Philosophy* (Oxford, 1981); Sten Ebbesen, "Boethius as an Aristotelian Commentator," in *Aristoteles: Werk und Wirkung*, ed. Jürgen Wiesner, 2 vols. (Berlin, 1987), pp. 286–311; Alessandro D. Conti, "Boezio commentatore e interprete delle *Categorie* di Aristotele," in *Scritti in onore di Girolamo Arnaldi offerti dalla Scuola Nazionale di Studi Medievali*, eds. A. Degrandi (Rome, 2001), pp. 77–102.

of all the crucial points of the treatise and (2) judge the division into ten categories of the fourth chapter to be a division of things, and only derivatively of their signs.³ In fact, we have to wait for Ockham, Buridan, *alii* to get a consistently nominalist exposition of the *Categories*. In detaching himself from the real Aristotelian intention, the *Venerabilis Inceptor* was (1) to consider the categorial table to concern terms alone and not things, and (2) to translate Aristotle's statements on the ontological and physical status of substances, quantities and so on, into rules for the correct use of terms, so that the level of language in the *Categories* was raised a step—the necessary presupposition of any consistently nominalist interpretation of the tract. On the other hand, many realist thinkers, such as Henry of Ghent, Simon of Faversham, “the first” Burley (before 1324), and Franciscus de Prato, held a reductionist position about the question of the number of real categories, as they judged only the items falling into the three absolute categories (substance, quantity, and quality) to be things (*res*), and considered the remaining ones real aspects (*respectus reales*) proper to the former.⁴ Few medieval authors developed a fully consistent realist interpretation of the *Categories*, by defending the thesis of the real distinction of all the ten categories, which would be real things irreducible one to another.⁵

³ Cf. e.g., Robert Kilwardby, *Notulae super librum Praedicamentorum, prooem.*, and lectio 5, Cambridge, Peterhouse, ms. 206, fols. 41ra, and 44vb–45ra; Thomas Sutton, *Expositio super librum Praedicamentorum, prooem.*, and cap. de numero praedicamentorum, Oxford, Merton College, ms. 289, fols. 3rb–va and 7ra (transcription in Alessandro D. Conti, “Thomas Sutton’s Commentary on the *Categories* according to the Ms Oxford, Merton College 289,” in *The Rise of British Logic*, ed. P. O. Lewry (Toronto, 1985), pp. 173–213, pp. 189–191 and 196).

⁴ Cf. Henry of Ghent, *Summa quaestionum ordinariarum*, a. 32, q. 5, in *Opera omnia*, vol. 27, pp. 79–80; *Quodlibet* V, q. 6, ed. (Parisiis, 1518), 2 vols., vol. 1, fols. 238r–240v; Simon of Faversham, *Quaestiones super librum Praedicamentorum*, q. 12, in *Opera omnia*, vol. 1, ed. Pasquale Mazzarella (Padua, 1957), pp. 82–85; Walter Burley, *Tractatus super librum Praedicamentorum*, cap. de numero et sufficientia praedicamentorum (Cambridge, Peterhouse), ms. 184, fol. 175rb–176rb; Franciscus de Prato, *Logica*, pars I, tr. 5, a. 1, in Fabrizio Amerini, *La logica di Francesco da Prato. Con l’edizione critica della Loyca e del Tractatus de voce univoca* (Florence, 2005), p. 381.

⁵ Cf. e.g., John Duns Scotus, *Quaestiones super Praedicamenta*, q. 1, in *Opera philosophica*, vol. 1, pp. 249–256, especially pp. 250–251; Walter Burley, *Expositio super Praedicamenta Aristotelis*, cap. de numero et sufficientia praedicamentorum, in *Expositio super Artem Veterem Porphyrii et Aristotelis*, ed. (Venetiis, 1509), fol. 21ra–b; Jacobus de Placentia, *Scriptum super librum Praedicamentorum* (Venice), Biblioteca Marciana, ms. lat. VI.97 (2594), fol. 30rb–va. On Duns Scotus’s conception of the categories see Peter King, “Scotus on Metaphysics,” in *The Cambridge Companion to Duns Scotus*, ed. Thomas Williams (Cambridge, 2003), pp. 28–38; Giorgio Pini, “Scotus’s Realist Conception of the Categories: His Legacy to Late Medieval Debates,” *Vivarium* 43 (2005), 63–100. On Burley’s categorial doctrine

Among them, Robert Alyngton⁶ († 1398), one of the most important authors of the generation after Wyclif, must be mentioned: his commentary on the *Categories*, which relies on Burley's last commentary on the *Categories* (A.D. 1337) and Wyclif's *De ente praedicamentali* (A.D. 1369),⁷ is the most mature output of this "stronger" interpretative tradition. Alyngton was able to work out (1) a coherently realist ontology of the categories, (2) a new semantic theory of second intentions,⁸ and (3) the general strategy adopted by the Oxford Realists after Wyclif,⁹ as

see Alessandro D. Conti, "Ontology in Walter Burley's Last Commentary on the *Ars Vetus*," *Franciscan Studies* 50 (1990), 121–176, pp. 145–174; and Marta Vittorini, *Predicabili e categorie nell'ultimo commento di Walter Burley all'Isagoge di Porfirio*, Ph.D. diss., University of Salerno, academic year 2004–05, pp. 335–397. On Jacobus de Placentia's commentary on the *Categories* see Alessandro D. Conti, "Il commento di Giacomo da Piacenza all'Isagoge e alle *Categorie*," in *L'insegnamento della logica a Bologna nel XIV secolo*, eds. Dino Buzzetti – Maurizio Ferriani – Andrea Tabarroni (Bologna, 1992), pp. 441–460.

⁶ Not a great deal is known of Robert Alyngton's life. Most of the information about him comes from A. B. Emden, *A Biographical Register of the University of Oxford to A.D. 1500*, 3 vols. (Oxford, 1957–59), vol. 1, pp. 30–31. From 1379 until 1386, he was fellow of Queens College (the same Oxford college where Wyclif started his theological studies in 1363 and Johannes Sharpe taught in the 1390s); he became *Magister Artium* and, by 1393, doctor of theology. He was chancellor of the University in 1393 and 1395. In 1382 he preached Wyclif's religious and political ideas in Hampshire (A. K. McHardy, "The Dissemination of Wyclif's Ideas," in *From Ockham to Wyclif*, eds. Anne Hudson – Michael J. Wilks (Oxford, 1987), 361–368, pp. 361–362). He was rector of Long Whatton, Leicestershire, where he died by September 1398. Alyngton was of considerable repute as a logician (see E. Jennifer Ashworth – Paul V. Spade, "Logic in Late Medieval Oxford," in *The History of the University of Oxford*, eds. Jeremy I. Catto – Ralph Evans (Oxford, 1992), vol. 2, pp. 50–62, *passim*). Among his extant works: the *Litteralis sententia super Praedicamenta Aristotelis* (henceforward *In Cat.*), partially edited in Alessandro D. Conti, "Linguaggio e realtà nel commento alle *Categorie* di Robert Alyngton," *Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale* 4 (1993), 179–306, pp. 242–306 (all references are to the pages of this edition or, for the unedited portions, to the ms. London, Lambeth Palace 393); a treatise on the supposition of terms (*Tractatus de suppositionibus terminorum*); a commentary on the *Liber sex principiorum*; a treatise on the genera of being (*Tractatus generum*).

⁷ On Wyclif's categorial doctrine see Alessandro D. Conti, "Logica intensionale e metafisica dell'essenza in John Wyclif," *Bollettino dell'Istituto Storico Italiano per il Medioevo e Archivio muratoriano* 99.1 (1993), 159–219, pp. 197–209; Alessandro D. Conti, "Wyclif's Logic and Metaphysics," in *A Companion to John Wyclif*, ed. Ian C. Levy (Leiden, 2006), 67–125, pp. 103–113.

⁸ See Alessandro D. Conti, "Second Intentions in the Late Middle Ages," in *Medieval Analyses in Language and Cognition*, eds. Sten Ebbesen – Russell L. Friedman (Copenhagen, 1999), pp. 453–470.

⁹ For an analysis of Oxford Realists's main doctrines and information on their lives and works see Alessandro D. Conti, "Studio storico-critico," in Johannes Sharpe, *Quaestio super universalia*, ed. Alessandro D. Conti (Florence, 1990), pp. 211–238, and 295–336; Alain de Libera, *La querelle des universaux. De Platon à la fin du Moyen Age* (Paris, 1996), pp. 403–428; and Alessandro D. Conti, "Categories and Universals in the Later Middle Ages," in this volume.

he methodically substituted reference to external objective realities for reference to linguistic and/or mental activities.

In what follows I shall offer a short analysis of Alyngton's doctrine of categories. This will enable us to appreciate the novelty of his thought and to gauge his importance within late medieval realism. He was one of the first authors whose commentary on the *Categories* shows that partial "dissolution" of the traditional doctrine which is the distinctive feature of the theories evolved during the very last period of the Middle Ages. In the first section, I shall sketch Alyngton's position on being and categories as well as his theory of analogy. The second section will deal with Alyngton's conception of universals and predication, the most innovative section of his philosophical system. In the third one, I shall discuss his ideas about substance. The fourth section will expound his central theses on the nature, reality, and mutual distinctions of the three main kinds of accidents: quantity, quality, and relation. In a final section, I shall draw some conclusions about the general significance of Alyngton's commentary on the *Categories* trying to place it within the historical and doctrinal context of the late medieval commentaries on that text.

Being and Categories

The point of departure of every realist interpretation of the *Categories* is the notion of being (*ens*) in its relationship to the ten categories, as Realists considered the categorial table to be a division of beings. Thus, it is not surprising that, like Burley, Alyngton affirms that (1) the division into ten categories is first of all a division of things existing outside the mind, and only secondarily of the mental concepts and spoken or written terms which signify them, and (2) things belonging to one categorial field are really distinct from those belonging to another—for instance, substances are really distinct from quantities, qualities, and relations; quantities are really distinct from substances, qualities, and relations, and so on.¹⁰ Unfortunately Alyngton does not define being; yet, what he says about (1) the subject of the book (the real categorial

¹⁰ Cf. Alyngton, *In Cat.*, cap. *de numero et sufficientia praedicamentorum*, pp. 251, 252–253, 255, and especially p. 258.

being which can be signified by atomic expressions—*ens in praedicamento reali significabile per signum incomplexum*),¹¹ and (2) analogy¹² seems to entail that, like Wyclif,¹³ he also thinks of being (*ens*) as a sort of an extra-mental reality proper to everything (God and creatures; substances and accidents; universal and individual items; things, collections of things, and states of affairs) according to different modes and degrees.¹⁴

In the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, all the realist authors, with the only remarkable exception of Duns Scotus, (1) regarded categorial items as composed of two main aspects: the inner nature or essence, and their peculiar mode of being or of being predicated (*modi essendi vel praedicandi*); and (2) maintained that the categorial table divides those categorial items according to their modes of being (or of being predicated) and not according to their inner natures (or essences). In more detail, Thomas Aquinas¹⁵ and Thomas Sutton¹⁶ (1) based their method of finding the ten Aristotelian categories on the differences of modes of being predicated, and (2) recognized three fundamental modes of being predicated: (i) essentially, proper to substances, when the predication indicates what a given *res* is; (ii) accidentally, proper to quantities, qualities, and *ad aliquid*, when the predication indicates that something inheres in a subject; and (iii) externally, proper to the remaining six categories, when the predication indicates that something which does not inhere in the subject nevertheless affects it. On the contrary,

¹¹ Cf. Alyngton, *In Cat.*, cap. *de numero et sufficientia praedicamentorum*, p. 252.

¹² Cf. Alyngton, *In Cat.*, cap. *de aequivocis*, fol. 70r–v—see note 31, below.

¹³ Cf. Wyclif, *De ente in communi*, cap. 3, in *Summa de ente libri primi tractatus primus et secundus*, ed. Samuel H. Thomson, Oxford 1930, p. 36; *De ente praedicamentali*, cap. 1, ed. Rudolf Beer (London, 1891), pp. 2 and 5.

¹⁴ Cf. Alyngton, *In Cat.*, cap. *de complexo et incomplexo*, p. 249; cap. *de numero et sufficientia praedicamentorum*, p. 255.

¹⁵ Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *Sententia super Metaphysicam*, liber V, lectio 9, eds. M.R. Cathala – R. M. Spiazzi (Turin, 1950), nn. 889–891. On Aquinas's derivation of the Categories, see John F. Wippel, "Thomas Aquinas's Derivation of the Aristotelian Categories (Predicaments)," *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 25 (1987), 13–34.

¹⁶ Cf. Sutton, *Expositio super librum Praedicamentorum*, cap. *de numero praedicamentorum*, fol. 7ra–b (partial transcription in Conti, "Thomas Sutton's Commentary on the Categories" cit., p. 196).

Albert the Great¹⁷ and Simon of Faversham¹⁸ (1) based their method of finding the categories on the differences of modes of being, and (2) admitted two fundamental modes of being: (i) being by itself, proper to substance; and (ii) being in something else, proper to the nine genera of accidents—(2.1) the latter subdivided into (i) being in something else absolutely, proper to quantities and qualities, and (ii) being in something else in virtue of a relation to a third *res* (*esse ad aliud*), proper to the remaining seven categories. In his last commentary on the *Categories*, Walter Burley¹⁹ recalled two other ways of deducing the ten Aristotelian categories (*aliqui acceperunt sufficientiam praedicamentorum sic...aliter accipiunt alii sic*), both based on the various levels of similarity among their own modes of being. In turn, Alyngton follows very closely Burley's first way of deriving the ten categories. In his opinion, there are two fundamental modes of being proper to things: being by itself, which characterizes substances, and being in something else (*alteri inhaerens*), which characterizes accidents. The latter is subdivided into three less general modes: being in something else in virtue of its matter; being in something else in virtue of its form; and being in something else in virtue of the whole composite. Something can be in something else in virtue of its matter, form, and composite according to three different ways: from inside (*ab intrinseco*), from outside (*ab extrinseco*), and partially from inside and partially from outside (*partim ab intrinseco et partim ab extrinseco*). If something is in something else in virtue of its matter and from inside, then it is a quantity; if from outside, it is a where (*ubi*); if partially from inside and partially from outside, it is an affection (*passio*). If something is in something else in virtue of its form and

¹⁷ Cf. Albert the Great, *Liber de praedicamentis*, tr. 1, cap. 7, in *Opera omnia*, ed. A. Borgnet (Paris, 1890), vol. 1, pp. 164–165. Today's scholars unanimously attribute to Albert the idea that *Categories* are divided according to their modes of being predicated, since he himself affirms that his own method of deducing the ten Aristotelian *Categories* is based on their modes of being predicated (*nos, quantum possumus, studebimus ex propriis horum generum modis praedicandi ostendere hujus numeri rationem*); but, in point of fact, he does not utilize modes of being predicated in drawing the ten categories from being. On the contrary, he constantly employs modes of being, as he speaks of *ens per se*, *ens in alio*, *ad aliud se habere*, *absolute inesse secundum materiam* and *secundum potentiam formae* and so on.

¹⁸ Cf. Simon of Faversham, *Quaestiones super librum Praedicamentorum*, q. 12, p. 84.

¹⁹ Cf. Burley, *Expositio super Praedicamenta Aristotelis*, cap. *de numero et sufficientia praedicamentorum*, fol. 21rb–va. On Burley's solution of the problem of the *sufficientia praedicamentorum* see Mischa von Perger, "Understanding the Categories by Division: Walter Burley vs. William of Ockham," in *La tradition médiévale des Catégories (XII^e–XV^e siècles)*, eds. Joel Biard – Irène Rosier-Catach (Louvain-la-Neuve, 2003), pp. 37–52.

from inside, then it is a quality; if from outside, it is when (*quando vel quandalitas*); if partially from inside and partially from outside, it is an action (*actio*). If something is in something else in virtue of the whole composite and from inside, then it is a relation; if from outside, it is a possession (*habitus*); if partially from inside and partially from outside, it is a position (*positio*).²⁰

Alyngton's choice implies an anti-reductionist approach to the matter, which is confirmed by the solution of the problem of what properly falls into the categorial fields. Unlike most medieval authors, Alyngton was aware of the importance of the question, which he discussed at length. According to the standard realist conception, not only the accidental forms, such as whiteness, but also the compounds they cause when inhering in substances, such as a white-thing (*album*), fall into the categories. Burley thought that whilst the accidental forms properly fall into the categories, the aggregates (*aggregata*) made up from a substance and an accidental form do not, since they are beings (*entia*) *per accidens*, wanting in real unity. In his opinion, such an aggregate may be said to fall into a certain category, the category into which its accidental form falls, only by reduction, in virtue of the accidental form itself.²¹ On the contrary, Wyclif maintained that the aggregates built up by a substance and an accidental form fall *per accidens* into both (1) the category of substance and (2) the category which the accidental form at issue belongs to.²² Alyngton combines in an original way the two slightly different opinions of Burley and Wyclif. He affirms that a thing (*res*) can be said to belong to a category in a threefold way (*tripliciter*): by itself (*per se*), by accident (*per accidens*), and by reduction (*per reductionem*). (1) Something is in a category by itself if and only if the *supremum genus* of

²⁰ Cf. Alyngton, *In Cat.*, cap. *de numero et sufficientia praedicamentorum*, pp. 252–253.

²¹ Cf. Burley, *Expositio super Praedicamenta Aristotelis*, cap. *de relatione*, fol. 34rb: “Illud quod est aggregatum ex rebus diversorum generum non est per se in aliquo genere uno.... Et ideo illud quod significatur per huiusmodi nomina ‘pater’ et ‘filius’ non est per se in genere, quia quod est per se in genere debet esse per se ens et per se unum, sed aggregatum ex rebus diversorum generum non est per se ens nec per se unum;” and cap. *de qualitate*, fol. 41rb: “Dico quod quamvis album vel nigrum non sit per se in genere, tamen est in genere qualitatis per reductionem.”

²² Cf. Wyclif, *De ente praedicamentali*, cap. 1, pp. 3–4.

that category is predicated²³ *per se in recto* of it,²⁴ that is, if and only if the highest genus of that category is one of the constitutive elements of the essence of the thing at issue. Accidental forms belong *per se* to the nine categories of accidents.²⁵ (2) Something is in a category by accident if and only if it is an aggregate from a substance and an accidental form. Such aggregates belong *per accidens* both to the category of substance and to the category in which its accidental form is by itself.²⁶ (3) Something can be in a category by reduction in two different ways: in a broad sense (*large*) and in a strict sense (*stricte*). (3.1) Something is in a category *per reductionem large* if and only if (i) it is an aggregate, and (ii) the highest genus of a certain category is predicated only *in obliquo* of it, that is, only indirectly. (3.2) Something is in a category *per reductionem stricte* if and only if (i) it is not an aggregate, and, (ii.a) like differences, it is a component of the reality of a thing which is in a category by itself, but the highest genus of that category is not predicated of it; or (ii.b) it is the privation correlated to a certain property which, in turn, is in a category by itself; or (ii.c), like extra-categorical principle such as God, the unity, and the point, it somehow instantiates the mode of being proper to a certain categorial field, but the highest genus of that category is not one of the constitutive elements of the essence of that thing.²⁷

Fundamental to Alyngton's deduction of the categories and solution of the problem of what falls into the categorial fields (and how) is a close isomorphism between language (mental, written, and spoken) and the world. Like Burley and Wyclif, he was firmly convinced that our thought is modelled on reality itself, so that it reproduces reality in all its elements, levels, and inner relations. Therefore, one of the best ways of understanding the world lay for him in an accurate investigation of our notions and conceptual schemes, as they show the structure of the world. A logical consequence of this conviction was his strong propensity towards reification: he hypostatizes the notion of being

²³ According to Alyngton, predication is a real relation between things. Such a real predication (*praedicatio realis*) is matched by a corresponding predicative relation between the signs (mental, written, and spoken) which signify those things—cf. *In Cat.*, cap. *de regulis praedicationis*, p. 247; cap. *de substantia*, pp. 273 and 287.

²⁴ Cf. Alyngton, *In Cat.*, cap. *de numero et sufficientia praedicamentorum*, p. 259.

²⁵ Cf. Alyngton, *In Cat.*, cap. *de relativis*, p. 300.

²⁶ Cf. Alyngton, *In Cat.*, cap. *de numero et sufficientia praedicamentorum*, p. 259; and cap. *de relativis*, p. 300.

²⁷ Cf. Alyngton, *In Cat.*, cap. *de numero et sufficientia praedicamentorum*, pp. 259–260.

and considers equivocity, analogy, and univocity not only as semantic relations between terms and things, but also as real relations between extra-mental items.²⁸

According to the standard interpretation of the opening passages of the *Categories* (1, 1a 1–12) equivocal terms are correlated with more than one concept and refer to a multiplicity of things sharing different natures, whereas univocal terms are correlated with only one concept and refer to a multiplicity of things sharing one and the same nature. In his last commentary on the *Physics* (after 1324), Burley had maintained that the term 'being' is at the same time univocal and equivocal with respect to the categories, as (1) a single concept corresponds to it (broadly speaking univocity), but (2) the categorial items share it in different ways, according to a hierarchy of value (broadly speaking equivocity).²⁹ In turn, Wyclif had admitted three main types of equivocity: by chance (*a casu*), analogical, and generic, the second of which applies to the relationship between being and categories.³⁰ Alyngton recognises four main kinds of equivocity: by chance, deliberate (*a consilio*), analogical, and generic. (1) Equivocals by chance are those things to which it just happens that they have the same name, but with different meanings and/or reasons for imposing the name. (2) Those things are deliberate equivocals which have distinct natures but the same name, and are subordinated to different but correlated concepts. (3) Those things are analogical which share the nature signified by their common name in various degrees and/or ways. (4) Generic equivocals are those things which share the same generic nature in the same way, but have distinct specific natures of different absolute value.³¹ So, within Alyngton's

²⁸ Cf. Alyngton, *In Cat.*, cap. *de aequivocis*, fols. 69v–70v; cap. *de univocis*, fols. 71v–72r; and cap. *de numero et sufficientia praedicamentorum*, pp. 255–256.

²⁹ Cf. Burley, *Expositio in libros octo Physicorum*, lib. I, tr. 2, cap. 1, ed. (Venetiis, 1501), fols. 12vb–13ra.

³⁰ Cf. Wyclif, *De ente praedicamentali*, cap. 2, pp. 16–17, 18–19, and 21. On Wyclif's theory of analogy see Conti, "Wyclif's Logic and Metaphysics," pp. 103–107.

³¹ Cf. Alyngton, *In Cat.*, cap. *de aequivocis*, fol. 70r–v: "Ubi primo notandum, secundum sententiam aliquorum, quod quadruplex est aequivocum. Est enim aequivocum a casu, aequivocum a consilio, aequivocum analogum et aequivocum generale. Est autem a casu quod imponitur casualiter ad significandum diversa secundum rationes dispares quarum nulla habet habitudinem ad aliam. Et illud est pure aequivocum. Ut iste terminus 'Robertus' a casu imponitur ad significandum hominem Romae et ad significandum hominem Oxoniae.... Sed aliud est aequivocum a consilio, quod est signum ex impositione significans aliqua primarie sub diversis actibus secundum rationes dispares quarum una tamen est analoga vel proportionalis ad aliam, sed non correspondet illi signo adaequate aliqua una intentio vel conceptus ad omnem rem

system, what differentiates analogy from univocity is the way in which a certain nature (or property) is shared by a set of things: analogous things share it according to different degrees (*secundum magis et minus*, or *secundum prius et posterius*), univocal things share it all in the same manner and to the same degree.³² Alyngton argues that being (*ens*) is not a sort of genus in relation to the ten categories, since it does not manifest their essence, nor is it predicated univocally of them; being is analogous in relation to the ten categories. It is a sort of basic stuff of the metaphysical structure of each reality, which possesses it in accordance with its own nature and level in the hierarchy of essences.³³

sic significatam. Et isto modo iste terminus 'canis' significat caeleste sydus, marinam beluam et animal latrabile, et forte propter proportionales proprietates repertas in omnibus istis rebus, puta acute mordendi vel aliud huiusmodi. . . . Et isto modo dicitur 'sanum' aequivoce de dieta, urina, medico, subiecto sano. Et ita de aliis. . . . Sed tertio modo dicitur signum aequivocum analogum cuius primum significatum est analogum. Et hoc contingit quando illud significatum participatur a pluribus secundum prius et posterius quo ad ordinem intelligendi, vel secundum maius et minus; modo quo ens participatur a substantia et accidente. Non enim contingit intelligere accidens, cum sit modus substantiae, nisi praecognoscendo substantiam; immo omnis substantia est magis ens quam accidens. Vel dicitur, secundum aliquos, ens a parte rei analogum eo quod est participatum a generibus diversis, quorum unum genus causat omne quod est per se in alio genere et secundum quilibet sui causat aliquid alterius generis; sicut ens communicatur substantiae et accidenti. Nam omnis substantia causat aliquid accidens et omne accidens causatur ab aliqua substantia—sed de isto posterius. . . . Sed quarto modo dicitur signum aequivocum generale si significet res diversarum perfectionum essentialium. Et sic omne genus est aequivocum; propter quod dicit Aristoteles in VII *Physicorum* quod in generibus multae latent aequivocationes.”

³² Cf. Alyngton, *In Cat.*, cap. *de univocis*, fol. 71v: “Notandum quod tripliciter est aliquid signum aut eius primum significatum univocum. Primo modo dicitur omne signum univocum quod sub uno conceptu plura adaequate significat, sive praedicetur de illis aequaliter, sive secundum maius et minus, sive secundum prius et posterius. Et isto modo transcendentia sunt univoca. Sed secundo <modo> magis proprie dicitur signum univocum si plura sub uno conceptu adaequate significet quibus competit aliqua differentialis proprietas aeque primo. Sic omne genus praedicabile est univocum. Et voco 'differentialis proprietatem' proprietatem essentialem non participatam secundum maius et minus, per quam distinguitur ens unius praedicamenti vel generis a re alterius praedicamenti vel generis. Et dico 'aeque primo' propter analogas, quae secundum maius et minus sive secundum prius et posterius competunt suis contentis, ut substantia est tam maius ens quam prius ens quam accidens. Sed tertio modo strictissime dicitur signum univocum quod solum res eiusdem perfectionis essentialis sub eadem definitione significat. Sic species specialissima solum est univoca.”

³³ Cf. Alyngton, *In Cat.*, cap. *de numero et sufficientia praedicamentorum*, pp. 255–256.

Universals and Predication

Among the many kinds of *entia* that Alyngton admits, the most important set is that consisting of universal items. Universals are among the most disputed topics in Medieval philosophical literature.³⁴ Like Wyclif and the other Oxford Realists, Alyngton claims that universals fully exist outside the minds and are really identical-to and formally distinct-from the individuals which instantiate them.

Alyngton speaks of universals, individuals, and predication mainly in the chapter on substance, but interesting remarks can be found also in the chapter on subject and predicate (*de subiecto* and *praedicato*). Like Albert the Great,³⁵ whom he quotes by name, Alyngton recognizes three main kinds of universals: (1) *ante rem*, or ideal universals—that is, the ideas in God, the archetypes of all that is; (2) *in re*, or formal universals—that is, the common natures present in the individual items as constitutive parts of their whole reality; and (3) *post rem*, or intentional universals—that is, the mental signs which signify formal universals. The ideas in God are the causes of formal universals, and formal universals are the causes of intentional universals.³⁶ Furthermore, like Burley and Wyclif, Alyngton holds that formal universals actually exist (*in actu*) outside our minds, and not potentially only (*in potentia*), as moderate realists thought—even if, unlike Burley, he maintains they are really identical with their individuals, for otherwise it would be impossible to explain, against the Nominalists, why and how individual substances show different and more or less close kinds of similarity among themselves.³⁷

Like Wyclif, Alyngton supports the thesis that formal universals are common natures in virtue of which the individuals that share them are exactly what they are, just as humanity is the form by which every man formally is a man. As natures, they are prior and indifferent to any division into universals and individuals. Although universality is not a constitutive mark of the nature itself, it is its unique, inseparable property. As a consequence, formal universals can be conceived of in

³⁴ For a brief account of the problem of universals (and predication) in the (Later) Middle Ages see Conti, “Categories and Universals” in this volume.

³⁵ Cf. Albert the Great, *De quinque universalibus*, tr. *de universalibus in communi*, capp. 3 and 5, ed. Col., vol. 1.1A, pp. 24–25 and 31–32.

³⁶ Cf. Alyngton, *In Cat.*, cap. *de substantia*, pp. 276–279.

³⁷ Cf. Alyngton, *In Cat.*, cap. *de substantia*, pp. 267–268. See also p. 290.

two different ways: by themselves, as first intentions, or in union with and from the point of view of their inseparable property, that is, the *universalitas*, and therefore as second intentions. In the first case, they are natures of a certain kind and are really identical with their own individuals. For example, man is the same thing as Socrates. In the second case, they are properly universals (that is, something that can be present in many things at once *qua* constitutive element of their essence), and distinct from their own individuals, considered *qua* individuals, because of the opposite constitutive principles: *universalitas* and *particularitas*.³⁸ Hence, universals are really (*realiter*) identical to, but formally (*formaliter*) distinct from, their individuals. In fact, universals are like formal causes in relation to their own individuals, while individuals are like material causes in relation to their universals.³⁹ Thus three different kinds of items can be qualified as formal universals: (1) the common natures (or essences) instantiated by individuals—common natures which are things of first intention; (2) the form itself of universality that belongs to a certain common nature when seen in its relation to the individuals—form of universality which is a thing of second intention; (3) the intelligibility proper to the common nature, by which it is a possible object of our mind—in other words, the real principle which connects formal universals with mental universals.⁴⁰

Since Alyngton accepted the core of the traditional, realist account of the relationship between formal universals and individuals, he, like Wyclif, had to define its logical structure more accurately, in order to avoid the inconsistencies stressed by Ockham⁴¹ and his followers. Thus he restates that (1) a universal in the category of substance can directly receive only the predications of substantial forms more common than it; and (2) the accidental forms inhering in individual substances can be predicated of the universal substantial form that those individuals instantiate only indirectly (*essentialiter*) in virtue of the individuals themselves having that substantial form.⁴² For this reason, Alyngton's

³⁸ Cf. Alyngton, *In Cat.*, cap. *de substantia*, p. 268.

³⁹ Cf. Alyngton, *In Cat.*, cap. *de substantia*, pp. 275–276.

⁴⁰ Cf. Alyngton, *In Cat.*, cap. *de substantia*, p. 277. This partition of the formal universal is very similar to that propounded by Wyclif in his *Tractatus de universalibus*, cap. 2, p. 64.

⁴¹ See Conti's article, "Categories and Universals."

⁴² Cf. Alyngton, *In Cat.*, cap. *de regulis praedicationis*, pp. 246–248; cap. *de substantia*, pp. 288–289.

description of the logical structure of the relationship between universals and individuals demanded a redefinition of predication.

Alyngton presents his own theory of predication when commenting on *Categories* 5, 3a4–5, where Aristotle seems to admit the possibility that an accidental form can inhere in a universal substance, as he affirms that the fact that an individual man is a grammarian implies the fact that also the man and the animal are such.⁴³ In order to explain and justify this affirmation, Alyngton introduces a new interpretation and partition of the predication, different from both the standard one and Wyclif's. Indeed, he was the first one to ameliorate Wyclif's theory (1) by cutting off Wyclif's habitual predication, and (2) by dividing predication into formal predication (*praedicatio formalis*) and remote inherence (*inhaerentia remota*), or predication by essence (*praedicatio secundum essentiam*). Remote inherence is grounded on a partial identity between subject and predicate, which share some, but not all, metaphysical constituents, and does not demand that the form signified by the predicate-term be directly present in the entity signified by the subject-term. On the contrary, such a direct presence is required by formal predication. 'Man is an animal' and 'Socrates is white' are instances of formal predication; '(What is) singular is (what is) common' (*'singulare est commune'*) and 'Humanity is (something) running' (*'humanitas est currens'*) are instances of remote inherence, since, according to Alyngton, the property of running is imputable to the form of humanity, if at least one man is running. He is careful, however, to use a substantival adjective in its neuter form as a predicate-term, because only in this way can it appear that the form signified by the predicate-term is not directly present in the subject, but is indirectly attributed to it through its individuals.⁴⁴ Formal predication itself is in turn divided into formal substantial and formal accidental predication, since formal predication necessarily demands the direct presence of a form in a substrate, and, according to Alyngton, this can occur in two different ways: either as one of the inner constitutive element of the substrate (substantially), or as one of its subsidiary properties (accidentally). Formal accidental predication is then further divided into *secundum motum* and *secundum habitudinem*.⁴⁵

⁴³ On this passage from Aristotle's *Categories* and its significance to the Aristotelian theory of predication see James Duerlinger, "Predication and Inherence in Aristotle's *Categories*," *Phronesis* 15 (1970), 179–203.

⁴⁴ Cf. Alyngton, *In Cat.*, cap. *de substantia*, p. 289.

⁴⁵ Cf. Alyngton, *In Cat.*, cap. *de substantia*, p. 289.

The basic idea of this last division seems to be that modes of being and natures of the accidental forms determine the set of substances which can play the role of their substrate. Alyngton distinguishes between those accidental forms that require a substance capable of undergoing change (*per se mobile*) as their own direct substrate of inherence, and those ones which do not need a substrate with such a characteristic. Forms like quantity, whiteness, *risibilitas*, alteration, diminution and so on belong to the first group, while relations of reason and *respectus*, like causation, difference, *dilectio* and so on, fall under the second one. The forms of the first group bring about formal accidental predication *secundum motum*, while the forms of the second group bring about formal accidental predication *secundum habitudinem*. The former necessarily entail singular substances as their substrates, since singulars alone can undergo change, while only the latter can directly inhere in universal natures (*possunt inesse denominative universalibus*).⁴⁶

Substance

These remarks on the relations between the accidental forms and substances bring us to the core of Alyngton's ontology: the doctrine of substance, developed in the fifth chapter of his commentary on the *Categories*. Alyngton's discussion can be divided into two main parts. (1) The first attempts to clarify what characterizes substance, and therefore (1.1) what falls by itself into this category; (2) the second is concerned with the distinction between primary and secondary substances.

Alyngton lists seven opinions about the nature and mode of being of substance, the last of which he supports. (1) According to the first one, proper to grammarians, substance is what the term 'substance' refers to when utilized in a broad sense, that is, the quiddity (*quidditas*) or essence (*essentia*) of anything. In this case, substance is not a category, since the items which fulfill this description do not share any common nature.⁴⁷ (2) The second opinion is that of Avicenna, who affirms that any entity which does not inhere in something else is a substance.⁴⁸ According to

⁴⁶ Cf. Alyngton, *In Cat.*, cap. *de subiecto et praedicato*, p. 245. See also cap. *de substantia*, p. 274.

⁴⁷ Cf. Alyngton, *In Cat.*, cap. *de substantia*, p. 263.

⁴⁸ Cf. Avicenna, *Liber de philosophia prima*, tr. 8, cap. 4, ed. Simone Van Riet, 2 vols. (Louvain, 1977–80), vol. 2, pp. 403–404.

this view, God, substantial differences, and negative truths can be said to be substances, even though only in an analogical way.⁴⁹ (3) A third meaning of the term 'substance' can be drawn from the use (of that term) proper to common people and theologians: everything which plays the role of foundation (*fundamentum*) in relation to something else is a substance. In this sense, the surface is the foundation (and therefore the substance) of the whiteness.⁵⁰ (4) The fourth opinion seems to be the same as the anonymous one discussed and partially criticized by Burley in his last commentary on the *Categories*.⁵¹ Substance would be (i) a positive being, which (ii) does not inhere in something else, and (iii) is naturally apt to play the role of subject (*subiectum*) in relation to absolute accidents (that is, quantities and qualities). According to this view, matter, form, the composite made up of matter and form, and the angelic intelligences are substances, whereas substantial differences and negative truths are not, since the former do not satisfy the third requisite, neither the latter the first one.⁵² (5) The fifth opinion is that of Boethius,⁵³ according to whom substance is (i) a positive being, which (ii) does not inhere in something else, and (iii) is a compound of matter and form.⁵⁴ (6) The sixth opinion is that of Burley,⁵⁵ to whom Alyngton refers by the expression 'moderni logici'. According to Burley, (i) not being in a subject, (ii) having an essence, (iii) autonomy and independent existence, and (iv) the capacity of underlying accidental forms are the main aspect of substances. This means that primary substances alone are substances properly speaking, while matter and form, and substantial differences are not.⁵⁶ (7) The last opinion is that of Wyclif,⁵⁷ quoted extensively and almost verbatim. Alyngton claims that it is superior to the preceding ones (*septima est expositio metaphysica et altior ad intelligendum quam praenominatae*). According to this view, the constitutive principle of the substance is not the capacity of underlying absolute accidents, but it is the capacity of underlying potency and act, which are its inner foundations—the capacity of underlying

⁴⁹ Cf. Alyngton, *In Cat.*, cap. *de substantia*, pp. 263–264.

⁵⁰ Cf. Alyngton, *In Cat.*, cap. *de substantia*, p. 264.

⁵¹ Cf. Burley, *Expositio super Praedicamenta Aristotelis*, cap. *de substantia*, fol. 22rb–va.

⁵² Cf. Alyngton, *In Cat.*, cap. *de substantia*, p. 264.

⁵³ Cf. Boethius, *In Categorias Aristotelis libri quattuor*, 184A–b.

⁵⁴ Cf. Alyngton, *In Cat.*, cap. *de substantia*, p. 264.

⁵⁵ Cf. Burley, *Expositio super Praedicamenta Aristotelis*, cap. *de substantia*, fol. 24ra.

⁵⁶ Cf. Alyngton, *In Cat.*, cap. *de substantia*, p. 265.

⁵⁷ Cf. Wyclif, *De ente praedicamentali*, cap. 5, pp. 36–39.

accidents being only a derivative property.⁵⁸ Wyclif's position about the nature of substance implies that the distinction between potency and act is, from the point of view of metaphysics, the most fundamental distinction, of which that between form and matter is but one example. As (1) prime matter is pure potentiality, while form is act, and (2) the distinction between potency and act is wider than that between matter and form, the latter is a particular case of the former. In fact, according to Wyclif, the distinction between potency and act runs through the whole of creation, since it applies also to any kinds of spiritual creatures, whereas the distinction between matter and form is found only in the corporeal creatures. On the contrary, Alyngton seems to interpret the distinction between potency and act as a particular case of the distinction between matter and form, since he constantly explains the meaning of the opposition potency-act in terms of the opposition between matter and form in a crucial passage that he quotes from Wyclif's *De ente praedicamentali*.⁵⁹

According to this view, Aristotle says that primary substance exists in a proper way, because it is an absolute thing which does not inhere in something else, as accidents do (since their own being consists in inhering). And primary substance is said to exist in an eminent way in relation to potency and act (i.e., matter and form), which <i> are not complete beings, nor <ii> exist in an eminent way, as they exist in virtue of the composite. And primary substance is said to exist at the highest level in relation to those three, <that is: accidents, potency, and act>. Hence, primary substance is said to be at the highest level also in the chain of our knowledge, since nobody can understand accidents if he has not understood substance. Nor can anyone understand potency and act (i.e.,

⁵⁸ Cf. Alyngton, *In Cat.*, cap. *de substantia*, p. 267: "Prima ratio substantiae est substatere potentiae et actui sicut suis intrinsecis fundamentis, et non substatere accidenti absoluto, cum hoc sit passio posterior substantiae."

⁵⁹ Alyngton, *In Cat.*, cap. *de substantia*, p. 267 (= Wyclif, *De ente praedicamentali*, cap. 5, pp. 38–39): "Et secundum istam sententiam dicit Aristoteles quod substantia prima proprie est, cum sit res absoluta non inhaerens sicut accidentia, quorum esse est inhaerere. Et principaliter dicitur in comparatione ad actum et potentiam (*id est: ad materiam et formam*), quae non sunt completa entia nec principaliter, cum sint propter compositum. Et maxime dicitur in comparatione ad haec tria. Unde et maxime dicitur esse in notitia hominum, cum nemo cognoscit accidens nisi praecognoscendo substantiam; nec aliquis cognoscit potentiam vel actum (*id est: materiam vel formam*) nisi praecognoscendo per se existens et transmutationem de uno esse ad aliud." Alyngton's additions are in italics. Wyclif and Alyngton misunderstand the meaning of Aristotle's statement about primary substance (*Categories* 5, 2a11–13), since the Stagirite is affirming that substance, in the truest and primary and most definite sense of the word, is what is neither predicable of a subject nor present in a subject.

matter and form) if he has not understood <i> what exists by itself, and <ii> the change from one being to another.

The result is a sort of universal hylomorphism, since in this way matter and form serve as principles in the order of being as well as in the order of becoming. All the more so because Alyngton seems to accept the thesis that (angelic) intelligences are not pure forms existing by themselves, but formal principles necessarily joined to the matter of heaven in such a way as to make up living beings.⁶⁰

A second consequence of this approach to the problem of the nature of substance is that, within his system, primary substances alone are substances properly speaking. This conclusion is confirmed by his analysis of the distinctive mark (*proprium*) of substance: while remaining numerically one and the same, being capable of admitting contrary properties, the modification taking place through a change in the subject itself of the motion at issue. Alyngton appears to think that this description is satisfied only by primary (that is, individual) substances.⁶¹ Secondary substances therefore are *per se* in the category of substance only insofar as they are constitutive parts of primary substances. Thus, secondary substances belong to the category of substance by virtue of the individual substances that instantiate them, since they are not formally substances. In fact, unlike primary substances, secondary substances are forms, and consequently incomplete entities with an imperfect and dependent mode of existence. They require composite substances in order to exist properly. No form as such, not even the substantial

⁶⁰ Cf. Alyngton, *In Cat.*, cap. *de substantia*, p. 264.

⁶¹ Cf. Alyngton, *In Cat.*, cap. *de substantia*, fol. 104v: "Maxime autem substantiae videtur esse proprium quod cum sit unum et idem numero, est susceptivum contrariorum. Haec est sexta proprietas. Pro qua notandum est quod duplex solet dici subiectum transmutationis, scilicet per se subiectum et per accidens subiectum. Voco 'per se subiectum transmutationis' substantiam compositam ex materia et forma, cui inest primo denominative transmutatio. Et dicitur per se subiectum transmutationis quia est subiectum non subiectatum ulterius, quia primo sibi inest transmutatio. Sed per accidens subiectum potest esse tripliciter. Aut quia non inest sibi transmutatio primo denominative, sed secundum quid vel secundum partem, ut si dicatur hominem transmutari quia pars eius transmutatur. Et tale potest esse per se subiectum transmutationis. Sed secundo per accidens dicitur esse subiectum transmutationis omne accidens quod potest recipere contrarias denominationes propter transmutationem subiecti per quod extenditur vel in quo subiectatur. Et tale numquam potest esse per se subiectum transmutationis, cum non potest non inhaerere. Et tertio omne contentum in alio, sive per modum formae actuantis sive per modum locati moti ad motum sui contentis, dicitur per accidens subiectum transmutationis; ut homo in navi, anima in corpore. Et talium aliqua possunt esse per se subiecta transmutationum et aliqua non."

ones, is formally a substance, since no form as such has the capacity of underlying potency and act. Secondary substances are related to primary (or individual) substances as formal principles of the latter. It is in this way that humanity and (say) Socrates are linked together. For this reason no secondary substances as such are totally identical with primary substances.⁶² As a consequence, while ‘man is animal’ (*homo est animal*) is a sentence to which a formal predication corresponds in the world, a predication by essence matches ‘humanity is animality’ (*humanitas est animalitas*). Any (individual) man is an animal because of the form of humanity present in him *qua* its essential constituent, albeit the form of humanity as such is not the principle of animality. Therefore, humanity is not formally animality nor rationality, even though it is animality plus rationality.⁶³

Primary substances are the substrate of existence of any other kinds of categorial being, as nothing exists in addition to primary substances but secondary substances and accidents, which both are forms present in individual substances. Like Aristotle (*Categories* 5, 2b5–6), Alyngton can therefore affirm that primary substances are the necessary condition of existence for any other items of the world: nothing could exist, if primary substances stopped existing.⁶⁴ This does not mean, however, that it would be possible to find in the world a primary substance (1) that would not belong to a certain species, and (2) without any accident inhering in it. It means that, from the point of view of full existence, accidents and secondary substances always presuppose primary substances, as to be a primary substance is to be an autonomous singular existing item (*hoc aliquid*), whilst (1) to be a secondary substance is to be an inner and essential determination (or form) of a primary substance (*quale quid*), and (2) to be an accident is to be an outer determination or aspect of a primary substance.⁶⁵

⁶² Cf. Alyngton, *In Cat.*, cap. *de substantia*, p. 280. See also pp. 281 and 282–283.

⁶³ Cf. Alyngton, *In Cat.*, cap. *de substantia*, pp. 283–284. See also cap. *de quantitate*, fols. 106v–107r.

⁶⁴ Cf. Alyngton, *In Cat.*, cap. *de substantia*, p. 286.

⁶⁵ Cf. Alyngton, *In Cat.*, cap. *de substantia*, fol. 101v: “Ubi notandum est quod hoc aliquid est individuum de cuius essentia non est, ut huiusmodi, cum alio componere qualitative aliquid. Et sic nec materia prima nec forma substantialis materialis est proprie hoc aliquid. Et solum tale dicitur proprie ponere in numerum quod (qui ms.) est quantitas discreta—ut patebit posterius. Ideo solum tale communiter vocatur unum numero. Et sic non est universale formaliter unum numero, quamvis large loquendo de uno numero, prout dicit ens quod cum alio constituit multitudinem, posset universale dici unum numero. Sic ergo patet quomodo substantia prima repraesentat hoc aliquid.

Accidents

As we have just seen, Alyngton thinks of primary substances as the ultimate substrates of existence in relation to anything else. As a consequence, for him, the only way (1) to safeguard the reality of accidents as well as their distinction from substance and from each other, while at the same time, (2) to affirm their dependence on substance in existence, was to conceive of them as forms of the substance itself, and therefore as something existentially incomplete. Accordingly, he insists that quantity, quality, and relations, considered as abstract accidents, are forms inherent in primary substances, whereas, if considered from the point of view of their actual existence as concrete items, they are not really distinct from the substance in which they are present, but only formally, as they are modes of substances. So, the chief features of Alyngton's treatment of accidents are (1) his twofold consideration of them as abstract forms and as concrete properties as well as (2) his commitment to their objective reality, since, in his opinion, they are mind-independent items of the world in both cases. Hence, the main goals of his reading of the chapters 6–8 of the Aristotelian treatise are (1) showing the ordered internal structure of the chief categories of accidents, and (2) reasserting their reality and real distinction from the category of substance, against those thinkers, like Ockham and his followers, who had attempted to reduce quantity and relations to mere aspects of material substances.

Secunda vero substantia videtur sub figura appellationis repraesentare principaliter hoc aliquid, ut cum hoc dixerit hominem vel animal. Sed non est verum. Sed magis significat quale quid, id est: substantialem qualitatem. Neque enim verum est quod subiectum est, neque substantia secunda est unum numero quod subicitur, modo quo primae substantiae subiciuntur; sed de pluribus dicitur secunda substantia, ut homo et animal. Et quia aliquis posset credere quod substantia secunda significat qualitatem, modo quo albedo aut aliud accidens significat qualitatem, removet hoc Aristoteles dicens quod secunda substantia non significat simpliciter quale, quemadmodum album et albedo, quia album (id est: albedo) nihil aliud significat a subiecto quam qualitatem accidentalem (id est: non significat aliquod quid vel aliquam partem quidditatis substantiae, sed solum qualitatem). Genera autem et species quae sunt secundae substantiae determinant quamdam qualitatem circa substantiam (id est: significant vel determinant qualitatem substantialem quae est pars quidditatis substantiae). Sic enim vocatur differentia substantialis 'qualitas substantialis', V *Metaphysicae*, commento 19°." See also fol. 102r–v.

1. According to the standard realist interpretation of the Aristotelian doctrine of the categories, followed also by Alyngton,⁶⁶ among the nine genera of accidents, quantity is the most important one, as it is the basis of all further accidents, since quantity orders material substances for receiving quality and the other accidental forms. On the contrary, Ockham had claimed that it was superfluous to posit quantitative forms really distinct from substance and quality, since quantity presupposes what it is intended to explain, that is, the extension of material substances and their having parts outside parts. As an accident, quantity needs substance as its substrate of inherence.⁶⁷ Like Burley and Wyclif, Alyngton denies that material substance can be actually extended without the presence of the general form of quantity in it, thereby affirming its necessity. Hence, he tries to confute Ockham's argumentation. He thinks that the existence of quantity always implies that of substance, but he also believes that the actual existence of parts in a substance necessarily implies the presence of a general form of quantity in it, (1) really distinct from the substance (say Socrates) in which it inheres, and (2) formally distinct from the fact, grounded on the substance at issue, that this same substance is a quantified thing. For Alyngton, what characterizes quantity and differentiates it from the other accidental forms, and in particular from quality, are the following features: (1) being the appropriate measure of anything, and (2) being an absolute entity which makes it possible that material substances actually have parts outside parts.⁶⁸

⁶⁶ Cf. Alyngton, *In Cat.*, cap. *de quantitate*, fol. 106r: "*Quantitatis aliud continuum aliud discretum*. Hoc est secundum capitulum secundae partis huius libri, in quo tractatur de secundo praedicamento, quod est quantitas. Sicut enim materia prima est prima in via generationis substantiae materialis, ita quantitas, quae consequitur materiam seu substantiam materiale, videtur esse prior in ordine procedendi quam fuit alia accidentia consequentia substantiam materiale. Ideo ponitur a multis tamquam basis aliorum accidentium."

⁶⁷ Cf. Ockham, *Expositio in librum Praedicamentorum Aristotelis*, cap. 10.4, in *Opera philosophica*, vol. 2, pp. 205–224.

⁶⁸ Cf. Alyngton, *In Cat.*, cap. *de quantitate*, fols. 106v: "Patet ergo quod quantitas eo quod absolutum sufficienter distinguitur a generibus respectivis, et in hoc quod de se habet partes extra partes distinguitur a qualitate;" 107r: "Omnis autem quantitas habet rationem mensurae;" 114v: "Sed ultra notandum quod est mensurare secundum replicationem et mensurare secundum adaequationem. Dicitur ergo quod omne mensurare secundum adaequationem reperitur aeque primo in quantitate continua sicut discreta. Nam subiectum quantum mensuratur adaequate per suam quantitatem quo ad esse quantum, et aggregatum quo ad esse multum mensuratur adaequate per numerum. Sed mensurare secundum replicationem invenitur principalius in numeris,

If the *sumum genus* of the category of quantity is a form, the seven species Aristotle enumerates (line, surface, solid, time, place, number, and speech) clearly are not. Alyngton tries to meet this difficulty (1) by reformulating the notion of quantified-thing (*quantum*), and (2) by proposing a method for deducing the seven species of quantity from the highest genus (a sort of *sufficiencia quantitatum*). He considers the seven species Aristotle lists not as quantitative forms, but as the most proper and primary bearers of the quantitative nature, revealed by the highest genus of the category. In fact, encouraged by the Aristotelian distinction between strict and derivative quantities (*Categories* 6, 5a38–b10), like Burley,⁶⁹ he distinguishes two different ways of being quantified: by itself and *per accidens*. Only the seven species of quantity would be *quanta* by themselves, while any other *quantum* would be such *per accidens*, indirectly, because of its connection to one (or more) of the seven *quanta per se*.⁷⁰ In Alyngton's view, these seven species of quantity correspond to the seven possible ways of measuring the being (*esse*) of the material substance. In fact, substance has two main kinds of *esse*: permanent and in succession. And both of them can be either discrete or continuous. In turn, the *esse* permanent and continuous of material substance can be measured either from inside or from outside. If from inside, then in three different modes: according to one, two or all the three dimensions proper to material substances. In the first case, the measure is line, in the second surface, and in the third solid. If it is measured from outside, then it is place. The being of material substance that is permanent and discrete is measured by numbers. The being that is in succession and continuous is measured by time. And finally,

cum ex numeris sciatur principaliter quotiens unum mensuratum contineat mensurans secundum replicationem."

⁶⁹ Cf. Burley, *Expositio super Praedicamenta Aristotelis*, cap. de quantitate, fol. 29va.

⁷⁰ Cf. Alyngton, *In Cat.*, cap. de quantitate, fol. 116r: "Notandum quod dupliciter dicuntur aliqua quanta. Primo per se, sicut quantitates absolutae superius numeratae. Secundo modo per accidens—quod potest esse tripliciter. Primo dicitur aliquid quantum per accidens quod est subiectum formaliter quantum per suam quantitatem quam subiectat. Et sic sola substantia materialis est quanta per quantitatem—sicut e contra quantitas est quanta per substantiam talem causaliter, sed non formaliter. Sed secundo modo dicitur quantum per accidens quod est accidens extensum per subiectum quantum. Et tertio modo dicitur aliquid quantum per accidens per respectum ad aliquid per se quantum, sicut angulus dicitur per accidens quantus in comparatione ad basim, et actio quanta in comparatione ad tempus. Et sic motus dicitur habere duplicem magnitudinem, permanentem scilicet et successivam. Et ita de aliis."

the being of substance that is in succession and discrete is measured by the quantity called 'speech' (*oratio*).⁷¹

Alyngton's derivation of the seven species of quantity from a unique principle common to them is unconvincing, but extremely interesting, nonetheless, as it clearly shows that he wants (1) to stress the unity of the category of quantity, which at first appears heterogeneous, and (2) to trace the problem of reality and real distinction of quantities back to that of the nature and status of its distinctive mark.

2. Aristotle's treatment of *ad aliquid* in the *Categories* is opaque and incomplete, since (1) he does not have any notion of relation, as he speaks of relatives and conceives of them as those entities to which non-absolute terms of our language refer; (2) he does not discuss the question of the reality of relatives; (3) he does not clarify the connection between the two definitions of relatives he proposes in the seventh chapters of the *Categories*; (4) he does not give any effective criterion for distinguishing relatives from some items belonging to other categories.⁷² Because of these facts, in the late antiquity and in the Middle Ages many authors tried to reformulate the doctrine of relatives.

The most successful and interesting attempt was that of the Neoplatonic commentators of the sixth century, such as Olympiodorus and Simplicius. Unlike Aristotle, they were able to elaborate a notion of relation (*schesis*) almost equivalent to our modern notion of two-place predicates, as they conceived of relations as abstract forms whose distinctive feature was the property of being present-in and joining two

⁷¹ Cf. Alyngton, *In Cat.*, cap. *de quantitate*, fol. 107r-v: "Sed ulterius pro divisione quantitatis est notandum quod substantia, quae est basis et fundamentum omnium aliorum generum, habet esse permanens et habet esse successivum. Esse autem permanens substantiae aut est continuum esse aut esse discretum. Et similiter esse successivum aut est continuum aut esse discretum. Omnis autem quantitas habet rationem mensurae. Aliqua ergo quantitas mensurat esse substantiae permanens et continuum: et hoc secundum unam dimensionem tantum, et sic est linea; aut secundum duas, et sic est superficies; aut secundum tres, et sic quantitas corporea, quae dicitur corpus de genere quantitatis. Potest enim corpus sumi vel pro substantia corporea vel pro quantitate molis, permanente, longa, lata et profunda, de qua nunc loquitur. Omnes tamen istae tres maneries quantitatum habent rationem mensurandi intrinsece... Secundum istos tres modos potest substantia quanta mensurari ab extrinseco, et sic est locus eius mensura, ut alius est locus linealis, et alius superficialis et alius corporeus. Sed esse substantiae permanens et discretum mensuratur per numerum. Et esse eius successivum et continuum mensuratur per tempus. Et esse eius successivum discretum per quantitatem mensuratur quae vocatur 'oratio'. Ita quod in permanentibus discretis est numerus, in successivis discretis oratio. Et sic patet sufficiens distinctio specierum quantitatis."

⁷² Cf. Ackrill, *Aristotle's Categories and De interpretatione*, pp. 98–103; and Julia Annas, *Aristotle's Metaphysics: Books M and N* (Oxford, 1976), p. 198.

different substances at once.⁷³ This view was rejected by Latin medieval authors. According to Boethius relation (*respectus* or *habitus*) is an accidental form which is in a substance (its substrate of inherence) and simply entails a reference to another, without inhering in that other.⁷⁴ Albert the Great explicitly denied that a relation could inhere (in the technical sense of the word) in two substances at once.⁷⁵ Some years later, the same theses were held by Simon of Faversham.⁷⁶ Also Walter Burley shared this approach, since it appeared to him to be the only thing consistent with one of the basic principle of medieval metaphysics: the equivalence and correspondence between accidental forms and their substrates of inherence, so that no accidental form could inhere at the same time and in full in two (or more) substances.⁷⁷ On the contrary, Wyclif seems to support a different opinion, similar to that of the Neoplatonists, as he maintained that relation (1) is different from quality and quantity, since it presupposes them, and (2) *qua* such is a sort of link between two things.⁷⁸

Alyngton's theory of *ad aliquid* is worthy of note, as he was the only late medieval author who followed and developed Wyclif's ideas on that topic. He conceived of relation (*relatio*) as an accidental form which is present in both the relatives at once—even though in different ways, since it names only one of them. Consequently his relation

⁷³ For a more detailed discussion of Neoplatonic theory of relations see Françoise Caujolle-Zaslowsky, "Les relatifs dans les *Catégories*," in *Concepts et Catégories dans la pensée antique*, ed. Pierre Aubenque (Paris, 1980), pp. 167–195; Alessandro D. Conti, "La teoria della relazione nei commentatori neoplatonici delle *Categorie* di Aristotele," *Rivista critica di storia della filosofia* 38 (1983), 259–283; Concetta Luna, "La relation chez Simplicius," in *Simplicius: sa vie, son oeuvre, sa survie*, ed. Ilsetraut Hadot (Berlin, 1987), pp. 113–147.

⁷⁴ For a short analysis of Boethius' theory of *ad aliquid* see Alessandro D. Conti, "La teoria degli *ad aliquid* di Boezio: osservazioni sulla terminologia," in *Atti del Congresso Internazionale di Storia della Logica. San Gimignano, 4–8 dicembre 1982*, eds. V. M. Abrusci – E. Casari – M. Mugnai (Bologna, 1983), pp. 247–262.

⁷⁵ Cf. Albert the Great, *Liber de praedicamentis*, tr. 4, cap. 10, pp. 240–241.

⁷⁶ Cf. Simon of Faversham, *Questiones in librum Praedicamentorum*, q. 43, pp. 137–138.

⁷⁷ Cf. Burley, *Expositio super librum Sex principiorum*, cap. *de habitu*, in *Expositio super Artem Veterem Porphyrii et Aristotelis* cit., fol. 63ra: "Intelligendum quod nullum accidens unum numero est simul secundum se totum in diversis subiective. Aliquod tamen accidens, ut numerus, est in diversis subiective secundum suas partes." On Burley's theory see Conti, "Ontology in Walter Burley's Last Commentary," pp. 165–170.

⁷⁸ Cf. Wyclif, *De ente praedicamentali*, cap. 7, p. 61. On Wyclif's theory see Conti, "Wyclif's Logic and Metaphysics," pp. 110–113.

can be considered as a sort of ontological counterpart of our modern functions with two variables, or two-place predicates.⁷⁹

According to Alyngton, whose account partially differs from those of Burley and Wyclif, in the act of relating one substance to another four distinct constitutive elements can be singled out: (1) the relation itself—for instance, the form of paternity; (2) the subject of the relation, that is, the substance that denominatively receives the name of the relation—for instance, the (substance that is the) father; (3) the object of the relation, that is, the substance which the subject of the relation is connected with—for instance, the (substance that is the) son; and (4) the foundation (*fundamentum*) of the relation, that is, the absolute entity in virtue of which the relation inheres in the subject and in the object.⁸⁰ The foundation is the main component, since it (1) joins the relation to the underlying substances, (2) lets the relation link the substrate to the object, and (3) transmits some of its properties to the relation.⁸¹ Like Wyclif,⁸² Alyngton affirms that only qualities and quantities can be the foundation of a relation.⁸³

Some consequences about the nature and status of relations and relatives derive from these premises: (1) relation is a categorial item whose reality is feebler than that of any other accidental form, as it depends upon the simultaneous existence of three different items: the subject, the object, and the foundation.⁸⁴ (2) A relation can start inhering in a substance without any change in the latter, but simply because of a change in another substance. For example: given two things, one white and the other black, if the black thing becomes white, then, because of this change, a new accident, that is, a relation of similarity, will inhere also in the first thing, apart from any other change in it. (3) All the true relatives (*relativa secundum esse*) are simultaneous by nature, since the real cause of being a relative is relation, which at the same time inheres in two substances, thereby making both ones relatives.⁸⁵

On this basis Alyngton can divide relations into transcendental and categorial relations,⁸⁶ and, what is more, among the latter he can

⁷⁹ Cf. Alyngton, *In Cat.*, cap. *de relativis*, pp. 295–296.

⁸⁰ Cf. Alyngton, *In Cat.*, cap. *de relativis*, p. 299.

⁸¹ Cf. Alyngton, *In Cat.*, cap. *de relativis*, p. 291.

⁸² Cf. Wyclif, *De ente praedicamentali*, cap. 7, p. 67.

⁸³ Cf. Alyngton, *In Cat.*, cap. *de relativis*, p. 291.

⁸⁴ Cf. Alyngton, *In Cat.*, cap. *de relativis*, p. 295.

⁸⁵ Cf. Alyngton, *In Cat.*, cap. *de relativis*, p. 301.

⁸⁶ Cf. Alyngton, *In Cat.*, cap. *de relativis*, pp. 290–291.

contrast real relatives (*relativa secundum esse*) with relatives of reason (*relativa rationis*) without utilizing references to our mental activities nor to semantic principles. In fact, on the one hand, Alyngton describes real relatives as those aggregates (1) made up of a primary substance, (2) an absolute accidental form (quantity or quality), and (3) a relation which correlates the substance at issue to another substance existing *in actu*. On the other hand, he defines relatives of reason as those aggregates characterized by the occurrence of at least one of these negative conditions: (1) either the relation's subject of inherence or its object is not a substance; (2) the object is not an actual entity; (3) the foundation of the relation is not an absolute accident.⁸⁷ The strategy which supports this choice is evident: Alyngton wanted to substitute references to mental activity with references to the external world, thus using only objective criteria, based on the framework of reality itself in order to classifying things.

3. The chapter on quality is the least complex and interesting part of the whole commentary, since Alyngton is faithful to Aristotle's text and doctrine, and sometimes even offers rather unproblematic analyses and elucidations. The main general topic he deals with is the internal structure of the category.

In the first lines of the eighth chapter of the *Categories* (8a25–26) Aristotle observes that quality is among those things that are spoken of in a number of ways—an affirmation which seems to imply that quality is not a *summu genus*, as, according to Aristotle himself, what is spoken of in a number of ways always gathers in several different natures. Furthermore, the Stagirite speaks of four species of quality (habits and dispositions, natural capacities and incapacities, affective qualities and affections, figures and shapes), without explaining how they are related to one another and to the highest genus of the category. No Aristotelian commentator had ever thought that quality was spoken of in many ways purely equivocally. Therefore no Aristotelian commentator had ever presumed that the term 'quality' could have several different (but connected) meanings. On the contrary, they unanimously took for granted that it had a unique *ratio*, common to all the items belonging to the category. They disagreed, however, about the status and hierarchical order of the four species mentioned by Aristotle. For example, Albert the Great held that quality at once and directly splits

⁸⁷ Cf. Alyngton, *In Cat.*, cap. *de relativis*, p. 293.

up into the four species, which would all be equally far from the highest genus.⁸⁸ Duns Scotus,⁸⁹ Ockham,⁹⁰ and Walter Burley⁹¹ maintained that the so called ‘species’ of the quality were not properly species (or intermediate genera), but modes of quality, since many singular qualities would belong to the first three species at the same time, as, unlike species, modes are not constituted by opposite properties. Alyngton rejected both opinions. The latter because it compromises the actual goal of a correct categorial theory,⁹² and the former because it does not fit in with the standard infracategorial structure described by Porphyry in his *Isagoge*. Consequently, he inserts an intermediate level between the highest genus of the category and the four species by claiming that quality is first of all divided into perceptible (*sensibilis*) and non-perceptible (*insensibilis*) qualities. Affective qualities and affections, figures and shapes stem from the former kind of quality, while habits and dispositions, natural capacities and incapacities derive from the latter. In fact, (1) figures and shapes are those perceptible qualities which inhere in substances because of the mutual position of its quantitative parts, while affective qualities and affections inhere in substances because of the form itself of the substantial composite. (2) Natural capacities and incapacities are inborn non-perceptible qualities, while habits and dispositions are due to the activity, both physical and, if it is the case, intellectual, of the substance in which they inhere.⁹³

⁸⁸ Cf. Albert the Great, *Liber de praedicamentis*, tr. 5, cap. 2, pp. 245–248.

⁸⁹ Cf. Duns Scotus, *Quaestiones super Praedicamenta*, q. 36, pp. 497–499.

⁹⁰ Cf. Ockham, *Expositio in librum Praedicamentorum Aristotelis*, cap. 14.4, p. 271.

⁹¹ Cf. Burley, *Expositio super Praedicamenta Aristotelis*, cap. *de qualitate*, fol. 38vb: “Illa quae hic ponuntur species qualitatis non sunt species ex opposito distinctae, quomodo distinguuntur homo et asinus, sed ‘species’ accipitur in proposito pro modo. Unde quattuor sunt species qualitatis, id est: quattuor sunt modi qualitatis, qui modi non sunt ex opposito distincti. Nam idem numero non continetur sub speciebus ex opposito distinctis; sed idem numero est in prima specie qualitatis, in secunda et in tertia; ergo illae species non sunt oppositae.”

⁹² Cf. Alyngton, *In Cat.*, cap. *de qualitate*, fol. 130r: “Sed melius et consonantius est dicere quod istae species distinguuntur ex opposito, ita quod nihil quod est per se in una specie est per se in alia specie.”

⁹³ Cf. Alyngton, *In Cat.*, cap. *de qualitate*, fol. 130r: “Pro quo est notandum quod omnis qualitas aut est active sensibilis aut insensibilis. Insensibilium autem qualitatum aliquae sunt naturaliter acquisibiles vel naturaliter inexistentes, et omnes tales et solum tales dicuntur esse in secunda specie qualitatis; sed aliae sunt insensibiles praeternaturaliter solum acquisibiles immediate per actionem, cuiusmodi sunt habitus corporei, ut sanitas et infirmitas, et habitus spirituales, ut virtutes morales vel intellectuales, quae omnes sunt insensibiles, quamvis occasionaliter sensu possunt percipi. Sunt etiam ex arte et usu acquisibiles, quamvis aliqua sit sanitas connaturalis animali. Nec generantur istae qualitates a sibi similibus immediate, sed per transmutationem in qualitibus primis

Concluding Remarks

As the preceding analyses show, Alyngton's theory of categories is an interesting example of that partial dissolution of the traditional doctrine which took place in between the end of the fourteenth and the beginning of the fifteenth centuries. Within Alyngton's metaphysics, (1) the relationships between primary (or individual) substances and secondary (or universal) substances, and (2) between substances and accidents (both abstract and concrete) as well as (3) the inner natures of essential and accidental predications are so different from their Aristotelian originals that the general meaning of the categorial doctrine is deeply modified. According to Alyngton, the formal-and-essential predication and the formal-and-accidental predication would correspond to Aristotle's essential and accidental predications respectively. But he regards remote inherence as more general than formal predication. Therefore, in his system formal predication is a sort of sub-type of the remote inherence. This means that he recognises a single ontological pattern, founded on a partial identity, as the basis of every kind of predicative relation. Thus, the *praedicatio formalis essentialis* and the *praedicatio formalis accidentalis* are very different from their Aristotelian models, as they express degrees in identity as well as the remote inherence. As a consequence, the relationships between substance and accidents and between individuals and universals (and hence the ontological status of universal substances and that of accidents) are completely changed. In Alyngton's view, both concrete accidents, *qua* modes of individual substances, and universal substances, *qua* the main components of the natures of individual substances, are really identical-to and formally distinct-from primary substances. Moreover, in the *Categories* Aristotle (1) characterizes primary substances as those beings which are neither present in a subject nor predicable of a subject, and (2) considers the capacity of underlying accidents as the constitutive principle of substance, while Alyngton (1) defines primary substance as what (i) is apt to underlie potency and act, and (ii) has matter and form as its inner foundations, and (2) explicitly affirms that underlying accidents is only a derivative property of substance. Finally, because of his strong propensity towards

vel aliter per actiones animae. Et ista sunt in prima specie qualitatis. Si autem sint qualitates sensibiles vel consequuntur positionem quantitatis, et sic sunt in quarta specie, vel insunt absolute ratione formae et non ratione positionis quantitatis, et sic sunt in tertia specie.”

hypostatization (as we have seen, Alyngton methodically replaces logical and epistemological rules with ontological criteria and references), he interprets Aristotle's theory of homonymy, synonymy, and paronymy as an ontological theory about real items and not as a semantic one about the relations between terms and things.

In conclusion, Alyngton conflates the real and "logical" (so to say) levels into one: like Burley and Wyclif, he considers logic as (1) *the* theory of *the* discourse on being (*ens*), (2) turning on structural forms and relations, which exist in the world and are totally independent of the mental acts by which they are grasped. It is through these structural forms and relations that the network connecting the basic items of reality (individuals and universals, substances and accidents) is clearly disclosed. Yet, because of his peculiar ideas on substance and predication, his world is different from those of Burley and of Wyclif.

On Burley's view, macro-objects (i.e., what is signified by a proper name or by an individual expression, such as 'Socrates' or 'this particular horse') are the basic components of the world.⁹⁴ They are aggregates made up of really different items: primary substances and substantial and accidental forms existing in them. Primary substances and substantial and accidental forms are like simple (or atomic) objects, each possessing a unique, well-defined nature. Although they are simple, some of these components are in a sense composite because they are reducible to something else—for example, primary substance is composed of a particular form and matter. Primary substance differs from the other components of a macro-object because of its peculiar mode of being as an autonomous and independently existing object—in contrast with the other categorial items, which necessarily presuppose it for their existence. Primary substances are therefore substrates of existence in relation to everything else. The distinction between substantial and accidental forms derives from their different relations to primary substances: substantial, universal forms disclose the natures of primary substances; by contrast, those forms that simply affect primary substances without being actually joined to their natures are accidental forms. As a result, the macro-object is not simply a primary substance but an orderly collection of categorial items, so that primary substance,

⁹⁴ On Burley's ontology of the macro-objects see Conti, "Ontology in Walter Burley's Last Commentary on the *Ars Vetus*," pp. 121–176; and also Alessandro D. Conti, "Significato e verità in Walter Burley," *Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale* 11 (2000), 317–350.

even though it is the most important element, does not contain the whole being of the macro-object.

On Wyclif's view, whatever is is a proposition (pan-propositionalism).⁹⁵ The constitutive property of any kind of being is the capacity of being the object of a complex act of signifying (*omne ens est primarie significabile per complexum*). This choice implies a revolution in the standard medieval theory of transcendentals, since Wyclif actually replaces being with true. According to the common belief, *verum* was nothing but being itself considered in relation to an intellect, no matter whether divine or human. According to Wyclif, being is no more the main transcendental and its notion is not the first and simplest, but there is something more basic to which being can be brought back: the truth (*veritas*) (or true—*verum*). Only what can be signified by a complex expression is a being, and whatever is the proper object of an act of signifying is a truth. 'Truth' is therefore the true name of being itself. From the ontological point of view this entails the uniqueness in type of the *significata* of every class of categorematic expressions. Within Wyclif's world it is the same (kind of) object which both concrete terms and propositions refer to, as primary substances have to be regarded as (atomic) states of affairs. According to him, from the metaphysical point of view a singular man (*iste homo*) is nothing but a real proposition (*propositio realis*), where the actual existence in time as an individual (*ista persona*) plays the role of subject, the common nature, i.e., human nature (*natura humana*), plays the role of predicate, and the singular essence (*essentia istius hominis*), that is what by means of which this individual is a man, plays the role of the copula. The result is that Wyclif's world consists of molecular objects, which are not simple, but composite, because they are reducible to something else, belonging to a different rank of reality, and unable to exist by itself: being and essence, potency and act, matter and form, abstract genera, species and differences. For that reason, everything one can speak about or think of is both a thing (or molecular object) and a sort of atomic state of affairs, while every true proposition expresses either an atomic or a molecular state of affairs, that is the union (if the proposition is affirmative) or the separation (if the proposition is negative) of two (or more) molecular objects.

⁹⁵ On Wyclif's pan-propositionalism see Laurent Cesalli, "Le 'pan-propositionalisme' de Jean Wyclif," *Vivarium* 43 (2005), 124–155; and Conti, "Wyclif's Logic and Metaphysics," pp. 78–86.

On the contrary, Alyngton's world consists of atomic objects whose constitutive elements are (1) abstract forms (or essences), both substantial and accidental, (2) potency and act, and (3) matter. In fact, according to him, unlike Burley, (1) what is signified by a proper name or by an individual expression is a primary substance, and, unlike Wyclif, (2) simple and complex expressions have different *significata*.⁹⁶ Moreover, in his view, Socrates cannot be regarded as an aggregate, since the beings of the substantial universal forms predicated of him and those of the concrete accidental forms inhering in him *coincide* with the being of that primary substance Socrates himself is. Thus, if we consider Socrates from the point of view of his being, Socrates is simply an atomic object, a primary substance. If we consider him from the point of view of the essences that he contains in himself, then he is a compound of really different forms, which can exist only in it, as its components, and through its being. This is the inner sense (1) of the formula 'really identical and formally distinct' that Alyngton employs for explaining the relation between universals and individuals as well as the relation between substance and concrete accidents; and (2) of his description of the nature and peculiar mode of being of the primary substance: to be a primary substance is to be *the being* of whatever can be.

⁹⁶ Cf. Alyngton, *In Cat.*, cap. *de complexo et incomplexo*, pp. 248–250.

THOMAS MAULEVELT'S DENIAL OF SUBSTANCE

Robert Andrews

With this paper¹ I hope to stimulate interest in an unjustly neglected medieval author, Thomas Maulevelt. I would like to do so by drawing attention to his ontology, one which entertains a hypothesis more radical than any other of the Middle Ages, and one unparalleled until the time of Hume.

Little is known about Maulevelt's life. He was born in England, but spent most of his active academic life in Paris in the 1320's and 1330's.² If he is famous at all, it is chiefly for his works in the *parva logicalia*, which were popular in the fifteenth century, including at the newly-established University of Uppsala—some of the manuscripts of his work remain here.³ It is even difficult to trace him through his name; besides being called Thomas Anglicus, his name is also spelled in multiple ways: Maulvelt, Maulfelt, Manlevelt, Maulfield, Manlefeld, Maulefeldt, and even Manlove. The text with which I shall here be concerned is his commentary on Aristotle's *Categories*. It is one of the lengthiest of the Middle Ages, surviving in a single, densely-written manuscript of over a hundred folios. In modern times it has hitherto never been transcribed or even discussed.

¹ The first version of this paper was presented at a conference, *Skepticism in Medieval and Renaissance Thought*, in Uppsala, Sweden, on May 8, 2005 (An ESF Workshop within the program *From Natural Philosophy to Science*). I would like to thank the organizer of that conference, Henrik Lagerlund, as well as the participants in the conference, for their useful comments and suggestions.

² The most extensive discussion of Maulevelt's life is in Sönke Lorenz, "Thomas Manlefeldt (Maulefeldt), Zu Leben und Werk," in *Schule und Schüler im Mittelalter. Beiträge zur europäischen Bildungsgeschichte des 9. bis 15. Jahrhunderts*, eds. Martin Kintzinger, Sönke Lorenz, and Michael Walter (*Beihefte zum Archiv für Kulturgeschichte* 42) (Köln, 1996), pp. 145–164.

³ The influence of Maulevelt is witnessed in Anders Piltz, *Studium Upsalense. Specimens of the oldest lecture notes taken in the medieval University of Uppsala* (Uppsala, 1977). A Maulevelt manuscript is also discussed in my "Resoluble, Exponible, and Officiable Terms in the 'Sophistria' of Petrus Olai, ms. Uppsala C 599," in *Sophisms in Medieval Logic and Grammar: Acts of the Ninth European Symposium for Medieval Logic and Semantics, held at St. Andrews, June 1990*, ed. Stephen Read (Dordrecht, 1993).

It is clear from the work that Thomas Maulevelt was following in the footsteps of William Ockham, another Englishman writing a bit earlier in the beginning of the 1300's.⁴ Maulevelt adopts as central the principle of Ockham's Razor (actually deriving from Aristotle) that "entities should not be multiplied beyond necessity," with which Ockham sliced away at the undergrowth of medieval realism. Ockham was responsible for an enormous conceptual shift within philosophy, and has been accorded credit variously for the Scientific Revolution,⁵ the Protestant Reformation,⁶ and the modern world view.⁷

As against his other targets, Ockham applied his reductive principle to Aristotle's ten categories, writing like Maulevelt a commentary on the *Categories* of Aristotle.⁸ The *Categories* in medieval ontology comprised a division of the world into ten categories, in a division that sounds familiar, if quaint, to us today: it consists of Substance, plus nine accidents: Quality, Quantity, Relation, Action, Undergoing, Space, Time, Situation, and Having.⁹ Already before Ockham this list had begun to appear problematic. It seemed to be arbitrary and impropportionate: should the final categories of "being in a reclining situation" or "having shoes on" be of the same status as quality or quantity? Problems with relation, too, led to ontological embarrassment: if a relation may itself be related, then between any two objects there must be an infinite number of relationships. Ockham's solution to this proliferation of categories was to wield his razor. Entities not necessary to explanation must be excised. So with one stroke Ockham sliced away eight of the categories; in his ontology, only substance and quality remain as distinct entities. All of the other categories are merely aspects of, or ways of talking about, substances or qualities.

⁴ Another early Ockhamist is edited in "Defensorium Ockham: An Edition," *Cahiers de l'institut du moyen-Âge grec et latin* 71 (2000), 189–273, and discussed in "The Defensorium Ockham," in R. Andrews, ed. *Essays in Honor of Fr. Gedeon Gál, O.F.M. on his Eightieth Birthday: Franciscan Philosophy and Theology II*, *Franciscan Studies* 54 (1995), 100–121.

⁵ P. Duhem *Le Système du monde*, 10 vols. (Paris, 1913–59).

⁶ Heiko Oberman, *The Harvest of Medieval Theology: Gabriel Biel and Late Medieval Theology* (Durham, 1983) 4–5.

⁷ Gordon Leff, *William of Ockham: The Metamorphosis of Scholastic Discourse* (Manchester, 1975), p. xiii.

⁸ Guillelmus de Ockham, *Expositio in librum Praedicamentorum Aristotelis*, in Guillelmi de Ockham *Opera philosophica et theologica*, *Opera philosophica II*, ed. Gedeon Gál (St. Bonaventure, N.Y., 1978).

⁹ The final nine categories are termed accidents, but may also be referred to as properties, or somewhat misleadingly, 'qualities'; here I shall use these three terms interchangeably.

Maulevelt, like Ockham, was engaged in a radical reduction in the number of the categories. One by one all of the lesser categories fall, each shown to be merely a way of speaking. Maulevelt, however, is willing to go a step farther than Ockham. Maulevelt entertains a unique, radical hypothesis: we have no need to posit that substance exists! The only category needed to describe the things of the world is that of quality. Let's investigate how this remarkable proposal came about.

Maulevelt's ideas are presented within the framework of a *Categories* commentary, and to be able to understand them one has to understand the conventions of the medieval philosophical question-commentary. A medieval question commentary never presents an author's opinion immediately, but instead first delivers it at the middle or near the end in a *determinatio*. Therefore one first has to wade through the question's preliminary arguments, which by convention argue for the position ultimately to be rejected. Such arguments were framed as counterfactual—and since in a preliminary argument an author could openly challenge dogma or the tenets of Aristotle, these arguments provide some of the most intriguing reasoning to be found in the Middle Ages. Such is certainly the case in Maulevelt.

But first it should be remarked that the very title of Maulevelt's question regarding substance is unusual. Titles of commentary questions in the Middle Ages are significant, for they indicate that a specific problem was thought worthy of discussion. Some titles are indeed routine exercises which everyone was expected to ask and answer, while others reflect the particular interests of an author or philosophical school.¹⁰ But among all the traditions and debates of *Categories* commentaries, no one before or after ever posed the question Maulevelt does: "Does substance exist?"¹¹ The reason for this, I suspect, is that it was held as obvious and self-evident that, of course, substance exists. Certainly no one ever asked the question in order to answer it in the negative.

¹⁰ See my discussion in "Question Commentaries on the *Categories* in the Thirteenth Century," *Medioevo: Rivista di storia della filosofia medievale* 26 (2000), 141–183.

¹¹ See *infra*, Maulevelt, *Quaestiones super Praedicamenta*, q. 16, §1.

The Preliminary Arguments

Of the six preliminary arguments in Question 16, I intend to discuss only two. The first couple of preliminary arguments may be dismissed as implausible semantic quibbles; arguments five and six are based upon theological problems. Notable, however, in the second argument is that Maulevelt cites approvingly Ockham's razor: "Entities should not be multiplied beyond necessity."¹²

It is in the third preliminary argument that we are presented with the paradigm evidence for Maulevelt's skepticism about substance: the Eucharist. Here is his argument:

We do not experience, nor are we convinced by any argument, that there is any substance, therefore we should not suppose that there is any substance. The argument is clear..., because naturally speaking we don't experience, nor have any reason to believe, that there is any more substance in an unconsecrated communion wafer than in a consecrated one (according to theologians); for the same reason we cannot experience nor prove that there is any substance in an unconsecrated communion wafer, and likewise for any other thing whatsoever.¹³

The background of this argument is, of course, the church doctrine of the Eucharist, the bread and wine which at the moment of a priest's blessing is turned into body and blood. In this consecration, none of the external appearances of the bread or wine is thereby altered; their qualities remain the same, and only their substance has been altered, from mundane to divine. We have no awareness of the substantial change, and by implication, we would have no awareness of any other such substantial change that might take place in other circumstances. The conclusion is that we have no awareness of substance whatsoever.

The same example is reinforced in the fourth preliminary argument.¹⁴ If no substances are supposed, still all the appearances can be saved. This phrase, "saving the appearances," is important for Maulevelt's argument in a way that it later comes to be important for the scientific revolution of the 17th century. Copernicus can defend his heliocentric

¹² Ibid., §5, 'Multiplicity ought not be supposed without necessity'.

¹³ Ibid., §7.

¹⁴ Ibid., §8: "All the appearances can be saved without supposing any substance, therefore we ought not suppose any substance. The argument seems clear. The antecedent is shown again by the consecrated and unconsecrated communion wafer: the unconsecrated communion wafer has color, size, edibility, a good taste, and all its other appearances, just like the consecrated wafer or communion wine."

model by claiming that it saves the appearances (that is, accounts for all phenomena) as well as the geocentric—but the heliocentric system is to be preferred for its simplicity. Likewise, the example of the Eucharist for Maulevelt shows that external properties are all that we witness in a case of transubstantiation; whatever internal status there might be remains inaccessible to us. And so we need never posit an underlying substance to account for the appearance of any object whatsoever.

If these preliminary arguments were all there are to Maulevelt's case, they could be dismissed as sterile exercises, nothing more than intriguing arguments for the sake of argument. However, it is what follows in the main body of Maulevelt's treatment that is truly unusual. In his *determinatio*, his considered opinion on the matter, Maulevelt's conclusions are not what is expected according to the traditional structure of the medieval commentary. In two of four conclusions, the author accepts as at least probable the initial proposal: no substance exists.

Conclusion One: No Substance in the Terrestrial World

In his first two conclusions, with responses to various objections, Maulevelt claims that it is a defensible position that there is no substance anywhere in the world, whether terrestrial or celestial. He does this not only negatively, by arguing that substance is unnecessary for explanatory purposes, but also positively, by explaining how natural phenomena may be understood in the absence of substance.

Maulevelt begins by limiting his case against substance to earthly things (*in istis inferioribus*). His argument is, as above, based on "saving the appearances"—nothing is lost in explanatory power if substance is sliced away using Ockham's razor. And, again, his example is the consecrated Eucharist. He appeals to various aspects of change (using Aristotelian terminology) in the following account:

The first conclusion is this, which physically speaking can be maintained as probable, that there is no substance whatsoever among earthly things—taking 'substance' to mean the composite of matter and form, or any part of such a composition. This is shown thusly: any theory whose opposite cannot be proven with evidence (*evidenter*) should be held as probable; but [this conclusion] is like this; therefore [it should be maintained]. The minor premise is proven, because all of the appearances can be saved without positing any substance; therefore it cannot be proven with evidence that there is any substance among earthly things.... The antecedent is furthermore declared, because supposing that there exist only

accidents which support and adhere to each other; all of the following can be saved: generation and corruption; increase and decrease; change and local motion—all of this is evident in the case of a consecrated communion wafer.¹⁵

Here also Maulevelt gives us a first hint of the mechanism he shall propose to explain the natural world in the absence of substance: his alternative explanation is that “accidents...support and adhere to each other.” Thus the picture is of a world in which physical objects are adhering aggregates of their properties: an apple is red because it smells pleasant, is cold because it is solid, and tastes sweet because it is round. All of its properties adhere to one another, and form each other’s substrate, without the need for an intangible and inaccessible substance.

Let me pause to aver that this radical reformulation of nature is completely unknown otherwise in the Middle Ages. It does, however, sound surprisingly similar to the deductions of the British Empiricists 400 years subsequently. David Hume was to write in 1739:

I would fain ask those philosophers, who found so much of their reasonings on the distinction of substance and accident, and imagine we have clear ideas of each, whether the idea of substance be derived from the impressions of sensation or of reflection? If it be conveyed to us by our senses, I ask, which of them; and after what manner? If it be perceived by the eyes, it must be a colour; if by the ears, a sound; if by the palate, a taste; and so of the other senses. But I believe none will assert, that substance is either a colour, or sound, or a taste. The idea, of substance must therefore be derived from an impression of reflection, if it really exist. But the impressions of reflection resolve themselves into our passions and emotions: none of which can possibly represent a substance. We have therefore no idea of substance, distinct from that of a collection of particular qualities, nor have we any other meaning when we either talk or reason concerning it.¹⁶

There is no evidence to suggest that Maulevelt the Englishman could have influenced his skeptical countryman of 400 years later. Indeed, it is almost certain that Maulevelt’s commentary on the *Categories*, which survives today only in a single manuscript, had little or no direct impact on subsequent generations. Rather, Maulevelt must have made his own

¹⁵ Ibid., §21.

¹⁶ David Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, Sect. VI, “Of Modes and Substances,” (New York, 1992).

extrapolations from the reductionism of Ockham, and proposed a radical parsimony that was to be unequalled until an age unshackled from the medieval world-view.

To return to Maulevelt's argument, in the text he next faces a series of self-penned objections to his proposal—a not at all unusual procedure in a medieval commentary, where interpolated doubts could be addressed in order to clarify the author's position. In this case, the doubts deal with various aspects of Aristotelian physics which seem compromised by Maulevelt's stance.

First, according to Aristotle, any generation of a new entity is defined as "change to a substantial form."¹⁷ Obviously, Maulevelt's new conception does not agree with this definition. Accordingly, Maulevelt rejects it: generation is "the perfect production of some thing into being, and corruption is its perfect destruction."¹⁸ Thus Maulevelt is willing and prepared to modify the details of Aristotelian science.

Next, Maulevelt confronts the weightiest objection to his theory: what is the underlying subject when an object undergoes a superficial or accidental change? Maulevelt here makes explicit what he intimated earlier: the subject for any accident is always another accident: "And it might be asked, what might be the subject in such generation? The response is that one accident is the subject for another accident in cases of generation and corruption. The theologians must necessarily hold this when they say that the Word is generated out of a communion wafer being consecrated, or when some color such as white or red is introduced onto a consecrated communion wafer."¹⁹

In two further objections,²⁰ Maulevelt counters difficulties arising from a case of radical transformation, such as when water changes to fire—that is, when one basic element changes into its opposite. On the one hand, it seems that in such a drastic change, there are no properties remaining which can serve as an underlying foundation for the new properties. Is this, then, a case of an entirely new creation out of nothing, *ex nihilo*? Aristotle would deny that there can be any creation *ex nihilo*.

Maulevelt provides two possible ways of answering this crucial objection. One is an *ad hoc* solution: perhaps there never is such a

¹⁷ Maulevelt, *Quaestiones super Praedicamenta*, q. 16, §22.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, §23.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, §§24–5.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, §§26–8.

case of transformation of an element into its direct opposite; perhaps such changes must always pass through an intermediate form, so that water must first change into air before becoming fire.²¹ Maulevelt's other solution, which he calls "more probable," is to claim that any natural change comes about because of a stronger force. If water were to change into fire, this would have to be because of a powerful influence—and so the possibility for change does not have to lie within the water, which is the passive part; instead the possibility would lie in the more powerful force which is responsible for the change in any aggregate of qualities.²²

Conclusion Two: No Substance in the Celestial World

In his second important conclusion, Maulevelt moves to a discussion of the celestial world. All appearances may be saved, he says, even if there is no substance posited among the heavenly bodies. The celestial bodies may be regarded as "composed out of various accidents perpetually adhering to each other." In a surprising analogy, Maulevelt says that "the mover of any celestial orb [may be regarded as] an accident inhering in that orb, just like gravity (*gravitas*) inheres in a rock, making it fall." This comparison is astoundingly prescient—to suggest that what moves a planet is like gravity in a rock—but there is no reason to suppose anything other than sheer coincidence in the association to Newton's correct description of gravity as the mover of planets. Rather, Maulevelt's basis for his comparison is firmly medieval: "A consecrated communion wafer, in which there is no substance, falls just like an unconsecrated one."²³

In what immediately follows, Maulevelt provides further interesting arguments, mostly dealing with minutiae of medieval theology. But I shall omit those arguments here, to move to his dramatic final conclusions.

²¹ Ibid., §29.

²² Ibid., §31.

²³ Ibid., §33.

Conclusions Three and Four: The Acceptance of Substance

In his conclusions three and four, Maulevelt shows the other side of the coin: it is equally probable that substance exists. Maulevelt does not provide much argument for this viewpoint, since it is "what everyone commonly holds." He merely lists all the types of substance that can be said to exist: God, angels, celestial bodies, the four elements earth, air, fire, and water, matter and form, the human soul, and ordinary bodies.²⁴ (In his fourth and final conclusion he also reaffirms the nominalist position that substance as a term of second intention, such as "genus" and "species," also exists.)

There is a striking symmetry in his four conclusions—two in favor of substance, and two against—which shows that the rejection of substance is regarded as equally plausible as its acceptance. Maulevelt did not pose his doubts about substance as merely contentious preliminary arguments; rather he weighed his claim in balanced opposition to all conventional acceptance of substance. His arguments against the existence of substance are necessarily more extensive because this is the radically unfamiliar position. Nevertheless, that he should evaluate the evidence as "equally probable" for both sides is a provocative agnosticism against the monolithic Aristotelian certainty regarding substance.

Why did Maulevelt not pursue a definitive denial of substance, as Ockham did earlier with his rejection of eight accidental categories? Certainly Maulevelt would have faced alarm and hostility from traditionalists confronted with a total rejection of substance. It was certainly no small matter to challenge the authority of Aristotle, as even Ockham was hesitant to do; it was even more serious to have to reckon with all

²⁴ Ibid., §43: "The third conclusion, which can be held as probable, since everyone holds it, is that there is one first substance which depends on nothing else, and that is God himself. Also, there are other individual and incorruptible separate substances, which indeed depend for the being upon the First Substance, but which subsist *per se*, and are neither accidents nor essential parts of anything else. Also, other substances are incorruptible bodies, such as celestial bodies, which depend simply upon the First Substance but subsist *per se* in the way that has been described. Other substances are composites of matter and form, but not out of other parts, and are homogenous; but these are corruptible, such as the four elements. There are other corporeal substances not composed out of prime matter and form, but out of homogenous parts like elements; these are called 'mixed' or 'elemental' substances. Finally, there are matter and form, which are the parts of corruptible substances. Some of these are incorruptible, such as the intellective soul, and matter, which is the foundation and subject of generation and corruption. Others are corruptible, like other substantial forms. Since everyone holds this position, it need not be explained further."

the theological difficulties which would have arisen from a conceptual shift that dispensed with the fundamental notion of substance.

I suggest that Maulevelt likely did not have the intellectual resources at his disposal to be able to systematically revise the substance/quality distinction. The strength of Maulevelt's challenge to substance lies in its ability to "save the appearances"—that is, it is able to account for our observations of the natural world. Yet original observation was something new at this time, and it is with Ockham's innovative emphasis upon the individual that the controlled observation and experimentation of the scientific method is in its infancy. Maulevelt's explanations might have been able to save the appearances, but they could not have saved the theorization out of which so many medieval systems were constructed. To have attempted to apply Maulevelt's insights into more complex areas of physics and natural science would have been an enormous undertaking, and would surely have run afoul of the watchdogs of orthodoxy and institution.

Having said this, I would yet assess Maulevelt's hypothesis as insightful and courageous. It was indeed bold in the early 1300's to accept Ockham's radical reduction of categorical entities, and to attempt to extend Ockham's reduction even further. And it was also perspicuous to see that there are reasonable grounds to question the cogency of the idea of substance—since it is something of which we have no direct experience, as Berkeley, Hume, and even Kant later were to recognize; and to question its indispensability—since the functions of substance could conceivably be replaced by an aggregate of qualities.

Furthermore, I think it is important to note that Maulevelt's ideas are not essentially theological. True, his inspiration for questioning the existence of substance is rooted in the miraculous transformation of the Eucharist; but the Eucharist merely provides the occasion for observing that substance is hidden from our observation. Maulevelt is able to readily transfer this claim to any object in the world because of his willingness to pursue Ockham's reductionism to a logical extreme, and because of his insightful distinction between what is known by observation and what is presupposed by theorization.

Maulevelt's insight built upon an implicit weakness in Aristotle's system, one made apparent by Ockham's radical reductionism. Maulevelt hypothesized a step further than Ockham—moving from Ockham's ontology of substances and qualities, to one of qualities alone. Whether he would have been able to sustain this position indefinitely, when faced with indignant attacks by his contemporaries, we shall never be able

to know. His presentation of the hypothesis as merely plausible, and as equally saving the appearances, made him retreat from committing to such a radical experiment. But it was an experiment which was to recur, with a vengeance, in the era of Early Modern Philosophy and the Scientific Revolution.

Maulevelt's speculation remains a footnote to the history of philosophy, since his work was uninfluential in his lifetime, and remained unread until our own. But the discovery of such an inspired innovator makes a strong case for the value of recovering the treasures still buried in medieval manuscripts.

QUAESTIONES SUPER VETERI ARTE FF. 1RA–145VB
QUAESTIONES SUPER PRAEDICAMENTA
ERFURT SB AMPL. Q 288 (XIV) FF. 43RB–145VB

Thomas Maulevelt

f. 55va

<Quaestio 16>

- 1 Consequenter quaeritur utrum aliqua substantia sit.
- 2 1. Et arguitur primo quod non. Nihil est per se subsistens; igitur nihil est substantia. Consequentia videtur ex hoc evidens, quia illa est differentia inter substantiam et accidens, videlicet quod substantia est illud quod per se existit, et accidens quod alteri inexistit. Antecedens patet, quia omne quod existit cum alio existit, sicut prima substantia cum secunda, et secunda cum prima.
- 3 2. Item, si aliqua substantia esset, vel illa esset divisibilis vel indivisibilis. Non divisibilis, quia omne divisibile est divisibile in aliquas partes; et omnis pars est relatio, quia alicuius totius pars; et omnis relatio est accidens, quia “adest et abest praeter subiecti corruptionem”;¹ igitur omnis pars est accidens. Sed nihil compositum ex accidentibus [non] est substantia, quia “ex non-substantiis non potest fieri substantia,” secundum Aristotelem primo Physicorum;² igitur nullum compositum est substantia.
- 4 Item, cuiuscumque compositi partes sunt quantitas continua vel discreta; igitur non sunt substantiae. Consequentia videtur evidens. Et antecedens est de se notum.
- 5 Et quod non sit aliqua substantia indivisibilis probatur, quia nihil tale experimur; nec est aliquid ratio cogens ad hoc ponendum; igitur nullum tale a nobis [55vb] est ponendum. Consequentia patet per

¹ Porphyrius *Isagoge*, 20.7–8: Accidens vero est quod adest et abest praeter subiecti corruptionem.

² Cf. Aristoteles *Physica* I,7 190a34–5.

Aristotelem primo Physicorum,³ ubi vult quod “pluralitas non est ponenda sine necessitate.”

Item, si aliqua substantia est indivisibilis, illa esset maxime prima causa; sed illa, secundum theologos, contineat in se tres personas distinctas; igitur non est indivisibilis. Et voco ad praesens ‘indivisibile’ illud quod non habet distinctionem aliquorum rerum in se. 6

3. Item, non experimur nec ratione convincimus aliquam substantiam esse; igitur substantia non est a nobis ponenda. Consequentia patet, ut prius. Antecedens declaratur, quia non habemus aliquem experientiam vel rationem naturaliter loquendo quod magis substantia sit in hostia non consecrata quam in hostia consecrata, et per nihil possimus experiri vel ratione probari substantiam esse in hostia consecrata, sicut patet per theologos; igitur pari ratione per nihil possimus experiri vel probare substantiam esse in hostia non consecrata; et pari ratione nec in aliqua alia re. 7

4. Item, omnes apparentiae possunt salvari, non ponendo aliquam substantiam; igitur nulla substantia est ponenda. Consequentia videtur evidens. Antecedens declaratur adhuc per hostiam consecratam et per hostiam non consecratam, quia \sicut/ hostia non consecrata est colorata, quanta, apta ad intereundum, bonum habens saporem gustis, et sic de quibuscumque apparentiis, ita etiam hostia consecrata vel vinum consecratum. 8

5. Item, si aliqua substantia esset, hoc maxime videtur de prima substantia, utpote de prima causa; sed ista non est; igitur nec aliqua alia. Assumptum probatur, quia si prima causa esset, tunc esset illud quo maius excogitari non potest, sicut patet per theologos dantes significationem huius vocabuli ‘deus’; et sicut satis expresse dicitur a Boethio libro tertio De consolatione philosophiae;⁴ sed nihil est tale quo maius excogitari non potest, quia quocumque tali posito, posset excogitari adhuc quod essent duo talia, et per consequens duplum ad unum istorum potest excogitari, et triplum, et sic in infinitum. 9

³ Aristoteles *Physica* I,4 188a17–8; Hamesse, *Auctoritates Aristotelis*, p. 141 (26):...peccatum est fieri per plura quod potest fieri per pauciora; cf. Guillelmus de Ockham *Scriptum in librum primum Sententiarum—Ordinatio* I prol. q. 1 (*OTH* I 74); cf. Gualterus de Chatton *Reportatio* II d. 2 q. 1 (cod. Paris. bibl. nat. lat., 1587) f. 115va: paucitas ponenda ubi pluralitas potest vitari per connotationes.

⁴ Boethius, *De consolatione philosophiae* III (1973): quo uero, inquit, habitet, ita considera. deum, rerum omnium principem, bonum esse communis humanorum conceptio probat animorum; nam cum nihil deo melius excogitari queat, id quo melius nihil est bonum esse quis dubitet?

- 10 6. Item, si aliqua substantia est composita ex materia et forma, tunc materia esset; et tunc omnis talis materia esset deus, quia sibi competent omnes proprietates dei, utpote incorruptibilitas, immutabilitas, et infinitas. Et quod incorruptibilitas patet per Aristotelem primo et secundo Physicorum. Et quod immutabilitas declaratur, quia non videtur mutari nisi quia aut habet aliquid quod prius non habuit, vel non habet quod prius habuit; sed propter hoc non debet dici mutabilis, cum ipsa in se praecise eadem remanet, quia deus ipse [non] habet quod aliquando non habuit, utpote materiam humanam et naturam humanam, et tamen propter hoc non dicitur mutabilis. Et quod infinitas [56ra] probatur, quia materia est potens ad recipiendum “non tot formas quin plures”;⁵ igitur est infinite potentiae receptiva.
- 11 Ad oppositum est Aristoteles in textu,⁶ et communis opinio, tam philosophorum quam theologorum; et principio alicuius inquisitionis vel opinionis vel philosophiae.
- 12 <DISTINCTIO PRIMA> <Prima> distinctio est ista, quod iste terminus ‘substantia’ potest accipi dupliciter. Uno modo secundum quod est terminus primae intentionis. Alio modo secundum quod est terminus secundae intentionis.
- 13 Secundum quod est terminus primae intentionis, accipitur multipliciter. Uno modo proprie et strictissime, scilicet pro illo quod per se subsistit, ita quod non pars alicuius per se unius; et simul cum hoc a nullo dependet. Et isto modo accipitur tantummodo pro prima causa.
- 14 Alio modo accipitur quodammodo largius, scilicet pro illo quod per se subsistit, ita quod non est pars alicuius per se unius, sive ab alio dependeat sive non. Et isto modo extendit se ad substantias separatas et ad formas compositas ex quibus aliae substantiae non componuntur, sicut ad angelos et ad omnes alias substantias per se existentes.
- 15 Tertio modo accipitur adhuc largius, secundum quod se extendit ad illud quod per se subsistit, et quod est pars essentialis per se naturaliter

⁵ Cf. Petrus Hispanus *Tractatus* XII,38 (1972) 231–2; Richardus Sophista, *Abstractiones* (cod. Oxon. Bodl. Digby 24, f. 79va): Et eodem modo dicendum est ad istam probationem: ‘non duo quin plura sunt finita etc.’; Gualterus Burlaeus *De puritate artis logicae tractatus brevior* (1955) 260; Ioannes Duns Scotus *Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum* II q. 4–6 n. 32 (*OPh* III) 248: Sed non essent infinitae actu, quia non sunt tot quin plura possunt esse.

⁶ Aristoteles *Cat.* 5 2a12–4b19.

subsistens. Et isto modo materia et forma ex quibus componitur substantia sunt substantia.

Quarto modo accipitur largissime, scilicet pro cuiuscumque rei essentia. Et isto modo convertitur cum ente, sicut accipitur in illa definitione grammaticali “nomen significat substantiam cum qualitate, proprio vel communi.”⁷ 16

Secundum vero quod est secundae intentionis, accipitur pro signis ipsas substantias primas tribus modis acceptas absolute vel proprie vel appellatione significantibus, cuiusmodi sunt tales terminos ‘iste homo’, ‘Sortes’, ‘homo’, ‘animal’, ‘corpus’, ‘substantia’, et consimiles. 17

<DISTINCTIO SECUNDA> Secunda distinctio est ista, quod per se existere accipitur multipliciter. Uno modo scilicet pro illo quod non est pars alicuius per se unius, et a nullo dependet vel sustinetur. Et isto modo solus deus per se subsistit. 18

Alio modo accipitur pro illo quod non est pars alicuius per se unius, nec est in aliquo tamquam in subiecto. Et isto modo substantiae separatae et substantiae compositae perfectae per se subsistunt. 19

Tertio modo dicitur per se subsistere omne illud quod non est in aliquo tamquam accidens in subiecto, sive sit pars alicuius per se unius sive non. Et isto modo non solum substantia composita perfecta per se subsistet, sed etiam quaelibet cuius pars. Et voco ‘per se unum’ in proposito omne illud quod est unum indivisibiliter, sicut deus et angeli; vel essentialiter sicut ignis et aer et cetera composita substantialia ex eorum partibus essentialibus; vel continuatione, sicut lignum, lapis, et cetera huiusmodi, cuius partes ad invicem continuetur. 20

<CONCLUSIO PRIMA> Prima conclusio est ista, quod probabiliter posset susteniri physice loquendo, nullam penitus substantiam esse in istis inferioribus, [56rb] accipiendo substantiam pro composito ex materia et forma, vel pro aliqua parte talis compositi. Ista declaratur: omne illud potest probabiliter teneri cuius oppositum non potest evidenter probari; sed illud est huiusmodi; igitur etc. Maior videtur evidens. Et minor declaratur, quia omnes apparentiae possunt evidenter salvari, non posita aliqua tali substantia; igitur non potest evidenter probari aliquam talem substantiam esse in istis inferioribus. Consequentia est 21

⁷ Cp. Priscianus *Institutiones grammaticae* II c. 3 n. 18, ed. Hertz (Leipzig, 1961), (GL II) I 55: Proprium est nominis substantiam et qualitatem significare.

satis evidens. Antecedens adhuc declaratur, quia positus tantummodo accidentibus sibi invicem subsistentibus et adhaerentibus, salvatur generatio et corruptio, augmentatio et diminutio, alteratio et loci mutatio, sicut patet in hostia consecrata.

- 22 <OBIECTIO> Sed contra istam conclusionem instatur: si non esset aliqua substantia in istis generabilibus et corruptibilibus, tunc non esset generatio; quia generatio est motus sive mutatio ad formam substantialem.⁸
- 23 Ad illud breviter dicitur quod ponentes nullam substantiam in istis inferioribus esse, negarent talem descriptionem generationis. Sed dicerent quod generatio est perfecta productio alicuius rei in esse, et corruptio perfecta destructio.
- 24 <OBIECTIO> Et si quaeratur tunc, quid est subiectum in tali generatione?
- 25 Dicitur quod unum accidens est subiectum respectu generationis et corruptionis alterius accidentis, sicut oportet necessario theologos dicere quando Verbum generatur ex hostia consecrata, vel quando alicuius color generatur, utpote pallor vel rubedo in hostia consecrata.
- 26 <OBIECTIONES> Et si dicatur quod tunc [non] posset assignari subiectum in generatione, contra:
- 27 Pura aqua generatur ex puro igne; quia secundum istam positionem, pura aqua nihil aliud est nisi compositum ex duabus qualitatibus primis, utpote ex frigidity et humiditate; et similiter purus ignis non est nisi compositum ex caliditate et siccitate. Et in tali generatione, totus ignis secundum utramque suam qualitatem corrumpitur, (corrumpitur *var. ms.*) et aqua secundum utramque suam qualitatem generatur. Et per consequens nihil est ibi quod manet in utroque termino generationis; igitur nihil est ibi subiectum.
- 28 Item, sequitur quod talis generatio esset creatio, quia ex nihilo; quod est contra principium omnium philosophorum, qui, secundum Philosophum primo Physicorum,⁹ concordant quod “ex nihilo nihil fit.”

⁸ Cf. Aristoteles *Phys.* V,1 225a12–7; Hamesse, *Auctoritates Aristotelis*, p. 152 (152): Generatio est mutatio de non esse ad esse.

⁹ Aristoteles *Physica* I,4 187a27–9; Hamesse, *Auctoritates Aristotelis*, p. 141 (16): Secundum omnes philosophos, ex nihilo nihil fit.

Ad primum istorum dicitur dupliciter. Uno modo quod talis generatio 29
est impossibilis, quia dicunt aliqui quod mediata elementa non possunt
ex se mutuo immediate generari, sed tantummodo mediate; utpote si
ignis debeat generari ex aqua, generatur mediante aere vel terra. Et
secundum istos tunc satis facilius dicitur quod qualitas symbola¹⁰ est
subiectum talis generationis.

Et secundum istam viam, secundum argumentum non habet locum. 30

Aliter vero dicitur, et satis probabiliter, quod in tali generatione vel 31
corruptione non requiritur aliquod subiectum aliud a re generanda vel
corrumpenda. Sed generaliter quando generatum approximatur suo
generanti quod est maioris virtutis, ex suo generato generatur sibi simile;
non tamquam ex |56va| subiecto, sed tamquam ex termino.

Et ulterius dicitur ad secundum argumentum negando consequen- 32
tiam, quod talis generatio esset creatio, quia creatio nihil praesupponit
ex parti passi, scilicet nec subiectum nec terminum a quo; sed omnis
generatio praesupponit aliquod passum tamquam terminum a quo,
utpote generatum, in quo tale generans(?) agat.

<CONCLUSIO SECUNDA> Secunda conclusio est ista, quod probabiliter 33
posset sustineri, nullam substantiam esse in rerum natura. Et probatur
ista conclusio sicut praecedens, quia omnes apparentiae aequae evidenter
possunt salvari, si nulla substantia ponatur, (salvatur *ms.*) sicut si aliqua
ponatur. Igitur probabiliter posset sustineri nullam substantiam esse.
Consequentia videtur evidens. Antecedens declaratur, quia nullum
inconueniens, ut videtur, sequitur si ponatur corpora supracaelestia esse
composita ex diversis accidentibus perpetuae (existentibus perpetuum
ms.) sibi invicem adhaerentibus, etsi ponatur cuiuslibet orbis motorem
esse unum accidens adhaerens orbi, et ipsum movens—sicut gravitas
adhaeret lapidi, faciens ipsum descendere. Nec ad hoc requiritur aliqua
substantia; quia ita naturaliter descenditur hostia consecrata, in qua
non ponitur substantia, sicut hostia non consecrata.

<OBJECTIONES> Et si dicatur quod omnia non ita uniformiter con- 34
cernent(?) unas(?) suas modi generandi <et> corrumpendi nisi guber-

¹⁰ Cf. Aristoteles *De Gen. et cor.* II,4 331a24–5: Quaecumque quidem enim habent
symbolum ad invicem, velox horum transmutatio, quaecumque autem non habent,
tarda... Cf. Thomas Maulevelot, *Quaestiones super Praedicamenta*, q. 9, conclusio prima.

netur ab aliquo uno principio, quod quidem principium vocatur deus, sicut deducit Boethius tertio *De consolatione*,¹¹ prosa ultima—

- 35 Item, Aristoteles quinto et octavo *Physicorum*¹² deducit ratione naturali unum primum principium esse, quia aliter esset processus in infinitum in mobilibus et motoribus—

- 36 Ad primum igitur istorum dicitur quod, si cui placeret, istam opinionem tenens (tenere *ms.*) faciliter diceret regnum totius universi uniformiter et naturaliter fieri ab accidentibus, sicut aequè uniformiter caliditas sine igne substantiali califaceret sicut cum igne substantiali.

- 37 Ad secundum dicitur quod tenens istam opinionem diceret argumentum Aristotelis nullo modo cogere. Primo quia non esset inconueniens in mobilibus et motoribus in infinitum procedere, sicut patet in motione ligni, quod si percutiatur in una extremitate, movetur reliqua extremitas, et non nisi quia una pars movet aliam, et ita adhuc aliam, et sic in infinitum. Sicut etiam patet in causationibus rerum quarum non fuit prima causa, quia quamcumque causationem aliqua alia (prima(?) *ms.*) causa praecessit, secundum ponentes¹³ mundum ab aeternum fuisse.

- 38 Secundo, supposito quod impossibile est in mobilibus et motoribus in infinitum procedere, adhuc non videtur argumentum Aristotelis concludere unum esse primum immobile, quia ipsum posset moveri ab illo quod ipsum movet; quia non videtur potius inconueniens ponere aliqua duo sibi invicem moventia et mobilia quam ponere aliqua duo sibi invicem esse causas, quod ponitur ab Aristotele et eius Commentatore secundo *Physicorum*, sicut homo existens in navi est causa motus navi, et navis est causa motus hominis; et sic se mutuo movent.

- 39 <OBJECTIO> Et [56vb] si dicatur quod omnem talem motorem perpetuum esse infinitae virtutis, quia movit perpetue—

- 40 Dico breviter quod nulla est evasio(?) ad ponendum, quia anima ponitur esse perpetua, et tamen non ponitur esse infinitae virtutis intensive. Et pari ratione non oportet ponere motorem caeli esse infinitae virtutis intensive (intensive *var. ms.*) propter motum caeli perpetuum praecise,

¹¹ Boethius *De consolatione philosophiae* III (1973): quibus, ait illa, gubernaculis mundus regatur.—memini, inquam, me incitiam meam fuisse confessum, sed quid afferas, licet iam prospiciam, planius tamen ex te audire desidero.—mundum, inquit, hunc deo regi paulo ante minime dubitandum putabas.

¹² Cf. Aristoteles *Physica* VII,1 242a15–20; Hamesse, *Auctoritates Aristotelis*, p. 155 (184): In moventibus et motis non est ire in infinitum, et ergo necesse est devenire ad primum motorem.

¹³ E.g., ipsemet Aristoteles; cf. Aristoteles *De Gen. et cor.* II,10 336a15–336b9.

cum motus motu nulla habet resistentia. Et ideo, cum (non *ms.*) posset imaginari ita parva potentia activa in corruptibilibus quae non posset perpetue caelum movere, quam perpetuis, ex tali motione nullo modo concluditur infinitas intensiva in aliquo motore.

<OBIECTIO> Et si dicatur quod tunc nihil esset ita perfectum quin perfectius posset imaginari— 41

Huic dicitur concedendo consequens, saltem ad istum intellectum quod non est aliquid ita perfectum quin posset haberi actus qui esset imaginatio perfectioris, si illud perfectius esset. 42

<CONCLUSIO TERTIA> Tertia conclusio est ista, quod probabiliter posset susteniri tamquam illud quod ab omnibus communiter ponitur, quod est una prima substantia quae a nullo dependet; quae scilicet est ipsemet deus. Et quod sunt aliae substantiae separatae individuales et incorruptibiles, quae quidem dependeant in esse a prima substantia, sunt tamen per se subsistentes, sic videlicet quod non sunt accidentia nec partes essentiales alicuius per se unius. Et quod sunt aliae substantiae corporales incorruptibiles, utpote corpora supercaelestia, quae simpliciter dependeant a prima substantia; sunt per se tamen subsistentia modo iam dicto. Et quod sunt aliae substantiae compositae ex materia et forma, et non ex aliis partibus et homogeneiis; sunt tamen corruptibiles, utpote quattuor elementa. Et quod sunt adhuc aliae substantiae corporales, non tamen compositae ex materia prima et forma, videlicet ex aliis partibus homogeneiis, utpote \ex/ elementis; et istae substantiae vocentur substantiae mixtae sive elementae. Et quod sunt aliae, scilicet partes istarum substantiarum corruptibilium, utpote materia et forma, quae vocantur partes essentiales, quarum quidem partium quaedam sunt incorruptibiles, sicut materia—quae ponitur tamquam fundamentum, et subiectum generationis et corruptionis—et anima intellectiva; et quaedam vero ponuntur corruptibiles, sicut aliae formae substantiales. Et ista conclusio, quia ab omnibus ponitur, amplius ad praesens non declaratur. 43

<CONCLUSIO QUARTA> Quarta conclusio est ista, quod accipiendo substantiam secundo modo, scilicet prout est nomen secundae intentionis, multae sunt substantiae, utpote species et genera absolute substantias significantia, sicut in sequentibus clarius apparebit. 44

- 45 1. Ad primum igitur principale dicitur, negando antecedens. Et ulterius dicitur quod quamvis omne quod existit cum alio existit, ita quod ipsummet non tantum existit, cum hoc tamen stat quod aliquod per se subsistat., quod requiritur ad hoc quod aliquid sit substantia, sicut declaratum in secunda |57ra| distinctione.
- 46 2. Ad secundum dicitur quod aliqua est substantia divisibilis, et aliqua indivisibilis, sicut patet per primam conclusionem. Et ulterius dicitur, negando istam: “omnis pars est relatio,” nisi subiectum supponat (subponat *var. ms.*) materialiter vel simpliciter; quia non pono ad praesens relationem aliud esse nisi signum quod ad aliud refertur sub habitudine alicuius casus virtute suae significationis.
- 47 Et ulterius dicitur, negando quod omnis relatio sit accidens, accipiendo accidens realiter et non praedicatione; quia multa sunt signa relativa scripta quae non sunt accidentia.
- 48 Et ulterius conceditur quod omnis pars, saltem divisibilis, est quantitas continua vel discreta; praecipue in istis corruptibilibus. Propter hoc tamen non sequitur quod sit accidens, quia teneo ad praesens quod non omnis quantitas sit accidens.
- 49 Et ulterius dicitur quod, quamvis non experiamur aliquod esse indivisibile, nec etiam habemus rationem ita necessario cogentem quin posset evadi; habemus tamen omnes evidencias ponendi tales substantias indivisibiles, utpote communem opinionem philosophorum tales substantias ponentium, quae satis est evidencia sufficiens, ubi nihil fortius absistit, quia non est dicendum contra opinionem omnium et maxime sapientium nisi propter rationem cogentem.
- 50 3. Ad tertium argumentum dicitur, negando consequentiam; quia multa ponimus esse quae non experimur esse; nec etiam quae possumus aliqua ratione convincenti (convicente *var. ms.*) probare; quia sufficit sicut praedictum aliqua evidencia probabilis.
- 51 Et ulterius dicitur quod, sicut Magister vult in quarto Sententiarum, non est articulus fidei credere quod in hostia consecrata sint accidentia sine subiecto; sed sufficit credere quod in illa hostia est unum corpus Christi, sive sit sine substantia panis sive cum substantia panis. Et ideo ponendo ibi substantiam panis esse nulla difficultas emergit ad salvandum apparentias. Si vero ponatur substantiam ibi non esse, hoc fit miraculose, et per consequens omnia quae sequuntur quodammodo sunt miraculosa.
- 52 4. Ad quartum dicitur quod, quamvis omnes apparentiae possunt salvari non ponenda aliquam substantiam, praecipue in istis inferioribus, non tamen aeque decenter; et aeque placeret communi opinioni

philosophorum et etiam omnium aliorum; et ideo potius ponanda est substantia quam non ponenda.

5. Ad quintum dicitur, concedendo consequentiam. Et ulterius conceditur quod deus est illud quo maius excogitatur non potest. Et ulterius dicitur, concedendo quod cogitari possit duas primas substantias esse. 53

Et ulterius negatur consequentia secunda, “duplum ad unam istarum possit excogitari esse”; quia prima causa est infinita, et nullum infinitum habet duplum. 54

<OBJECTIO> Et si dicatur quod omnis dualitas est dupla ad suam unitatem, quia dualitas est numerus par, et potest dividi in duas medietates aequales— 55

Ad illud breviter dicitur, negando |57rb| istam: “omnis dualitas est dupla ad suam unitatem,” quia in dualitate infinita est illa propositio falsa. 56

Et ulterius dicitur quod ista propositio “omnis numerus par potest dividi in duas medietates aequales”; intelligitur de numero praeinfinito et de divisione nominali, non reali. 57

Ad istum intellectum quod iste terminus ‘unitas’ vel ‘unum’ qui significat vel est unum membrum divisionis, non est expressius ex virtute significationis maioris quantitatis quam iste terminus ‘unum’ vel ‘unitas’ qui est aliud membrum divisionis; quia clarum est quod realiter quaedam dualitas composita ex maxime monte et musca non habet unitates aequales discretas; sed, quantum ad propositum est, sufficit quod nulla dualitas inferiorum est dupla ad suam unitatem. Et ideo dualitas patris et filii in divinis non est dupla ad patrem, quamvis iste terminus ‘dualitas’ vel iste terminus ‘duo’ sit duplae denominationis ad istum terminum ‘unum’ vel ‘unus’. 58

6. Ad sextum dicitur, concedendo quod materia prima est ponenda, et quod ista est incorruptibilis; sed non immutabilis. 59

Et ulterius dicitur quod ipsa mutatur in sua essentia intrinseca per rarefactionem et condensationem, sicut per formarum substantialium receptionem in sua essentia; quod non est in deo, quia quamvis deus habeat extrinsece aliquid nunc quam prius, non tamen intrinsece. Et ideo non mutatur. 60

Et ulterius conceditur quod materia sit infinitae potentiae receptivae, et passivae; sed hoc non arguit perfectionem, sed potius imperfectionem. Et ideo negaretur ista consequentia “est infinitae potentiae receptivae et passivae, igitur est infinita.” Sed deus est infinitae potentiae activae; 61

et hoc arguit perfectionem infinitam. Et ideo similitudo inter deum et materiam primum non sufficit ut materia sit deus.

- 62 Ad argumentum in oppositum, posset responderi, si cui placeret, per superius dicta.

CATEGORIES AND UNIVERSALS IN THE LATER MIDDLE AGES

Alessandro D. Conti

In the (later) Middle Ages categories and universals were closely linked topics. Categorical doctrine concerned (1) the existence, inner natures, and the mutual relationships of the basic, metaphysical items of the world (individual and universal substances, individual and universal accidents), and (2) the connections of such basic items to language. Late medieval theories of universals¹ dealt with the problems of (1) real existence of universals (or common natures), both substantial and accidental ones, and (2) the relationship between them and the (perceptible or otherwise intelligible) individuals. Hence, in one way, later medieval theories of universals investigated more thoroughly some of the many related questions which categorical doctrines went into. This is not surprising, since (1) textually, medieval discussions on the problem of universals derived from a well-known passage of Porphyry's *Isagoge*, a work which was intended to be an introduction to Aristotle's *Categories*, and (2) philosophically, the medieval problem of universals is one of the various aspects of the problem of meaning, which in its turn is one of the two main subjects of any later medieval categorical doctrine. In *Isagoge* 1,13–16 Porphyry raises his famous series of questions, about the ontological status of universals and their relation to individuals, which medieval philosophers faced up to in their commentaries on the *Isagoge* and treatises on universals: (1) whether genera and species exist in themselves or are nothing but mere concepts; (2) whether, if they have an extramental form of existence, they are corporeal or incorporeal; (3) and whether they exist apart from perceptible objects or in and by virtue of them. In another way, all late medieval theories of universals respond to an implicit semantic question: is there something *in re* which corresponds to the common nouns of our language in the same way

¹ A comprehensive survey of the problem of universals from Antiquity to late Middle Ages is provided in Alain de Libera, *La querelle des universaux: De Platon à la fin du Moyen Age*, Paris 1996.

as individuals correspond to proper names? The answer of Realists was affirmative, negative that of Nominalists; while, within each group, authors disagreed about the peculiar modes of being of universals and the nature of their relation to individuals.

In what follows, I will draw the outline of the problem of universals in late Middle Ages both from a systematic and from a historical point of view, trying to indicate the connections with the doctrine(s) of categories. Accordingly, first of all I will give a short account of the standard theories of universals worked out between the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. Second, I will summarise Ockham's criticism of the traditional view. Finally, in the third and fourth sections, I will consider the main positions about universals elaborated from 1330 ca. to 1430 ca. in some detail, and show their increasing relevance for the categorial doctrines. From this and the concluding remarks—I hope—it shall emerge (1) why and how the debate over the status and nature of universals evolved during the very last period of the Middle Ages, and (2) the progressive subordination of the categorial view to the conception of universals.

The Moderate Realist View

Since Robert Kilwardby's formulation of the problem of universals in his commentaries on the *Ars Vetus* (*Isagoge*, *Categories*, *Liber sex principiorum*, *De interpretatione*) the semantic origin of the so called "moderate realist" view on universals (endorsed by authors such as Robert Kilwardby himself, Albert the Great, Thomas Aquinas, Henry of Ghent, Simon of Faversham, John Duns Scotus, Thomas Sutton, Giles of Rome, and Walter Burley before 1324), is quite evident. What might be described as the orthodox view (at least until it was challenged by Ockham and the other Nominalists) was that universals (or common natures) are the real significata of general nouns, such as 'man', 'animal', and 'whiteness'.² As a consequence, moderate Realists conceived of universals

² In his middle commentary on *De interpretatione* (*Commentarius in librum Perihermeneias*, before 1310) in commenting on the starting lines of chapter seven (17a38–b7), Walter Burley claims that a linguistic expression is a general noun (*nomen appellativum*) if and only if it signifies a universal, that is an entity apt to be common to many individual items—see Stephen F. Brown, "Walter Burley's Middle Commentary on Aristotle's *Perihermeneias*," *Franciscan Studies* 33 (1973), 42–134, p. 85.

as metaphysical entities, existing independently of our minds, which are necessary conditions for our language to be significant. Common nouns would be meaningless if they did not signify something (1) that exists somehow in reality, and (2) that has the peculiar feature of being common to (namely, present in) many individual items. Moreover, they investigated the metaphysical composition of such common natures by the doctrine of categories, from a point of view that we can call “intensional” and in a way similar to that exploited by our modern componential analysis. Only by associating general nouns with such entities as their proper *significatum* did they think the fact could be explained that a general noun can be used predicatively to ascribe a given property (say, being a man or an animal) to many individuals at the same time. According to them, a general noun stands for (*supponere*) and labels (*appellare*) a certain set of individual items only by way of the common nature (the universal) that (1) it directly signifies, and (2) is present in that set of individuals as their own intelligible essence. Since common natures (1) connect general nouns up with their extensions by determining the classes of the things to which they are correctly applied, and (2) are what general nouns stand for when they have simple supposition,³ they are the intensions of common nouns; or better, the hypostatisations of these intensions, inasmuch as they were conceived of as entities existing independently of our minds.

This comes out quite clearly from the standard reading of *Categories* 5, 3b 10–15, where Aristotle maintains that a primary substance signifies a single item (*hoc aliquid* according to the Latin translation) whilst a secondary substance signifies a qualifying (and therefore common or universal) item (*quale quid* according to the Latin translation), notwithstanding it seems to signify a single item. Thirteenth century authors identified the secondary substance with the *quale quid* and the primary substance with the *hoc aliquid*, and therefore secondary substances (namely, the universals of the category of substance) with the significata of general nouns of that category (such as ‘man’) and primary substances (namely, the individuals of the category of substance) with the *significata* of individual expressions of that category (such as ‘this man’, which refers to a single human individual only). Furthermore,

³ Cf. e.g., Walter Burley, *De suppositionibus* (A.D. 1302), in Stephen F. Brown, “Walter Burleigh’s Treatise *De suppositionibus* and its Influence on William of Ockham,” *Franciscan Studies* 32 (1972), 15–64, pp. 35–36.

they assumed that common nouns of the category of substance, when used predicatively, specify which kind of substance a certain individual substance is.⁴ As a consequence, they thought of universals and individuals as linked together by a sort of relation of instantiation. In other words, they conceived of primary substances as the tokens of secondary substances (and, more in general, individuals as tokens of universals), and secondary substances as the types of primary substances (and, more in general, universals as types of individuals). In fact, according to them, (1) individual substances are unique physical entities, located at a particular place in space and time, and universal substances are their specific or generic forms—that is, their intelligible natures, immanent in them, having no independent existence, and apt to be common to many different individuals at the same time. (2) Any individual substance can be recognized as a member of a certain natural species by virtue of its conformity to the universal substance that it instantiates, and by virtue of its likeness to other individual substances.

From what has been said it is manifest that the crucial question of the medieval realist approach to the problem of universals was not that of the ontological status of the universals (as it was for Boethius and the other Neoplatonic commentators of Aristotle); it was that of their relation with the individuals. Since moderate Realists, agreeing with Aristotle (*Categories* 5, 2a35–2b6), maintained that, if primary substances did not exist, it would be impossible for anything else to exist, as everything else depends on them for its own being,⁵ the question of the status of universals necessarily became the question of their relation to individual substances. In fact, according to the moderate

⁴ Cf. Robert Kilwardby, *Notulae super librum Praedicamentorum*, lectio 7 (Cambridge, Peterhouse), ms. 206, fol. 47ra–b; Albert the Great, *Liber de praedicamentis*, tr. 2, cap. 8, in *Opera omnia*, ed. A. Borgnet (Paris, 1890), vol. 1, pp. 181–183; Thomas Sutton, *Expositio super librum Praedicamentorum*, cap. *de substantia* (Oxford, Merton College), ms. 289, fol. 11rb–va (transcription in Alessandro D. Conti, “Thomas Sutton’s Commentary on the *Categories* according to the Ms Oxford, Merton College 289,” in *The Rise of British Logic*, ed. P. O. Lewry (Toronto, 1985), pp. 173–213, pp. 203–204); Walter Burley, *Tractatus super librum Praedicamentorum*, cap. *de substantia* (Cambridge, Peterhouse), ms. 184, fol. 178ra–b.

⁵ Cf. Kilwardby, *Notulae super librum Porphyrii*, lectio 2 (Cambridge, Peterhouse), ms. 206, fol. 34vb; Albert the Great, *Liber de praedicamentis*, tr. 2, cap. 4, pp. 172–174; Simon of Faversham, *Quaestiones super librum Praedicamentorum*, q. 7, in *Opera omnia*, vol. 1, ed. Pasquale Mazzarella (Padua, 1957), p. 77; Thomas Sutton, *Expositio super librum Praedicamentorum*, cap. *de substantia*, fol. 8rb; John Duns Scotus, *Quaestiones super Praedicamenta*, q. 13, in *Opera philosophica*, vol. 1, pp. 369–372 and 377; Burley, *Tractatus super librum Praedicamentorum*, cap. *de substantia*, fol. 177va.

realist view, universals are not self-subsistent entities, but exist only in individual items, as universals have no being (*esse*) outside the being of their instantiations. As a result, moderate Realists thought that universals could be said to be everlasting because of the succession of their individuals, not because of a peculiar kind of being of their own.⁶ But whereas according to the most common opinion universals existed *in potentia* outside the mind and *in actu* within the mind, on Duns Scotus's and Burley's accounts they exist *in actu* outside the mind, since their being is exactly the same as the being of individuals, which is actual. Indeed, for Duns Scotus and Burley the necessary and sufficient condition for a universal to be *in actu* is the existence of at least one individual instantiating it. Therefore our mind does not give actuality to universals, but a separate mode of existence only.

Like the Neoplatonic commentators of Aristotle, such as Ammonius and Simplicius, medieval moderate Realists also argued that universals are threefold: (1) *ante rem*, or ideal universals, that is the ideas in God, archetypes of all that there is; (2) *in re*, or formal universals, that is the common natures shared by individual things; and (3) *post rem*, or intentional universals, that is mental signs by which we refer to the universals *in re*. On the other hand, differing from Neoplatonists, they were convinced that common natures really have the property of being universal by themselves. More precisely, like Avicenna, they believed that, properly speaking, common natures *qua* such are prior, and so "indifferent," to any division into universals and individuals. However, universality is as it were their inseparable characteristic.⁷ As a consequence they thought that three different kinds of entities can be qualified as real universals (*universalia in re*): (1) the common natures instantiated by individuals—which are *res* of first intention; (2) the form itself of universality which belongs to a certain common nature when seen in its relation to the individuals—which is a second intention, such as being-a-genus, being-a-species; (3) the entities which are made

⁶ Cf. e.g., Simon of Faversham, *Quaestiones super libro Porphyrii*, q. 5, p. 27; Burley, *Tractatus super librum Praedicamentorum*, cap. de substantia, fol. 177va.

⁷ Cf. Kilwardby, *Notulae super librum Porphyrii*, lectio 2, fol. 34va; Albert the Great, *De quinque universalibus*, tr. de universalibus in communi, capp. 3 and 5, ed. Col., vol. 1.1A, pp. 24–25 and 31–32; Simon of Faversham, *Quaestiones super libro Porphyrii*, qq. 4 and 5, in *Opera omnia*, vol. 1, pp. 23–24 and 26–27; Giles of Rome, *Super librum I Sententiarum*, d. 19, p. 2, q. 1, ed. (Venetiis, 1521), fol. 110va; Duns Scotus, *Quaestiones in librum Porphyrii Isagoge*, q. 11, in *Opera philosophica*, vol. 1, pp. 50–51; *Lectura II*, d. 3, p. 1, q. 1, ed. Vaticana, vol. 18, p. 237.

up by the union of a common nature with one of these properties of second intention. Moreover, they conceived of formal universals in two different manners: as first intentions or as second intentions. In the first case, they considered universals as natures of a certain kind, identical with their own individuals (for example, man would be the same thing as Socrates). In the second case, formal universals were regarded as properly universals and distinct from their own individuals, considered *qua* individuals, because of the opposite constitutive principles: *communicabilitas* for universals and *incommunicabilitas* for individuals.⁸ Hence, moderate Realists thought of universals as formal causes in relation to their own individuals, and individuals as material causes in relation to their universals. Furthermore, agreeing with what Aristotle states in the third (1b10–15) and fifth (2b2–3) chapters of the *Categories*, they maintained that (1) a universal could directly receive only the predications of those forms more common than itself (i.e., those forms which are put on a higher level in the *linea praedicamentalis*); and (2) the accidental forms inhering in substantial individuals could be predicated of the substantial form itself that those individuals instantiate only indirectly, through and in virtue of the individuals of that substantial form.⁹ Thus, their position on the question of the relationship between universals and individuals necessarily entailed a soft attitude towards the problem of defining and classifying the types of identity and distinction (or difference), since it is evident that universals had to be considered at the same time not totally identical—with and not totally different—from their own individuals.

Indeed, at the end of the thirteenth century two main attempts were made to revise the common notions of identity and distinction

⁸ Cf. Albert the Great, *De quinque universalibus*, tr. *de universalibus in communi*, cap. 3, p. 26, cap. 5, pp. 32–33; Simon of Faversham, *Quaestiones super libro Porphyrii*, q. 4, pp. 23 and 25; Duns Scotus, *Quaestiones in librum Porphyrii Isagoge*, q. 3, pp. 19–20.

⁹ For instance, if Socrates is white, then man (*homo*) is white, but the form of whiteness cannot be directly attributed-to (or predicated-of) the form of humanity itself: humanity is not whiteness, nor white. Cf. Kilwardby, *Notulae super librum Praedicamentorum*, lectio 4, fol. 44va; Albert the Great, *Liber de praedicamentis*, tr. 1, cap. 6, pp. 161–162; tr. 2, cap. 4, pp. 172–173; Thomas Sutton, *Expositio super librum Praedicamentorum*, cap. *de ordine praedicati ad subiectum*, fol. 6ra; cap. *de substantia*, fol. 7vb (transcription in Conti, “Thomas Sutton’s Commentary on the *Categories*,” pp. 195–196, and 197); Simon of Faversham, *Quaestiones super librum Praedicamentorum*, q. 3, p. 76; q. 21, pp. 95–96; Duns Scotus, *Quaestiones super Praedicamenta*, q. 9, pp. 327–332; q. 13, pp. 365–377; Burley, *Tractatus super librum Praedicamentorum*, cap. *de regulis praedicationis*, fol. 174va; cap. *de substantia*, fol. 177va.

by introducing a third kind of difference in between the real (*realis*) and the notional (*secundum rationem*) ones, but neither of them was specifically intended to offer an answer to the problem of the relationship between universals and individuals. Henry of Ghent spoke of intentional (*secundum intentionem*) difference,¹⁰ which he characterised in the following way: two entities intentionally differ one from the other if and only if (1) both of them are constitutive elements of the same thing, but (2) the definition of neither of them is part of the definition of the other, so that (2.1) each of them can be understood even together with the negation of the other. Duns Scotus spoke of formal distinction.¹¹ He gave two different definitions of it. In the *Lectura* and in the *Ordinatio* he described it as a symmetrical relation between two entities which cannot exist separately: two entities are formally distinct one from the other if and only if (1) both of them are constitutive elements of the same reality, but (2) neither of them can exist by itself, (3) nor is one part of the definite description of the other.¹² In the *Reportata Parisiensia* he defined it as an asymmetrical relation between a whole reality and one of its constitutive elements: an entity x is not formally identical with another entity y if and only if (1) y is not part of the definite description of x, but (2) x and y are one and the same thing in reality.¹³ He utilised these two rather different notions of formal distinction in order to illustrate respectively (1) how the genus and the specific difference, and the specific nature and the individual difference are linked together, and (2) the relations which hold between the divine nature

¹⁰ Cf. Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet* X, q. 7, ed. R. Macken (Leiden, 1981), pp. 164–166. On Henry of Ghent's doctrine of intentional distinction see John F. Wippel, "Godfrey of Fontaines and Henry of Ghent's Theory of Intentional Distinction Between Essence and Existence," in *Sapientiae procerum amore*, ed. T. W. Koehler (Rome, 1974), pp. 289–321.

¹¹ On Scotus's theory of formal distinction see Marilyn McCord Adams, "Ockham on Identity and Distinction," *Franciscan Studies* 36 (1976), 5–74, pp. 25–43; Peter King, "Duns Scotus on the Common Nature and Individual Difference," *Philosophical Topics* 20 (1992), 51–76; Stephen D. Dumont, "Duns Scotus's Parisian Question on the Formal Distinction," *Vivarium* 43 (2005), 7–62. On further developments of Scotus's theory in Oxford at the end of the fourteenth century see Alessandro D. Conti, "Sviluppi e applicazioni della distinzione formale scotista ad Oxford sul finire del XIV secolo," in *Via Scoti, Methodologica ad mentem Joannis Duns Scoti*, ed. Leonardo Sileo, 2 vols. (Rome, 1995), vol. 1, pp. 319–336.

¹² Cf. Duns Scotus, *Lectura* I, d. 2, p. 2, qq. 1–4, ed. Vaticana, vol. 16, p. 216; *Ordinatio* I, d. 2, p. 2, qq. 1–4, ed. Vaticana, vol. 2, pp. 356–357; II, d. 3, p. 1, q. 6, ed. Vaticana, vol. 7, pp. 483–484.

¹³ Cf. Duns Scotus, *Reportata Parisiensia* I, d. 33, qq. 2–3, and d. 34, q. 1, ed. Vivès, vol. 22, pp. 402–408, and 410.

and its three Persons, and between the human soul and its faculties. On the other side, in his *Quaestiones in librum Perihermeneias* (A.D. 1301), Walter Burley used the intentional difference for clarifying the relations between genus and difference, and between essence and being.¹⁴ He claimed that there was not a real distinction between essence and being (as Aquinas and Giles of Rome had taught), but they were really the same and only intentionally distinct.¹⁵ By means of these new kinds of distinctions moderate Realists were trying to explain how it is possible to distinguish many different real aspects internal to the same individual thing, without breaking its unity.

In conclusion, the legacy to the late Middle Ages left by the debate on universals which took place in between the thirteenth and the fourteenth centuries can be summed up as follows: (1) universals exist in a threefold way, as ideas in the mind of God, as common natures *in re*, and as general concepts in our mind. (2) Real universals are forms naturally apt to be present in many individual items as their main metaphysical components. (3) Real universals have no being outside the being of their individuals. (4) Real universals are partially identical-with and partially different-from their own individuals. (5.1) Real universals exist *in potentia* only outside our minds, or, (5.2) according to Duns Scotus's and Burley's views, they exist *in actu* outside our minds.¹⁶ As far as the logical machinery was concerned, besides the real and notional distinctions there were three other types of distinction which could be employed in order to account suitably for the inner composition of beings: Henry of Ghent's intentional distinction, and the two kinds of formal distinction drawn up by Duns Scotus.

Ockham's Critique

As is well known, in the first decades of the fourteenth century, in his commentary on the first book of the *Sentences*, in his *Expositio aurea*, and in

¹⁴ See Alessandro D. Conti, "Essenza ed essere nel pensiero della tarda scolastica (Burley, Wyclif, Paolo Veneto)," *Medioevo* 15 (1989), 235–267.

¹⁵ Cf. Burley, *Quaestiones in librum Perihermeneias*, q. 4, in Stephen F. Brown, "Walter Burley's *Quaestiones in librum Perihermeneias*," *Franciscan Studies* 34 (1974), 200–295, p. 273.

¹⁶ Cf. e.g., Burley, *Expositio libri De Anima* (1316 ca.) lib. I, q. 3: "utrum universale habeat esse extra animam," Civitas Vaticana, Bibl. Apostolica Vaticana, ms. Vat. Lat. 2151, fol. 10ra–vb.

the first part of his *Summa logicae*, Ockham contended that (T1) the pre-supposition of a relation of identity between universals and individuals was inconsistent with the standard definition of real identity, according to which two things *a* and *b* are identical if and only if, for all *P*, it is the case that *P* is predicated of *a* if and only if it is predicated of *b*; and (T2), from an ontological point of view, the only kind of distinction which could hold between two creatures was the real one, as (in his opinion) any form of distinction between two creatures necessarily implies a real distinction between them. From these two theses and the assumption of the absolute truth of the Aristotelian claim that (T3) there cannot be universal forms apart from their individuals, he derived (T4) a rejection of any type of extramental existence for universals.¹⁷ His final argumentation, expressed in general terms, was that, if universals are something existing *in re*, really identical with their individuals, when considered as first intentions, then whatever is predicated of the individuals must be predicated of their universals too, and so a unique universal entity (say, the human nature) would possess contrary attributes simultaneously (because of the different accidental forms inhering in the various individuals really identical with that common nature at a given time). A conclusion clearly unacceptable.¹⁸

The crucial point of Ockham's attack on the traditional realist view on universals is the demonstration of the thesis (T2), since (T3) was a sort of undisputed dogma in his times, and (T1) was recognised to be somehow true by moderate Realists too. As a matter of fact, they had tried to avoid that internal contradiction by introducing some form of distinction between universals and individuals considered as second intentions—as we have already seen. It was a common topic in the explanation of *Categories* 3, 1b10–15, that one cannot infer from 'Socrates is a man' and 'man is a species' that 'Socrates is a species,' notwithstanding the identity between *homo* and *Socrates*.¹⁹ On the other

¹⁷ On Ockham's theory of universals see Marilyn McCord Adams, *William Ockham* (Indiana, 1987), 2 vols, vol. 1, pp. 3–69; and Alessandro D. Conti, "Studio storico-critico," in Johannes Sharpe, *Quaestio super universalibus*, ed. Alessandro D. Conti (Florence, 1990), pp. 257–294.

¹⁸ Cf. Ockham, *Expositio in librum Praedicamentorum Aristotelis*, cap. 8.1, in *Opera philosophica*, vol. 2, pp. 164–168; *Summa logicae*, pars I, cap. 15, in *Opera philosophica*, vol. 1, pp. 50–51.

¹⁹ Cf. Kilwardby, *Notulae super librum Praedicamentorum*, lectio 4, fol. 44va; Albert the Great, *Liber de praedicamentis*, tr. 1, cap. 6, pp. 161–162; Thomas Sutton, *Expositio super librum Praedicamentorum*, prologus, fol. 2rb (transcription in Conti, "Thomas Sutton's Commentary on the *Categories*," p. 187); Simon of Faversham, *Quaestiones super librum*

hand, in their opinion, the thesis of the identity of universals and individuals was necessary for safeguarding (1) the division of predication into essential and accidental, and (2) the difference between substantial and accidental forms, stated by Aristotle in the second (1a20–1b5) and fifth (2a18–33, 3b17–21) chapters of the *Categories*.²⁰ Consequently, moderate Realists had been forced to speak of identity between universals and individuals, but to weaken that same identity by limiting the transitivity of predications, since, according to them, not all that was predicated of individuals could be predicated of universals and vice versa. Besides differentiating common natures conceived of as first intentions and as second intentions, a further device moderate Realists had made use of was to distinguish between two points of view from which one could consider universal forms: (1) *in abstracto* (intensionally) and (2) *in concreto* (extensionally). (1) Intensionally regarded a common nature was nothing but the sum of essential properties which constituted a categorial item, without any reference to the existence of individuals which, if that was the case, instantiated it. (2) Extensionally regarded a common nature was that same form conceived of as actually instantiated by at least one individual. For instance, the human nature intensionally considered was *humanitas*, extensionally considered was *homo*. Both terms '*humanitas*' and '*homo*' referred to the same nature, but respectively viewed (1) as simply a form, existentially incomplete and dependent, and (2) as a real type, concretely instantiated by at least one individual. While it was not possible to ascribe a property of one of its individual to the universal form regarded *in abstracto* (obviously, humanity is neither white nor running nor sick), it was possible to attribute it to the universal form regarded *in concreto* (man is white and black and running etc.) without any contradiction.²¹

Praedicamentorum, q. 3, p. 76; Duns Scotus, *Quaestiones super Praedicamenta*, q. 9, pp. 327–332; Burley, *Tractatus super librum Praedicamentorum*, cap. *de regulis praedicationis*, fol. 174va.

²⁰ Cf. Kilwardby, *Notulae super librum Praedicamentorum*, lectio 3, fol. 44ra–b; lectio 6, fol. 45rb–va; lectio 7, fol. 47rb; Thomas Sutton, *Expositio super librum Praedicamentorum*, cap. *de subiecto et praedicato*, fol. 5rb–vb; cap. *de substantia*, fol. 11ra (transcription in Conti, "Thomas Sutton's Commentary on the *Categories*," pp. 194–195 and 201–202); Burley, *Tractatus super librum Praedicamentorum*, cap. *de complexo et incomplexo*, fols. 173vb–174ra; cap. *de substantia*, fol. 177va.

²¹ Cf. Kilwardby, *Notulae super librum Porphyrii*, lectio 5, fol. 37ra; *Notulae super librum Praedicamentorum*, lectio 1, fol. 43va–b; lectio 8, fol. 49vb; Albert the Great, *De quinque universalibus*, tr. *de universalibus in communi*, cap. 1, pp. 17–19, and cap. 8, pp. 37–38;

According to Ockham, (1) resorting to those expedients, and (2) positing a third kind of distinction in order to solve the problem of clarifying the relation holding between universals and individuals amounted simply to looking for *ad hoc* solutions. In his opinion, there was no room for any further distinction in addition to the real one (traditionally viewed), since any other possible kind of distinction necessarily implied identity, and identity was a transitive, symmetrical, and reflexive relation.²² Moreover, he apparently subscribed to both the Identity of Indiscernibles (for all *x* and *y*, if for all *P*, *P* is predicated of *x* if and only if it is predicated of *y*, then *x* is identical with *y*) and the Indiscernibility of Identicals (for all *x*, *y*, and *P*, if *x* is identical with *y*, then *P* is predicated of *x* if and only if it is predicated of *y*) laws.²³ As a consequence, he concluded that it was impossible that contradictory properties (such as *communicabilitas* and *incommunicabilitas*) were truly asserted of the same *res* unless the bearers of those contradictory properties were really distinct and independent beings.²⁴ But given (T3), universals could not in any way be real things (*res*); they necessarily were mental entities (*entia rationis*), as no other alternative was possible.²⁵ So, for Ockham, the only universal beings it made sense to talk about were universal *concepts*, and derivative from them, universal terms in spoken and written language—taking for granted that such universal concepts, if regarded simply as beings, were individual like all others, as they were universal only in the sense of being the mental signs of a multiplicity of individual things. So that for Ockham universality consisted simply in the universality of the representative function of mental, spoken, and written terms.²⁶

Burley, *Tractatus de abstractis*, Civitas Vaticana, Bibl. Apostolica Vaticana, ms. Vat. Lat. 2146, fol. 249rb.

²² Cf. Ockham, *Ordinatio* I, d. 2, q. 6, in *Opera theologica*, vol. 2, p. 186; d. 33, q. 1, in *Opera theologica*, vol. 4, pp. 416–421. On real sameness and distinction in Ockham see Marilyn McCord Adams, “Ockham on Identity and distinction,” especially pp. 6–12 and 44–50.

²³ Cf. Ockham, *Ordinatio* I, d. 2, q. 1, pp. 14 and 16; q. 6, pp. 173–174; *Summa logicae*, pars I, cap. 16, p. 56.

²⁴ Cf. Ockham, *Ordinatio* I, d. 2, q. 1, p. 14: “Impossibile est contradictoria verificari de quibuscumque, nisi illa, vel illa pro quibus supponunt, sint distinctae res, vel distinctare rationes sive entia rationis, vel res et ratio”; and q. 11, p. 363: “Contradictoria non possunt verificari nisi propter aliquam distinctionem vel non-identitatem”; see also *Summa logicae*, pars I, cap. 16, pp. 54–55.

²⁵ Cf. Ockham, *Ordinatio* I, d. 2, q. 1, pp. 14–15.

²⁶ Cf. Ockham, *Ordinatio* I, d. 2, q. 4, pp. 122–124; *Expositio in librum Porphyrii, prooem.*, in *Opera philosophica*, vol. 2, pp. 11 and 14–16; *Summa logicae*, pars I, cap. 14, pp. 48–49; and cap. 15, pp. 53–54.

As is well known, over the course of his career, Ockham modified his belief on the status of universal concepts.²⁷ At the very beginning, following the ideas of Henry of Harclay and Peter Auriol, he was of the opinion that universals were purely intentional objects (*ficta*), in the sense that they did not exist in our minds as in their own subjects of inherence (*subiective*), but they were the objects (namely, the semantic contents) apprehended by our minds through the acts of understanding (*obiective*). Such semantic contents would be what we grasp by means of common nouns and compare with reality in order to establish the truth or falsity of a sentence.²⁸ Eventually, he changed his mind and in his later *Quaestiones super libros Physicorum*, *Quodlibet* IV, and *Summa logicae* adopted the so called “intellectio-theory.” The turnabout was caused by Walter Chatton’s critique, that the *Venerabilis Inceptor* partially accepted. Ockham maintained that universal concepts were those singular acts of understanding by means of which our minds think of several individuals at once—a choice that was consistent with his theories of supposition and of meaning.²⁹

Universals, identity, and predication from Ockham to Wyclif

With the noteworthy exception of Ockham’s followers,³⁰ such as John Buridan, Albert of Saxony, Henricus Totting de Oyta, and Marsilius of

²⁷ See Marilyn McCord Adams, “Universals in the Early Fourteenth Century,” in Norman Kretzmann et al., eds. *The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy. From the Rediscovery of Aristotle to the Disintegration of Scholasticism 1100–1600* (Cambridge, 1982), pp. 411–439; Adams, *Ockham*, pp. 71–107; Robert Pasnau, *Theories of Cognition in the Later Middle Ages* (Cambridge, 1997), pp. 277–289; Claude Panaccio, “Semantics and Mental Language,” in *The Cambridge Companion to Ockham*, ed. Paul V. Spade (Cambridge, 1999), pp. 53–75.

²⁸ Cf. Ockham, *Ordinatio* I, d. 2, q. 8, pp. 271–281.

²⁹ Cf. Ockham, *Summa logicae*, pars I, c. 12, pp. 42–43: “Dicendum quod circa istum articulum diversae sunt opiniones. Aliqui dicunt quod non est nisi quoddam fictum per animam. Alii, quod est quaedam qualitas subiective existens in anima. Alii dicunt quod est actus intelligendi. Et pro istis est ratio ista, quia ‘frustra fit per plura quod potest fieri per pauciora’. Omnia autem quae salvantur ponendo aliquid distinctum ab actu intelligendi possunt salvari sine tali distincto, eo quod supponere pro alio et significare aliud ita potest competere actui intelligendi sicut alii signo. Igitur praeter actum intelligendi non oportet aliquid aliud ponere.” See also cap. 15, p. 53. On Ockham’s semantics see Adams, *Ockham*, pp. 327–435; Claude Panaccio, *Les Mots, les Concepts et les Choses. La sémantique de Guillaume d’Occam et le nominalisme d’aujourd’hui* (Montréal-Paris, 1991).

³⁰ I do not take their theories into consideration, since they did not add any remarkable feature to Ockham’s approach and doctrine.

Inghen, later medieval authors acknowledged that Ockham's critique showed that the traditional realist description of the relation between universals and individuals was untenable, but they were convinced that realism as a whole still was defensible. Therefore, they tried to remove the aporetic points of the traditional realist theory of universals by suitable strategies. Fundamentally these were two: (1) the affirmation of a real distinction between universals and individuals; (2) the elaboration of new notions of identity and distinction as means to interpret the relation between universals and individuals, and thereby the nature of predication. The first strategy was that of Walter Burley, who after 1324 in his writings always maintained that universals, conceived of as general forms, fully exist outside the mind and are *really distinct* from the individuals in which they are present and of which they are predicated. The second strategy was the most common in all of Europe during the later Middle Ages. Burley was persuaded that Ockham's arguments for proving the theses (T1) and (T2) were valid, and therefore renounced his support for thesis (T3) in order to escape from the inconsistencies stressed by the *Venerabilis Inceptor*. On the other hand, the other late medieval authors stuck by (T3), recognised that Ockham's demonstration of (T1) was effective, and unanimously judged Ockham's reasons for (T2) to be insufficient for proving it. As a consequence, they had to revise the notions of identity and distinction so that they could utilise them for expounding the peculiar relation of partial identity and partial distinction holding between universals and individuals without falling prey to the contradictions pointed out by Ockham.

There were two different forms of this second strategy. The first one was that of some Italian Dominican masters (such as Franciscus de Prato and Stephanus de Reate), who, in order to avoid the conclusion that a universal and its individuals were considered to be the same thing, worked out new definitions for identity and distinction inspired by Hervaeus Natalis's notion of conformity (*conformitas*).³¹ They regarded identity as an intersection of classes of forms (or properties), so that it

³¹ Cf. Hervaeus Natalis, *Quodlibet* I, q. 9, ed. Venetiis 1513, fol. 19ra–vb. On Hervaeus's theory see Jan Pinborg, "Zum Begriff der *Intentio Secunda*: Radulphus Brito, Hervaeus Natalis und Petrus Aureoli in Diskussion," *Cahiers de l'institut du moyen-Âge grec et latin* 13 (1974), 49–59; Dominik Perler, "Peter Aureol vs. Hervaeus Natalis on Intentionality. A Text Edition With Introductory Remarks," *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Âge* 61 (1994), 227–262; Dominik Perler, *Theorien der Intentionalität im Mittelalter* (Frankfurt am Main, 2002), pp. 258–317; Fabrizio Amerini, "What is Real. A Reply to Ockham's Ontological Program," *Vivarium* 43 (2005), 187–212; Fabrizio Amerini, "Realism and Intentionality: Hervaeus Natalis, Peter Auriol, and William

was possible to affirm (1) that two entities were really identical without entailing that they were the same thing, and (2) that two entities were not really identical without entailing that they were really different. The second line of development was that of the most important school of later medieval Realists, started up by John Wyclif in the second half of the fourteenth century, the so called “Oxford Realists”: besides Wyclif himself, the Englishmen Robert Alyngton († 1398), William Milverley, William Penbygull († 1420), Roger Whelpdale († 1423), and John Tarteys, as well as the German Johannes Sharpe († after 1415), and the Italian Paul of Venice (1369–1429). According to the Oxford Realists (1) universals and individuals are really identical but formally distinct; (2) the two notions of difference (or distinction) and real identity are logically compatible, and (3) predication is not a mental relation between two things, but a real one. In particular, Wyclif revised Duns Scotus’s twofold notion of formal distinction and developed a form of intensional logic where the basic relation between things is that of formal distinction, intended by him as the measure of the coincidence of the metaphysical components of two *res*. Improving to some extent Wyclif’s ideas, his followers (1) proposed new determinations of the twin notions of identity and distinction, and (2) deeply modified the standard medieval analysis of predication.

Chronologically, the first solution we meet is that of Walter Burley. As we have already seen, at the beginning of his academic career Burley was a supporter of the moderate realism, but after 1324, because of Ockham’s criticism, he changed his opinions and evolved an original form of platonic realism. In the prologue of his last commentary on the *Physics* (1324–34), in the *Quaestiones super Porphyrium*, in the last commentary on the *Ars Vetus* (A.D. 1337), and in the later *Tractatus de universalibus* (after 1337), he expounds his new ontology of macro-objects, based on a threefold real distinction:³² (1) between universals

Ockham in Discussion,” in *Philosophical Debates at the University of Paris in the First Quarter of the Fourteenth Century*, eds. Theo Kobusch—Stephen F. Brown (Louvain, forthcoming).

³² On Burley’s ontology of macro-objects see Alessandro D. Conti, “Ontology in Walter Burley’s Last Commentary on the *Ars Vetus*,” *Franciscan Studies* 50 (1990), 121–176; on his semantic theory see Alessandro D. Conti, “Significato e verità in Walter Burley,” *Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale* 11 (2000), 317–350; and Laurent Cesalli, “Le réalisme propositionnel de Walter Burley,” *Archives d’histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Âge* 68 (2001), 155–221; on his theory of universals and individuals set in its epistemological context see Alessandro D. Conti, “La conoscenza del singolare in Walter Burley,” *Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale* 15 (2004), 517–540; on his theory of universals set in its metaphysical and semantic contexts see Marta

and individuals;³³ (2) between categorial items (or simple objects—*incomplexa*) and real propositions (or states of affairs—*propositiones in re*);³⁴ and (3) among the ten categories.³⁵

Burley's most accurate and analytical treatments of the problem of universals are those set in the treatise on universals and in the chapter on substance of his last commentary on the *Categories*, but interesting remarks can be found in his last commentaries on the *Isagoge* and the *Liber sex principiorum*, and in his *Quaestiones super Porphyrium*. Like Albert the Great, whom he quotes by name, Burley admits the typical thirteenth century division of universals into *ante rem*, *in re*, and *post rem*;³⁶ however, he follows also Auriolo and the early Ockham in positing, besides the act of understanding (the standard *post rem*, conceptual universal), another mental universal, distinct from the former, and existing in the mind only as its object (*habens esse obiectivum in intellectu*).³⁷ By introducing a second mental universal, existing *objective* in the mind, Burley hoped to account for the fact that we can grasp the meaning of a general noun even though we have never seen any individual among those for which the noun can stand for in a predicative sentence, and therefore without properly knowing the universal it directly signifies.

In order to avoid the inconsistencies of the traditional moderate realist view on universals pointed out by Ockham, he claims that universals fully exist outside the mind and are really distinct from the individuals they are-in and are predicated of. According to him, if universals are no longer constitutive parts of their own individuals, then the inconsistencies stressed by Ockham vanish, as universals cannot take

Vittorini, *Predicabili e categorie nell'ultimo commento di Walter Burley all' Isagoge di Porfirio*, Ph.D. diss., University of Salerno, academic year 2004–05.

³³ Cf. Burley, *In Physicam Aristotelis Expositio et Quaestiones, prooem.*, ed. Venetiis 1501, fol. 9rb; *Expositio super Praedicamenta Aristotelis*, cap. de subiecto et praedicato and cap. de substantia, in *Expositio super Artem Veterem Porphyrii et Aristotelis*, ed. Venetiis 1509, fols. 20rb, 23rb–vb, and 24va; *Expositio super librum Perihermeneias*, cap. de oppositione enuntiationum, in *Expositio super Artem Veterem Porphyrii et Aristotelis*, fol. 74rb–va; *Tractatus de universalibus*, ed. Hans-Ulrich Wöhler, Leipzig 1999, pars III, pp. 14–40.

³⁴ Cf. Burley, *Expositio super Praedicamenta Aristotelis, prooem.*, fols. 17vb–18va; cap. de subiecto et praedicato, fol. 20rb; cap. de priori, fol. 47va; *Expositio super librum Perihermeneias, prooem.*, fol. 66ra–b.

³⁵ Cf. Burley, *Expositio super Praedicamenta Aristotelis*, cap. de numero et sufficientia praedicamentorum, fol. 21ra–b.

³⁶ Cf. Burley, *Expositio super librum Sex principiorum*, cap. de forma, in *Expositio super Artem Veterem Porphyrii et Aristotelis*, fol. 53rb.

³⁷ Cf. Burley, *Expositio super Praedicamenta Aristotelis*, cap. de priori, fol. 48vb; and *Tractatus de universalibus*, pars VI, pp. 60–66.

the (opposite) properties of the latter. Furthermore, the principle holds that causes must be proportionate to the effects they produce: but the causes of an individual, which is a singular effect, must be individual, while obviously those of a common nature must be universal. Therefore, individual substance cannot be composed of anything but singular form and matter; whereas universals must be compounded by genus and specific difference, and by any other universal form ordered over the genus. Consequently, the lowest species is not a constitutive part of the individuals it is in and is predicated of, but only a form coming together with their individual essences, and making their metaphysical structure known, since it is the species or genus (namely, the type) which individuals belong to (namely, instantiate).³⁸ Hence, Burley sharply distinguishes between two main kinds of substantial forms: one singular (*forma perficiens materiam*) and the other universal (*forma declarans quidditatem*). The former affects a particular piece of matter and, together with it, brings the substantial composite (or *hoc aliquid*) about. The latter, the lowest species, discloses the nature of the individual substances in which it is present and of which it is predicated, but it is not one of their constitutive parts.³⁹ This distinction between a *forma perficiens materiam* and a *forma declarans quidditatem* is very like the one, very common among the moderate Realists of the thirteenth century, between *forma partis* (the singular form which in union with a clump of matter brings the substantial composite about) and *forma totius* (the universal form or

³⁸ Cf. Burley, *In Physicam Aristotelis expositio et quaestiones, prooem.*, fols. 8rb–9vb.

³⁹ Cf. Burley, *Expositio super Praedicamenta Aristotelis*, cap. de substantia, fol. 23rb–va: “Ad primum in contrarium dicendum est quod substantia singularis non componitur ex universalibus, sed solum ex singularibus, quia Sortes non componitur nisi ex hac materia et hac forma, et non componitur ex genere et differentia quae praedicantur de eo in quid. Sed species de genere substantiae componitur ex genere et differentia, et ex omnibus superioribus ad ipsum. Et huius ratio est quia effectus particularis sunt causae particulares et effectus universalis sunt causae universales;... sed individuum est effectus particularis et species est effectus universalis. ... Ad illud quando probatur quod species est pars individui, quia est quidditas individui, dicendum quod quidditas et forma unum sunt. Et ideo, sicut forma est duplex, scilicet forma declarans quidditatem et forma perficiens materiam, sic quidditas est duplex: quia quaedam est quidditas quae est forma perficiens materiam et quaedam est forma declarans quidditatem. Quidditas quae est forma perficiens materiam est pars individui cuius est quidditas; sed quidditas declarans quidditatem non est pars individui cuius est quidditas, nec est de essentia talis individui, sed est essentialiter concomitans essentiam eius. ... Ad quantum principale, cum dicitur an haec species, homo, sit eadem omnino res in Sorte et Platone an alia et alia, dicendum quod haec species, homo, est eadem in Sorte et Platone.” This same thesis is supported with new arguments based on the definition of identity in the *Tractatus de universalibus*, pars III, pp. 22–28.

essence which is the type that the substantial composite instantiates).⁴⁰ But, because of the real distinction between universals and individuals, Burley was able to draw from it a further conclusion that moderate Realists could not draw: the “dissolution” of the problem of individuation. For him, individual substances are really distinct from their own species and from one another in and of themselves. A primary substance really differs (1) from its species because the latter is not a part of its essence, but a form present in it and dependent on it for actual existence, and (2) from the other primary substances belonging to the same species because of its own singular form and matter.⁴¹

Such a dissolution of the problem of individuation is not the only point of agreement between the later Burley and Ockham: like the *Venerabilis Inceptor*, Burley rejects any kind of distinction in addition to the real one (and therefore even that form of intentional distinction he had employed in his early works). As it has been already said, he admits Ockham’s thesis (T2). In his last commentary on the *Categories*⁴² and in the *Tractatus de universalibus*⁴³ he considers (1) identity a transitive, symmetrical, and reflexive relation; and (2) identity and difference (or distinction) two mutually incompatible concepts. In fact, he defines identity and distinction as follows: a is identical with b if and only if for all x, it is the case that x is predicated of a if and only if it is predicated of b; a differs from b if and only if (1) there is at least one x such that a is predicated of x and b is not, or vice versa, or (2) there is at least one y such that y is predicated of a and not of b, or vice versa. The other two main theses of Burley’s system (the existence of a real proposition and a real distinction among the ten categories) depend on his new position

⁴⁰ Cf. e.g., Albert the Great, *De quinque universalibus*, tr. *de universalibus in communi*, cap. 8, pp. 37–38; *Metaphysica* VII, tr. 1, cap. 1; VIII, tr. 1, cap. 3, ed. Col., vol. 16.2, pp. 316–317, and 391.

⁴¹ Cf. Burley, *Expositio super Universalia Porphyrii*, cap. *de specie*, in *Expositio super Artem Veterem Porphyrii et Aristotelis*, fol. 10va: “Intelligendum est quod unum individuum substantiae non distinguitur ab alio solum per huiusmodi proprietates accidentis, sed formaliter per suam formam et materialiter per suam materiam.”

⁴² Cf. Burley, *Expositio super Praedicamenta Aristotelis*, cap. *de oppositione*, fol. 44rb: “Nota quod ex isto loco sumitur doctrina bona ad cognoscendum identitatem vel diversitatem aliquorum ad invicem. Et est: si unum praedicatur de aliquo de quo non praedicatur reliquum, illa non sunt eadem, sed diversa; et si aliquid praedicatur de uno quod non praedicatur de reliquo, illa non sunt idem. Et e contrario: si quicquid vere praedicatur de uno vere praedicatur de reliquo, illa sunt eadem.”

⁴³ Cf. Burley, *Tractatus de universalibus*, pars III, p. 22.

on identity and distinction, and consequently on what he thought was necessary in order to defend a realist view of universals.

Because of his giving up of the intentional difference, Burley was compelled to make the ontological status of propositiones *in re* much stronger than it was before. While in the *Quaestiones in librum Perihermeneias* and middle commentary on the *De interpretatione* he had clearly stated that mental propositions exist in our minds as in their own subjects of inherence (*habent esse subiectivum in intellectu*) and real propositions (*propositiones in re*) exist in our minds as their intentional objects (*habent esse obiectivum in intellectu solum*),⁴⁴ in his last commentary on the *Ars Vetus* he affirms that a real proposition is an *ens copulatum* formed by the entities for which the subject and the predicate of the corresponding mental proposition stand, together with an identity-relation, if the proposition is affirmative, or a non-identity-relation, if the proposition is negative.⁴⁵ Moreover, as far as the problem of the ontological value of the Aristotelian categories is concerned, whereas in his middle commentary on the *Categories*⁴⁶ Burley (1) judged only the absolute categories (substance, quantity, and quality) to be really things, and (2) considered the remaining ones as a sort of real aspects (*respectus reales*) of the absolute ones, in his last commentary on the *Categories* he claims that (1) the division into categories is first of all a division of *res* existing outside the mind, and only secondarily of the mental concepts and spoken or written terms which signify them; and (2) things in one category are really distinct from those in others.⁴⁷ What is more, (3) he polemicizes against Ockham's strong reductionist position, arguing that it compromises the actual goal of a correct categorial theory, namely, the classifying and putting in hierarchical order all the items according to their nature, inner metaphysical structure, and peculiar modes of being.⁴⁸

Notwithstanding the assumption of a real distinction between universals and individuals, and the different evaluation of the categorial

⁴⁴ Cf. Burley, *Quaestiones in librum Perihermeneias*, q. 3, pp. 248–249; *Commentarius in librum Perihermeneias*, pp. 61–62.

⁴⁵ Cf. Burley, *Expositio super librum Perihermeneias*, proem., fol. 66ra–b.

⁴⁶ Cf. Burley, *Tractatus super librum Praedicamentorum*, cap. *de numero et sufficientia praedicamentorum*, fols. 175rb–176rb.

⁴⁷ Cf. Burley, *Expositio super Praedicamenta Aristotelis*, cap. *de numero et sufficientia praedicamentorum*, fol. 21ra–b.

⁴⁸ Cf. Burley, *Expositio super Praedicamenta Aristotelis*, cap. *de numero et sufficientia praedicamentorum*, fols. 21va–b, and 22ra.

table in relation to his early works, Burley kept on supporting, without introducing any restrictive clause, the Aristotelian principle (stated in *Categories* 5, 2b5–6) that primary substances are the necessary condition of existence for any other categorial items (universal substances included).⁴⁹ This was still possible since he held that universals were forms, and therefore entities existentially incomplete and dependent which require the existence of at least one individual for being. Ockham had interpreted in an original way that same principle: he had claimed that what Aristotle meant was that the truth of all the propositions of the form ‘Sortes is not’ necessarily entails the truth of the following proposition ‘no man is’ (*nullus homo est*),⁵⁰ so translating a metaphysical principle into a logical rule. Paradoxically, the divergent interpretation of *Categories* 2b5–6 is the only remarkable difference between the logical structure of Burley’s theory of universals and that of Ockham. Burley himself stresses this point: in commenting on that passage, he observes that it goes against Ockham’s position on universals, since, if universal substances were concepts, the destruction of all the members of a certain species could not imply the disappearance of the corresponding universal.⁵¹ Indeed, both Ockham and Burley subscribe to (T1) and (T2), and do not accept (T3), even though Ockham only accepted it in the sense that universal concepts (say, the concept of man) do exist apart from and independently of their corresponding real individuals (say, Socrates or Plato). What prevents Burley from totally agreeing with Ockham is precisely the opposite reading of Aristotle’s affirmation that if primary substances did not exist, it would be impossible for anything else to exist. Being faithful to Aristotle on this point, Burley had to build up a sort of mixed theory of universal, where some principles of Aristotelian ontology went alongside some principles of Platonic ontology. In contrast, detaching himself from the real Aristotelian intention, Ockham could construct a theory consistent with Aristotle’s claim in *Metaphysics* Z 13 (1038b8–9, 1038b34–1039a3) that universals are not substances.

⁴⁹ Cf. Burley, *Expositio super Praedicamenta Aristotelis*, cap. de substantia, fol. 24va.

⁵⁰ Cf. Ockham, *Expositio in librum Praedicamentorum Aristotelis*, cap. 8.5, pp. 175–176.

⁵¹ Cf. Burley, *Expositio super Praedicamenta Aristotelis*, cap. de substantia, fol. 24va: “Hic patet evidenter quod secundae substantiae non sunt conceptus in anima, quia, si secundae substantia essent conceptus animae, tunc destructis primis substantiis possibile esset alia remanere. Nam destructis omnibus rosis adhuc potest conceptus rosae remanere in anima. Et ita species potest manere destructis omnibus individuis suis—quod est contra Philosophum hic.”

Two main difficulties arise from Burley's (new) solution to the problem of universals: (1) within his ontology, it was difficult to distinguish between essential and accidental predication, since secondary substances (namely, the universal forms of the category of substance) necessarily presupposed primary substances for their existence in the same way as accidental forms did. Thereby, their relation to primary substances was (almost) the same as that peculiar to accidental forms, a sort of inherence. (2) Universals had a being different from that of their individuals—a conclusion "dangerously" close to Plato's thesis on the subject. As a consequence, many late medieval Realists tried other ways of replying to Ockham's charges.

When Ockhamist logic arrived in Italy in the 1330s, some Italian Dominican masters brought into question Ockham's ontological reductionist program, at the same time attempting to escape from the "exaggeration" of Burley's version of realism. According to Franciscus de Prato and Stephanus de Reate,⁵² in order to defend moderate realism, it was necessary (1) to clarify the relation that holds between universals and individuals, and (2) to rethink the twin notions of identity and distinction in such a way to avoid both the inconsistencies pointed out by Ockham, and Burley's real distinction between individuals and universals. To preserve a real foundation of universal concepts and to defend the entire extension of the table of the categories were the two main steps of their philosophical strategy, aimed to restore the principles of a Thomistic view of the world. In order to achieve this goal they developed some of Hervaeus Natalis's chief logico-metaphysical intuitions.⁵³

⁵² On their lives, works, and logico-metaphysical theories see Fabrizio Amerini, "La *quaestio* 'Utrum subiectum in logica sit ens rationis' e la sua attribuzione a Francesco da Prato. Note sulla vita e gli scritti del domenicano Francesco da Prato (XIV secolo)," *Memorie Domenicane*, n.s. 30 (1999), pp. 147–217; Fabrizio Amerini, "La dottrina della *significatio* di Francesco da Prato, O.P. (XIV secolo). Una critica tomista a Guglielmo di Ockham," *Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale* 11 (2000), 375–408; Fabrizio Amerini, *I trattati De universalibus di Francesco da Prato e Stefano da Rieti (secolo XIV)*, Centro Italiano di studi sull'alto Medioevo (Spoleto, 2003), pp. 1–56 (at pp. 57–132 the critical edition of Franciscus's treatise on universals, and at pp. 133–145 the edition of Stephanus's tract); Christian Rode, *Franciscus de Prato* (Stuttgart, 2004); Fabrizio Amerini, *La logica di Francesco da Prato. Con l'edizione critica della Loyca e del Tractatus de voce univoca* (Florence, 2005), pp. 1–248 (at pp. 249–506 the critical edition of Franciscus's *Loyca*, and at pp. 507–597 the edition of his *Tractatus de voce univoca*); Amerini, "What is Real," pp. 187–212.

⁵³ Amerini, "What is Real," pp. 200–201, and 212.

Like Hervaeus, Franciscus and Stephanus rejected any kind of distinction that was midway between a real distinction and one of reason.⁵⁴ Their basic ideas were that (1) universal forms have no being outside the being of their individuals;⁵⁵ (2) real identity may be more or less close, and (2.1) the limit of that real identity is the entirely real identity (*esse idem convertibiliter* or *totaliter*).⁵⁶ This means that they recognised degrees in real identity. Moreover, Franciscus explicitly assumes that (1) from the fact that two items are not entirely really identical we cannot conclude that they are really different.⁵⁷ According to Franciscus, a universal and one of its individuals are really identical, but they are not entirely identical. There are properties that can be predicated of a universal form and not of one of its individual, or vice versa, but this is not equivalent to proving that they are really non-identical, so that they can be really separate. For instance, Peter and man (*homo*) are really identical if they are compared to each other, but they are not entirely identical if they are compared to another individual man, say Martin. What is more, according to Franciscus, saying that if two items are not identical in any respect, then they are really different, amounts to formulating an

⁵⁴ Ibid., p. 201.

⁵⁵ Cf. e.g., Franciscus de Prato, *Tractatus de universalibus* (between 1341 and 1343), a. 5, p. 110: "Cuius ratio est quia albedo universalis, in tali casu, non habet in rerum natura aliam entitatem, sive aliam albedinem, quam albedinem Petri"; p. 121: "Cuius ratio est quia homo universalis realiter et essentialiter praedicatur de Petro et de Martino, et est de essentia Petri et Martini, et est homo universalis unum realiter cum Petro et idem est unum realiter cum Martino."

⁵⁶ Cf. e.g., Franciscus de Prato, *Tractatus de universalibus*, a. 4, pp. 99–100: "Ex his quae tacta sunt in ista conclusione ego elicio quattuor correlaria. Primum est quod universale et singulare, ad invicem comparata, sunt idem realiter et essentialiter et differunt sola ratione.... Secundum correlarium est quod universale et singulare, in comparatione ad tertium, idest in comparatione ad aliud singulare, distinguuntur realiter. Cuius ratio est quia universale identificat sibi aliud singulare nec differt ab eo realiter; unum autem singulare non identitat sibi aliud singulare, sed differt realiter ab eo. Unde Petrus et homo differunt realiter in comparatione ad Martinum, pro quanto homo includit identice Martinum, qui differt realiter a Petro. Tertium correlarium est quod universale et singulare non sunt idem convertibiliter. Cuius ratio est quia ex quo universale plura includit et in plus se habet quam singulare sequitur quod non sunt idem convertibiliter. Quartum correlarium est quod ex eo quod universale est idem realiter cum suis singularibus sequitur quod illud universale est subiective in intellectu cuius singulare vel singularia sunt subiective in intellectu, et illud universale est extra intellectum subiective cuius singulare vel singularia sunt extra intellectum subiective."

⁵⁷ Cf. Franciscus de Prato, *Tractatus de universalibus*, a. 5, p. 121: "Cum ulterius dicitur si homo et Petrus non sunt idem omnibus modis realiter, ergo differunt aliquo modo realiter, dico quod non sequitur... sicut etiam non sequitur 'Petrus non est omnis homo, ergo Petrus est aliquid non-homo', vel sicut non sequitur 'Petrus non est omnibus modis identitatis et omnibus modis unitatis homo, ergo Petrus aliquo modo est non-homo'."

invalid consequence (in his opinion it is a case of *fallacia consequentis*).⁵⁸ Franciscus argues that the following consequences are valid: 'if man and Peter are identical in any respect, then they are identical', 'if man and Peter are not identical, then they are not identical in any respect'; while the following consequences are invalid: 'if man and Peter are identical, then they are identical in any respect', 'if man and Peter are not identical in any respect, then they are not identical'.⁵⁹ In fact, he distinguishes between being-not-identical (*esse non idem*), that he equates with being-different (*differre*), and not-being-identical (*non esse idem*), as the former relation implies the latter, but not vice versa.⁶⁰

Franciscus's position on universals and his explanation of the relationship between universals and individuals ultimately depend on the acceptance of the Thomistic thesis of a real composition of essence and being (*esse*) in creatures. Pursuing Aquinas's line of thought, he assumed that essence and being are distinct from each other, but related one to the other just as potency (essence) and act (being). All the individuals belonging to a certain natural species share the same essence (or nature), in the sense that each of them derives from one and the same essence. On the other hand, that same common essence *qua* the essence of a given individual is, from an ontological point of view, singular and not universal, since it is "contracted" by the act of being peculiar to that given individual.⁶¹ Hence, each individual belonging

⁵⁸ Cf. Franciscus de Prato, *Tractatus de universalibus*, a. 4, p. 100; a. 5, pp. 113; and 119–121.

⁵⁹ Cf. Franciscus de Prato, *Tractatus de universalibus*, a. 5, pp. 119–120. See Amerini, "What is Real," p. 205.

⁶⁰ Cf. Franciscus de Prato, *Tractatus de universalibus*, a. 5, pp. 121–122: "Hic etiam nota quod aliud est dicere quod aliqua duo aliquo modo non sunt idem et aliud est dicere quod aliqua duo aliquo modo sunt non idem: nam prima propositio est de praedicato negato et secunda propositio est de praedicato infinito. Et quia ad propositionem de praedicato negato non sequitur propositio de praedicato infinito, e converso autem sic, ut patet in II *Perihermeneias*, ideo ad hanc propositionem: 'homo et Petrus aliquo modo (non) sunt idem,' quae est de praedicato negato, non sequitur ista conclusio: 'homo et Petrus aliquo modo sunt non idem,' quae est de praedicato infinito. Et ideo dato quod possit concedi quod homo et Petrus (inter se) aliquo modo non sint idem realiter, quia non sunt idem convertibiliter, tamen non potest concedi quod homo et Petrus inter se aliquo modo sint non idem (realiter); et per consequens non potest concedi quod inter se aliquo (modo) differant realiter, quia numquam de aliquibus potest verificari quod aliquo modo differant realiter inter se, nisi possit verificari de eis quod aliquo modo sint non idem realiter (inter se), quia 'differre' et 'esse non idem' uniformiter et convertibiliter se habent."

⁶¹ Cf. e.g., Franciscus de Prato, *Tractatus de sex transcendentibus*, ed. Burkhard Mojsisch, in *Bochumer Philosophisches Jahrbuch für Antike und Mittelalter* 5 (2000), 177–217, a. 1, pp.

to a certain natural species is really different from any other belonging to that same natural species because of its own (act of) being, and not because of its essence. As a consequence, according to Franciscus (and Stephanus), (1) there is real identity between two items *a* and *b* if and only if they share at least one act of being, and (2) two items *a* and *b* are entirely identical if and only if, for all the acts of being **B**, it is the case that **B** is an act of being of *a* if and only if it is an act of being of *b*. From this, it necessarily follows that (1) a universal essence is really identical with each of its individuals but not entirely identical, as it shares (or may share, in the case of universal essences instantiated by one individual only) many other beings. For instance, humanity *qua* instantiated by a given individual, say Peter, is really identical with him, but *qua* instantiated by another one, say Martin, it is not entirely identical with Peter. (2) Real identity is not a transitive relation. From the fact that a certain universal essence, say humanity, is really identical with each of its individuals (Peter, Martin, and so on) does not follow that each of them is really identical with any other.⁶²

Franciscus's (and Stephanus's) theory of universals testifies to the permanent influence of Thomas Aquinas's approach within the Dominican order in the middle of the fourteenth century. They dealt with universals and categories from the point of view of a metaphysics of being, and not of essences. The rules they explicitly laid down or implicitly followed are ineffectual or contradictory if they are set in a different metaphysical context. What Franciscus stated about identity and distinction makes sense only if interpreted as concerning acts of being. The same is true for his defence of the reality (and real distinction) of each category. He observes that all the ten Aristotelian categories are things (*res*), but according to two different meanings of the term '*res*'. In fact, it signifies (1) a real essence, or (2) the mode of being of a real essence. The three absolute categories (substance, quantity, and quality) are things in

182 and 185; a. 2, pp. 187–188; a. 6, p. 216. See Amerini, *La logica di Francesco da Prato*, pp. 151–157.

⁶² Cf. e.g., Franciscus de Prato, *Tractatus de universalibus*, a. 5, p. 119: "Ad quadagesimum quartum dico quod dato quod homo universalis sit existens in rerum natura, in (quo) conveniunt Petrus et Martinus, non tamen sequitur quod Petrus et Martinus sint idem inter se. Et quando dicitur quod (*quae*) *uni et eidem sunt eadem inter se sunt eadem*, dico quod verum est quod aliqua sint eadem realiter in aliquo quod sit unum realiter; sed Petrus et Martinus sunt eadem realiter in entitate hominis, quae est unum non realiter (immo est plures realiter), sed unum est tantum secundum rationem. In qua unitate Petrus et Martinus sunt unum secundum rationem et non secundum rem, ex quo remanent Petrus et Martinus distincta realiter."

the former sense (of the term); while the latter is the sense according to which the other seven categories are said to be things.⁶³ The basic pattern of his arguments aimed to prove, against Ockham, that the ten categories are really different from each other is an example of *reductio ad absurdum*: if a certain category a was really identical with another category b, (namely, if a and b shared at least one act of being), then one of them would be over-ordinated to the other, and therefore it would transmit all its essence to the other, so that it would be possible to find all the essential properties of a among the essential properties of b, or vice versa. But, for instance, none among the essential properties of substance is one of the essential properties of quantity, nor vice versa, since they are described in totally different ways. And therefore substance and quantity are really different categories.⁶⁴

Franciscus and Stephanus were influenced by Thomas Aquinas's and Hervaeus Natalis's metaphysical views, and especially by the theory of a real composition of essence and being, but the most influential metaphysics of the later Middle Ages was Duns Scotus's. In fact, many among the main philosophical convictions of Wyclif, who pointed to the strategy (almost) all the subsequent Realists were to adopt, were an original version of the most fundamental theses of Duns Scotus's system, where much more stress was put on the ontological presuppositions and entailments of the doctrines. In particular, no one maintained a real distinction between essence and being: since later medieval Realists considered being (*ens*) as a sort of stuff that the ten categories modulated according to their own natures, they thought that any categorial item (universal substances and accidents included) was immediately something which is, so that the essences of creatures do not precede their beings, not even causally, as every thing is (really identical with) its essence.⁶⁵

⁶³ Cf. Franciscus de Prato, *Logica*, pars I, tr. 5, a. 1, p. 381; *Tractatus de sex transcendentibus*, a. 6, p. 215.

⁶⁴ Cf. Franciscus de Prato, *Logica*, pars I, tr. 5, a. 7, pp. 415–424.

⁶⁵ Cf. e.g., John Wyclif, *Tractatus de universalibus* (1374 ca.), ed. Ian J. Mueller (Oxford, 1985), cap. 6, pp. 120–123. In view of his position on the problem of being, Wyclif maintains no real distinction between essence and being. According to him, the being of a thing is brought into existence by God at the same instant as its essence, since essence without being and being without essence would be two self-contradictory states of affairs. In fact, essence without being would imply that an individual could be something of a given type without being real in any way, and being without essence would imply that there could be the existence of a thing without the thing itself. As a consequence, the *pars destruens* of his theory on being and essence is a strong refutation

As just indicated, the starting point of the latest medieval realist speculations on universals, predication, and categories were the theories on these subjects worked out by Wyclif.⁶⁶ Like Burley, Wyclif reacted to Ockham's attack to the traditional realist view on universals and categories, but, unlike him, he (1) stuck by the thesis of the real identity of universals and individuals, and (2) revised the theory of predication and the notions of identity and distinction. He (1) explicitly presents his opinion on universals as intermediate between those of Aquinas and Giles of Rome, on the one hand, and of Burley, on the other hand,⁶⁷ and (2) many times in his works expresses the deepest hostility to Ockham's approach to philosophy. Ockham and his followers discriminated between things as they exist in the extra-mental world and the concepts and schemata by means of which we can grasp and signify them. As we have seen, according to the *Venerabilis Inceptor*, in the world there are only individual substances and qualities; on the contrary, the signs by which they are understood and signified are both individual and universal, and of ten different types (the ten Aristotelian categories). Nor do the relations through which we connect our concepts in a proposition correspond to the real links which connect individual items in a state of affairs. Thus, our knowledge does not reproduce the world and its items, but merely concerns them. Wyclif maintained that such an approach to philosophical questions was misleading and deleterious. Like Burley, he thought that only on the ground of a close isomorphism between mental language and the world could the signifying function of terms and propositions, the possibility of definitions, and finally the validity and universality of our knowledge be accounted

of the twin opinions of Aquinas and Giles of Rome. On Wyclif's theory of essence and being see Alessandro D. Conti, "Wyclif's Logic and Metaphysics," in *A Companion to John Wyclif*, ed. Ian C. Levy (Leiden, 2006), pp. 89–95.

⁶⁶ On Wyclif's main logico-metaphysical theories see John A. Robson, *Wyclif and the Oxford Schools* (Cambridge, 1961); Paul V. Spade, "Introduction," in John Wyclif, *On Universals*, trans. Anthony Kenny (Oxford, 1985), pp. vii–xlvii; Anthony Kenny, *Wyclif* (Oxford, 1985), pp. 1–30; Anthony Kenny, "The Realism of *De Universalibus*," in *Wyclif in his Times*, ed. Anthony Kenny (Oxford, 1986), pp. 17–29; Alessandro D. Conti, "Logica intensionale e metafisica dell'essenza in John Wyclif," *Bollettino dell'Istituto Storico Italiano per il Medioevo e Archivio muratoriano* 99.1 (1993), 159–219; Alessandro D. Conti, "Analogy and Formal Distinction: on the Logical Basis of Wyclif's Metaphysics," *Medieval Philosophy and Theology* 6.2 (1997), 133–165; Paul V. Spade, "The Problem of Universals and Wyclif's Alleged 'Ultrarealism'," *Vivarium* 43 (2005), 111–123; Laurent Cesalli, "Le 'pan-propositionnalisme' de Jean Wyclif," *Vivarium* 43 (2005), 124–155; Conti, "Wyclif's Logic and Metaphysics," pp. 67–125.

⁶⁷ Cf. Wyclif, *Tractatus de universalibus*, cap. 4, pp. 86–87.

for and ensured. He firmly believed that mental language was an ordered collection of signs, each referring to one of the metaphysical constituents of the world (individuals and universals, substances and accidents, concrete properties, like being-white, and abstract forms, like whiteness), and that true propositions were like pictures of the inner structure and mutual relationships of such items (or essences, according to his terminology). So the main characteristics of his own form of realism, which were to inspire the strategy and doctrines of the (other) Oxford Realists, were the trust in the scheme object-label as the fundamental interpretative key of semantic problems, and a strong propensity towards hypostatization.

Like moderate Realists of the thirteenth century, Wyclif recognizes three main kinds of universals: (1) *ante rem*, or ideal universals; (2) *in re*, or formal universals; and (3) *post rem*, or intentional universals. On the other hand, just like Burley, Wyclif holds that formal universals exist *in actu* outside our minds, and *not in potentia*, as moderate Realists thought—even if, unlike Burley, he maintains that they are really identical with their own individuals.⁶⁸ In his view, (1) universals and individuals share the same empirical reality, which is that of individuals, but (2) have opposite constituent principles, when properly considered as universals and individuals. According to his terminology, they are really the same but formally distinct.⁶⁹ This formulation is only another way of saying that universals and individuals are the same identical things if conceived as first intentions, and differ from each other if conceived as second intentions. So at last Wyclif accepts the very core of the traditional realistic account of the relationship between universals and individuals; but he tries to improve it by defining more accurately its predicative structure.

According to Wyclif, because of the formal distinction, not everything predicable of individuals can be directly predicated of universals and vice versa, although an indirect predication is always possible. As a consequence, Wyclif distinguished three main non mutually exclusive

⁶⁸ Cf. Wyclif, *Tractatus de universalibus*, cap. 2, p. 69. In addition to this partition of universals, standard in the Middle Ages, Wyclif adopts another one, which was very successful among his followers, based on the different functions that universal essences perform (*Tractatus de universalibus*, cap. 1, pp. 15–16): he divides universals into (1) universals by causality (*causatione*), (2) universals by community (*communicatione*), and (3) universals by representation (*repraesentatione*).

⁶⁹ Cf. Wyclif, *Tractatus de universalibus*, cap. 2, pp. 62–63; cap. 4, pp. 86–87; cap. 10, pp. 208–213.

types of predication (that he conceives as a real relation which holds between metaphysical entities),⁷⁰ each more general than the preceding one (or ones). In the *Tractatus de universalibus* they are the following: formal predication (*praedicatio formalis*), predication by essence (*praedicatio secundum essentiam*), and habitual predication (*praedicatio secundum habitudinem*). (1) Formal predication is that in which the form signified by the predicate-term is directly present in the entity designated by the subject-term. This happens whenever an item in the categorial line is predicated of its inferior or an accident of its subject of inherence. (2) It is sufficient for predication by essence that the same empirical reality is both the real subject and predicate, even though the formal principle connoted by the predicate-term differs from that connoted by the subject-term. 'God is man' and '(What is) universal is (what is) singular' (*'universale est singulare'*) are instances of this kind of predication. (3) There is habitual predication when the form connoted by the predicate-term does not inhere, directly or indirectly, in the thing signified by the subject-term but simply implies a relation to it, so that the same real predicate may be at different times said truly or falsely of its real subject without any change in the subject itself. According to Wyclif, we use this kind of predication mainly when we want to express theological truths, such as: that God is known and loved by many creatures, and brings about, as efficient, exemplar, and final cause, many good effects.⁷¹

Habitual predication does not require any kind of identity between the entity signified by the subject-term and the entity signified by the predicate-term, but formal predication and essential predication do. Thus, the ontological presuppositions of the most general type of predication, implied by the other types, are completely different from those of the other two. In any case, it is clear that Wyclif's efforts were directed towards unifying the various kinds of predication through a unique basic relation of partial identity: the formal distinction. In the *Tractatus de universalibus* it is described as the difference by which things differ from each other even though they are constitutive elements of the same single essence or supposit. According to Wyclif, this is the case for: (1) the concrete accidents inhering in the same substance, as they coincide in the same particular subject, but differ from each other because

⁷⁰ Cf. Wyclif, *Tractatus de universalibus*, cap. 1, pp. 35–36.

⁷¹ Cf. Wyclif, *Tractatus de universalibus*, cap. 1, pp. 28–30 and 34.

of their own natures; (2) the matter and substantial form of the same individual substance; (3) what is more common in relation to what is less common, like (3.1) the divine nature and the three Persons, (3.2) the world and this world; and, (3.3) among the categorial items belonging to the same category, a superior item and one of its inferiors.⁷² As it is evident, the first sub-type of the formal distinction is a slightly different version of the Scotistic formal distinction as defined in the *Lectura* and in the *Ordinatio*, while the third sub-type is a reformulation of the Scotistic formal distinction as described in the *Reportata Parisiensia*.

Formal distinction is one of the three main kinds of difference that Wyclif recognises, as he speaks of real-and-essential and real-but-not-essential differences also.⁷³ Still, formal distinction is the main kind of transcendental relation holding among (Wyclif's) items, as it is the tool by means of which the dialectic one-many internal to the individual substances is regulated. It is intended to explain why one and the same individual substance (say, Socrates) is one thing, even if it contains in itself a lot of simpler entities, and how many different entities can constitute just one thing. Moreover, formal distinction sets the relations (1) between a concrete accident, such as being-white (*album*), and its substance, namely, the substance in which the corresponding abstract form (say, whiteness) inheres; (2) among all the concrete accidents belonging to one and the same substance. Consequently, formal distinction is a central notion for the categorial doctrine too.

Wyclif held that the extramental world is divided into ten genera of beings, or categories, none of which can be reduced to another one.⁷⁴ Since, like Aristotle (and the moderate Realists), he thought of substance as the ultimate substrate of existence and subject of predication in relation to anything else, the only way to demonstrate the reality of the items belonging to other categories was to conceive of them as forms and attributes of substance. Accordingly, he insisted that the items falling into the accidental categories, considered by themselves, are forms inherent in the composite substances.⁷⁵ In this way, Wyclif wanted to safeguard the reality of accidents as well as their distinction

⁷² Cf. Wyclif, *Tractatus de universalibus*, cap. 4, pp. 91–92.

⁷³ Cf. Wyclif, *Tractatus de universalibus*, cap. 4, pp. 90–91. On Wyclif's notions of difference see Conti, "Analogy and Formal Distinction," pp. 158–163; Conti, "Wyclif's Logic and Metaphysics," pp. 72–78.

⁷⁴ Cf. Wyclif, *De ente praedicamentali* (1369 ca.), cap. 4, ed. Rudolf Beer (London, 1891), pp. 30–32.

⁷⁵ Cf. Wyclif, *De ente praedicamentali*, cap. 6, p. 48.

from substance and from one another, while at the same time affirming their dependence on substance in existence—so following some of the main principles stated by Aristotle in the *Categories*. And in fact, in the *De ente praedicamentali* (1) he clearly states that quantity, quality, and relation are entities with well determined natures, and really distinct from substance;⁷⁶ and, (2) like all the other medieval Realists, he also subscribes to the Aristotelian thesis that primary substances are the necessary condition of existence for any other categorial items.⁷⁷ All the more so because, as what he says about the first sub-type of formal distinction makes evident, accidents considered in an absolute way, according to their own natures, are abstract forms, really distinct from substance; yet, if considered from the point of view of their existence as concrete accidents, they are only formally, but not really distinct from the substance in which they are present and that they affect, since, in this case, they are modes of that substance.⁷⁸

The final result of Wyclif's approach to the problems of universals and categories was a system of intensional logic where (1) the copula of any standard philosophical proposition (like 'Socrates is white', or 'man is an animal') had to be interpreted as meaning degrees in identity between the things signified by the subject-term and the predicate-term; and (2) individuals and universals, considered *qua* beings, appear to be a sort of hypostatisation of intensions, since they are what is signified by proper and common nouns respectively. Only in virtue of renouncing an extensional approach to the matter was Wyclif able to give a (partially) satisfactory solution of the problem of the relationship between universals and individuals, which had always been the most difficult issue for any medieval form of realism.

The Oxford Realists

Wyclif's logico-metaphysical system, however rigorous in its general design, contains—as we have seen—some unclear and aporetic points,

⁷⁶ Cf. Wyclif, *De ente praedicamentali*, cap. 6, pp. 48 and 50; cap. 7, pp. 61–62.

⁷⁷ Cf. Wyclif, *De ente praedicamentali*, cap. 5, pp. 42–43.

⁷⁸ Cf. Wyclif, *De actibus animae* (1365 ca.), pars 2, cap. 4, in *Johannis Wyclif miscellanea philosophica*, ed. Michael H. Dziewicki, 2 vols. (London, 1902), [vol. 1, pp. 1–160], pp. 122–23, and 127. On Wyclif's categorial doctrine see Conti, "Logica intensionale e metafisica dell'essenza," pp. 197–209; Conti, "Wyclif's Logic and Metaphysics," pp. 103–113.

which needed to be removed. All the same, Wyclif's philosophy exercised an enormous influence on the forms of later medieval realism, since his intuitions concerning universals, predication, and categories played a large role both in logic and metaphysics of many authors, and especially of the Oxford Realists.⁷⁹ According to these authors (who in their works show the closest familiarity with Wyclif's writings) (1) universals and individuals are really identical but formally distinct; (2) predication is a real relation between things; (3) the ten Aristotelian categories are ten really distinct kinds of beings. Partially modifying Wyclif's doctrine, they (1) introduced a new type of predication, called predication by essence (*secundum essentiam*), based on a partial identity between the entities for which the subject and predicate stood; and (2) redefined the traditional kinds of predication (the essential and

⁷⁹ Besides Wyclif himself, Robert Alyngton, William Milverley, William Penbygull, Roger Whelpdale, John Tarteys, Johannes Sharpe, and Paul of Venice. All those philosophers studied and/or taught in Oxford: Alyngton at Queen's College, Penbygull at Exeter College, Whelpdale at Balliol and Queen's Colleges, Tarteys at Balliol College; Paul of Venice at the Augustinian *studium* from 1390 to 1393. On their lives and works see A. B. Emden, *A Biographical Register of the University of Oxford to A.D. 1500* (Oxford, 1957–59), 3 vols., *sub nominibus*. On Paul of Venice's life and works see Alan R. Perreiah, *Paul of Venice: a Bibliographical Guide* (Ohio, 1986). Sharpe's *Quaestio super universalis* has been edited in Sharpe, *Quaestio super universalis*, pp. 1–145; Penbygull's *De universalibus* has been edited in Alessandro D. Conti, "Teoria degli universali e teoria della predicazione nel trattato *De universalibus* di William Penbygull: discussione e difesa della posizione di Wyclif," *Medioevo* 8 (1982), 137–203, pp. 178–203. *Excerpta* from Alyngton's main work, a commentary on the *Categories*, in Alessandro D. Conti, "Linguaggio e realtà nel commento alle *Categorie* di Robert Alyngton," *Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale* 4 (1993), 179–306, pp. 242–306; *excerpta* from Milverley's *Compendium de quinque universalibus*, Whelpdale's *Tractatus de universalibus*, Tarteys's *Problema correspondens libello Porphyrii*, and Paul of Venice's *Quaestio de universalibus*, in Sharpe, *Quaestio super universalis*, Appendices II, III, IV, and V, pp. 159–164, 165–187, 189–197, and 199–207 respectively. For analyses of their main works and doctrines and information on Wyclif's influence see: Conti, "Teoria degli universali e teoria della predicazione," pp. 137–166; Conti, "Studio storico-critico," in Sharpe, *Quaestio super universalis*, pp. 211–238, and 295–336; Alain de Libera, "Questions de réalisme. Sur deux arguments antiockhamistes de John Sharpe," *Revue de métaphysique et de morale* 97 (1992), 83–110; Alessandro D. Conti, "Il problema della conoscibilità del singolare nella gnoseologia di Paolo Veneto," *Bollettino dell'Istituto Storico Italiano per il Medio Evo e Archivio muratoriano* 98 (1992), 323–382; Conti, "Linguaggio e realtà," pp. 179–241; Alessandro D. Conti, *Esistenza e verità: Forme e strutture del reale in Paolo Veneto e nel pensiero filosofico del tardo medioevo* (Rome, 1996); Alain de Libera, *La querelle des universaux. De Platon à la fin du Moyen Age* (Paris, 1996), pp. 402–428; Alessandro D. Conti, "Paul of Venice on Individuation," *Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie médiévales* 65 (1998), 107–132; Alessandro D. Conti, "Paul of Venice's Theory of Divine Ideas and its Sources," *Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale* 14 (2003), 407–448; Alessandro D. Conti, "Johannes Sharpe's Ontology and Semantics: Oxford Realism Revisited," *Vivarium* 43 (2005), 156–186; Conti, "Wyclif's Logic and Metaphysics," pp. 118–125.

accidental predications) in terms of this partial identity. Furthermore, some of them, starting from Wyclif's characterization of identity and distinction, formulated new definitions of these transcendental relations, which were the main tools that they utilised in building up their own philosophical systems.

Like Wyclif, Oxford Realists accepted the core of the moderate realist approach to the problem of universals. Their accounts (1) of the kinds and status of universals, and (2) of the relationship between universals and individuals are very similar to those worked out by moderate realist authors of the second half of the thirteenth century, such as Albert the Great and Duns Scotus. According to Oxford Realists, we can count the following entities universal: (1) those causes that have a multiplicity of effects (*universalia causalia*, or *causatione*), such as God and the angelic intelligences; (2) the ideas in God (*universalia idealia*, or *exemplatione*); (3) universal forms, or real universals (*universalia realia*, or *formalia*, or *communicatione*, or *praedicatione*); and (4) universal concepts (*universalia repraesentatione*, or *cognitione*).⁸⁰ In their view, formal universals are common natures in virtue of which the individuals that share them are exactly what they are, just as humanity is the form by which every man formally is a man. Like Wyclif, all of them thought that common natures exist *in actu* in the external world and are really (*realiter*) identical-with and formally (*formaliter*) distinct-from their own individuals.⁸¹

Since, like Wyclif, Oxford Realists accepted the essence of the traditional, realist account of the relationship between (formal) universals and individuals, they too had to define its logical structure more accurately, but at the same time trying to avoid Wyclif's aporias. As a consequence

⁸⁰ Cf. Alyngton, *Litteralis sententia super Praedicamenta Aristotelis*, cap. *de substantia*, pp. 279 and 287; Penbygull, *De universalibus*, p. 178; Milverley, *Compendium de quinque universalibus*, p. 159; Tarteys, *Problema correspondens libello Porphyrii*, p. 171; Whelpdale, *Tractatus de universalibus*, p. 189; Paul of Venice, *Lectura super libros Metaphysicorum*, prooem, cap. 2, Pavia, Biblioteca Universitaria, fondo Aldini, ms. 324, fol. 9va–b. Tarteys and Whelpdale add a fifth kind of universal to that list: the universal by reception (*receptione*), namely, place and primary matter. Sharpe (*Quaestio super universalia*, pp. 49–50) adds two other kinds: the universal quantifiers (such as 'omnis' and 'nullus'), and universal propositions, both affirmative and negative.

⁸¹ Cf. Alyngton, *Litteralis sententia super Praedicamenta Aristotelis*, cap. *de substantia*, p. 268; Penbygull, *De universalibus*, pp. 181 and 189; Milverley, *Compendium de quinque universalibus*, p. 163; Tarteys, *Problema correspondens libello Porphyrii*, pp. 178–179; Whelpdale, *Tractatus de universalibus*, pp. 193–194; Sharpe, *Quaestio super universalia*, pp. 91–92; Paul of Venice, *Quaestio de universalibus*, p. 199; *Expositio super Universalia Porphyrii*, cap. *de genere*, in *Expositio super Universalia Porphyrii et Artem Veterem Aristotelis* (A.D. 1428), ed. (Venetiis, 1494), fol. 14vb.

they had to redefine predication, and through it (implicitly or explicitly) also the notions of identity and distinction (or difference).

In particular, Alyngton, and some years later Sharpe, Milverley, and Tarteys, divided predication into formal predication and predication by essence (*secundum essentiam*), that Alyngton calls also “remote inherence” (*inhaerentia remota*). Predication *secundum essentiam* (1) shows a partial identity between the real subject and predicate, which share some, but not all, metaphysical component parts, and (2) does not require that the form connoted by the predicate-term is directly present in the item signified by the subject-term. Formal predication, on the contrary, requires such a direct presence. ‘Man is an animal’ and ‘Socrates is white’ are instances of formal predication. Unlike Wyclif, who applied predication by essence to second intentions only, these later philosophers thought that it held also when applied to first intentions. So they affirmed that it was possible to predicate of the universal-man (*homo in communi*), or of the abstract form of humanity (*humanitas*), the property of being white, if at least one of its individuals was white. They were careful, however, to use a substantival adjective in its neuter form as a predicate-term, because only in this way could it appear that the form signified by the predicate-term is not directly present in the subject, but is indirectly attributed to it through its individuals. Therefore, according to them ‘(what is) singular is (what is) common’ (*‘singulare est commune’*), ‘universal-man is (something) white’ (*‘homo in communi est album’*) and ‘humanity is (something) running’ (*‘humanitas est currens’*) are instances of predication by essence (or remote inherence).⁸² Formal predication itself is in turn divided by Alyngton and Milverley into formal substantial and formal accidental predication, since (1) formal predication necessarily demands the direct presence of a form in a substrate, and, (2) according to them, this can occur in two different ways: either as one of the inner constitutive element of the substrate (substantially), or as one of its subsidiary properties (accidentally).⁸³

According to Alyngton, Milverley, and Tarteys the formal-and-essential predication and the formal-and-accidental predication would

⁸² Cf. Alyngton, *Litteralis sententia super Praedicamenta Aristotelis*, cap. de substantia, p. 289; Milverley, *Compendium de quinque universalibus*, p. 160; Tarteys, *Problema correspondens libello Porphyrii*, London, Lambeth Palace, ms. 393, fols. 204(235)r-v, and 209(240)r-v; Sharpe, *Quaestio de universalibus*, pp. 89–91.

⁸³ Cf. Alyngton, *Litteralis sententia super Praedicamenta Aristotelis*, cap. de subiecto et praedicato, p. 245; cap. de substantia, pp. 274 and 289; Milverley, *Compendium de quinque universalibus*, pp. 160–161.

correspond to Aristotle's essential and accidental predication respectively. But, as a matter of fact, they agreed with Wyclif in regarding predication by essence as more general than formal predication. As a consequence, in their theories formal predication is a particular type of the predication by essence. This means that they implicitly recognized a single ontological pattern, founded on a partial identity, as the basis of every kind of predication statement. But in this way, the *praedicatio formalis essentialis* and the *praedicatio formalis accidentalis* are very different from their Aristotelian models, as they express degrees in identity as well as the predication by essence.

In contrast, Penbygull and Whelpdale, who possibly belong to the same generation as Sharpe, were closer to Wyclif's teaching as manifested in the *Purgans errores circa universalia in communi* (1366–68), since they divided predication into formal (*praedicatio formalis*), by essence (*secundum essentiam*), and causal (*secundum causam*). They describe formal and by essence predications in the same way as the other Oxford Realists, and causal predication in the same way as Wyclif.⁸⁴ According to Penbygull and Whelpdale, there is causal predication when the item signified by the predicate-term is not present in any way in the item signified by the subject-term, but the real subject has been caused by the real predicate—'*dies est latio solis super terram*' is an example of this kind of predication.⁸⁵

These two interpretative schemes of the nature and kinds of predication (that worked out by Alynngton, Milverley, Tarteys, and Sharpe, and that adopted by Penbygull and Whelpdale) are ultimately grounded on various notions of identity which are different from that common in the thirteenth century, and fixed by Walter Burley in his last commentary on the *Categories* and treatise on universals. So it is not surprising that Penbygull, Milverley, and Sharpe put forward new criteria for identity and distinction.

⁸⁴ Cf. Wyclif, *Purgans errores circa universalia in communi*, cap. 2, in Samuel H. Thomson, "A 'Lost' Chapter of Wyclif's *Summa de ente*," *Speculum* 4 (1929), 339–346, p. 342. As a matter of fact the ms. Cambridge, Trinity College, B.16.2, used by Dziewicki for his edition of the work (London 1909), lacks the second chapter and the first section of the third chapter. Samuel H. Thomson integrated the text on the basis of the ms. Wien, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, 4307.

⁸⁵ Cf. Penbygull, *De universalibus*, pp. 186–188; Whelpdale, *Tractatus de universalibus*, pp. 190–192.

Penbygull and Milverley⁸⁶ (1) distinguish between the notion of non-identity and that of difference (or distinction); (2) deny that the notion of difference implies that of non-identity; (3) affirm that the two notions of difference and real identity are logically compatible, thus admitting that (3.1) there are degrees in distinction, and (3.2) that the degrees of distinction between two things can be read as the inverse measure of their (partial) identity. In his turn, Sharpe seems to combine the theories of Duns Scotus, Wyclif, and Penbygull and Milverley themselves.⁸⁷ (1) Like Penbygull and Milverley, he considers identity and distinction (or difference) as the two possible inverse measures of the coincidence of the metaphysical components of two given entities. Moreover, (2) he speaks of formal and real (or essential) identity, formal and real (or essential) distinction (or difference), and (2.1) states that formal identity is stronger than real (or essential) identity, since the former entails the latter, while real difference is stronger than formal distinction, since the latter is entailed by the former. (3) Finally, he admits degrees in formal distinction (*distinctio formalis consistit in gradibus*), as he recognizes two different types, the first of which comes very close to that proposed by Scotus in his *Ordinatio*, while the second is drawn from Wyclif's *Tractatus de universalibus* (third sub-type).

Yet, among the Oxford Realists, the most original was Paul of Venice. His philosophical theories (culminating in a metaphysics of essences which states the ontological and epistemological primacy of universals over any other kind of beings) are the final and highest result of the preceding realistic tradition of thought, since he (1) fully developed the new form of realism started up by Wyclif; (2) renewed Burley's attacks against nominalistic views; (3) was open to influences from many other directions, as he (3.1) held in due consideration also the positions of authors such as Albert the Great, Thomas Aquinas, and Giles of Rome, and (3.2) critically discussed the doctrines of the main Nominalists of the fourteenth century, William Ockham, John Buridan, and Marsilius of Inghen.

Paul of Venice divides predication into identical and formal, and defines them in a slightly different way in relation to his sources. To

⁸⁶ Cf. Penbygull, *De universalibus*, pp. 190–191; Milverley, *Compendium de quinque universalibus*, p. 163.

⁸⁷ Cf. Sharpe, *Quaestio super universalia*, pp. 91–92; *Quaestio super libros De Anima*, q. 2: "utrum potentia intellectiva distinguatur ab essentia animae," Oxford, New College, ms. 238, fol. 236r–v (transcription in Conti, "Studio storico-critico," p. 216, note 18).

speak of identical predication it is sufficient that the form signified by the subject-term of a (true) proposition and the form signified by the predicate-term share at least one of their substrates of existence. This is the case of propositions like 'man is (an) animal' and 'the universal-man is something white' (*'homo in communi est album'*). One speaks of formal predication in two cases: (1) when for the truth of the proposition it is necessary that the form signified by the predicate-term is present in all the substrates of existence of the form signified by the subject-term in virtue of a formal principle (declared in the proposition itself) which is in its turn directly present in all the substrates of existence of the form signified by the subject-term. This is the case of propositions like 'man is formally (an) animal', 'Socrates *qua* man is an animal.' (2) Or when the predicate of the proposition is a term of second intention, like 'species' or 'genus.' This is the case of propositions like 'man is a species', 'animal is a genus.'⁸⁸

As is evident, identical predication is extensionally defined, whereas formal predication is intensionally defined, since formal predication entails a relation modally determined between the subject-thing and the predicate-thing. In fact, the formal predication presupposes that there is a necessary connection between the subject-thing and the predicate-thing of the given proposition. For this reason Paul denies that sentences like '(what is) singular is (what is) universal' (*'singulare est universale'*), that Wyclif and the other Oxford Realists acknowledged as true ones, are true propositions. For Wyclif (and the other Oxford Realists) the sentence at issue is an example of predication by essence, but for Paul it is an example of formal predication. As a consequence, Paul rewrites the preceding sentence in this form: '(what is) singular is this universal' (*'singulare est hoc universale'*), where the presence of the demonstrative 'this' modifies the kind of predication from formal to identical. So corrected the sentence is true, since it signifies that a certain item, in itself singular, is the substrate of existence of an universal essence.⁸⁹

As a result, Paul builds up a mixed system, where the copula of the standard philosophical sentences which he deals with can have a three-fold value: it means (1) a partial identity between the real subject and the real predicate, in the case of identical predication; (2) a necessary

⁸⁸ Cf. Paul of Venice, *Quaestio de universalibus*, pp. 201–202.

⁸⁹ Cf. Paul of Venice, *Quaestio de universalibus*, pp. 206–207. See Alessandro D. Conti, "Il sofisma di Paolo Veneto: *Sortes in quantum homo est animal*," in *Sophisms in Medieval Logic and Grammar*, ed. Stephen Read (Dordrecht, 1993), pp. 304–318.

link between forms, in the case of the first type of formal predication; and (3) that the real subject in virtue of itself necessarily is a member of a given class of objects, labelled and referred-to by the predicate-term of the proposition at issue, in the case of the second type of formal predication, namely, when the predicate is a term of second intention. Paul therefore inverts the terms of the question in relation to Wyclif's approach, since Paul is attempting to reduce multiplicity to unity (the passage is from many to one). What he wants to account for is the way in which many different entities of a certain kind (namely, of an incomplete and dependent mode of existence) can constitute one and the same substance in number.

As the previous analysis has shown, Paul of Venice's world consists of finite beings (namely, things such as men and horses), which are aggregates made up by a primary (or individual) substance and a host of formal items (common natures and accidental forms, both universal and singular) existing in it and by it. The components of the finite beings are nothing but the categorial items themselves, taken together with their own modes of being. All these items are real, namely, they are beings (*entia*), in the sense that they are mind-independent. Yet, primary substances only are existent (in other words, primary substances only are actual beings—*entia in actu*). Individuation is what causes this passage from being (*esse*) to existence, and from specific natures (universals) to individuals. What is more, Paul of Venice's metaphysics celebrates the centrality of specific natures, which correspond to the ideas in the mind of God, and in relation to which the actual existence of individuals is functional, as they exist only as material substrates (*partes subiectivae*) of the natures themselves. Hence, within his system, notwithstanding the real identity with individuals, common natures have a form of being their own, which is independent of individuals. So that, if all the individuals belonging to a certain natural species were annihilated, their corresponding nature would keep on being, even though only potentially, as a mere metaphysical possibility (*esse indeterminatum et in potentia*).⁹⁰ In commenting on *Categories* 5, 2b5–6 (as we have seen, one

⁹⁰ *Expositio super Universalia Porphyrii, prooem.*, fol. 8va: "Licet repugnet universali habere determinatum esse absque suo singulari, non tamen repugnat habere indeterminatum esse absque illo; et consequenter non repugnat illi separari a suo singulari tam realiter quam intentionaliter. Unde nulla rosa existente adhuc est aliquo modo quidditas rosae, alioquin ea corrupta non amplius haberetur scientia de rosa, ex quo scientia non habetur de non ente... Et si allegatur illud Aristotelis in *Praedicamentis*: 'Destructis primis substantiis impossibile est aliquid horum remanere', demonstratis

of the most important passages of the work), Paul restates that same thesis, and adds that a certain common nature would be annihilated if (and only if) all the individuals belonging to the corresponding natural species were destroyed not only in relation to their actual existence, but also in relation to their potential being.⁹¹ Still, the potential being of individuals is nothing but the essential being proper to universals, and therefore the destruction of the individuals in relation to their potential being is the destruction of universals themselves.

Concluding Remarks

As is well known, in the *Categories* Aristotle sketches the main features of his metaphysics and semantics (which in turn are the ground of these medieval disciplines), since he (1) sets out the basic elements of the world (individual and universal substances, individual and universal accidents) in their mutual relationships, and (2) shows their links to language. As a consequence, that treatise is not a homogeneous text, but a compound one. There are in it three main doctrinal bodies, which can be split up into a few minor theories:

- (1) The categorial doctrine properly so-called concerns the table of categories (ch. 4), and the standard, internal structure of the (ten) categorial fields (chs. 2, 3, and 5). Two other theories complete it: (1.1) a semantic one, about homonymy, synonymy, and paronymy (ch. 1), and (1.2) a metaphysical one, on substance, where the Stag-irite states the epistemological and ontological primacy of individual substances over any other kind of beings (ch. 5). This first group of

universalibus, illud est sic intelligendum: destructis primis substantiis impossibile est aliquod universale eorum remanere secundum esse determinatum. Cum quo stat quod possint remanere secundum esse indeterminatum. Destructis ergo omnibus singularibus alicuius universalis illud universale remanet, non actu sed potentia, non determinatum sed indeterminatum; remanet quidem in potentia activa primi motoris, et in potentia passiva primae materiae, et in potentia cognitiva animae." See also *Quaestio de universalibus*, fol. 127ra–b.

⁹¹ Cf. Paul of Venice, *Expositio super Praedicamenta Aristotelis*, cap. *de substantia*, in *Expositio super Universalialia Porphyrii et Artem Veterem Aristotelis*, fol. 57va–b: "Destructo quolibet homine coniunctim ita quod non sit aliquod individuum speciei humanae, non manet homo, sed manet essentia hominis in suis causis. . . . Si tamen deficerent omnes homines et actu et potentia, non maneret species humana secundum esse neque secundum essentiam." On this point see Conti, *Esistenza e verità*, pp. 119–123, and 190–192.

- doctrines culminates in a threefold distinction: (1.3) between substance and accidents; (1.4) between individuals and universals; and (1.5) between two different types of predication: (1.5.1) the being-in-something-as-a-subject (or accidental predication) and (1.5.2) the being-said-of-something-as-a-subject (or essential predication) (chs. 2 and 5).
- (2) The “regional” ontologies, about the foremost categorial fields after substance (chs. 6–9). This second group of doctrines consists of physical and metaphysical theories of quantity (ch. 6), relation (ch. 7), quality (ch. 8), action and passion (ch. 9). There Aristotle (2.1) roughly describes (2.1.1) the items falling into these categorial fields, (2.1.2) their own modes of being, and (2.1.3) their main properties, and (2.2) supplies preliminary lists of them.
 - (3) The *Postpraedicamenta* (according to the terminology proper to the Latin tradition), a bundle of several loosely related topics concerning opposition, priority and posteriority, change, and having (chs. 10–15).

Medieval commentators usually did not ascribe much significance to this final section of the tract, but chiefly concentrated on the first two parts, and on the general questions of (1) the subject, (2) purpose, and (3) importance of the work. The *Categories* is not only a composite, but also a rather ambiguous text, as Aristotle’s *Categories* can be considered as both a classification of things and a classification of the signs signifying those things. Therefore, from late Antiquity onwards there were many disputes about those three questions. Depending on the general evaluation of the treatise, whether it primarily deals with world things or their signs, it is customary to classify medieval authors as being Realists or Nominalists. Furthermore, Nominalists (such as Peter of John Olivi, Ockham, Buridan) maintained that (1) in the world there are two (substance and quality), or three (substance, quantity, and quality), supreme genera of beings only, but (2) we grasp and signify the items falling into those two (or three) real categories by means of ten semantically different kinds of terms. On the contrary, Realists (such as Robert Kilwardby, Albert the Great, Thomas Aquinas, Simon of Faversham, Henry of Ghent, Duns Scotus, Burley, Franciscus de Prato, Jacobus de Placentia, Wyclif, Alyngton, Paul of Venice) held that the ten Aristotelian categories are the supreme genera of beings, irreducible to one another—even though there were some significant differences among them in establishing the nature and ontological status of

those ten categories. Some of them, such as Robert Kilwardby, Henry of Ghent, Simon of Faversham, “the first” Burley, and Franciscus de Prato judged only the items falling into the three absolute categories to be things (*res*), and considered the remaining ones real aspects (*respectus reales*) proper to the former. Some, such as Duns Scotus, “the second” Burley, Wyclif, Alyngton, and Paul of Venice, claimed that all the ten Aristotelian categories are distinct kinds of things. Some of them, such as Albert the Great, Simon of Faversham, Burley, Alyngton, thought that the ten categories are characterized by their own modes of being (*modi essendi*); some, such as Thomas Aquinas, believed that their constitutive and distinctive principles are their own modes of being-predicated (*modi praedicandi*); and some, such as Duns Scotus and Paul of Venice, affirmed that the ten real categories differ from each other in virtue of their own essences.

Originally, the problem of universals was only one of the main question internal to the theory of categories considered in the most proper sense. As a consequence, even though from a purely logical point of view the opinions on categories and universals are independent of each other (one might support the thesis that categories chiefly are really distinct genera of things while rejecting the thesis that universals have some existence of their own outside the mind, or vice versa), historically, in the (later) Middle Ages, realism concerning categories was always matched by a realist conception of universals, whereas nominalism on the question of categories was always paralleled by a nominalist position about universals.

If we consider the moderate realist view of universals, it is easy to see that it is totally determined by (1) the general evaluation of the categories, and (2) the main principles and theses stated by Aristotle in the first five chapters of the book. When moderate Realists interpreted the relation between universals and individuals in terms of identity, they were trying to save the ontological primacy of individual substances at the same time reading in a realist way (1) the nature and division of predication, and (2) the twofold partition (into substantial and accidental, individual and universal items) set in the second chapter of the *Categories*. On the one hand, they assumed that being a universal was equivalent to being-said-of-something-as-a-subject, on the other hand, they considered that relation as a real relation between two different kinds of beings. As a result, they were compelled to postulate a form of identity between universals and individuals: universals are (metaphysical) parts of their individuals. Otherwise it would have been impossible

to distinguish the relation of being-said-of-something-as-a-subject (or essential predication) from the relation of being-in-something-as-a-subject (or accidental predication, or inherence). Both universal substances and accidents are somehow present in individual substances and neither can exist apart from individual substances, but universals are parts of individuals and accidents are not.⁹² On the other side, universals and individuals cannot be entirely identical, since there is not a complete transitivity in predication between them. To elaborate new notions of identity and distinction was therefore a necessity for the Realists of the fourteenth century, as the logical machinery they had at their disposal was insufficient for their purposes. Because of Ockham's critique (1) of the moderate realist view, and (2) formal distinction, almost all the Realists of the later Middle Ages became fairly unsatisfied with Henry of Ghent's and Duns Scotus's formulations of distinctions midway between the real distinction and the distinction of reason. So they tried to improve the theory of universals by modifying (1) the standard Aristotelian analysis of predication, and (2) the notion of formal distinction. In fact, the only other possible way of overcoming Ockham's argumentations against realism was to assume, like Burley did, that universals and individuals are really distinct. A choice which entailed a change from an Aristotelian metaphysics to a "Platonic" one—as we have seen. Indeed, this second way also led to a paradoxical result: the partial dissolution of the traditional doctrine of categories. Within the new metaphysical system that Oxford Realists built up, universals and individuals, essential and accidental predication are far too different from their Aristotelian patterns. As Paul of Venice's explicit denial of the existential primacy of individual substances shows, the metaphysics proper to the Oxford Realists substantially is a Platonic metaphysics, where universal essences, and not individual substances, are the main kind of being. According to the moderate Realists of the second half of the thirteenth century, the actual existence of at least one individual was necessary in order to guarantee the existence *in potentia* of the corresponding universal. In Paul of Venice's view, the existence of a universal essence is the necessary condition for the existence of

⁹² Cf. Aristotle, *Categories* 2, 1a24–25, where the Stagirite posits that something is in something as a subject if, *not being in anything as a part*, it cannot exist apart from what it is in.

individuals. In other words, for moderate Realists universals were types and individuals were the tokens which instantiated those types; about one hundred and fifty years later, for Paul of Venice universals were projects and individuals were their possible fulfilments. There cannot be types without tokens, but no project, as such, needs to be fulfilled.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Abed, Shukri, "Language," in *History of Islamic Philosophy*, eds. S. Nasr and O. Leaman, London, 1996, pp. 904–13.
- Ackrill, J. L., *Aristotle's Categories and De interpretatione*, trans. J. L. Ackrill, Oxford, 1963.
- Adams, Marilyn McCord, "Ockham on Identity and Distinction," *Franciscan Studies* 36 (1976), 5–74.
- , "Universals in the Early Fourteenth Century," in *The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy: From the Rediscovery of Aristotle to the Disintegration of Scholasticism; 1100–1600*, eds. Norman Kretzmann, Anthony Kenny, and Jan Pinborg, Cambridge, 1982, pp. 411–39.
- , *William Ockham*, Indiana, 1987.
- Albertus Magnus, *Analytica posteriora*, in *Opera omnia*, ed. Auguste Borgnet, Paris, 1890.
- , *Analytica priora*, in *Opera omnia*, ed. Auguste Borgnet, Paris, 1890.
- , *De anima*, ed. Clemens Stroick, Münster, 1968.
- , *De bono*, eds. Heinrich Kühle et al., Münster, 1951.
- , *De causis et processu universitatis*, ed. Winfried Fauser, Münster, 1993.
- , *De natura et origine animae*, ed. Bernhard Geyer, Münster, 1955.
- , *De praedicamentis*, eds. Carlos Steel, Silvia Donati and Manuel Santos Noya (Münster, 2008).
- , *Ethica*, in *Opera omnia*, ed. Auguste Borgnet, Paris, 1891.
- , *Liber de Praedicabilibus*, in *Opera omnia*, ed. A. Borgnet, Paris, 1890.
- , *Liber de praedicamentis*, in *Opera omnia*, ed. A. Borgnet, Paris, 1890.
- , *Metaphysica*, ed. Bernhard Geyer, Münster, 1960.
- , *Peri hermeneias*, in *Opera omnia*, ed. Auguste Borgnet, Paris, 1890.
- , *Super Dionysium De divinis nominibus*, ed. Paul Simon, Münster, 1972.
- , *Super libros sententiarum*, in *Opera omnia*, ed. Auguste Borgnet, Paris, 1893.
- , *Super Porphyrium De V universalibus*, ed. Manuel Santos Noya, Münster, 2004.
- al-Fārābī, *Al-Mantiq 'inda l-Fārābī*, ed. R. Al-Ġam, vol. 3 (Beirut, 1986); trans. as "al-Fārābī's Paraphrase of The Categories of Aristotle," *Islamic Quarterly* (1957), 158–97.
- , *Book of the concordance in view of the two sages, the divine Plato and Aristotle*, eds. & French transl. F. W. Najjar & D. Mallet, Damascus, 1999.
- , *Greater Commentary on De interpretatione*, eds. W. Kutsch and S. Morrow, Beirut, 1960, trans. F. W. Zimmermann, London, 1981.
- , *Kitāb al-Āfāz al-Musta'mala fī l-mantiq*, ed. M. Mahdi, Beirut, 1968.
- , *Kitāb al-Hurūf*, ed. M. Mahdi, Beirut, 1970.
- Alyngton, Robert, *Litteralis sententia super Praedicamenta Aristotelis*, in Alessandro D. Conti, "Linguaggio e realtà nel commento alle *Categorie* di Robert Alyngton," *Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale* 4 (1993), 179–306.
- Amerini, Fabrizio, "La dottrina della *significatio* di Francesco da Prato, O.P. XIV secolo. Una critica tomista a Guglielmo di Ockham," *Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale* 11 (2000), 375–408.
- , "La *questio* 'Utrum subiectum in logica sit *ens rationis*' e la sua attribuzione a Francesco da Prato. Note sulla vita e gli scritti del domenicano Francesco da Prato XIV secolo," *Memorie Domenicane* n.s. 30 (1999), 147–217.
- , "Realism and Intentionality: Hervaeus Natalis, Peter Auriol, and William Ockham in Discussion," in *Philosophical Debates at the University of Paris in the First Quarter of the Fourteenth Century*, eds. Theo Kobusch and Stephen F. Brown, Paris, forthcoming.

- , “What is Real. A Reply to Ockham’s Ontological Program” *Vivarium* 43 (2005), 187–212.
- , *La logica di Francesco da Prato. Con l’edizione critica della Loyca e del Tractatus de voce univoca*, Florence, 2005.
- Andrews, Robert, “Peter of Auvergne on Denomination,” in *Meaning and Inference in Medieval Philosophy: Studies in Memory of Jan Pinborg*, ed. Norman Kretzmann, Dordrecht, 1988.
- , “Petrus de Alvernia, *Quaestiones super Praedicamentis*: An Edition,” *Cahiers de l’Institut du Moyen Âge grec et latin* 55 (1987), 3–84.
- , “Question Commentaries on the *Categories* in the Thirteenth Century,” *Medioevo* 26 (2001), 265–326.
- , “Resoluble, Exponible, and Officiable Terms in the ‘Sophistria’ of Petrus Olai, ms. Uppsala C 599,” in *Sophisms in Medieval Logic and Grammar: Acts of the Ninth European Symposium for Medieval Logic and Semantics, held at St. Andrews, June 1990*, ed. Stephen Read, Dordrecht, 1993.
- , “Thomas of Erfurt on the *Categories* in Philosophy,” in *Was ist Philosophie im Mittelalter?* Akten des X. Internationalen Kongresses für mittelalterliche Philosophie der Société Internationale pour l’Etude de la Philosophie Médiévale, 25. bis 30. August 1997 in Erfurt, eds. Jan A. Aertsen and Andreas Speer (*Miscellanea Mediaevalia* 26) Berlin, 1998, pp. 801–8.
- , ed. “The *Defensorium Ockham*,” *Essays in Honor of Fr. Gedeon Gál, O.F.M. on his Eightieth Birthday: Franciscan Philosophy and Theology* II, *Franciscan Studies* 54 (1995), 100–21.
- , *Peter of Auvergne’s Commentary on Aristotle’s “Categories”: Edition, Translation, and Analysis*, Dissertation: Cornell University, 1988.
- Annas, Julia, *Aristotle’s Metaphysics: Books M and N*, Oxford, 1976.
- Anonymus Escorial, *Quaestiones super Metaphysicam*, partim ed. P. Porro, in “Le *Quaestiones super Metaphysicam* attribuite a Enrico di Gand.”
- Anonymus Matritensis, *Quaestiones super librum Praedicamentorum*, ed. R. Andrews, in *Cahiers de l’Institut du moyen-âge grec et latin* 56 (1988), 117–92.
- Anton, J. P., “The Aristotelian Doctrine of Homonymy in the *Categories* and its Platonic Antecedents,” *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 6 (1968), 315–326.
- Aristoteles, *Analytica Priora et Posteriora*, eds. W. D. Ross and Laurent Minio-Paluello, Oxford, 1964.
- , *Categoriae*, ed. Laurent Minio-Paluello, Oxford, 1949.
- , *De anima*, ed. W. D. Ross, Oxford, 1956.
- Aristotle, *Aristotle’s “Categories” and “De Interpretatione,”* trans. J. L. Ackrill, Oxford, 1963.
- , *Metaphysica*, ed. W. Jaeger, Oxford, 1924.
- , *On Interpretation*, ed. Laurent Minio-Paluello, Oxford, 1949.
- , *Physics* 1.1, ed. Henri Carteron, Paris, 1961.
- , *Prior Analytics*, ed. W. D. Ross, Oxford, 1964.
- Ashworth, E. J. and Paul V. Spade, “Logic in Late Medieval Oxford,” in *The History of the University of Oxford*, eds. Jeremy I. Catto and Ralph Evans, vol. 2, Oxford, 1992, pp. 50–62.
- , “L’analogie de l’être et les homonymes: *Catégories*, 1 dans le «Guide de l’étudiant», in *L’enseignement de la philosophie au XIII^e siècle. Autour du «Guide de l’étudiant» du ms. Ripoll 109*, éd. par Claude Lafleur and Joanne Carrier, Turnhout, 1997, pp. 281–95.
- , “Language and Logic,” in *The Cambridge Companion to Medieval Philosophy*, New York, 2003, pp. 73–96.
- Asztalos, Monika, “Boethius as a Transmitter of Greek Logic to the Latin West,” *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology* 95 (1993), 367–407.
- Augustine, *Confessions*, ed. Pierre de Labriolle, Paris, 1950.
- Averroes, *In Aristotelis librum II Metaphysicorum commentarius*, Darms, 1966.
- , *Quaestiones in libros logicae*, in *Aristotelis Opera cum Averrois Commentariis*, Venice 1562–74; repr. Frankfurt am Main, 1962.

- , *Tahāfut al-Tahāfut*, trans. Simon van den Bergh, London, 1954.
- Avicenna, *Al-Maqūlāt*, eds. G. Anawati et al., Cairo, 1959.
- , *Aṣ-Ṣiṭ*, ed. 'A. Badawī, Cairo, 1966.
- , *Fi Nafs*, ed. G. Anawati, Cairo, 1962.
- , *Liber de philosophia prima sive scientia divina*, ed. S. Van Riet, 3 vols., Leuven, 1977–1983.
- , *Logica*, Venice, 1508.
- Bäck, Allan, "Aristotle's Discovery of First Principles," in *From Puzzles to Principles*, ed. May Sim, Maryland, 1999, pp. 163–82.
- , "Avicenna's Ontological Pentagon," *The Journal of Neoplatonic Studies* 7 (1999), 87–109.
- , "Review of Averroes' Middle Commentary on Aristotle's Poetics," trans. Charles Butterworth, *Canadian Philosophical Reviews* 10 (1990), 92–101.
- , "The Ordinary Language Approach in Traditional Logic," in *Argumentationstheorie*, ed. K. Jacobi, Leiden, 1993, pp. 507–30.
- , "The Triplex Status and its Justification," *Studies in the History of Logic*, eds. I. Angelelli & M. Cerrezo, Berlin, 1996.
- Badawī, A., "New Philosophical Texts Lost in Greek and Preserved in Islamic Translations," in *Islamic Philosophical Theology*, ed. P. Morewedge, Albany, 1979, pp. 3–13.
- , *La transmission de la philosophie grecque au monde arabe*, Paris, 1968.
- Bakker, Paul J. H. M., "Aristotelian Metaphysics and Eucharistic Theology: John Buridan and Marsilius of Inghen on the Ontological Status of Accidental Being." In *The Metaphysics and Natural Philosophy of John Buridan*, eds. J. M. M. H. Thijssen and Jack Zupko, Leiden, 2001, pp. 247–64.
- Beuchot, Mauricio, "La naturaleza de la lógica y su conexión con la ontología en Alberto Magno," *Diánoia* 33 (1987), 235–46.
- Black, Deborah L., "al-Fārābī," in S. H. Nasr and O. Leaman, eds. *History of Islamic philosophy*, London, 1996, pp. 178–97.
- Bloch, Marc, *The Historian's Craft*, trans. P. Putnam, New York, 1953.
- Bodéüs, R., "Introduction," in Aristote, *Catégories*. Texte établi et traduit par R. Bodéüs, Paris, 2001, pp. XXIV–CX.
- , "L'influence historique du stoïcisme sur l'interprétation de l'œuvre philosophique d'Aristote," *Revue des Sciences philosophiques et théologiques* 79 (1995), 553–586.
- Boethius, *De divisione liber*, ed. J. Magee, Leiden, 1998.
- , *In Categorias Aristotelis libri quatuor*, ed. J.-P. Migne, PL 64, Paris, 1847; reprint Turnhout, 1979.
- , *In Isagogen Porphyrii Commenta*, eds. G. Schepss and S. Brandt, Lipsiae, 1906.
- Bonaventura, *Commentarius in quattuor libros Sententiarum Petri Lombardi*, in *Opera omnia I–IV*, Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1882–1902.
- Bonin, Thérèse, *Creation as Emanation. The Origin of Diversity in Albertus Magnus's On the Causes and the Procession of the Universe*, Notre Dame, 2001.
- Bos, E. P. and A. C. van der Helm, "The Division of Being over the Categories According to Albertus Magnus, Thomas Aquinas and Duns Scotus," in *John Duns Scotus: Renewal of Philosophy: Acts of the Third Symposium Organized by the Dutch Society for Medieval Philosophy Medium Aevum May 23 and 24, 1996*, ed. E. P. Bos, ELEMENTA: Schriften zur Philosophie und ihrer Problemgeschichte 72 Amsterdam, Rodopi, 1998, pp. 183–96.
- Bos, E. P., "John Versor's Albertism in his Commentaries on Porphyry and the Categories," in *Chemins de la pensée médiévale. Études offertes à Zénon Kaluza*, ed. Paul J. J. M. Bakker, Textes et études du Moyen Âge, 20 Turnhout, 2002, pp. 47–78.
- Boulnois, O., "Être, luire et concevoir. Note sur la genèse et la structure de la conception scotiste de l'esse objective." *Collectanea franciscana* 60 (1990), 117–35.
- Brabant, Siger, *Écrits de logique, de morale et de physique*, ed. Bernardo Bazán, *Philosophes Médiévaux* xiv, Louvain-la-neuve, 1974, pp. 7–8.

- Breton, Stanislas, "La déduction thomiste des catégories," *Revue philosophique de Louvain* 60 (1962), 5–32.
- Brito, Radulphus, *Quaestiones super librum Porphyrii*, in *Quaestiones subtilissimae magistri Rodulphi Britonis super arte veteri*, Venetiis, 1499.
- , *Quaestiones super Praedicamenta*, in *Quaestiones subtilissimae magistri Rodulphi Britonis super arte veteri*, Venetiis, 1499.
- Brown, Stephen F., "Walter Burley's Middle Commentary on Aristotle's *Perihermeneias*," *Franciscan Studies* 33 (1973), 42–134.
- Brunschwig, J., "Aristote de Stagire. L'*Organon*: tradition grecque," in *Dictionnaire des Philosophes Antiques*, vol. 1, Paris, 1989, pp. 482–502.
- Buridan, John, "Jan Buridan, Kommentarz do *Isagogi* Porfiriusza [Introduction in Polish and Edition of the *Questiones in Isagogen Porphyrii* by Ryszard Tatarzyński]," *Przegląd Tomistyczny* 2 (1986), 111–95.
- , *In Metaphysicen Aristotelis Questiones argutissimae*, Paris, 1588 actually 1518; reprint, *Kommentar zur Aristotelischen Metaphysik*, Frankfurt am Main, 1964.
- , *Johannes Buridanus, Summulae: In Praedicamenta*, Introduction, critical edition and notes by E. P. Bos, *Artistarium* 10–3, Nijmegen, 1994.
- , *John Buridan: "Sumulae de Dialectica": An Annotated Translation with a Philosophical Introduction* by Gyula Klima, (Yale Library of Medieval Philosophy) Connecticut, 2001.
- , *Quaestiones in Praedicamenta*, ed. J. Schneider, München, 1983.
- Burnet, J., *Early Greek Philosophy*, 3rd ed, London, 1920.
- Burnyeat, M., *A Map of Metaphysics Zeta*, Pittsburgh, 2001.
- Caujolle-Zaslavsky, Françoise, "Les relatifs dans les *Catégories*," in *Concepts et Catégories dans la pensée antique*, ed. Pierre Aubenque, Paris, 1980, pp. 167–95.
- Cesalli, Laurent, "Le 'pan-propositionnalisme' de Jean Wyclif," *Vivarium* 43 (2005), 124–55.
- , "Le réalisme propositionnel de Walter Burley," *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Age* 68 (2001), 155–221.
- Chadwick, Henry, *Boethius. The Consolations of Music, Logic, Theology and Philosophy*, Oxford, 1981.
- Charles, David, "Aristotle on Names and their Signification," in *Language*, ed. S. Everson, Cambridge 1994.
- Chase, Michael, "Did Porphyry write a commentary on Aristotle's *Posterior Analytics*? Albertus Magnus, Fārābī and Porphyry on *per se* predication," in P. Adamson, ed. *Classical Arabic Philosophy: Sources and Reception*, London, forthcoming.
- , ed. & trans., *Simplicius: On Aristotle's Categories 1–4*, Ithaca, 2003.
- , *Études sur le commentaire de Porphyre sur les «Catégories» d'Aristote adressé à Gédalios*. Diss. École pratique des Hautes Études, Paris, 2000.
- Chávarri, Eladio, "El orden de los escritos lógicos de Aristóteles según San Alberto Magno," *Estudios filosóficos* 9 (1960), 97–134.
- Chenu, M.-D., *La théologie comme science au XII^e siècle*, 3rd ed. Paris, 1969.
- Cohen, Marc S., "Aristotle's Metaphysics," *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Winter 2003 Edition*, ed. Edward N. Zalta, URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2003/entries/aristotle-metaphysics>.
- Conti, Alessandro D., "Analogy and Formal Distinction: on the Logical Basis of Wyclif's Metaphysics," *Medieval Philosophy and Theology* 6 (1997), 133–65.
- , "Boezio commentatore e interprete delle *Categorie* di Aristotele," in *Scritti in onore di Girolamo Arnaldi offerti dalla Scuola Nazionale di Studi Medievali*, eds. A. Degrandi et al., Rome, 2001, pp. 77–102.
- , "Essenza ed essere nel pensiero della tarda scolastica Burley, Wyclif, Paolo Veneto," *Medioevo* 15 (1989), 235–67.
- , "Il commento di Giacomo da Piacenza all'*Isagoge* e alle *Categorie*," in *L'insegnamento della logica a Bologna nel XIV secolo*, eds. Dino Buzzetti, Maurizio Ferriani, and Andrea Tabarroni, Bologna, 1992, pp. 441–60.

- , “Il problema della conoscibilità del singolare nella gnoseologia di Paolo Veneto,” *Bollettino dell'Istituto Storico Italiano per il Medio Evo e Archivio muratoriano* 98 (1992), 323–82.
- , “Il sofisma di Paolo Veneto: *Sortes in quantum homo est animal*,” in *Sophisms in Medieval Logic and Grammar*, ed. Stephen Read, Dordrecht, 1993, pp. 304–18.
- , “Johannes Sharpe's Ontology and Semantics: Oxford, Realism Revisited,” *Vivarium* 43 (2005), 156–86.
- , “La conoscenza del singolare in Walter Burley,” *Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale* 15 (2004), 517–40.
- , “La teoria degli *ad aliquid* di Boezio: osservazioni sulla terminologia,” in *Atti del Congresso Internazionale di Storia della Logica. San Gimignano, 4–8 dicembre 1982*, eds. V. M. Abrusci, E. Casari, and M. Mugnai, Bologna, 1983, pp. 247–262.
- , “La teoria della relazione nei commentatori neoplatonici delle *Categorie* di Aristotele,” *Rivista critica di storia della filosofia* 38 (1983), 259–83.
- , “Linguaggio e realtà nel commento alle *Categorie* di Robert Alyngton,” *Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale* 4 (1993), 179–306.
- , “Logica intensionale e metafisica dell' essenza in John Wyclif,” *Bollettino dell'Istituto Storico Italiano per il Medioevo e Archivio muratoriano* 99 (1993), 159–219.
- , “Ontology in Walter Burley's Last Commentary on the *Ars Vetus*,” *Franciscan Studies* 50 (1990), 121–76.
- , “Paul of Venice on Individuation,” *Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie médiévales* 65 (1998), 107–32.
- , “Paul of Venice's Theory of Divine Ideas and its Sources,” *Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale* 14 (2003), 407–48.
- , “Second Intentions in the Late Middle Ages,” in *Medieval Analyses in Language and Cognition*, eds. Sten Ebbesen, Russell L. Friedman, Copenhagen, 1999, pp. 453–70.
- , “Significato e verità in Walter Burley,” *Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale* 11 (2000), 317–50.
- , “Studio storico-critico,” in Johannes Sharpe, *Quaestio super universalia*, ed. Alessandro D. Conti, Florence, 1990, pp. 211–38, and 295–336.
- , “Sviluppi e applicazioni della distinzione formale scotista ad Oxford, sul finire del XIV secolo,” in *Via Scoti, Metodologica ad mentem Joannis Duns Scoti*, ed. Leonardo Sileo, 2 vols., Rome, 1995, vol. 1, pp. 319–36.
- , “Teoria degli universali e teoria della predicazione nel trattato *De universalibus* di William Penbygull: discussione e difesa della posizione di Wyclif,” *Medioevo* 8 (1982), 137–203.
- , “Thomas Sutton's Commentary on the *Categories* according to MS Oxford, Merton College 289,” in *The Rise of British Logic*, ed. P. Osmund Lewry, Toronto, 1983, pp. 173–213.
- , “Wyclif's Logic and Metaphysics,” in *A Companion to John Wyclif*, ed. Ian C. Levy, Leiden, 2006, pp. 67–125.
- , *Esistenza e verità: Forme e strutture del reale in Paolo Veneto e nel pensiero filosofico del tardo medioevo*, Rome 1996.
- Copleston, Frederick, *A History of Medieval Philosophy* New York, 1972.
- Courcelle, Pierre, “Le «Connais-toi toi-même» chez les néo-platoniciens grecs,” in *Le néoplatonisme. Actes du Colloque de Royaumont, 9–13 juin 1969*, Paris, 1971, pp. 153–66.
- Cunningham, Francis A., “Speculative Grammar in St. Thomas Aquinas,” *Laval Théologique et Philosophique* 17 (1961), 76–86.
- D'Ancona, Cristina, “Greek into Arabic: Neoplatonism in translation,” in P. Adamson and R. C. Taylor, eds. *The Cambridge Companion to Arabic Philosophy*, Cambridge, 2005, pp. 10–31.
- Daiber, H., “Review of Peters' *Aristoteles Arabus*,” *Gnomon* 42 (1970).
- de Courtraco, Siger, *Expositio in librum Aristotelis Perihermeneias*, in *Žeger van Kortrijk, Commentator van Perihermeneias*, ed. C. Verhaak, Brussels, 1964.

- , *Summa modorum significandi, Sophismata*, New edition by Jan Pinborg, *Sophisma IV*: “Album potest esse nigrum” *Amsterdam Studies in the Theory and History of Linguistic Science*. Series III, *Studies in the History of Linguistics* 14, Amsterdam, 1977.
- de Libera, Alain, “Questions de réalisme. Sur deux arguments antiocckhamistes de John Sharpe,” *Revue de métaphysique et de morale* 97 (1992), 83–110.
- , “Théorie des universaux et réalisme logique chez Albert le Grand,” *Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques* 65 (1981), 55–73.
- , *Albert le Grand et la philosophie*, Paris, 1990.
- , *La querelle des universaux. De Platon à la fin du Moyen Âge* Paris, 1996.
- de Mottoni, Barbara Faes, “Il commento di Pietro di S. Amore agli *Analitici Posteriori* ritrovato?,” *Studi Medievali* 27 (1986), 383–405.
- de Rijk, L. M., ed. *Peter of Spain: Tractatus called afterwards ‘Summulae Logicales,’* Assen, 1972.
- , *Logica modernorum: A Contribution to the History of Early Terminist Logic*, vol. 2, part I, Assen, 1967.
- Decorte, J., “Avicenna’s Ontology of Relation. A Source of Inspiration to Henry of Ghent,” in *Avicenna and his Heritage. Acts of the International Colloquium, Leuven – Louvain-la-Neuve, September 8–September 11, 1999*, eds. J. Janssens and D. De Smet, Leuven, 2002, pp. 197–224.
- , “Giles of Rome and Henri de Gand on the Reality of a Real Relation,” *Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale* 7 (1996), 183–211.
- , “*Relatio as Modus Essendi*: The Origins of Henry of Ghent’s Definition of Relation,” *International Journal of Philosophical Studies* 10 (2002), 309–36.
- Defensorium Ockham: An Edition*, “*Cahiers de l’institut du moyen-âge grec et latin* 71 (2000), 189–273.
- Dekker, Dirk-Jan, “John Buridan’s Treatise ‘*De dependentiis, diversitatibus et convenientiis*’: An Edition,” *Vivarium* 42 (2004), 109–49.
- Delisle, L., “Manuscripts divers acquis par la Bibliothèque Nationale en 1876, 1877 et 1878,” in *Mélanges de Paléographie et de Bibliographie*, Paris, 1880, pp. 469–71.
- Denifle, Heinrich and Emile Chatelain, eds. *Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis* I, Paris, 1889–1897.
- Dillon, John, “Iamblichus’ *Noera theoria* of Aristotle’s *Categories*,” *Syllecta Classica* 8 (1997) 65–77.
- Donati, Silvia, “Per lo studio dei commenti alla Fisica del XIII secolo. I: Commenti di probabile origine inglese degli anni 1250–1270 ca.,” *Documenti e Studi sulla Tradizione Filosofica Medievale* II 2 (1991), 384–5.
- Druart, Thérèse-Ann, “Averroes on God’s Knowledge of Being *qua* Being,” in *Studies in Thomistic Theology*, ed. P. Lockey, Houston, 1996.
- Duerlinger, James, “Predication and Inherence in Aristotle’s *Categories*,” *Phronesis* 15 (1970), 179–203.
- Duhem, P., *Le Système du monde*, 10 vols., Paris, 1913–59.
- Dumont, Stephen D., “Duns Scotus’s Parisian Question on the Formal Distinction,” *Vivarium* 43 (2005), 7–62.
- Dunlop, D. M., “Averroes on the Modality of Propositions,” *Islamic Studies*, 1 (1962).
- Ebbesen, Sten, “Albert the Great’s Companion to the *Organon*,” in *Albert der Grosse. Seine Zeit, seine Werk, seine Wirkung*, ed. Albert Zimmermann, Berlin, 1981, pp. 89–103.
- , “Ancient Scholastic Logic as the Source of Medieval Scholastic Logic,” in *The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy: From the Rediscovery of Aristotle to the Disintegration of Scholasticism; 1100–1600*, eds. Norman Kretzmann, Anthony Kenny, and Jan Pinborg, Cambridge, 1982, pp. 101–27.
- , “Anonymous D’Orvillensis’ Commentary on Aristotle’s *Categories*,” *Cahiers de l’Institut du Moyen Âge grec et latin* 70 (1999), 229–423.

- , “Boethius as an Aristotelian Commentator,” in *Aristoteles: Werk und Wirkung*, ed. Jürgen Wiesner, 2 vols., Berlin, 1987, pp. 286–311.
- , “Les *Catégories* au moyen âge et au début de la modernité,” in *Les Catégories et leur histoire*, eds. O. Bruun and L. Corti, Paris, 2005, pp. 245–74.
- Emden, A. B., *A Biographical Register of the University of Oxford, to A.D. 1500*, 3 vols., Oxford, 1957–59.
- Endress, Gerhard, “Die wissenschaftliche Litteratur,” in *Grundrisse der Arabischen Philologie*, ed. H. Gätje, vol. 2, Wiesbaden, 1987, pp. 402–34.
- Euclid, *The Thirteen Books of the Elements*, trans. Thomas L. Heath, 2nd ed. New York, 1956.
- Eustratus, *In primum Aristotelis moralium ad Nicomachum*, eds. H. Paul and F. Mercken, Leiden, 1973.
- Evans, J. D. G., *Aristotle's Concept of Dialectic*, Cambridge, 1977.
- Fischer, Wolfdietrich, *A Grammar of Classical Arabic*, 3rd ed., trans. J. Rodgers, New Haven, 2002.
- Franceschini, Ezio, “Giovanni Pigo: Le sue *Rationes super Praedicamenta Aristotelis* e la loro posizione nel movimento aristotelico del secolo XIII,” *Sophia* 2 (1934), 172–82.
- Franciscus de Prato, “*Logica*,” in Fabrizio Amerini, *La logica di Francesco da Prato. Con l'edizione critica della Loyca e del Tractatus de voce univoca*, Florence, 2005.
- , *Tractatus de sex transcendentibus*, ed. Burkhard Mojsisch, in *Bochumer Philosophisches Jahrbuch für Antike und Mittelalter*, 5 (2000), 177–217.
- Frede, Michael, “Categories in Aristotle,” *Studies in Aristotle*, ed. Dominic J. O'Meara, Washington, D.C., 1981, pp. 1–24.
- , “The Title, Unity, and Authenticity of the Aristotelian *Categories*,” in *Essays in Ancient Philosophy*, ed. M. Frede, Oxford, 1987, pp. 11–28.
- Friedrich, Paul, “Polytrophy,” in *Beyond Metaphor*, ed. J. Fernandez, Stanford, 1991, pp. 19–55.
- Galluzzo, G., “*Met. Z 13* in the Contemporary Debate and in Aquinas's Interpretation,” *Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale*, 14 (2003), 159–226.
- Gaskin, Richard, trans. & comm., *Simplicius, On Aristotle's Categories 9–15*, Ithaca, 2000.
- Gätje, Helmut, “Simplikios in der arabischen Überlieferung,” *Der Islam* 59 (1982), 6–31.
- Gellius, “*Noctes Atticae* 20,5,11–2,” in *Aristoteles, Privatorum Scriptorum Fragmenta*, ed. M. Plezia, Leipzig, 1977.
- Giles of Rome, *Expositio super libros Elenchorum Aristotelis*, Venetiis, 1500; reprint Frankfurt am Main, 1968.
- , *Super librum I Sententiarum*, Venetiis, 1521.
- Gilson, Étienne, “Les sources gréco-arabes de l'Augustinisme avicennisant,” *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Age* 4 (1929–30); reprint, Paris, 1986.
- , “Quasi Definitio Substantiae,” in *St. Thomas Aquinas 1274–1974. Commemorative Studies*, eds. A. Maurer et al., Toronto, 1974, vol. 1, pp. 111–129.
- , *Being and Some Philosophers*, Toronto, 1952.
- , *History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages*, New York, 1955.
- Glorieux, P., “Pierre de Saint-Amour. Pierre Bellison. Neveu de Guillaume de Saint-Amour. Dès 1250 chanoine de Saint-Vincent de Mâcon. Recteur de l'Université en 1281. Mort le 1er juin 1295,” in *La Faculté des arts et ses maîtres au XIII^e siècle*, ed. P. Glorieux, Paris, 1971.
- Gohlman, W., ed. and trans., *The Life of Ibn Sina*, Albany, 1974.
- Gorman, Michael and Jonathan J. Sanford, eds. *Categories: Historical and Systematic Essays*, Washington, DC, 2004.
- Gracia, J. E. and Lloyd Newton, “Medieval Theories of Categories,” *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, 14 April 2006, <<http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/medieval-categories>> 8 August 2006.

- Greimas, J., *Dictionnaire de l'ancien français jusqu'au milieu du XIV^e siècle*, Paris, 1987.
- Grosseteste, Robertus, *De veritate propositionis*, ed. L. Baur, Aschendorff, 1912.
- Grotz, Stephan, trans., *De Modis Significandis*, *Thomas von Erfurt, Abhandlung über die bedeutenden Verhaltensweisen der Sprache* Tractatus De modis significandi, Amsterdam, 1998.
- Gutas, Dimitri, *Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition*, Leiden, 1988.
- , *Greek Thought, Arabic Culture*, London, 1998.
- Guthrie, W. K. C., *A History of Greek Philosophy*, vol. 1, Cambridge, 1962.
- , *The Presocratic Philosophers*, 2nd ed. Cambridge, 1983.
- Hadot, Ilsetraut, "Deuxième point du premier schéma introductif: la division néoplatonicienne des écrits d'Aristote," in Simplicius, *Commentaire sur les Catégories*. Traduction commentée sous la direction de Ilsetraut Hadot, fascicule I, Leiden, 1990, pp. 63–93.
- , "La vie et l'œuvre de Simplicius d'après des sources grecques et arabes," in I. Hadot, ed. 1987, 3–39.
- , ed. *Simplicius, sa vie, son œuvre, sa survie; actes du colloque international de Paris 28 sept.–1 oct. 1985*, Berlin, 1987.
- , *Simplicius, Commentaire sur les Catégories: traduction commentée*, I: Introduction. Première partie: pp. 1–9, 3 Kalbfleisch, sous la dir. de Ilsetraut Hadot; trad. par Philippe Hoffmann; avec la collab. de Ilsetraut Hadot & Pierre Hadot; commentaires et notes à la trad. I. Hadot; avec des appendices de P. Hadot & Jean-Pierre Mahé, Leiden, 1990.
- , *Simplicius, Commentaire sur les Catégories: traduction commentée*, III: Préambule aux Catégories. Commentaire au premier chapitre des Catégories: pp. 21–40 Kalbfleisch, sous la dir. de Ilsetraut Hadot; trad. de Philippe Hoffmann; avec la collab. de Ilsetraut Hadot, Pierre Hadot & Concetta Luna; commentaires & notes à la trad. par C. Luna, Leiden, 1990.
- Hadot, Pierre, *Philosophy as a way of life: spiritual exercises from Socrates to Foucault*, ed. Arnold Davidson, trans. John Michael Chase, Oxford, 1995.
- , *Porphyre et Victorinus*, 2 vols., Paris, 1968.
- , *What is ancient philosophy?*, trans. John Michael Chase Cambridge, Mass, 2002.
- Hamesse, Jacqueline, *Auctoritates Aristotelis, Senecae, Boethii, Platonis, Apulei et quorundam aliorum*, Louvain, 1974.
- Hankey, Wayne, "Aquinas and the Platonists," in *The Platonic Tradition in the Middle Ages: A Doxographic Approach*, eds. Stephen Gersh and Maarten J. F. M. Hoenen, with the assistance of Pieter Th. van Wingerden, Berlin, 2002, pp. 279–324.
- , "Philosophy as a Way of Life for Christians? Iamblichan and Porphyrian Reflections on Religion, Virtue, and Philosophy in Thomas Aquinas," *Laval théologique et philosophique* (2003), 193–224.
- , "Review of: *Simplicius: On Aristotle's Physics 5*," translated by J. O. Urmson, notes by Peter Lautner. The Ancient Commentators on Aristotle. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1997, *Bryn Mawr Classical Review*, 9.6 (1998), 585–8.
- , "Thomas' Neoplatonic Histories: His following of Simplicius," *Dionysius* 20 (2002), 153–78.
- Hasse, Dag, *Avicenna's De Anima in the Latin West* London, 2000.
- Henle, R. J. *Saint Thomas and Platonism*, Hague, 1956.
- Henninger, Mark, *Relations: Medieval Theories 1250–1325*, Oxford, 1989.
- Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibeta*, ed. J. Badius Ascensius, Paris, 1518, reprint Leuven, 1961.
- , *Quodlibet VII*, in *Opera omnia* 11, ed. G. A. Wilson, Leuven, 1991.
- , *Quodlibet IX*, in *Opera omnia* 13, ed. R. Macken, Leuven, 1983.
- , *Quodlibet X*, ed. R. Macken, Leuven, 1981.

- , *Summa quaestionum ordinariarum*, ed. J. Badius Ascensius, Paris, 1520, reprint St. Bonaventure, N.Y., 1953.
- , *Summa quaestionum ordinariarum*, art. XXXI–XXXIV, in *Opera omnia* 27, ed. R. Macken, Leuven, 1991.
- Henry, D. P., *Medieval Logic and Metaphysics*, London, 1972.
- Hervaeus Natalis, *Quodlibeta*, Venetiis, 1513.
- Hintikka, Jaakko, “The Development of Aristotle’s Ideas of Scientific Method,” in *Aristotle’s Philosophical Development*, ed. W. Wians, Lanham, Md., 1996.
- Hoffmann, Philippe, “Catégories et langage selon Simplicius. La question du *skopos* du traité aristotélicien des *Catégories*,” in Ilsetraut Hadot, ed. 1987, pp. 61–90.
- Honoratus, Maurus Servius, in *Vergilii carmina commentarii*, eds. G. Thilo et H. Hagen Leipzig, 1881.
- Hourani, George, “Ibn Sina on Necessary and Possible Existence,” *The Philosophical Forum* 14 (1974), 74–86.
- , *Averroes on the Harmony of Philosophy and Religion* Leiden, 1959.
- Hugonnard-Roche, Henri, “Remarques sur la tradition arabe de l’*Organon* d’après le manuscrit Paris, Bibliothèque nationale, ar. 2346,” in *Glosses and commentaries on Aristotle’s logical texts*, ed. C. Burnett, London, 1993, pp. 19–28.
- Hume, David, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, New York, 1992.
- Ivry, Alfred, “Towards a Unified View of Averroes’ Philosophy,” *The Philosophical Forum* 14 (1974), 87–113.
- Jacobus de Placentia, *Scriptum super librum Praedicamentorum*, Venice, Biblioteca Marciana, ms. lat. VI.97 2594, fol. 30rb–va.
- Jean le Page (Johannes Pagus), *Rationes super Predicamenta Aristotelis*, in ed. E. Franceschini, “Giovanni Pigo: le sue “*Rationes super Predicamenta Aristotelis*” e la loro posizione nel movimento aristotelico del secolo XIII,” *Sophia* 2 (1934), 172–82, 329–50, 476–86.
- John Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio*, in *Opera omnia*, Vaticana, 1950.
- , *God and Creatures: The Quodlibetal Questions*, trans. Felix Alluntis and Allan B. Wolter, Princeton, N. J., 1975.
- , *Lectura*, in *Opera omnia*, ed. Vaticana, 1950.
- , *Quaestiones in duos libros Perihermenias Aristotelis*, in Ioannis Duns Scoti *Opera philosophica* II, eds. R. Andrews, G. Etzkorn, G. Gál, R. Green, T. Noone, and R. Wood, St. Bonaventure, 2004.
- , *Quaestiones in Isagogen Porphyrii et Quaestiones super Praedicamenta Aristotelis*, in *Opera philosophica* I, eds. R. Andrews, G. Etzkorn, G. Gál, R. Green, T. Noone, and R. Wood, St. Bonaventure, 1999.
- , *Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis, Libri I–IX*, in *Opera philosophica*, vols. 3 and 4, eds. R. Andrews, G. Etzkorn, G. Gál, R. Green, F. Kelley, G. Marcil, T. Noone, and R. Wood, St. Bonaventure, 1997–1998.
- , *Questions on the Metaphysics of Aristotle*, trans. Girard J. Etzkorn and Allan B. Wolter, 2 vols. St. Bonaventure, 1997.
- , *Reportata Parisiensia*, vol. 22, ed. Vivès, 1891.
- Jordan, Mark D., *Rewritten Theology—Aquinas After His Readers*, Oxford, 2006.
- Kenny, Anthony, “The Realism of *De Universalibus*,” in *Wyclif in his Times*, ed. Anthony Kenny, Oxford, 1986, pp. 17–29.
- , *Wyclif*, Oxford, 1985.
- Kilwardby, Robert, *Notulae super librum Praedicamentorum, proem.*, and lectio 5, Cambridge, Peterhouse, ms. 206, fols. 41ra, and 44vb–45ra.
- , *Notulae super Praedicamenta*, ed. P. O. Lewry in *Robert Kilwardby’s Writings on the Logica Vetus, Studied with Regard to their Teaching and Method*, D.Phil. Thesis, University of Oxford, 1978.

- King, Peter, "Between Logic and Psychology: Jean Buridan on Mental Language." Paper presented at John Buridan and Beyond, Copenhagen, September, 2001. Accessed at http://individual.utoronto.ca/pking/presentations/Buridan_on_Mental.pdf.
- , "Duns Scotus on the Common Nature and Individual Difference," *Philosophical Topics* 20 (1992), 51–76.
- , "Jean Buridan." In *Individuation in Scholasticism: The Later Middle Ages and the Counter-Reformation; 1150–1650*, ed. Jorge J. E. Gracia, New York, 1994, pp. 397–430.
- , "John Buridan's Solution to the Problem of Universals." In *The Metaphysics and Natural Philosophy of John Buridan*, eds. J. M. M. H. Thijssen and Jack Zupko, Leiden, 2001, pp. 1–28.
- , "Scotus on Metaphysics," in *The Cambridge Companion to Duns Scotus*, ed. Thomas Williams, Cambridge, 2003, pp. 28–38.
- Klima, Gyula, "Aquinas' Theory of the Copula," *Logical Analysis and History of Philosophy* 5 (2002).
- , "Buridan's Logic and the Ontology of Modes," in *Medieval Analyses in Language and Cognition*, eds. Sten Ebbesen and Russell L. Friedman, Copenhagen, 1999, pp. 473–95.
- , "Buridan's Theory of Definitions in his Scientific Practice," in *The Metaphysics and Natural Philosophy of John Buridan*, eds. J. M. M. H. Thijssen and Jack Zupko, Leiden, 2001, pp. 29–48.
- , "Ockham's Semantics and Ontology of the Categories," in *The Cambridge Companion to Ockham*, ed. P. V. Spade, Cambridge, 1999, pp. 118–42.
- , "The Semantic Principles Underlying Saint Thomas Aquinas's Metaphysics of Being," *Medieval Philosophy and Theology* 5 (1996), 87–141.
- Knudsen, Christian, "Intentions and Impositions," in *The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy: From the Rediscovery of Aristotle to the Disintegration of Scholasticism; 1100–1600*, eds. Norman Kretzmann, Anthony Kenny, and Jan Pinborg, Cambridge, 1982, pp. 479–95.
- Kogan, Barry, *Averroes and the Metaphysics of Causation*, Albany, 1985.
- Kretzmann, Norman and Eleonore Stump, eds. *The Cambridge Companion to Aquinas*, New York, 1993.
- Kretzmann, Norman, "History of Semantics," in *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, ed. Paul Edwards, New York, 1967, vol. 7, p. 371.
- , Anthony Kenny and Jan Pinborg, eds. *The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy: From the Rediscovery of Aristotle to the Disintegration of Scholasticism; 1100–1600*, Cambridge, 1982.
- , *William of Sherwood's Introduction to Logic*, St. Paul, 1966.
- Laarmann, M., *Deus, primum cognitum: Die Lehre von Gott als dem Ersterkannten des menschlichen Intellekts bei Heinrich von Gent † 1293*, Münster, 1999.
- Lafleur, C., *Le «Guide de l'étudiant» d'un maître anonyme de la Faculté des arts de Paris au XIII^e siècle*, Québec, 1992.
- Leaman, Oliver, *Averroes and his Philosophy*, Oxford, 1988.
- Leff, Gordon, *William of Ockham: The Metamorphosis of Scholastic Discourse*, Manchester, 1975.
- Lewry, P. O., "Robertus Anglicus and the Italian Kilwardby," in *English Logic in Italy in the 14th and 15th Centuries*, Acts of the 5th European Symposium on Medieval Logic and Semantics, Rome, 10–14 November 1980, ed. A. Maierù, Naples, 1982, pp. 34–5.
- , "The *Liber sex principiorum*, A Supposedly Porretanean Work. A Study in Ascription," in *Gilbert de Poitiers et ses contemporains. Aux origines de la Logica modernorum*, eds. Jean Jolivet and Alain de Libera, Naples, 1987, pp. 251–78.
- , *Robert Kilwardby's Writings on the Logica Vetustas, Studied With Regard to Their Teaching* doctoral thesis, Oxford, 1978.

- Lohr, Charles H., "Medieval Latin Aristotle Commentaries. Authors: A–F," *Traditio* 23 (1967), 313–414.
- , "Medieval Latin Aristotle Commentaries. Authors G–I," *Traditio* 24 (1968), 149–246.
- , "Medieval Latin Aristotle Commentaries. Authors: Jacobus—Johannes," *Traditio* 26 (1970), 135–216.
- , "Medieval Latin Aristotle Commentaries. Authors: Johannes de Kanthi—Mynogodus," *Traditio* 27 (1971), 251–351.
- , "Medieval Latin Aristotle Commentaries. Authors: Narcissus—Richardus," *Traditio* 28 (1972), 281–396.
- , "Medieval Latin Aristotle Commentaries. Authors: Robertus—Wilgelmus," *Traditio* 29 (1973), 93–192.
- Lorenz, Sönke, "Thomas Manlefeld Maulefeld, Zu Leben und Werk," in *Schule und Schüler im Mittelalter. Beiträge zur europäischen Bildungsgeschichte des 9. bis 15. Jahrhunderts*, eds. Martin Kintzinger, Sönke Lorenz, and Michael Walter, *Beihefte zum Archiv für Kulturgeschichte* 42, Köln, 1996, pp. 145–64.
- , *Studium Generale Erfordense. Zum Erfurter Schulleben im 13. und 14. Jahrhundert*, Monographien zur Geschichte des Mittelalters, 34 Stuttgart, 1989.
- Luna, Concetta, "La relation chez Simplicius," in *Simplicius: sa vie, son oeuvre, sa survie*, ed. Ilsetraut Hadot, Berlin, 1987, pp. 113–47.
- , *Simplicius, Commentaire sur les «Catégories» d'Aristote*, Chapitres 2 à 4; trad. par Philippe Hoffmann; avec la collab. de Ilsetraut Hadot et Pierre Hadot; commentaire par Concetta Luna, Leiden, 2001.
- MacDonald, Scott, "Theory of Knowledge," in *The Cambridge Companion to Aquinas*, eds. Noman Kretzmann and Eleonore Stump, Cambridge, 1993, pp. 160–195.
- Madkour, Ibrahim, "Le traité des *Catégories* du *Shifa*," *Mélanges de l'Institut dominicain d'études orientales du Caire* 5 (1958), 253–78.
- , *L'Organon d'Aristote dans le monde arabe*, 2^e éd., Paris, 1969.
- Majercik, Ruth, "Porphyry and Gnosticism," *Classical Quarterly* 55 (2005), 277–92.
- Marenbon, J., "Vocalism, Nominalism and the Commentaries on the '*Catégories*' from the Earlier Twelfth Century," *Vivarium* 30 (1992), 51–61.
- Markowski, Mieczysław, "Johannes Buridans Polemik gegen die Universalienlehre des Walter Burleigh," *Mediaevalia Philosophica Polonorum* 26 (1982), 7–17.
- , *Repertorium commentariorum mediæ ævi in Aristotelem latinorum quæ in bibliothecis Wienneæ asservantur. Opera philosophorum mediæ ævi, Textus et studia*, Wrocław, 1985.
- Marmo, Costantino, "A Pragmatic Approach to Language in Modism," in *Sprachtheorien in Spätantike und Mittelalter*, ed. Sten Ebbesen, Tübingen, 1995, pp. 169–83.
- , "Suspicio: A Key Word to the Significance of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* in Thirteenth Century Scholasticism," *Cahiers de l'Institut du moyen-âge grec et latin* 60 (1990), 170–75.
- , "The Semantics of the *Modistæ*," in *Medieval Analyses in Language and Cognition*, Acts of the Symposium, 'The Copenhagen School of Medieval Philosophy', January 10–13, 1996, eds. Sten Ebbesen and Russell L. Friedman, Copenhagen, 1999, pp. 83–104.
- Marmura, Michael E., "Avicenna on the Division of the Sciences in the *Isagoge* of His *Shifa*," *Journal of the History of Arabic Science* 4 (1980), 239–51.
- Martin of Dacia, *Opera*, ed. H. Roos, Corpus Philosophorum Danicorum Medii Aevi, Copenhagen, 1961.
- Matthen, Mohan, "The *Catégories* and Aristotle's Ontology," *Dialogue* 17 (1978), 228–41.
- McGee, C. Douglas, "Who Means What by 'Synonymy'?", *Inquiry* 2 (1959), 199–212.
- McGrade, A. S., ed. *The Cambridge Companion to Medieval Philosophy*, New York, 2003.
- McHardy, A. K., "The Dissemination of Wyclif's Ideas," in *From Ockham to Wyclif*, eds. Anne Hudson and Michael J. Wilks, Oxford, 1987, pp. 361–68.

- McInerny, Ralph, "Albert on Universals," *Southwestern Journal of Philosophy* 10 (1979), 3–18.
- , "Being and Predication," *Being and Predication: Thomistic Interpretations* (Washington, D.C., 1986), pp. 173–228.
- McMahon, William E., "Albert the Great on the Semantics of the Categories of Substance, Quantity, and Quality," *Historiographia Linguistica* 7 (1980), 145–57.
- , "Radulphus Brito on the Sufficiency of the Categories," *Cahiers de l'Institut du Moyen Age grec et latin* 39 (1981).
- Meyer, Ruth, "Eine neue Perspektive im Geistesleben des 13. Jahrhunderts: Plädoyer für eine Würdigung der Organon-Kommentierung Alberts des Großen," in *Geistesleben im 13. Jahrhundert*, eds. Jan A. Aertsen and Andreas Speer, *Miscellanea Mediaevalia* 27, Berlin, 2000, pp. 189–201.
- Mill, John Stuart, *A System of Logic: Ratiocinative and Inductive*, in *Collected Works VII–VIII*, eds. J. M. Robson and R. F. MacRae, Toronto, 1973.
- Minio-Paluello, Laurentius, "Les traductions et les commentaires aristotéliens de Boèce," *Studia Patristica* 64 (1957), 567–84, reprint in Id., *Opuscula, The Latin Aristotle*, Amsterdam, 1972, pp. 328–35.
- , "Note sull'Aristotele latino medievale VI. Boezio, Giacomo Veneto, Guglielmo di Moerbeke, Jacques Lefèvre d'Étaples e gli «Elenchi Sofistici»," *Rivista di Filosofia Neo-Scholastica* 44 (1952), 398–411, reprint in Id., *Opuscula. The Latin Aristotle* Amsterdam, 1972, pp. 164–77.
- Moody, E. A., "Ockham, Buridan, and Nicholas of Autrecourt," in *Inquiries into Medieval Philosophy: A Collection in Honor of Francis P. Clarke*, ed. James F. Ross, Westport, CT, 1971, pp. 275–314.
- Morau, P., *Der Aristotelismus bei den Griechen. Von Andronikos bis Alexander Von Aphrodisias*, vol. 2 Berlin, 1984.
- Moravcsik, J. M. E., "Aristotle's Theory of Categories," in *Aristotle: A Collection of Critical Essays*, ed. J. M. E. Moravcsik, New York, 1967, pp. 125–45.
- Muckle, J. T., "Isaac Israeli's Definition of Truth," *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Age* 8 (1933), 5–8.
- Narcy, Michel, "L'homonymie entre Aristote et ses commentateurs néoplatoniciens," *Les Études Philosophiques* 1 (1981), 35–52, p. 47.
- Newton, Lloyd A., *Duns Scotus's Questions on the Categories of Aristotle: A Translation of the Whole, Together with a Philosophical Analysis and Commentary on Questions 1–8*, Dissertation: University of Dallas, 2003.
- Normore, Calvin G., "Buridan's Ontology," in *How Things Are: Studies in Predication and the History of Philosophy and Science*, eds. James Bogen and James E. McGuire, Dordrecht, 1981, pp. 189–203.
- , "The Tradition of Medieval Nominalism," in *Studies in Medieval Philosophy*, ed. John F. Wippel, Washington, D.C., 1981, pp. 201–71.
- Nuchelmans, G., *Theories of the Proposition. Ancient and Medieval Conceptions of the Bearers of Truth and Falsity*, Amsterdam, 1973.
- Nussbaum, Martha, *The Fragility of Goodness*, Cambridge, 1986.
- O'Brian, Joseph, "Duns Scotus's Teaching on the Distinction Between Essence and Existence," *New Scholasticism* 38 (1964), 61–77.
- O'Meara, Dominic, *Pythagoras revived. Mathematics and philosophy in Late Antiquity*, Oxford, 1989.
- Oberman, Heiko, *The Harvest of Medieval Theology: Gabriel Biel and Late Medieval Theology*, Durham, 1983.
- Ockham, William, *Expositio in librum Praedicamentorum Aristotelis*, in *Guillelmi de Ockham Opera philosophica et theologica, Opera philosophica* II, ed. Gedeon Gál, St. Bonaventure, 1978.
- , *Ordinatio*, in *Opera theologica*, vol. 2, ed. J. C. Wey, St. Bonaventure, 1980.
- , *Quodlibeta septem*, in *Guillelmi de Ockham Opera theologica* IX, ed. J. C. Wey, St. Bonaventure, N.Y., 1980.

- , *Scriptum in librum primum Sententiarum ordinatio. Prologus et distinctio prima*, in *Guillelmi de Ockham, Opera theologica I*, ed. Gedeon Gál, St. Bonaventure, N.Y., 1967.
- , *Summa Logicae*, in *Guillelmi de Ockham, Opera philosophica et theologica I*, eds. Gedeon Gál, et al., St. Bonaventure, N.Y., 1974.
- Ottaviano, Carmelo, "Le 'Quaestiones super libro Praedicamentorum' di Simone di Faversham," *Atti della R. Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei. Memorie della Classe di Scienze morali, storiche e filologiche* 3 (1930), 258–351.
- Ottman, Jennifer and Rega Wood, "Walter Burley: His Life and Works," *Vivarium* 37 (1999), 1–23.
- Owen, G. E. L., "Tithenai ta Phainomena," in *Logic, Science, and Dialectic*, ed. Martha Nussbaum, Ithaca, 1986, pp. 239–51.
- Owens, Joseph, "Aristotle on Categories," *The Review of Metaphysics* 14 (1960), 73–9.
- , *An Elementary Christian Metaphysics*, Milwaukee, 1963.
- Panaccio, Claude, "Semantics and Mental Language," in *The Cambridge Companion to Ockham*, ed. Paul V. Spade, Cambridge, 1999, pp. 53–75.
- , *Connotative Concepts and Their Definitions in Ockham's Nominalism*, in *La tradition médiévale des Catégories XII^e–XIV^e siècles*. Actes du XIII^e Symposium européen de logique et de sémantique médiévales Avignon, 6–10 juin 2000, eds., J. Biard and I. Rosier-Catach, Louvain, 2003.
- , *Les mots, les concepts et les choses. La sémantique de Guillaume d'Occam et le nominalisme d'aujourd'hui*, Montréal, 1991.
- Pasnau, Robert and Christopher Shields, *The Philosophy of Aquinas*, Boulder, 2004.
- Pasnau, Robert, *Theories of Cognition in the Later Middle Ages*, Cambridge 1997.
- Pattin, A., "Pour l'histoire du 'Commentaire sur les Catégories d'Aristote' de Simplicius au moyen âge," in *Arts libéraux et philosophie au Moyen Âge: IV^e Congrès international de philosophie médiévale*, Montréal 1967, Paris, 1969, pp. 1073–78.
- , ed. *Simplicius, Commentaire sur les Catégories d'Aristote*, Traduction de Guillaume de Moerbeke, 2 vols., Louvain, 1971–1975.
- Perler, Dominik, "Peter Aureol vs. Hervaeus Natalis on Intentionality. A Text Edition With Introductory Remarks," *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Âge* 61 (1994), 227–62.
- , *Theorien der Intentionalität im Mittelalter*, Frankfurt am Main, 2002.
- Perreiah, Alan R., *Paul of Venice: a Bibliographical Guide*, Ohio, 1986.
- Perrod, M., *Pierre de Saint-Amour, recteur de l'Université de Paris, chanoine de Mâcon, archidiacre de Vauxrenard*, Besançon, 1902.
- Peter of Auvergne, *Quaestiones super Porphyrium*, in "Le questioni su Porfirio di Pierre d'Auvergne," ed. A. Tiné, *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Âge* 64 (1997), 253–333.
- , *Quaestiones super Praedicamentis*, ed. Robert Andrews, *Cahiers de l'Institut du moyen-âge grec et latin* 55 (1987), 3–84.
- Peter of John Olivi, *Quaestiones in secundum librum Sententiarum*, ed. B. Jansen, I Ad Claras Aquas, 1922.
- Peters, F. E., *Aristoteles Arabus*, Leiden, 1968.
- , *Aristotle and the Arabs*, New York, 1968.
- Pickavé, Martin, *Heinrich von Gent über Metaphysik als erste Wissenschaft. Studien zu einem Metaphysikentwurf aus dem letzten Viertel des 13. Jahrhunderts*, Leiden, 2007.
- , *Henry of Ghent on the Categories*, (forthcoming).
- Piltz, Anders, *Studium Upsalense. Specimens of the oldest lecture notes taken in the medieval University of Uppsala*, Uppsala, 1977.
- Pinborg, Jan, "Die Logik der Modistae," *Studia Mediewistyczne* 16 (1975), 39–97.
- , "Speculative Grammar," in *The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy: From the Rediscovery of Aristotle to the Disintegration of Scholasticism; 1100–1600*, eds. Norman Kretzmann, Anthony Kenny, and Jan Pinborg, Cambridge, 1982, pp. 254–70.

- , “Zum Begriff der *Intentio Secunda*: Radulphus Brito, Hervacus Natalis und Petrus Aureoli in Diskussion,” *Cahiers de l’Institut du Moyen Âge Grec et Latin* 13 (1974), 49–59.
- Pini, Giorgio, “*Absoluta consideratio naturae*: Tommaso d’Aquino e la dottrina avicenniana dell’essenza,” *Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale* 15 (2004): 387–438.
- , “Scotus on Assertion and the Copula: A Comparison with Aquinas,” *Medieval Theories on Assertive and Non-Assertive Language. Acts of the 14th European Symposium on Medieval Logic and Semantics, Rome, June 11–15, 2002*, eds. A. Maierù and L. Valente Firenze, Olschki, 2004, pp. 307–31.
- , “Scotus on Deducing Aristotle’s Categories,” in *La tradition médiévale des Catégories XII^e–XIV^e siècles*. Actes du XIII^e Symposium européen de logique et de sémantique médiévales Avignon, 6–10 juin 2000, éds. J. Biard and I. Rosier-Catach, Louvain, 2003, pp. 23–35.
- , “Scotus’s Realist Conception of the Categories: His Legacy to Late Medieval Debates,” *Vivarium* 43 (2005), 63–110.
- , *Categories and Logic in Duns Scotus: an Interpretation of Aristotle’s Categories in the Late Thirteenth Century*, Leiden, 2002.
- Porphyry, *In Cat.*, ed. A. Busse, CAG IV,1, Berlin, 1887.
- , *On Aristotle’s Categories*, trans., S. K. Strange, London, 1992.
- , *Porphyrii Isagoge*, ed. A. Busse, Berlin, 1887.
- Porro, P., “Le *Quaestiones super Metaphysicam* attribuite a Enrico di Gand: elementi per un sondaggio dottrinale,” *Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale* 13 (2002), 507–602.
- Powers, Lawrence, “Equivocation,” in *Fallacies*, eds. H. Hansen & R. Pinto, University Park, 1995, pp. 293–301.
- Priscianus, *Institutiones grammaticae*, ed. M. Hertz, Leipzig, rpt. Hildesheim, 1961.
- Pseudo-Gilbert of Poitiers, *Anonymi fragmentum vulgo vocatum “Liber sex principiorum”*, ed. Laurent Minio-Paluello, Bruges, 1966.
- Rashed, Marwan, “La classification des lignes simples selon Proclus et sa transmission au monde islamique,” in *Aristotele e Alessandro di Afrodisia nella tradizione araba*, eds. C. D’Ancona and Giuseppe Serra, Padova, 2002, pp. 257–79.
- Reeve, C. D. C., *Practices of Reason*, Oxford, 1992.
- Rescher, Nicholas, *Studies in the History of Arabic Logic*, Liverpool, 1963.
- Robertus Anglicus, *Scriptum super libro Porphyrii*, in *Le problème des universaux à la faculté des arts de Paris entre 1230 et 1260*, ed. D. Piché, Paris, 2005.
- Robson, John A., *Wyclif and the Oxford Schools*, Cambridge, 1961.
- Rode, Christian, *Franciscus de Prato*, Stuttgart 2004.
- Rosier, Irène, *La grammaire spéculative des modistes* (Lille, 1983).
- Ruland, H.-J., “Zwei arabischen Fassungen der Abhandlung des Alexander von Aphrodisias über die universalia,” *Nachr. der Akademie der Wiss., Göttingen*, 1979.
- , *Die arabischen Fassungen zweier Schriften des Alexander von Aphrodisias: Über die Vorsehung und Über das liberum arbitrium*, diss. Saarbrücken, 1976.
- Sabra, A. I., “Avicenna on the Subject Matter of Logic,” *The Journal of Philosophy* 77 (1980), 746–64.
- Santos Noya, Manuel, “Die Universalienlehre der ‘Nominales’ in der Darstellung Albertus des Großen,” in *Albertus Magnus. Zum Gedenken nach 800 Jahren: Neue Zugänge, Aspekte und Perspektiven*, ed. Walter Senner, Quellen und Forschungen zur Geschichte des Dominikanerordens 10, Berlin, 2001.
- Scheu, M. Marina, *The Categories of Being in Aristotle and St. Thomas*, Washington D.C., 1944.
- Shields, Christopher, *Unity in Multiplicity*, Oxford, 1999.
- Schmidt, Robert W., *The Domain of Logic According to Saint Thomas Aquinas*, The Hague, 1966.

- Schönberger, R., *Relation als Vergleich. Die Relationstheorie des Johannes Buridanus im Kontext seines Denkens und der Scholastik*, Leiden, 1994.
- Senko, W., *Repertorium commentariorum medii aevi in Aristotelem latinorum quae in Bibliothecis publicis Parisiis asservantur, Opera philosophorum medii aevi, Textus et studia tom. 5 fasc. 1–2*, Warsaw, 1982.
- Shiel, James, “Boethius’ Commentaries on Aristotle,” *Mediaeval and Renaissance Studies* 4 (1958), 217–44.
- Simon of Faversham, *Notulae super Summulas Petri Hispani*, ed. L. M. de Rijk, *Vivarium* 6 (1968), 69–101.
- , *Quaestiones super libro Porphyrii*, in *Opera omnia*, vol. 1, ed. P. Mazzarella, Padova, 1957.
- , *Quaestiones super librum Praedicamentorum* in *Opera omnia*, vol. I, ed. P. Mazzarella, Padova 1957.
- , *Quaestiones super libro Elenchorum*, eds. S. Ebbesen et al., Toronto, 1984.
- Simplicius, *Simplicius: On Aristotle’s Categories 1–4*, trans. Michael Chase, Ithaca, 2003.
- Solmsen, F., “Boethius and the History of the *Organon*,” *American Journal of Philology* 65 (1944), 69–74.
- Spade, Paul V., “Introduction,” in John Wyclif, *On Universals*, trans., Anthony Kenny, Oxford, 1985.
- , “The Problem of Universals and Wyclif’s Alleged ‘Ultrarealism,’” *Vivarium*, 43 (2005), 111–123.
- Stehkämper, Hugo, ed. *Albertus Magnus: Ausstellung zum 700. Todestag*, Cologne, 1980–81.
- Strange, Steven K., ed. *Porphyry “On Aristotle’s ‘Categories,’”* trans., Steven K. Strange, London, 1992.
- Stump, Eleonore, *Aquinas: The Arguments of the Philosophers*, New York, 2005.
- Szlezák, T. A., *Pseudo-Archytas über die Kategorien*, Berlin, 1972.
- Tabarroni, Andrea, “Lo pseudo Egidio Guglielmo Arnaldi e un’inedita continuazione del commento di Tommaso al *Perihermenias*,” *Medioevo* 14 (1988), 391–403.
- Tardieu, Michel, “Šābiens coraniques et ‘Šābiens’ de Harrān,” *Journal asiatique* 274 (1986), 1–44.
- , *Recherches sur la formation de l’Apocalypse de Zostrien et les sources de Marius Victorinus*, Pierre Hadot, «Porphyre et Victorinus»: questions et hypotheses, Leuven, 1996.
- Taylor, A. E., *Varia Socratica*, Oxford, 1911.
- Thomas Aquinas, *Commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics: St. Thomas Aquinas*, trans. John P. Rowan, Notre Dame, 1995.
- , *Commentary on the Posterior Analytics of Aristotle*, trans. F. R. Larcher, 2 New York, 1970.
- , *De ente et essentia*, ed. Hyacinthe F. Dondaine, Rome, 1976.
- , *De potentia*, in *Quaestiones disputatae*, vol. 2, Rome, 1953.
- , *De veritate*, in *Opera omnia XXIII*, ed. Leonina, Rome, 1882.
- , *Expositio libri Perihermenias*, in S. Thomae de Aquino, *Opera omnia I**, 1, ed. Commissio Leonina, Rome, 1989.
- , *Expositio libri Posteriorum*, in S. Thomae de Aquino, *Opera omnia*, I* 2, ed. Commissio Leonina Rome, 1989.
- , *In duodecim libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis Expositio*, eds. M.-R. Cathala and R. M. Spiazzi, Rome, 1964.
- , *In octo libros Physicorum Aristotelis expositio*, ed. P. M. Maggiolo, Turin, 1954.
- , *Quaestiones quodlibetales*, in *Opera omnia* 25, ed. Leonina, Rome 1996.
- , *Scriptum super libros sententiarum*, ed. R. P. Mandonnet, Paris, 1929.
- , *Summa contra Gentiles*, in *Opera omnia* 13–15, ed. Leonina, Rome, 1918–1930.
- , *Summa Theologiae*, in *Opera omnia* 4–12, ed. Leonina, Rome, 1888–1906.

- Thomas of Erfurt, *Grammatica Speculativa. An Edition with Translation and Commentary*, ed. G. L. Bursill-Hall, London, 1972.
- Thomas Sutton, *Expositio super librum Praedicamentorum*, Oxford, Merton College, ms. 289, fols. 3rb–va and 7ra, transcription in Alessandro D. Conti, “Thomas Sutton’s Commentary on the *Categories* according to the Ms Oxford, Merton College 289,” in *The Rise of British Logic*, ed. P. O. Lewry, Toronto, 1985, pp. 173–213.
- Tomarchio, John, “Aquinas’s Division of Being According to Modes of Existing,” *Review of Metaphysics* 54 (2001), 585–613.
- Torrell, Jean-Pierre, *Initiation à Saint Thomas d’Aquin: Sa personne et son oeuvre*, Paris, 2002.
- Tremblay, Bruno, “A First Glance at Albertus Magnus’s Teachings on Analogy of Words,” *Medieval Philosophy and Theology* 5 (1996), 265–92.
- , “Albert le Grand: *De ce qui vient avant la logique*,” *History and Philosophy of Logic* 25 (2004), 165–203.
- , “Nécessité, rôle et nature de l’art logique, d’après Albert le Grand,” *Bochumer philosophisches Jahrbuch für Antike und Mittelalter*, forthcoming.
- Urvoy, Dominique, “Ibn Rushd,” in *History of Islamic Philosophy*, eds. S. Nasr and O. Leaman, London, 1996, pp. 330–45.
- Vallat, Philippe, *Fārābī et l’Ecole d’Alexandrie. Des prémisses de la connaissance à la philosophie politique*, Paris, 2004.
- Van Steenberghen, F., *Aristote en occident*, Louvain, 1946, trans. L. Johnston, as *Aristotle in the West*, Louvain, 1970.
- Verhaak, C., *Zeger van Kortrijk, Commentator van Perihermeneias*, Brussels, 1964.
- Vittorini, Marta, *Predicabili e categorie nell’ultimo commento di Walter Burley all’ Isagoge di Porfirio*, Ph.D. diss., University of Salerno, academic year 2004–5.
- von Perger, Mischa, “Understanding the *Categories* by Division: Walter Burley vs. William of Ockham,” in *La tradition médiévale des Catégories XII^e–XV^e siècles*, eds. Joel Biard, Irène Rosier-Catach, Louvain-la-Neuve, 2003, pp. 37–52.
- Wagner, Hans, “Über das Aristotelische ‘pollachos legetai to on,’” *Kantstudien* 53 (1962), 75–91.
- Wallace, William A., “Albertus Magnus’s Inventive Logic: His Exposition on the *Topics* of Aristotle,” *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* 70 (1996), 11–39.
- Wallerand, G., *Les oeuvres de Siger de Courtrai Les Philosophes Belges*, VIII, Louvain, 1913.
- Walter Burley, *De suppositionibus* (A.D. 1302), in Stephen F. Brown, “Walter Burleigh’s Treatise *De suppositionibus* and its Influence on William of Ockham,” *Franciscan Studies* 32 (1972), 15–64.
- , *Expositio libri De Anima* (before 1316), Civitas Vaticana, Bibl. Apostolica Vaticana, ms. Vat. Lat. 2151, fols. 1ra–88rb.
- , *Expositio super librum Perihermeneias*, in *Expositio super Artem Veterem Porphyrii et Aristotelis* cit., fols. 66ra–93rb.
- , *Expositio super Praedicamenta Aristotelis*, in *Expositio super Artem Veterem Porphyrii et Aristotelis* cit., fols. 17va–50va.
- , *Expositio super Universalia Porphyrii*, in *Expositio super Artem Veterem Porphyrii et Aristotelis* (A.D. 1337), Octavianus Scotus per Bonetum Locatellum, Venetiis 1509, fols. 2ra–17va.
- , *In Physicam Aristotelis Expositio et Quaestiones* (after 1324), Simon de Luere, Venetiis 1501.
- , *Quaestiones in librum Perihermeneias* (A.D. 1301), in Stephen F. Brown, “Walter Burley’s *Quaestiones in librum Perihermeneias*,” *Franciscan Studies* 34 (1974), 200–95.
- , *Tractatus de abstractis*, Civitas Vaticana, Bibl. Apostolica Vaticana, ms. Vat. Lat. 2146, fol. 249ra–249vb.
- , *Tractatus de universalibus* (after 1337), ed. Hans-Ulrich Wöhler, Leipzig 1999.

- , *Tractatus super librum Praedicamentorum* (before 1310), Cambridge, Peterhouse, ms. 184, fols. 171rb–189va.
- Walton, William M, “The Second Mode of Necessary or Per Se Propositions According to St. Thomas Aquinas,” *The Modern Schoolman* 29 (1951–52), 293–306.
- Walzer, Richard, “Porphyry and the Arabic tradition,” in *Porphyre, Vandœuvres*, 1966, *Entretiens sur l'Antiquité classique* 12, pp. 275–99.
- Washell, Richard F, “Logic, Language, and Albertus Magnus,” *Journal of the History of Ideas* 34 (1973), 445–50.
- Weinberg, Julius, *Abstraction, Relation and Induction*, Madison, 1965.
- Wians, William, “Saving Aristotle from Nussbaum’s *Phainomena*,” in *Essays in Ancient Greek Philosophy V*, eds. A Preus and J. Anton, Albany, 1992.
- Wieland, Georg, *Untersuchungen zum Seinbegriff im Metaphysikkommentar Alberts des Großen*, Münster, 1972.
- Wippel, John F, “Essence and Existence,” in *The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy: From the Rediscovery of Aristotle to the Disintegration of Scholasticism; 1100–1600*, eds. Norman Kretzmann, Anthony Kenny, and Jan Pinborg, Cambridge, 1982, pp. 385–410.
- , “Godfrey of Fontaines and Henry of Ghent’s Theory of Intentional Distinction Between Essence and Existence,” in *Sapientiae procerum amore*, ed. T. W. Koehler, Rome 1974, pp. 289–321.
- , “Thomas Aquinas’s Derivation of the Aristotelian Categories,” *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 25 (1987), 13–34.
- , *The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas* Washington, D.C., 2000.
- Wlodck, Sophie, “Albert le Grand et les Albertistes du XV^e siècle: le problème des universaux,” in *Albert der Grosse. Seine Zeit, seine Werk, seine Wirkung*, Band 2, ed. Albert Zimmermann, *Miscellanea Mediaevalia* 14, Berlin, 1981, pp. 193–207.
- Wolter, Allan, *Transcendentals and their Function*, Washington, D.C., 1946.
- Wright, W., *A Grammar of the Arabic Language*, Cambridge, 1967.
- Wyclif, John, *De actibus animae* 1365 ca., in *Johannis Wyclif miscellanea philosophica*, ed. Michael H. Dziewicki, 2 vols., London, 1902.
- , *De ente in communi*, in *Summa de ente libri primi tractatus primus et secundus*, ed. Samuel H. Thomson, Oxford, 1930.
- , *De ente praedicamentali*, ed. Rudolf Beer, London, 1891.
- , *Tractatus de universalibus* 1374 ca., ed. Ian J. Mueller, Oxford, 1985.
- Zedler, Beatrice, trans. & comm., *Destructio Destructionum Philosophiae Algazelis*, Milwaukee, 1961.
- Zimmermann, A., *Ontologie oder Metaphysik? Diskussionen über den Gegenstand der Metaphysik im 13. und 14. Jahrhundert: Texte und Untersuchungen*, 2nd ed. Leuven, 1998.
- Zimmermann, F. W., *al-Fārābī’s commentary and short treatise on Aristotle’s De Interpretatione*, Oxford, 1981.
- Zupko, Jack, *John Buridan: Portrait of a Fourteenth-Century Arts Master*, Notre Dame, 2003.

LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS

ROBERT ANDREWS' study of *Categories* commentaries from the Middle Ages arises out of a broader interest in the change and development of ideas in the history of philosophy. After obtaining a doctorate from Cornell University, he joined the Scotus Project of the Franciscan Institute at St. Bonaventure University, editing the philosophical works of John Duns Scotus. He has since taught in Sweden, Norway, and the United States, and is currently teaching in Kristinehamn, Sweden.

ALLAN BÄCK received his B.A. in philosophy (Phi Beta Kappa) from Reed College, and his Ph.D. in philosophy from The University of Texas at Austin. He has published widely in such areas as the history and philosophy of logic, ancient philosophy, medieval philosophy, and comparative philosophy. His first book (*On Reduplication* (Leiden: Brill, 1996)) received a prize from VG—Wort. In 1999 he received a *Forschungspreis* from the Alexander von Humboldt Stiftung for his research, and was in residence at the University of Freiburg (im Breisgau). He has taken an American Philosophical Association Fellowship for the Institute for Advanced Studies at Edinburgh University. He is a Professor of Philosophy at Kutztown University in Pennsylvania. He has taught at other schools, including Rice University and Emory University.

TODD BATES received his Ph.D. in 2003 from the University of Pennsylvania, writing a dissertation on Duns Scotus and the problem of universals. In 1993, he received a B.A., *summa cum laude*, in Philosophy, and a B.A., *cum laude*, in Classics from the University of Massachusetts at Amherst. In 2004, he published an article on natural theology with Jim Ross in *The Cambridge Companion to Duns Scotus*. Dr. Bates joined the faculty of the University of Central Florida in 2004; before that, he lectured at Stetson University and Rollins College.

MICHAEL CHASE (Ph.D. Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes, Paris [Sorbonne] 2000), is Ingénieur de Recherche at the French National Center of Scientific Research (UPR 76, Villejuif-Paris), where he works as Associate Editor at the periodical *l'Année Philologique*. He is the author of a translation of Books 1–4 of Simplicius' *Commentary on the Categories*

(London: Duckworth, 2003, in the series *Ancient Commentators on Aristotle*), as well as of several articles on Late Antique, Islamic and Medieval thought, several of which have appeared in R. Goulet's *Dictionnaire des Philosophes Antiques*. He has also translated a half-dozen works by the French scholars Pierre and Ilsetraut Hadot, most recently Pierre Hadot, *The Veil of Isis. An Essay on the History of the Idea of Nature*, Harvard University Press, Autumn 2006.

ALESSANDRO D. CONTI is Associate Professor in the Faculty of Letters and Philosophy at the University of L'Aquila (Italy). His research interests include the tradition of commentaries on Porphyry's *Isagoge* and on Aristotle's *Categories* in late Antiquity and Middle Ages, and Realism in late Middle Ages. He has published editions of texts by Thomas Sutton, Robert Alynngton, Johannes Sharpe, William Penygull, William Russell, and Paul of Venice. Among his books is *Esistenza e verità: Forme e strutture del reale in Paolo Veneto e nel pensiero filosofico del tardo medioevo* (Rome 1996). He has been the Guest Editor of *Vivarium* 43 (2005), dedicated to Realism in the late Middle Ages.

ALEXANDER HALL is an Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Clayton State University. He is the author of *Thomas Aquinas and John Duns Scotus: Natural Theology in the High Middle Ages* (Thoemmes Continuum), and "Logic and Analogy: Aquinas's Five Ways," in *The Logic and Semantics of Thomas Aquinas: Essays in Honor of Professor E. J. Ashworth*.

LLOYD A. NEWTON (University of Dallas, 2003) is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Benedictine College, in Atchison, Kansas. His research interests include medieval logic, metaphysics and the philosophy of nature. He has an article on Duns Scotus's understanding of the categories in the *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* and has co-authored with Jorge J. E. Gracia an article on "Medieval Theories of the Categories" for the *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.

MARTIN PICKAVÉ (University of Cologne, 2003) is Assistant Professor of philosophy and medieval studies at the University of Toronto. His research interests include medieval metaphysics and philosophy of mind and especially the philosophy of Henry of Ghent. He is the author of several articles and recently published *Heinrich von Gent über Metaphysik als erste Wissenschaft. Studien zu einem Metaphysikentwurf aus dem letzten Viertel*

des 13. Jahrhunderts (Leiden 2007). He also co-edited several volumes of the *Miscellanea Mediaevalia*.

GIORGIO PINI (Ph.D., Scuola Normale Superiore, 1997) is Associate Professor at Fordham University, New York. His research interests include late medieval logic, metaphysics, and theology, especially in Giles of Rome, Henry of Ghent, and John Duns Scotus. He is the author of several articles and two books, *Categories and Logic in Duns Scotus. A Thirteenth-Century Interpretation of Aristotle's Categories* (Brill 2002) and *Scoto e l'analogia. Logica e metafisica nei commenti aristotelici* (Pisa 2002).

PAUL SYMINGTON (Ph.D., University at Buffalo in New York, 2007) is an Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Franciscan University of Steubenville. His dissertation, directed by Jorge J. E. Gracia, examined the debate between Thomas Aquinas and John Duns Scotus on the sufficiency of Aristotle's categories. His most recent article, "Naming and the Analogy of Being," is forthcoming in *International Philosophical Quarterly*. He also has articles in *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* and *Philosophy Today*. He presently lives in Buffalo with his wife Eliza and three daughters.

BRUNO TREMBLAY (Université Laval) is Assistant Professor in the Philosophy department of St. Jerome's University, Canada. He has published articles on Boethius, Albertus Magnus, Thomas Aquinas, and Michel de Montaigne, which have appeared in varied international journals: *Carmina Philosophiae*, *Angelicum*, *Medieval Philosophy and Theology*, *Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie*, *Estudios Filosóficos*, *History and Philosophy of Logic*, and *Montaigne Studies*.

INDEX

- ‘Abdallāh ibn al-Ṭayyib, 12
 Abed, 46 n. 57, 411
 Abelard, 33, 43, 46
 Abū Ya‘qūb, 31, 65
 Abū Zakarīyā’ Yahyā ibn ‘Adī, 12
 Abū-l-Ḥasan al-‘Amirī, 12
 Ackrill, 171 n. 44, 300 nn. 16–17, 302
 n. 24, 305 n. 34, 317 n. 1, 338 n. 72,
 411–413
 Adams, 163 n. 30, 297 n. 9, 375 n. 11,
 377 n. 17, 379 n. 22, 380 nn. 27, 29,
 413
 Afnan, 45 n. 56
 Albert, 10, 73, 73 nn. 2, 4, 74, 74 nn.
 5–6, 75, 75 n. 10, 76, 76 n. 11, 77,
 77 n. 15, 78–79, 79 nn. 24, 27–29,
 80 nn. 30, 33, 81, 82 nn. 46, 48, 83,
 83 n. 51, 84, 84 n. 56, 85–88, 90–94,
 94 n. 101, 95, 95 n. 102, 102 n. 15,
 96–97, 97 n. 112, 111–112, 113 n.
 58, 114 n. 62, 115, 119 n. 4, 120,
 121 n. 9, 243, 322, 322 n. 17, 327,
 327 n. 35, 339, 339 n. 75, 341, 342
 n. 88, 370, 372 nn. 4–5, 373 n. 7,
 374 nn. 8–9, 377 n. 19, 378 n. 21,
 380, 383, 385 n. 40, 399, 402, 406,
 411, 422
 Alexander, 17, 36 n. 22, 41–42, 44 nn.
 50, 52, 66, 68–69, 170 n. 42, 422,
 424
 al-Fārābī, v, 9, 12, 12 n. 16, 17, 17
 n. 36, 18 n. 38, 25, 28 n. 76, 38,
 40–41, 42 n. 43, 44, 44 nn. 49, 52,
 45–47, 47 n. 59, 53 n. 76, 54, 58
 n. 94, 61, 62 n. 99, 65–68, 154, 411,
 413, 427
 Al-Ghazālī, 65, 67, 69–70
 al-Ḥasan ibn Suwār, 12
 al-Jūzjānī, 40, 42 n. 45
 al-Mas‘ūdī, 28
 al-Nadīm, 12, 12 n. 12
 al-Qifī, 12, 12 n. 13
 al-Yasin, 19
 Alyngton, 147, 162, 167–168, 168 n. 40,
 169, 169 n. 41, 171, 176, 178, 178
 n. 54, 411
 Amerini, 318 n. 4, 381 n. 31, 388 nn.
 52–53, 390 nn. 59–61, 411–413, 417
 Ammonius, 9 n. 1, 25, 40 n. 35, 42, 373
 Andrews, v–vi, 75 n. 10, 99, 99 n. 1,
 104 n. 24, 105 nn. 29, 34, 111 n. 50,
 119 n. 2, 155 n. 18, 158 n. 23, 160
 n. 26, 183 n. 2, 185 nn. 3–4, 189
 n. 14, 195 n. 32, 196 nn. 35, 37–38,
 197 n. 41, 201 n. 50, 214 n. 87, 215
 nn. 88, 91, 217 n. 96, 233, 234 n. 44,
 235 n. 47, 241 n. 61, 347, 347 n. 3,
 348 n. 4, 413, 419
 Andronicus, 149
 Annas, 338 n. 72, 412
 Anonymous of Madrid, 195, 197, 201,
 214, 215 nn. 89, 91, 217–218, 218
 n. 99
 Anonymus Escorial, 198 n. 43
 Antiochus, 13
 Anton, 34 n. 15, 52 n. 73, 414, 429
 Aquinas, v, 9, 10 n. 3, 11–13, 13 n. 17,
 15, 15 n. 26, 16 nn. 29–30, 17 n. 32,
 20, 20 n. 50, 23, 24 n. 61, 25–26,
 71, 79, 81, 81 n. 44, 84 n. 56, 94
 n. 101, 99, 101, 103, 107 n. 38, 116,
 119, 119 nn. 2, 4, 120, 120 nn. 5–8,
 121, 121 nn. 9–10, 122, 122 n. 12,
 123, 123 n. 17, 124–125, 125 n. 21,
 127–129, 129 n. 35, 130, 130 n. 38,
 131, 131 n. 43, 132–139, 139 n. 64,
 140–143, 147, 155, 155 n. 18, 157,
 157 n. 22, 158, 166, 166 n. 34, 170
 n. 43, 171, 171 n. 45, 172, 172 n. 46,
 173, 186 n. 5, 193, 193 n. 26, 201,
 201 n. 51, 202, 202 n. 56, 203, 203
 nn. 57–58, 204, 207, 207 n. 70, 216,
 228, 228 n. 28, 229, 230 n. 33, 231,
 231 nn. 35, 42, 239 n. 55, 251, 254,
 254 n. 95, 321, 321 n. 15, 370, 376,
 390, 392, 392 n. 65, 393, 393 n. 65,
 402, 406, 413, 417, 420, 425, 427
 Archytas, 44
 Ashworth, 75 n. 10, 76–77, 143 n. 74,
 152 n. 15, 153 n. 15, 319 n. 6, 412
 Asztalos, 76 n. 12, 412
 Augustine, vii, 71, 74, 74 n. 8, 412

- Averroes, 11 n. 9, 12, 31, 32 n. 6,
65, 65 nn. 115–116, 66, 66 n. 118,
67–68, 68 nn. 124, 128, 69, 69 nn.
129–131, 133, 70–71, 110 n. 48–49,
111, 167, 412–413, 416, 419–420
- Avicenna, v, 31, 31 nn. 1, 3, 32, 32 nn.
5–7, 33, 37–38, 38 nn. 27, 29, 39,
39 nn. 30, 32, 40, 40 n. 33, 41, 41
nn. 39–40, 42, 42 nn. 42–43, 45, 43,
43 n. 47, 44, 44 nn. 48, 50, 52, 45,
45 n. 56, 46, 46 n. 58, 65–68, 68
n. 125, 69–71, 78, 78 nn. 18, 20, 23,
79 n. 24, 80, 85, 89, 89 n. 78, 91, 95
n. 102, 97, 97 n. 113, 107 n. 38, 151,
154, 161, 167, 169 n. 41, 205 n. 65,
206 n. 65, 215 n. 88, 233, 242, 330,
330 n. 48, 373, 413, 418
- Bäck, v, 31, 32 n. 5, 34 n. 14, 413
- Bacon, 46
- Badawī, 32 n. 6, 38 n. 27, 44 nn. 50,
52, 413
- Bakker, 74 n. 7, 295 n. 1, 413
- Bekker, 102 n. 15, 145
- Beuchot, 77 n. 15, 413
- Black, 413
- Bloch, 37 n. 25, 413
- Bodéüs, 148 n. 2, 149 nn. 5–6, 151
n. 11, 170 n. 43, 171 n. 45, 413
- Boethius, vii, 9 n. 1, 46, 73 n. 3, 76,
76 n. 12, 91, 91 n. 84, 92, 92 n. 91,
106–107, 107 n. 40, 108, 108 n. 43,
110, 110 n. 49, 111, 111 n. 51, 112
n. 54, 115, 148 n. 4, 150, 150 nn.
7–9, 163, 167–168, 173, 174 n. 48,
234, 242–243, 302, 317, 317 n. 2,
331, 331 n. 53, 339, 339 n. 74,
359 n. 4, 364, 364 n. 11, 372, 413,
425
- Bonaventura, 413
- Bonin, 80 n. 33, 413
- Bos, 74 n. 7, 84 n. 56, 94 n. 101, 119
n. 4, 121 n. 9, 129 n. 35, 302 n. 27,
303 nn. 29–30, 413
- Bouffartigue, 27 n. 71
- Boulnois, 413
- Breton, 129 n. 35, 414
- Brito, 119 n. 2, 147, 155, 155 n. 18,
156, 159, 159 n. 25, 162, 232, 381
n. 31, 414, 424
- Brown, 370 n. 2, 371 n. 3, 376 n. 15,
381 n. 31, 382 n. 31, 411, 414, 426
- Brunschwig, 145 n. 1, 148 n. 3, 414
- Buridan, vi, 6–7, 162, 163 n. 29, 295,
295 nn. 1, 4, 296, 296 nn. 6–7, 297,
297 nn. 7–8, 298, 298 nn. 10–12,
299, 299 n. 13, 300 nn. 14–15,
302–303, 303 n. 30, 304, 304 n. 33,
305, 305 nn. 35, 37–39, 306 nn.
39–40, 307, 308 nn. 43–45, 309,
309 n. 46, 310, 310 n. 48, 311–314,
314 n. 50, 315, 318, 380, 402, 406,
413–414, 416, 420, 422, 427
- Burley, 147, 160, 162, 164, 167, 167 nn.
36–38, 168, 168 n. 39, 171, 176, 177
n. 52, 297–298, 298 n. 10, 318, 318
nn. 4–5, 320, 322, 322 n. 19, 323,
323 n. 21, 324–325, 325 n. 29, 327,
331, 331 nn. 51, 55, 336–337, 337
n. 69, 339, 339 n. 77, 340, 342,
342 n. 91, 344, 344 n. 94, 346, 370,
370 n. 2, 371 n. 3, 372 nn. 4–5,
373, 373 n. 6, 374 n. 9, 376, 376 nn.
14–16, 377 n. 19, 378 nn. 19–21, 379
n. 21, 381–382, 382 n. 32, 383, 383
nn. 33–37, 384, 384 nn. 38–39, 385,
385 nn. 41–43, 386, 386 nn. 44–48,
387, 387 nn. 49, 51, 388, 393–394,
401–402, 406, 408, 414
- Burnet, 34, 34 n. 11, 414
- Burnyeat, 148 n. 3, 170 n. 42, 414
- Campo, 82 n. 46
- Caujolle-Zaslavsky, 339 n. 73, 414
- Cesalli, 167 n. 38, 345 n. 95, 382 n. 32,
393 n. 66, 414
- Chadwick, 317 n. 2, 414
- Charles, 1 n. 1, 32 n. 6, 48 n. 64, 100
n. 6, 101 n. 12, 104 n. 20, 115, 115
n. 63, 413–414, 421
- Chase, v, 2, 9, 11 n. 7, 13 n. 19, 16
n. 27, 19 n. 45, 27 n. 70, 28 n. 76,
44 n. 50, 45 nn. 53–54, 119 n. 1,
414, 418, 425, 429
- Chávarri, 77 n. 15, 414
- Chenu, 199 n. 46, 414
- Chiaradonna, 21 n. 52
- Cohen, 50 nn. 70–71, 62 n. 99, 301
n. 19, 414
- Confucius, 41
- Conti, vi, 7–8, 76, 76 n. 13, 77, 155
n. 18, 156 nn. 15, 19, 162 n. 28, 167
n. 36, 168 n. 40, 169 n. 41, 178 nn.
53–54, 183 n. 2, 317 n. 2, 318 nn. 3,
5, 319 nn. 5–9, 321 n. 16, 325 n. 30,
327 n. 34, 328 n. 41, 339 nn. 73–74,

- 77–78, 344 n. 94, 345 n. 95, 369,
372 n. 4, 374 n. 9, 375 n. 11, 376
n. 14, 377 nn. 17, 19, 378 n. 20,
382 n. 32, 392 n. 65, 393 nn. 65–66,
396 n. 73, 397 n. 78, 398 n. 79, 402
n. 87, 403 n. 89, 405 n. 91, 411,
414–415, 426, 430
Copleston, 31 n. 2, 415
Courcelle, 27 n. 73, 415
Cunningham, 415
- D'Ancona, 11 n. 9, 24 n. 62, 415, 424
Daiber, 44 n. 51, 415
Damascius, 26 n. 67
de Haas, 21 n. 52
de Libera, 80 n. 33, 83 n. 51, 319
n. 9, 369 n. 1, 399 n. 79, 416
de Mottoni, 100, 416
de Rijk, 180 n. 55, 188 n. 11, 234
n. 45, 416
Decorte, 205 n. 65, 206 n. 65, 416
Dekker, 298 n. 11, 416
Delisle, 102, 102 n. 16, 416
Denifle, 100 n. 2, 416
Dexippus, 9 n. 1
Dillon, 23 n. 56, 416
Donati, 99 n. 1, 416
Druart, 68 n. 128, 416
Duerlinger, 329 n. 43, 416
Duhem, 348 n. 5, 416
Dumont, 375 n. 11, 416
Dunlop, 68 n. 124, 416
Durand de St. Pourçain, 11, 103
- Ebbesen, 73 n. 4, 151 n. 13, 183 n. 1,
186 nn. 5, 7, 187, 187 n. 10, 209
n. 74, 213 n. 84, 218, 219 n. 103,
301 n. 19, 317 n. 2, 319 n. 8,
415–417
Elias, 9 n. 1
Emden, 319 n. 6, 381 n. 79, 417
Endress, 44 nn. 50–51, 417
Euclid, 11, 227 n. 25, 230 n. 32, 417
Eustratus, 80, 417
Evans, 34 n. 16, 319 n. 6, 412, 417
- Fischer, 53 n. 76, 417
Franceschini, 75 n. 10, 154 n. 16, 417,
419
Franciscus, 318, 318 n. 4, 381, 388,
388 n. 52, 389, 389 nn. 55–57, 390,
390 nn. 58–61, 391, 391 n. 62, 392,
392 nn. 63–64, 406, 417, 424
- Frede, 120 n. 5, 145 n. 1, 148 n. 2, 149,
417
Friedrich, 64 n. 112, 417
- Galluzzo, 171 n. 45, 417
Gaskin, 45 n. 55, 417
Gäje, 11 nn. 9–10, 12 nn. 12, 14–15,
44 nn. 50–51, 417
Gauthier, 101
Gellius, 41 n. 38, 417
Gerard of Nogent, 100, 103, 106–107,
116, 233
Gilbert of Poitiers, 83 n. 51
Giles, 147, 158, 158 nn. 23, 370, 205,
206 n. 65, 373 n. 7, 376, 392–394,
394 n. 65, 402, 417
Gilson, 28 nn. 77–78, 31 n. 2, 120 n. 7,
203 n. 58, 417
Glorieux, 100 n. 3, 417
Godefroid, 11
Gohlman, 39 n. 31, 417
Gorman, 417
Gracia, viii, 119 n. 2, 144 n. 76, 300
n. 14, 417, 420, 430–431
Greimas, 118 n. 68, 418
Gremper, 75 n. 9, 418
Grosseteste, 107 n. 38, 418
Grotz, 106 n. 35, 418
Guilelmus Dorotheus, 10
Gutas, 31 n. 1, 38, 38 nn. 27–29, 39
nn. 30, 32, 40, 40 n. 33, 41 nn.
39–40, 42 nn. 42–43, 44 nn. 51–52,
45, 45 n. 56, 46 n. 58, 418
Guthrie, 34, 34 n. 11, 418
- Hadot, Ilsetraut, 18 n. 43, 27 n. 74, 148
n. 4, 339 n. 73, 418–419, 421
Hadot, Pierre, 20 n. 50, 24, 24 n. 59,
27, 27 n. 70, 425
Hall, vi, 6–7, 105 n. 32, 295, 426, 430
Hamesse, 107 n. 39, 108 n. 42, 110
n. 46, 113 n. 57, 359 n. 3, 362 nn.
8–9, 364 n. 12, 418
Hankey, 11 n. 7, 13, 13 nn. 15, 26, 17,
17 n. 33, 20, 20 nn. 49–51, 21, 23,
23 n. 58, 24 n. 61, 25 nn. 63, 66, 26,
26 n. 68, 418
Hase, 46 n. 58, 418
Henle, 25 n. 65, 418
Henninger, 201 n. 51, 202 n. 52, 205,
206 n. 65, 210 n. 77, 418
Henry of Ghent, 5, 11, 198, 198 n. 43,
201, 201 n. 51, 202 nn. 52, 55, 203,

- 203 n. 57, 205–206, 206 n. 65, 209,
210 n. 77, 212, 217, 239, 253, 318,
318 n. 4, 370, 375, 375 n. 10, 376,
406, 408, 416, 418–419, 423, 427,
430–431
Henry, D. P., 419
Hervaeus, 381 n. 31, 388–389, 392,
411, 419, 423–424
Hintikka, 70, 70 n. 134, 419
Hoffmann, 9 n. 1, 18 n. 43, 418–419,
421
Honoratus, 114 n. 61, 419
Hourani, 65 n. 116, 66 n. 117, 68
n. 125, 69 n. 133, 419
Hugonnard-Roché, 12 n. 14, 419
Hume, 7, 347, 352, 352 n. 16, 356, 419
Ḥunayn Ishāq, 38, 43
- Iamblichus, 14, 20, 20 n. 50, 21–23, 23
n. 56, 26, 26 n. 67, 27, 27 nn. 69,
72–73, 416
Ivry, 69 n. 131, 419
- Jacobus de Placentia, 318 n. 5, 406, 419
Jacques de Thérines, 11
James of Viterbo, 11
Jean Quidort, 11
Johannes Pagus, 74, 153, 154 n. 16,
233, 419
John of Seccheville, 104
Jordan, 9 n. 2, 419
- Kenny, 393 n. 66, 411, 416, 419–420,
423, 425, 427
Kilwardby, 74
King, 298 n. 12, 299, 299 n. 13, 300
n. 14, 305 n. 37, 308, 318 n. 5,
375 n. 11, 420
Kirk, 34
Klima, 131 n. 43, 163 n. 30, 295, 295
n. 4, 296 n. 6, 296 n. 8, 299 n. 13,
303, 305, 305 nn. 34–35, 306 n. 39,
308, 308 n. 45, 309 n. 46, 310 n. 47,
420
Knudsen, 261 n. 5, 262 n. 8, 420
Kogan, 68 n. 128, 420
Kretzmann, 78 n. 19, 95 n. 102, 111
n. 50, 121 n. 10, 210 n. 77, 261 nn.
5–6, 297 n. 9, 301, 380 n. 27,
411–412, 416, 420, 423, 427
- Laarmann, 209 n. 75, 420
Lafleur, 75 n. 10, 152 n. 15, 420
- Leaman, 12 n. 16, 31 n. 3, 46 n. 57, 65
n. 115, 66 n. 118, 411, 414, 420, 426
Leff, 348 n. 7, 420
Lewry, 75 n. 10, 76 n. 13, 83 n. 51,
96 n. 107, 97 n. 112, 104, 104 n. 23,
152 n. 15, 155 n. 18, 183 n. 2, 233,
234 n. 43, 318 n. 3, 372 n. 4,
419–420, 426
Lohr, 100 n. 6, 101, 101 n. 12, 104
n. 20, 105 n. 30, 115, 115 n. 63, 421
Lombard, 78
Lorenz, 105 n. 33, 347 n. 2, 421
Luna, 9 n. 1, 45 n. 54, 49 n. 66, 51
n. 72, 52 n. 73, 53 n. 77, 54 n. 79,
339, 418, 421
- Mabādi, 41 n. 39
Madkour, 40 n. 36, 97 n. 113, 151
n. 11, 421
Maimonides, 41, 65
Majercik, 24 nn. 59–60, 27 n. 71, 421
Marenbon, 151 n. 10, 421
Markowski, 101 n. 8, 105 n. 28, 298 nn.
10–11, 421
Marmo, 186 n. 5, 421
Marmura, 78 n. 20, 421
Martin of Dacia, 5, 214, 214 n. 85,
222, 232–233, 233 n. 41, 234 n. 46,
235, 240, 252, 259, 421
Matthen, 300 n. 18, 421
Maximus the Confessor, 24 n. 62
McGee, 54 n. 79, 421
McGrade, 421
McHardy, 317 n. 6, 421
McInerny, 77 n. 15, 79 n. 27, 422
McMahon, 76 n. 11, 119 nn. 2, 4, 422
Meyer, 73 n. 4, 422
Mill, 181, 181 n. 56, 422
Milverley, 162
Minio-Paluello, 10 nn. 4–5, 83 n. 52, 90
n. 81, 150 n. 9, 422
Moody, 298 n. 10, 422
Moraux, 170 n. 42, 422
Moravcsik, 300, 301 n. 18, 422
Muckle, 107 n. 38, 108 n. 41, 422
- Najjar, 17 n. 36, 19, 411
Narcy, 50 n. 70, 422
Neoplatonic, 9 n. 1, 11, 11 n. 7, 13,
13 n. 18, 15 n. 24, 16, 18, 19 n. 45,
20–21, 23–25, 27, 32 n. 5, 66, 146,
148–149, 170, 170 n. 42, 180, 339
n. 73, 372–373, 413, 418

- Neoplatonist, 13, 15, 24 n. 61, 27, 31, 36, 38, 80, 92, 339, 373
- Newton, v, 5, 73 n. 1, 119 n. 2, 144 n. 76, 221, 222 n. 4, 259, 277, 288 n. 11, 354, 417, 422, 430
- Nicholas of Paris, 74, 233
- Normore, 297 n. 9, 305 n. 37, 422
- Noya, 74 n. 6, 81 n. 43
- Nuchelmans, 166 n. 34, 422
- Nussbaum, 34 n. 15, 35, 35 nn. 17, 20, 422–423, 427
- O'Brian, 254 n. 95, 422
- O'Meara, 14 n. 22, 120 n. 5, 417, 422
- Oberman, 348 n. 6, 422
- Ockham, vii, 71, 147, 160, 162–163, 163 n. 30, 164, 164 n. 31, 165, 165 nn. 32–33, 166, 166 nn. 34–35, 167, 171, 175–176, 176 nn. 50–51, 180, 295, 297 n. 9, 298, 298 n. 10, 305, 306 n. 39, 308 n. 45, 423
- Olivi, 147, 160, 161 n. 27, 162, 406, 423
- Olympiodorus, 9 n. 1, 338
- Ottaviano, 75 n. 10, 423
- Ottman, 298 n. 10, 423
- Owen, G. E. L., 35, 35 n. 17, 423
- Owens, Joseph, 137, 138 n. 59, 170 n. 43, 423
- Panaccio, 163 n. 30, 380 nn. 27, 29, 423
- Pasnau, 120 n. 7, 380 n. 27, 423
- Pattin, 10 nn. 3–6, 11 n. 8, 423
- Paul of Genezano, 10 n. 5
- Pengybull, 162
- Perler, 381 n. 31, 423
- Perreiah, 398 n. 79, 423
- Perrod, 100, 100 n. 3, 423
- Peter of Auvergne, 11, 104 n. 24, 105 n. 29, 111 n. 50, 155, 155 n. 18, 183 n. 2, 189, 189 n. 14, 195, 196 n. 37, 197 n. 41, 198, 214, 214 n. 87, 215 nn. 88–89, 91, 232, 234 n. 44, 235, 235 n. 47, 239, 241 n. 61, 252, 412, 423
- Peter of Saint-Amour, 100–103, 106, 110, 115–116, 118
- Peter of Spain, 180, 180 n. 55, 302, 303 n. 28
- Peters, 12 n. 11, 43 n. 47, 44 n. 51, 423
- Philoponus, 9 n. 1, 44 n. 52
- Pickavé, v, 5, 183, 221, 221 n. 2, 237 n. 50, 423, 430
- Piltz, 347 n. 3, 423
- Pinborg, 104 n. 27, 105, 105 n. 31, 111 n. 50, 223 n. 7, 261 n. 6, 262, 381, 412, 416, 423–424
- Pini, v–vi, 76, 76 n. 14, 77 n. 15, 79 n. 25, 95 n. 102, 119 n. 3, 121 n. 9, 129 n. 35, 131 n. 43, 144 n. 76, 145, 152, 155 n. 17, 156 n. 19, 160 n. 26, 166 n. 34, 183 n. 1, 185, 189 n. 12, 192 n. 23, 194 n. 29, 197 n. 40, 215 n. 89, 216, 216 n. 93, 238 n. 54, 239 nn. 55–56, 240 n. 60, 243, 243 n. 66, 244 n. 72, 247 n. 80, 248–249, 249 n. 83, 250–251, 251 n. 92, 253 n. 94, 254, 254 n. 98, 258 n. 105, 259–261, 261 n. 4, 262, 262 nn. 10–12, 263–264, 264 n. 18, 265, 265 n. 20, 266–268, 273–275, 301–302, 318 n. 5, 424
- Plato, 13–15, 15 n. 24, 16–17, 17 nn. 34, 36, 20, 23, 25–26, 27 n. 72, 28, 34, 36, 41, 43, 67, 69–70, 83, 122, 194, 205, 207, 207 n. 71, 265, 299, 299 n. 13, 301, 301 n. 22, 309, 313, 387–388, 411
- Platonism, vii
- Platonist, 25, 25 n. 63
- Plotinus, 21, 21 n. 52, 22–23, 25, 26 n. 67, 31, 36, 38, 42, 149
- Porphyry, vii, 9 n. 1, 13–15, 15 n. 23, 17 nn. 34–35, 19 n. 45, 21, 21 n. 53, 22–23, 23 n. 56, 24, 24 n. 59, 25–26, 26 n. 67, 27, 27 n. 71, 28, 28 n. 76, 32, 40, 43 n. 47, 44 n. 50, 46, 66, 73 n. 3, 74 n. 7, 77, 86, 90, 94 n. 101, 95–96, 96 n. 107, 100, 145, 149–150, 167–168, 170 n. 42, 178, 180, 213, 223 n. 6, 225, 229, 234, 242, 245, 248 n. 82, 249 n. 86, 300 n. 18, 301 n. 20, 302, 342, 369, 414, 421, 424, 427
- Porro, 198 n. 43, 412, 424
- Powers, 64, 64 n. 113, 424
- Presocratics, 11
- Priscianus, 361 n. 7, 424
- Proclus, 14, 23–24, 24 n. 62, 25, 25 n. 66, 26 n. 67, 27 nn. 72–73, 31, 38, 424
- Pseudo-Dionysius, 24, 25 n. 66
- Pseudo-Gilbert of Poitiers, 424
- Pythagorean, 16

- Quine, 35
- Rashed, 24 n. 62, 424
- Raven, 34
- Reeve, 35 n. 21, 424
- Rescher, 68 nn. 125, 127, 424
- Robert Kilwardby, 75 n. 10, 96 n. 107, 97 n. 112, 152, 152 n. 15, 419
- Robertus Anglicus, 104 n. 23, 152, 420
- Robson, 181 n. 56, 393 n. 66, 422, 424
- Rode, 388 n. 52, 424
- Ross, 34, 90 n. 81, 298 n. 10
- Ruland, 44 n. 50, 424
- Sabra, 79 n. 24, 97 n. 113, 424
- Santos Noya, 411, 424
- Scheu, 129 n. 35, 424
- Schmidt, 186 n. 5, 223 nn. 6–7, 226, 226 n. 18, 227, 227 n. 22, 228 n. 27, 229, 229 n. 31, 233 n. 42, 424
- Schofield, 34
- Schönberger, 206 n. 65, 425
- Scotus, vi, viii, 10 n. 5, 11, 71, 76 n. 14, 77 n. 15, 79, 79 n. 25, 84 n. 56, 94 n. 101, 95 n. 102, 104 n. 24, 105, 105 n. 29, 119 nn. 3–4, 121 n. 9, 129 n. 35, 131 n. 43, 147, 152, 155, 155 n. 18, 156, 158, 158 n. 23, 159–160, 160 n. 26, 162, 165, 166 n. 34, 171, 173–174, 174 n. 49, 175, 183 n. 1, 184–185, 189 n. 12, 192, 194, 197 n. 40, 215 n. 89, 216 n. 93, 221, 223, 223 n. 6, 225, 229, 231–232, 238 n. 54, 239, 239 n. 55, 240 n. 60, 241–243, 243 n. 66, 244, 244 n. 72, 245, 245 n. 75, 246–247, 247 n. 80, 249, 249 nn. 83, 85, 250–252, 253 n. 94, 254, 254 nn. 95, 98, 255–257, 258 n. 105, 259–260, 260 n. 2, 261–264, 264 nn. 16, 19, 265, 265 n. 22, 266–267, 267 n. 27, 268–269, 269 n. 28, 270, 270 n. 30, 271, 271 n. 33, 272–274, 297, 301 n. 20, 302, 318, 321, 342, 360, 370, 372–373, 373 n. 7, 374, 374 n. 8, 375, 375 nn. 11–13, 376, 378 n. 19, 382, 392, 399, 402, 406, 408, 413, 419, 424
- Segonds, 27 nn. 72–73
- Senko, 102, 102 n. 17, 104 nn. 21–22, 425
- Sharpe, 162, 162 n. 28
- Shiel, 317 n. 2, 425
- Shields, 63, 63 nn. 106–107, 64 n. 109, 120 n. 7, 423–424
- Siger of Brabant, 11, 413
- Siger of Courtrai, 4, 11, 100, 103–104, 106, 109–110, 113, 115–116, 415
- Simon, v, 69 n. 129, 80 n. 34, 183–185, 185 n. 3, 186 nn. 5–6, 187, 187 n. 10, 188, 188 n. 11, 189, 189 n. 12, 190, 190 n. 15, 191, 191 n. 17, 192, 192 n. 21, 193, 193 n. 26, 194, 194 nn. 27, 29, 195, 197, 197 n. 40, 198, 198 n. 42, 199, 199 n. 45, 200, 200 nn. 47, 49, 201, 206–207, 207 n. 69, 208–213, 213 n. 84, 215–218, 218 n. 99, 219–220, 232, 236–237, 237 n. 50, 238, 238 n. 54, 239, 239 nn. 55–56, 240, 240 n. 58, 252, 318, 318 n. 4, 322, 322 n. 18, 339, 339 n. 76, 370, 372–373, 373 n. 7, 374 nn. 8–9, 377, 406, 413, 425
- Simplicius, v, 2, 9, 9 n. 1, 10, 10 nn. 3, 5, 11, 11 nn. 7–9, 12, 12 n. 12, 13, 13 nn. 17–20, 14–15, 15 n. 26, 16, 16 nn. 27–28, 17, 17 n. 31, 18, 18 n. 43, 19–21, 23, 23 nn. 56–57, 24 n. 61, 25–26, 26 n. 67, 27, 27 n. 74, 29, 36 n. 22, 40 n. 36, 41 n. 38, 44, 44 nn. 49–50, 45, 45 nn. 53–55, 48, 48 n. 65, 49–51, 51 n. 72, 52–54, 54 n. 79, 56, 59, 60 n. 98, 66, 119, 119 n. 2, 148 n. 4, 167, 183, 221, 373, 414, 417–419, 421, 423, 425, 429
- Socrates, 27 n. 70, 86, 122, 124–129, 129 n. 35, 131, 133–134, 137–138, 138 n. 60, 143, 155, 205, 207, 207 n. 71, 208, 208 n. 73, 225–226, 228, 265–266, 268, 296, 298, 299 n. 13, 304, 306, 306 n. 40, 307, 309–311, 313, 315, 328–329, 334, 336, 344, 346, 374, 374 n. 9, 377, 387, 396–397, 400, 403, 418
- Solmsen, 148 n. 4, 150 n. 7, 425
- Sophonias, 48 n. 65
- Sosigenes, 68
- Spade, 163 n. 30, 269 n. 28, 319 n. 6, 380 n. 27, 393 n. 66, 412, 420, 423, 425
- Stehkämper, 74 n. 6, 425
- Stoic, 23, 66, 146, 148, 180
- Strange, 21 n. 52, 45 n. 54, 150 n. 7, 301 n. 20, 302 n. 25, 424–425
- Stump, 120 n. 7, 121 n. 10, 420, 425

- Sutton, 155, 155 n. 18, 318 n. 3, 321
n. 16, 372 n. 4, 374 n. 9, 377 n. 19,
378 n. 20, 426
Syrianus, 26 n. 67, 49
Szlezák, 44 n. 49, 425
- Tabarroni, 100, 100 n. 5, 101, 101 nn.
9, 13, 102, 116 n. 64, 319 n. 5, 414,
425
Tardieu, 24 n. 59, 28, 425
Tarteys, 162, 382, 398 n. 79, 399 nn.
80–81, 400, 400 n. 82, 401
Taylor, 34, 34 n. 11, 425
Themistius, 25, 42, 44 n. 52, 66
Theophrastus, 70
Thomas of Erfurt, 100, 103, 105, 105
nn. 32, 34, 106, 116, 412, 426
Thomas of Strasbourg, 11
Thomas Sutton, 11, 76 n. 13, 155, 155
nn. 18–19, 183 n. 2, 318 n. 3, 321,
321 n. 16, 370, 372 nn. 4–5, 374
n. 9, 377 n. 19, 378 n. 20, 426
Tomarchio, 130 n. 38, 426
Torrell, 9 n. 2, 426
Tremblay, v, 3, 73, 73 n. 1, 74 n. 5, 80
n. 30, 246 n. 78, 426, 431
- Urvoy, 31 n. 3, 426
- Vallat, 12, 13 n. 18, 14 n. 21, 15 nn.
24–25, 17, 17 nn. 36–37, 19, 19 nn.
46–48, 25 nn. 64, 66, 426
Van den Bergh, 67 nn. 119, 121, 68 nn.
122–123, 69 nn. 129–130, 132
van der Helm, 84 n. 56, 119 n. 4, 121
n. 9, 129 n. 35, 413
Van Steenberghe, 31 n. 2, 151 n. 12,
426
Verhaak, 104, 104 n. 26, 105 n. 30,
106, 106 n. 36, 109 n. 45, 415, 426
Versor, 74 n. 7, 94 n. 101
Victorinus, 24 n. 59, 418, 425
Vittorini, 319 n. 5, 385 n. 32, 426
von Perger, 322 n. 19, 426
- Wagner, 49 n. 68, 426
Wallace, 73 n. 2, 426
- Wallerand, 104 n. 25, 426
Walter Burley, 4, 147, 319 n. 5, 322
n. 19, 339 n. 77, 344 n. 94, 370 n. 2,
376 n. 15, 382 n. 32, 414–415, 423,
426
Walton, 121 n. 10, 139 n. 65, 427
Walzer, 17 nn. 34–35, 28 n. 76, 427
Washell, 77 n. 15, 427
Weinberg, 44 n. 50, 427
Whelpdale, 162, 382, 398 n. 79, 399
nn. 80–81, 401
Wians, 34 n. 15, 70 n. 134, 419, 427
Wieland, 80 n. 33, 427
William of Moerbeke, 9
William of Saint-Amour, 100
Wippel, 120–121, 121 n. 9, 122, 122
n. 12, 123, 123 n. 17, 124–125, 125
n. 21, 127–129, 129 n. 35, 203 n. 58,
205 n. 67, 210 n. 77, 297, 321 n. 15,
375 n. 10, 427
Wlodek, 80 n. 33, 82 n. 46, 427
Wolter, 249 n. 85, 254 n. 95, 419, 427
Wood, 104 n. 24, 105 n. 29, 267 n. 27,
298 n. 10, 419, 423
Wright, 53 n. 76, 427
Wyclif, 7, 319, 319 nn. 6–7, 321, 321
n. 13, 323, 323 n. 22, 324–325, 325
n. 30, 327–328, 328 n. 40, 329, 331,
331 n. 57, 332 n. 59, 336, 339, 339
n. 78, 340, 340 n. 82, 344–345, 345
n. 95, 346, 376 n. 14, 380, 382, 392,
392 n. 65, 393, 393 nn. 66–67, 394,
394 nn. 68–69, 395, 395 nn. 70–74,
396, 396 nn. 72–75, 397, 397 nn.
76–78, 398 n. 79, 399–401, 401 n.
84, 402–404, 406, 414–415, 419, 421,
424–425, 427
- Zedler, 69 n. 129, 427
Zeno, 34
Zimmermann, 73 n. 4, 80 n. 33, 191
n. 17, 199 n. 46, 427
Zupko, 105 n. 33, 163 n. 29, 295, 295
n. 1, 299, 300 n. 15, 303 n. 30, 305
n. 38, 413, 420, 427

Brill's Companions to the Christian Tradition

Volumes deal with persons, movements, schools and genres in medieval and early modern Christian life, thought and practice. Written by the foremost specialists in the respective fields, they aim to provide full balanced accounts at an advanced level, as well as synthesis of debate and the state of scholarship in 8-15 substantial chapters. Volumes are in English (contributions from continental scholars are translated). 2-3 volumes of 350-600 pages will be published each year. The series is expected to comprise 20-30 volumes.

1. Schabel, C. (ed.). *Theological Quodlibeta in the Middle Ages*. The Thirteenth Century. 2006. ISBN 978 90 04 12333 5
2. Cox, V. & J.O. Ward (eds.). *The Rhetoric of Cicero in Its Medieval and Early Renaissance Commentary Tradition*. 2006. ISBN 978 90 04 13177 4
3. McGuire, B.P. (ed.). *A Companion to Jean Gerson*. 2006. ISBN 978 90 04 15009 6
4. Levy, I.C. (ed.). *A Companion to John Wyclif*. Late Medieval Theologian. 2006. ISBN 978 90 04 15007 2
5. Swanson, R.N. (ed.). *Promissory Notes on the Treasury of Merits*. Indulgences in Late Medieval Europe. 2006. ISBN 978 90 04 15287 8
6. Stayer, J.M. & J.D. Roth (eds.). *A Companion to Anabaptism and Spiritualism, 1521-1700*. 2006. ISBN 978 90 04 15402 5
7. Schabel, C. (ed.). *Theological Quodlibeta in the Middle Ages*. The Fourteenth Century. 2007. ISBN 978 90 04 16288 4
8. Kirby, T. (ed.). *A Companion to Richard Hooker*. With a Foreword by R. Williams. 2008. ISBN 978 90 04 16534 2
9. Rummel, E. (ed.). *Biblical Humanism and Scholasticism in the Age of Erasmus*. 2008. ISBN 978 90 04 14573 3
10. Newton, L.A. (ed.). *Medieval Commentaries on Aristotle's Categories*. 2008. ISBN 978 90 04 16752 0
11. Kolb, R. (ed.). *Lutheran Ecclesiastical Culture, 1550-1675*. 2008. ISBN 978 90 04 16641 7